Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

i.e., 1ns independent of individual instantiation is akin to objectivity when 
we add subjectivities and objective relations and insert time -- it is the 
statistical aggregate, or confluence, which supersedes the individual by virtue 
of its convergence toward "fact": but I know this is not what Peirce has in 
mind in his metaphysic which is much more about pure possibility (much more 
phenomenological). I just conceptualize it from a theory of practice.


From: JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Sent: Friday, July 1, 2022 4:20 PM
To: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt 
; JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

Jon, List

Apologies in advance for this overly-long reply which may open up some lines of 
thought without properly addressing them - in a bit of a rush but wanted to put 
my point to paper!  (it really is longwinded! - a draft of a draft!). [also 
conscious that I diverge from the initial point, so double apologies].

I did have qualitative possibility in mind -- and don't think I disagree with 
your summary -- but have arrived at the same conclusion from the inverse angle. 
The problem I have with understanding feeling as 1ns independent of individual 
instantiation is not that I disagree with the Peircean metaphysic, also 
outlined quite well by Gary, but that the only way for us to actually think or 
talk about such things is through experience. This leads me to extracting 
Peirce's metaphysical concept of the monadic, in general, by a method I think 
is compatible with his overall theory regarding the "final interpretant".

I note Gary's point that the monadic does not exist as such -- cannot exist, as 
we know it, except as qualitative possibility -- but we still require a clear 
disentangling of that which exists for us in theory but not exist in "reality". 
Or is the order of problem we deal with not akin to feeling as felt versus 
feeling prior to its existence (beyond the qual. possibility of such)? If so, I 
think it useful to conceive of the two, instantiated and possible, within the 
objective/subjective dichotomy if only because in analytical terms we cannot do 
away with this dichotomy by merely deferring to its theoretical non-existence 
(we make it exist insofar as we consider it, which must always be the case -- 
at least in analytical thought which reflects upon the feeling and attempts to 
categorize it).

My point, then, is to clarify what is meant by "objective" and "subjective" 
respectively and to demonstrate how a definition, mutual, may within Peirce's 
overall argument (touching upon the "final interpretant").

For example, the idea of a key being played without anyone being around to hear 
it just raises that old proverbial paradox of the tree in the forest to my mind 
(or essentially all imaginative attempts to clarify the quality of the 
precissive abstraction which necessarily involve a subjective rendering of that 
which we would abstract from subjective relations).

Rather than imagine what is the essence of the qualia in imaginative 
abstraction, I prefer to reinsert object and subject terms to demonstrate how 
we arrive at objectivity, of the Peircean kind, via the subject. I am doing 
this by playing with polysemy -- the possibility for semantic divergence in the 
signification of any object among any group of subjects (over time). It is 
divergence which gives us convergence -- which I don't mean directly but as a 
logical necessity insofar as the logic of contrast goes.

This brings me to the idea of the "single" or "same" key which diverges in 
semantic (subjective) value simultaneously (among a group of subjects). The 
essence of objectivity is not that every person should experience the same 
object the same way but that a range of people, over time, via repetition, 
should be capable of consensus regarding what is the nature of said object. 
I.e., a subjective "band", or statistical range, comes to mirror the value of 
the object insofar as it is embodied. Or the "object" influences the 
"subject[s]".

This influence, which need not be singular in the subjective sense which 
implies individuation, constitutes an objective modification upon a subjective 
field -- and it is this effect upon the field which is "singular". Similarities 
in this field, or band, over time, converge toward objectivity. An example is 
the relation between smoking and cancer. An objective relation which converges 
to Objective proof. Or in the conditions of living relative to class and 
likelihood of similarity in "taste" or "disposition" among the classes (this is 
a synoptic version Bourdieu's thesis in his Judgement which many of you will 
know is essentially a Marxist-inspired sociological text).

The objective is that which converges -- much like Peirce's no

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

hen that which 
requires time is diminished (when the leaps taken, experientially, are smaller 
by virtue of prior convergence -- which is the case in class, especially in the 
professions). Or, when anything out of the ordinary happens and we run to an 
expert in whichever field deals with X phenomenon -- we do so because they are 
presumed to have formulated an objective, or quasi-objective, analysis of X by 
virtue of it being uppermost in their consideration... by virtue of time 
diminished by prior convergence.

The singular subjective point of view which comes to form the commens, inasmuch 
as I can understand Peirce's usage of that term, is a kind of received 
objectivity within the community at large. We, as it were, have converged upon 
mutual agreement -- though not absolute -- regarding the nature of X. I.e., it 
is not absolute because we agree that the earth is spherical, but many will 
attest to its being flat.

