Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metalanguage (was Delta Existential Graphs
Jon, I appreciate your comments, even though they disagree with what I believe Peirce intended. But I can see that I need to respond to the questions you raise in the article I'm writing. JAS> In the RLT example, what is written outside the "lightly drawn oval" does not govern what is written inside the oval, at least not in the same sense. After all, what is written outside the oval is not a proposition at all. It most certainly is a proposition. Outside the oval, there is a line of identity attached to a verb phrase "is much to be wished." That forms a complete sentence "X is something to be wished." The other end of the line is attached to the oval which contains the proposition that is to be wished. To express the complete graph, Peirce introduced the word 'that' to create the complete sentence "That you are a good girl is much to be wished." You could express the same point in the notation of R514. In the margin, you write an EG that states "The proposition stated below is much to be wished," Inside the content circled in red, you write "You are a good girl." As for my description in the slides presented in 2020, I was not lecturing to Peirce scholars. I started with a summary of the EG notation of 1911. Then slide 30 is stated in the terms introduced in slides15, 16, 17... Therefore, my later discussion is stated in those terms. JAS> the sole reason that Peirce expresses for needing to add a Delta part to EGs is "in order to deal with modals," which for him are propositions involving possibility and necessity. Please do not make any assumptions about what Peirce did or did not intend. As you know, Peirce had the most complete collection of MSS on medieval logic in the Boston area -- he had more than the Harvard libraries. Among the authors were logicians call the "Modistae". They had a huge number of modes, including "written in Holy Scriptures". We don't know exactly what Peirce read, but It's quite likely that he had read something by or about them. And we don't know what he thought about them. In any case, such modes may be possible, actual, or necessary. The additional information, such as "written in Holy scriptures" or "is much to be wished" is descriptive, but it's independent of the state of those worlds as possible, actual, or necessary. As more examples, look at the three ways of describing the diagrams in slide 31. To start, let's assume that Pierre is sitting in the actual world. The content of the thought balloons may be actual or possible. His thoughts about them, such as wishing or hoping, add information, but they don't change their status as actual or possible. John From: "Jon Alan Schmidt" John, List: JFS: The word 'paper' is the same word that he used in R514 for a paper with postulates in the margin that govern the graphs inside a red line. Actually, Peirce does not use the word "paper" in the "red pencil" passage of R 514, he uses the word "sheet." However, this is just a quibble--I now recognize that every individual page in the R L376 approach could have a red line drawn just inside its edges, with different postulates in its margin and thus different graphs within its red line. I also heartily agree that the postulates in the margin govern the graphs inside the red line, which is why I continue to disagree with this subsequent statement. JFS: But the notation of RLT in 1898 is logically equivalent--in the sense that any "postulates" or "special understandings" could be specified in either form with exactly the same implications for the "papers" of the phemic sheet. In the RLT example, what is written outside the "lightly drawn oval" does not govern what is written inside the oval, at least not in the same sense. After all, what is written outside the oval is not a proposition at all, so it cannot be a postulate or express a special understanding between the utterer and interpreter. It is merely a rheme, and its blank is filled by the proposition written inside the oval. As far as I know, this is a completely different notation from anything that Peirce presents in his other writings about EGs, and he uses it in RLT only as a step toward explaining the cut for negation. JFS: I strongly recommend three slides--29, 30, and 31. If you don't read all (or even any) of the others, please look at the diagrams and read the text of those three. I already did so, after you provided the link in your earlier post. I agree that the RLT example is consistent with what you say about metalanguage, but it is still not equivalent to the "red pencil" operation in R 514 nor the "many papers" concept in R L376. Moreover, it is misleading to state on slide 30, "A shaded oval negates the nested EG. Without shading, the EG expresses a proposition that is neither asserted nor negated." As you know very well, Peirce did not introduce shading for negation until 1911. Up
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Metalanguage (was Delta Existential Graphs