Which very long-winded point takes me back to my earlier post:

"...the being -- or essence -- of "feeling" is not in feeling alone but also 
(and this is an anthropocentric point) requires the body (as conduit) which 
embodies the feeling as such."...

I stand by the above insofar as we add "potentiality" to the equation because 
potential implies possible which provides scope for possible embodiment which 
is typical of qualitative possibility -- that which may or may not come to 
be[embodied]. We cannot know anything which is not embodied.* To modify it 
slightly then: the essence of feeling resides neither solely in feeling nor in 
the body, but in the embodiment of feeling -- simultaneously one and two, or 
holistic but distinct (spectral).

I suppose I don't believe that there is a vacuum "feeling" even in the 
analytical sense whereby we abstract -- which seems not dissimilar from what 
you and others would say regarding the copresence of 1ns, 2ns, and 3ns 
(holistic yet distinct, and so spectral). Or, the possibility of existence, at 
least cognitively, implies existence insofar as we can think or speak of it.


*our attempts at defining that which does not exist necessarily bring that 
thing, whatever it is, be it concept or tone or sound, into existence -- though 
not necessarily the same order of existence as often understood by "real" (it 
could be entirely idiosyncratic -- a dreamscape -- but nonetheless real for its 
divergence).



A Too Long Version: I just can't reconcile the erasure of the 
objective/subjective even from the theoretical level as we theorize from the 
subjective condition, and so such attempts are tautological to my mind.



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Sent: Friday, July 1, 2022 3:37 PM
To: Peirce-L ; Jon Alan Schmidt 

Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

Jon, List,

Thanks for that Jon. I don't substantially disagree. I find this helpful. I 
arrive at a similar conclusion from a different angle in what was an enormous 
reply better suited to a draft. Gary's point in reply to Helmut was also 
helpful. Where I disagree, slightly, is in the idea of embodiment which I think 
is a necessity (even analytically as we formulate the absence of such 
embodiment, the negative, from the existence of such embodiment, or the 
positive -- a kind of a priori contradiction).

I need to formulate my point much more concisely for it to be properly 
considered here as it is a mishmash of verbiage right now. I'll endeavor to get 
back to you with a concise response asap as I'd be interested in your opinion 
(just trying to make it clear and not overly long).

Best

Jack

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 7:53 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

Jack, List:

When Peirce associates feeling with 1ns, he is not referring to that which is 
felt by a subject, which is clearly an example of 2ns. He is instead referring 
to a qualitative possibility, independent of any individual instantiation. It 
is indeed a prescissive abstraction of the 1ns that is always involved in 2ns, 
which is always involved in 3ns.

We can imagine a world in which we constantly hear the same musical note, until 
it suddenly changes to a different note. The quality of each note in 
itself--prescinded from anyone actually hearing it--corresponds to 1ns, the 
contrast between successive notes to 2ns, and the melody comprised of a series 
of such notes to 3ns (CP 5.395, EP 1:128-129, 1878).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 10:02 AM JACK R

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

Jon, List,

Thanks for that Jon. I don't substantially disagree. I find this helpful. I 
arrive at a similar conclusion from a different angle in what was an enormous 
reply better suited to a draft. Gary's point in reply to Helmut was also 
helpful. Where I disagree, slightly, is in the idea of embodiment which I think 
is a necessity (even analytically as we formulate the absence of such 
embodiment, the negative, from the existence of such embodiment, or the 
positive -- a kind of a priori contradiction).

I need to formulate my point much more concisely for it to be properly 
considered here as it is a mishmash of verbiage right now. I'll endeavor to get 
back to you with a concise response asap as I'd be interested in your opinion 
(just trying to make it clear and not overly long).

Best

Jack

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 7:53 PM
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

Jack, List:

When Peirce associates feeling with 1ns, he is not referring to that which is 
felt by a subject, which is clearly an example of 2ns. He is instead referring 
to a qualitative possibility, independent of any individual instantiation. It 
is indeed a prescissive abstraction of the 1ns that is always involved in 2ns, 
which is always involved in 3ns.

We can imagine a world in which we constantly hear the same musical note, until 
it suddenly changes to a different note. The quality of each note in 
itself--prescinded from anyone actually hearing it--corresponds to 1ns, the 
contrast between successive notes to 2ns, and the melody comprised of a series 
of such notes to 3ns (CP 5.395, EP 1:128-129, 1878).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> / 
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt>

On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 10:02 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>> wrote:
just for clarity, the point I'm making is probably an old one but: Peirce 
conceives of the subject-less feeling as object. That, I think, is an 
impossibility.

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> 
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> on 
behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
mailto:jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>>
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 3:48 PM
To: s...@bestweb.net<mailto:s...@bestweb.net> 
mailto:s...@bestweb.net>>; Helmut Raulien 
mailto:h.raul...@gmx.de>>
Cc: Peirce List mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>>; CG 
mailto:c...@lists.iccs-conference.org>>
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning
A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is 
in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an 
existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it 
is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling:
Helmut, List,

Is this an example of Peirce being abstract again? Because by "feeling" he 
often meant "tone" if I recall correctly. The problem I have (although I think 
it only exists with regard to this short extract as Peirce explains it better 
in detail) is that a "feeling" cannot easily be disregarded from that which 
embodies it. That is, the being -- or essence -- of "feeling" is not in feeling 
alone but also (and this is an anthropocentric point) requires the body (as 
conduit) which embodies the feeling as such.

I don't remember disagreeing with Peirce re "feeling" the last time I read 
through his texts at length so likely just a result of much context ommitted.

best

Jack
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
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co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jack, List:

When Peirce associates *feeling *with 1ns, he is not referring to that
which is *felt *by a subject, which is clearly an example of 2ns. He is
instead referring to a qualitative possibility, independent of any
individual instantiation. It is indeed a *prescissive *abstraction of the
1ns that is always involved in 2ns, which is always involved in 3ns.

We can imagine a world in which we constantly hear the same musical note,
until it suddenly changes to a different note. The quality of each note *in
itself*--prescinded from anyone *actually *hearing it--corresponds to 1ns,
the contrast between successive notes to 2ns, and the melody comprised of a
series of such notes to 3ns (CP 5.395, EP 1:128-129, 1878).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt / twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Jun 30, 2022 at 10:02 AM JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY <
jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie> wrote:

> just for clarity, the point I'm making is probably an old one but: Peirce
> conceives of the subject-less feeling as object. That, I think, is an
> impossibility.
> --
> *From:* peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
> on behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
> *Sent:* Thursday, June 30, 2022 3:48 PM
> *To:* s...@bestweb.net ; Helmut Raulien <
> h.raul...@gmx.de>
> *Cc:* Peirce List ; CG <
> c...@lists.iccs-conference.org>
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning
>
> A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its
> being is in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for
> example, an existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself;
> whatever it is, it is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling:
>
> Helmut, List,
>
> Is this an example of Peirce being abstract again? Because by "feeling" he
> often meant "tone" if I recall correctly. The problem I have (although I
> think it only exists with regard to this short extract as Peirce explains
> it better in detail) is that a "feeling" cannot easily be disregarded from
> that which embodies it. That is, the being -- or essence -- of "feeling" is
> not in feeling alone but also (and this is an anthropocentric point)
> requires the body (as conduit) which em*bodies* the feeling as such.
>
> I don't remember disagreeing with Peirce re "feeling" the last time I read
> through his texts at length so likely just a result of much context
> ommitted.
>
> best
>
> Jack
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
► PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . 
► To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message NOT to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
with UNSUBSCRIBE PEIRCE-L in the SUBJECT LINE of the message and nothing in the 
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► PEIRCE-L is owned by THE PEIRCE GROUP;  moderated by Gary Richmond;  and 
co-managed by him and Ben Udell.

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

i.e., if we take "tone" in its literal sense as "sound" then we can say that a 
key played upon an instrument is what it is regardless of all subjectivity but 
that this does not exclude subjectivity - the evidence being subjectivity 
itself. That is, if five people hear the "same" tone, it may signify five 
distinct ways which polysemy highlights the independence of the signifying 
entity (feeling/tone) on one level as well as the independence of the 
subjectivities to which that entity signifies, variously, on another level 
(thus potentiality seems to square the abstract circle).

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 4:32 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca ; Helmut Raulien 
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

Helmut,

Yes I agree. Although he does give himself typically clever wiggle-room insofar 
as he mentions potentiality which would seem to both include and exclude the 
subject depending on one's level of analysis.

best

jack

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 4:19 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

*Warning*

This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not 
reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know 
the content is safe.

Gary F., yes, my mistake. So, myths are symbols, which don´t lack indexicality, 
and can be false.

Jack Robert Kelly: I agree. Maybe Peirce´s way to talk of signs without the 
subject (interpreter) is consistent, but if one wants to combine his theories 
with systems theories, the subject has to be mentioned.