John, List: JFS: The word 'paper' is the same word that he used in R514 for a paper with postulates in the margin that govern the graphs inside a red line. Actually, Peirce *does not* use the word "paper" in the "red pencil" passage of R 514, he uses the word "sheet." However, this is just a quibble--I now recognize that every individual page in the R L376 approach could have a red line drawn just inside its edges, with different postulates in its margin and thus different graphs within its red line. I also heartily agree that the postulates in the margin *govern *the graphs inside the red line, which is why I continue to disagree with this subsequent statement. JFS: But the notation of RLT in 1898 is logically equivalent--in the sense that any "postulates" or "special understandings" could be specified in either form with exactly the same implications for the "papers" of the phemic sheet. In the RLT example, what is written outside the "lightly drawn oval" *does not* govern what is written inside the oval, at least not in the same sense. After all, what is written outside the oval is not a *proposition *at all, so it cannot be a postulate or express a special understanding between the utterer and interpreter. It is merely a *rheme*, and its blank is filled by the proposition written inside the oval. As far as I know, this is a *completely different* notation from anything that Peirce presents in his other writings about EGs, and he uses it in RLT only as a step toward explaining the cut for negation. JFS: I strongly recommend three slides--29, 30, and 31. If you don't read all (or even any) of the others, please look at the diagrams and read the text of those three. I already did so, after you provided the link in your earlier post. I agree that the RLT example is consistent with what you say about metalanguage, but it is still *not *equivalent to the "red pencil" operation in R 514 nor the "many papers" concept in R L376. Moreover, it is misleading to state on slide 30, "A shaded oval negates the nested EG. Without shading, the EG expresses a proposition that is neither asserted nor negated." As you know very well, Peirce did not introduce shading for negation until 1911. Up until then, *any *oval--except the one-of-a-kind RLT example, where a rheme is attached to it--negates the nested EG. Again, the sole reason that Peirce expresses for needing to add a Delta part to EGs is "in order to deal with modals," which for him are propositions involving possibility and necessity. The synthesis that I am now contemplating would satisfy that one criterion by combining the graphs scribed in R 339:[340r] with the "red pencil" improvement in R 514 and the "many papers" concept in R L376. Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Sat, Feb 24, 2024 at 6:12 PM John F Sowa wrote: > Jon, List, > > Please note the phrase "a special understanding between utterer and > interpreter" in the excerpt below. And note that different "papers" of the > phemic sheet may have different special understandings. Although Peirce > did not coin the term 'metalanguage', that is the word that has been used > for such texts from the 1930s to today. Since the word 'metalanguage' is > far more widely used than 'special understandings', Peirce's ethics of > terminology would require us to adopt that term for the special > understandings that determine the interpretation of any paper of the phemic > sheet. > > The word 'paper' is the same word that he used in R514 for a paper with > postulates in the margin that govern the graphs inside a red line. Note > that R514 also contains a draft of the EG specifications that he uses in > every MS from June 1911 to November 1913. It is quite likely that Peirce > would have used the R514 conventions to specify the metalanguage. Since he > didn't finish L376, we can only guess what notation he might have chosen > for his "papers". The best guess is the notation for "papers" in R514. > But the notation of RLT in 1898 is logically equivalent -- in the sense > that any "postulates" or "special understandings" could be specified in > either form with exactly the same implications for the "papers" of the > phemic sheet. > > In my previous notes, I included many references, each of which includes > many more references. For simplicity, I recommend the slides of > https://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf starting at slide 14, which begins with > a short review of EG notation and continues with applications of EGs for > representing the semantics of natural languages. > > I strongly recommend three slides -- 29, 30, and 31. If you don't read > all (or even any) of the others, please look at the diagrams and read the > text of those three. Slide 31 shows how different metalanguage can state > whether a diagram is interpreted as actual (a fact in current time),
[PEIRCE-L] Metalanguage (was Delta Existential Graphs