Best, Helmut


Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:52 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, myths, narratives, arguments and propositions are all symbols. Symbols 
can have any level of complexity. Peirce suggests in at least one place that 
the entire intelligible universe can be regarded as a symbol.



gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 30-Jun-22 10:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



Gary F., List,



But aren´t myths narratives, and more than symbols, containing arguments and 
propositions? Propositions (alone or as parts of arguments) may be false, 
mightn´t they?



Best Regards



Helmut





Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:37 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
An: "'Peirce List'" mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>>
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in 
itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one 
another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking 
indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects, or rather 
their denotations, are indeterminate — that is, they don’t enable the 
interpreter to know what the utterer is talking about. This is one of the 
“defects” of symbols generally, not only of myths.

And of course, if we don’t know what subject (object) we are talking about, we 
don’t know whether the predicate we ascribe to it really applies to it or not. 
Predicates and significations are general and are represented iconically, so 
their mode of being is “not rational yet capable of rationalization.” Icons, 
like indices, cannot be true or false in themselves, yet their functions are 
necessary to determine whether a proposition is true or false of the actual 
universe of discourse.

I hope this bit of paraphrase might help to clarify Peirce’s point for some 
readers.

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} When your felt sense<https://gnusystems.ca/TS/bdy.htm#fltsns> works its way 
into words, the act of meaning collides and colludes with the limits of 
language to determine what you say. {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu> 
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 29-Jun-22 09:55
To: g...@gnusystems.ca<mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca>
Cc: 'Peirce List' mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



Gary F., List,



In the Peirce quote below, now I have seen, that Peirce wrote "modes of 
metaphysical being", so maybe myths are excluded from that, if they are not 
metaphysical. Maybe they are, if seen as parables, not facts. My pejorative 
view on "myth" is based on myths that claim to be facts, not just parables. 
Resp. on an orthodox resp. 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

Helmut,

Yes I agree. Although he does give himself typically clever wiggle-room insofar 
as he mentions potentiality which would seem to both include and exclude the 
subject depending on one's level of analysis.

best

jack

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 4:19 PM
To: g...@gnusystems.ca 
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

*Warning*

This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not 
reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know 
the content is safe.

Gary F., yes, my mistake. So, myths are symbols, which don´t lack indexicality, 
and can be false.

Jack Robert Kelly: I agree. Maybe Peirce´s way to talk of signs without the 
subject (interpreter) is consistent, but if one wants to combine his theories 
with systems theories, the subject has to be mentioned.

Best, Helmut


Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:52 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, myths, narratives, arguments and propositions are all symbols. Symbols 
can have any level of complexity. Peirce suggests in at least one place that 
the entire intelligible universe can be regarded as a symbol.



gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 30-Jun-22 10:46
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' 
Subject: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



Gary F., List,



But aren´t myths narratives, and more than symbols, containing arguments and 
propositions? Propositions (alone or as parts of arguments) may be false, 
mightn´t they?



Best Regards



Helmut





Gesendet: Donnerstag, 30. Juni 2022 um 16:37 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
An: "'Peirce List'" mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>>
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

Helmut, myths are symbols. Icons and indices, neither of which is rational in 
itself, are “signs of which we have need now and then in our converse with one 
another to eke out the defects of words, or symbols.” Symbols lacking 
indexicality can’t be either true or false, because their objects, or rather 
their denotations, are indeterminate — that is, they don’t enable the 
interpreter to know what the utterer is talking about. This is one of the 
“defects” of symbols generally, not only of myths.

And of course, if we don’t know what subject (object) we are talking about, we 
don’t know whether the predicate we ascribe to it really applies to it or not. 
Predicates and significations are general and are represented iconically, so 
their mode of being is “not rational yet capable of rationalization.” Icons, 
like indices, cannot be true or false in themselves, yet their functions are 
necessary to determine whether a proposition is true or false of the actual 
universe of discourse.

I hope this bit of paraphrase might help to clarify Peirce’s point for some 
readers.

Gary f.

Coming from the ancestral lands of the Anishinaabeg

} When your felt sense works its way 
into words, the act of meaning collides and colludes with the limits of 
language to determine what you say. {

https://gnusystems.ca/wp/ }{ Turning Signs



From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu 
mailto:peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu>> On 
Behalf Of Helmut Raulien
Sent: 29-Jun-22 09:55
To: g...@gnusystems.ca
Cc: 'Peirce List' mailto:PEIRCE-L@list.iupui.edu>>
Subject: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning



Gary F., List,



In the Peirce quote below, now I have seen, that Peirce wrote "modes of 
metaphysical being", so maybe myths are excluded from that, if they are not 
metaphysical. Maybe they are, if seen as parables, not facts. My pejorative 
view on "myth" is based on myths that claim to be facts, not just parables. 
Resp. on an orthodox resp. fundamentalistic (non-)interpretation of a myth.