Jon, List, Please note the phrase "a special understanding between utterer and interpreter" in the excerpt below. And note that different "papers" of the phemic sheet may have different special understandings. Although Peirce did not coin the term 'metalanguage', that is the word that has been used for such texts from the 1930s to today. Since the word 'metalanguage' is far more widely used than 'special understandings', Peirce's ethics of terminology would require us to adopt that term for the special understandings that determine the interpretation of any paper of the phemic sheet. The word 'paper' is the same word that he used in R514 for a paper with postulates in the margin that govern the graphs inside a red line. Note that R514 also contains a draft of the EG specifications that he uses in every MS from June 1911 to November 1913. It is quite likely that Peirce would have used the R514 conventions to specify the metalanguage. Since he didn't finish L376, we can only guess what notation he might have chosen for his "papers". The best guess is the notation for "papers" in R514. But the notation of RLT in 1898 is logically equivalent -- in the sense that any "postulates" or "special understandings" could be specified in either form with exactly the same implications for the "papers" of the phemic sheet. In my previous notes, I included many references, each of which includes many more references. For simplicity, I recommend the slides of https://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf starting at slide 14, which begins with a short review of EG notation and continues with applications of EGs for representing the semantics of natural languages. I strongly recommend three slides -- 29, 30, and 31. If you don't read all (or even any) of the others, please look at the diagrams and read the text of those three. Slide 31 shows how different metalanguage can state whether a diagram is interpreted as actual (a fact in current time), possible (modal), or wished (another kind of modality that may also be called intentional). In slide 31, the diagram is drawn as a kind of cartoon. But it could also have been drawn as an EG on a phemic sheet. In fact, the commentary about the cartoon in slide 31 could also have been stated in three different "papers" of a phemic sheet. That would be a good illustration of what Peirce was saying in L376. In fact, note Peirce's own example of the sentence "Sometimes it snows." That's a good example by somebody who is writing a letter in December. One paper might be actual at one time, other papers might be possible at other times, and some paper might be wished for Christmas. He may have been laying out a large phemic sheet of such papers when he slipped. Nobody knows. But it's possible. John _ From L376: All thought, which is the process of forming, under self-control, an intellectual habit, requires two functionaries; an utterer and an interpreter, and though these two functionaries may live in one brain, they are nevertheless two. In order to distinguish the actual performance of an assertion, though it be altogether a mental act, from a mere representation or appearance, the difference between a mere idea jotted down on a bit of paper, from an affidavit made before a notary, for which the utterer is substantially responsible,|I provide my system with a phemic sheet, which is a surface upon which the utterer and interpreter will, by force of a voluntary and actually contracted habit, recognize that whatever is scribed upon it and is interpretable as an assertion is to be recognized as an assertion, although it may refer to a mere idea as its subject. If "snows" is scribed upon the Phemic Sheet, it asserts that in the universe to which a special understanding between utterer and interpreter has made the special part of the phemic sheet on which it is scribed to relate, it sometime does snow. For they two may conceive that the "phemic sheet" embraces many papers, so that one part of it is before the common attention at one time and another part at another, and that actual conventions between them equivalent to scribed graphs make some of those pieces relate to one subject and part to another. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
Re: [PEIRCE-L] Delta Existential Graphs (was The Proper Way in Logic)
John, List: I had an epiphany of sorts while I was initially drafting this reply. For now, I will just respond to a few specific points, but in a later post, I intend to propose a way forward for Delta EGs that could be truly collaborative instead of competitive--both/and, not either/or. JFS: Since the content of L376 is very different from his sources and from his own writings before and after, that provides very little guidance. That's why nobody was able to interpret L376 to determine what Peirce wrote and how he intended to use what he was specifying. The content of R L376 is perfectly consistent with Peirce's other writings about EGs. The only reason why nobody has been able to determine definitively what he had in mind for Delta is because the manuscript breaks off before he gets around to distinguishing it from the other parts by explaining how it deals with modals. JFS: The second way of interpreting Peirce is to look backwards from the developments in logic in the century or more after Peirce and interpreting what he wrote in comparison to ALL developments in the same or similar subjects. The words 'metalanguage' and 'metalogic' were coined by Tarski and Carnap a few decades after Peirce died. This is not so much an alternative interpretation of Peirce as a recognition of his prescience with respect to subsequent developments in logic. His 1898 example indeed anticipates metalanguage and metalogic, "assert[ing] something about a proposition without asserting the proposition itself" (RLT 151). However, I still see nothing in R 514 nor in R L376 about *modal *applications of these concepts, only their *classical *application to a conditional proposition--it does not assert the antecedent itself, only that *if *it is true, then the consequent is *also *true. From that standpoint, ordinary Alpha EGs are metalogical because they often assert propositions about propositions. JFS: But the that-operator in RLT (1898) can support the methods they used for metalanguage. It is logically identical to writing postulates in the margin of a paper in R514 (June 1911) and to the "papers" of a phemic sheet in L376 (December 1911). The that-operator in RLT is *not* "logically identical to" the "red pencil" improvement in R 514, nor the "many papers" remark in R L376. In fact, Peirce's very next example in RLT is "That you are a good girl is false," leading directly to the convention that enclosing a proposition within "a lightly drawn oval," such that it "is merely fenced off from the field of assertion without any assertion being explicitly made concerning it," is "an elliptical [no pun intended?] way of saying that it is false" (RLT 151-152). What Peirce describes in R 514 is converting the entire sheet into nested cuts, thus asserting a conditional proposition. The margin is the outer close (antecedent), where "whatever is scribed is merely asserted to be possible," such as mathematical postulates. The area within the red line is the inner close (consequent), where whatever is scribed follows necessarily from what is in the margin, such as mathematical theorems. What Peirce describes in R L376 is treating the "many papers" as different portions of the phemic sheet to which the utterer and interpreter give their "common attention" at different times, where "some of those pieces relate to one subject and part to another." In other words, each individual page represents a different subuniverse of discourse within the overall universe of discourse. However, what occurred to me today is that the latter two approaches are compatible *with each other*. Again, I expect to say a lot more about this in the near future. JFS: What he [Peirce] wrote about modals in 1903 represents his views about modals in 1903. But 1903 was the end of the line for earlier projects, especially lexicography (Century & Baldwin dictionaries) and Minute Logic (rejection). Peirce still limits modal propositions to those asserting possibility or necessity several years later, not long before he writes the letter to Risteen. CSP: Now assertions differ in *modality*,--a term which must be explained at once. It refers to the different relations there may be between the *affirmation *of the state of things asserted and the *denial *of it, these different relations distinguishing three different "modes" of assertion [including "the mode of actuality," i.e., being "without modality"]. If a man says "It may rain tomorrow," his assertion is in "the mode of possibility," because it may be true that possibly it will rain tomorrow and, at the same time, be true that possibly it will not rain tomorrow. Any assertion is said to be made in the mode of possibility if, and only if, it is conceivable that the affirmation and the denial of that which it so asserts should be both at once true. ... On the other hand, an assertion is said to be made in "the mode of necessity," if, and only if, the affirmation and the denial of that which is so
[PEIRCE-L] Slides for a quick overview (was Delta Existential Graphs
Jon, Jerry, List, My previous notes cited many references, and I doubt that people will read them all (any?). But I presented some slides at a conference on Knowledge Graphs in May of 2020 (via Zoom because of covid), which I extended in July for a keynote talk at the European Semantic Web Conference, and added a few more slides in September. These slides introduce existential graphs and show how they can be used in a variety of ways: https://jfsowa.com/talks/eswc.pdf See slides 14 to 28 for an intro to EGs and a comparison with other notations used in linguistics and AI. For an extension for metalanguage, see slides 29 to 33. This notation can be used for Delta graphs and a wide variety of applications -- including all the examples that follow. The remaining slides cover many issues, including some that I discussed in my recent article on phaneroscopy. John _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ARISBE: THE PEIRCE GATEWAY is now at https://cspeirce.com and, just as well, at https://www.cspeirce.com . It'll take a while to repair / update all the links! ► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . ► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the body. More at https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/help/user-signoff.html . ► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP; moderated by Gary Richmond; and co-managed by him and Ben Udell.