Best Regards



Helmut

Helmut, the project of integrating a systems view of meaning with Peircean 
semiotics and phaneroscopy (or “category theory”) is one that is also 
undertaken in my netbook Turning Signs. Since you can sample it any time by 
entering “meaning site:gnusystems.ca/TS” into your search engine, I won’t 
reproduce any of it here. Instead I’ll offer an extended quote from Peirce 
which I think is especially relevant to this project: it’s from 1909, CP 
6.338-343.

The two points I would emphasize here are (1) that meaning in its fullest sense 
is a combination of denotation and signification, and (2) that the difference 
between the two is grounded in the “modes of being” of their “matter.” I think 
you’ll see that Peirce’s “modes of being” apply his “categories” in a very 
different way from the application of them in your post.

___

All thinking is dialogic in form. Your self of one instant appeals to your 
deeper self for his assent. Co

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

just for clarity, the point I'm making is probably an old one but: Peirce 
conceives of the subject-less feeling as object. That, I think, is an 
impossibility.

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 3:48 PM
To: s...@bestweb.net ; Helmut Raulien 
Cc: Peirce List ; CG 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning


A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is 
in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an 
existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it 
is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling:

Helmut, List,

Is this an example of Peirce being abstract again? Because by "feeling" he 
often meant "tone" if I recall correctly. The problem I have (although I think 
it only exists with regard to this short extract as Peirce explains it better 
in detail) is that a "feeling" cannot easily be disregarded from that which 
embodies it. That is, the being -- or essence -- of "feeling" is not in feeling 
alone but also (and this is an anthropocentric point) requires the body (as 
conduit) which embodies the feeling as such.

I don't remember disagreeing with Peirce re "feeling" the last time I read 
through his texts at length so likely just a result of much context ommitted.

best

Jack

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 3:40 PM
To: s...@bestweb.net 
Cc: Peirce List ; CG 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

*Warning*

This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not 
reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know 
the content is safe.

John, Gary F., List,

first, here again the part of Gary´s Peirce quote, in which Peirce tells the 
three modes of being:

"
So, then, there are these three modes of being: first, the being of a feeling, 
in itself, unattached to any subject, which is merely an atmospheric 
possibility, a possibility floating in vacuo, not rational yet capable of 
rationalization; secondly, there is the being that consists in arbitrary brute 
action upon other things, not only irrational but anti-rational, since to 
rationalize it would be to destroy its being; and thirdly, there is living 
intelligence from which all reality and all power are derived; which is 
rational necessity and necessitation.
A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is 
in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an 
existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it 
is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling: its being is actual, 
consists in action, is dyadic. That is what I call existence. A reason has its 
being in bringing other things into connexion with each other; its essence is 
to compose: it is triadic, and it alone has a real power.
"

As I said, I not merely want to talk about reality, which is always meant 
universally, but also about false, but for a system viable, narratives. In this 
more general matter, not only talking about reality, but about pseudoreality as 
well, the third mode is not only the universal intelligible force, but also a 
system´s intentional force, creating false but viable narratives. I think, it 
is for all agreeable, that such things exist, and that it would be helpful to 
uncover them? Examples are galore.

Peirce says of the third mode, that its essence is composition. I think, before 
composition comes classification. A system can only compose its organs, if they 
first are classified and so specified. Example: The castes system in India, 
other feudal classification of people, and also classification of acts as good 
or bad. If classification of acts is in accord with the universal system (I 
think, the ten commandments mostly are), this is good at first glance, but if 
the system does not adress their origin as the universe´s nature, but as an act 
of its own, this is hijacking. Example: Liberal christians admit, that in 
Mahayana-Buddhism too similar values like compassion exist, but illiberal 
christians perhaps say, that good values only exist in the christian context, 
and since their prophets have declareded them.

Best Regards

Helmut

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 29. Juni 2022 um 21:44 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: "Peirce List" 
Cc: "CG" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning
Helmut, Gary F, List

The many complex issues in this thread would require a lengthy commentary.  But 
I'll just make a few remarks on the word myth.

In classical Greek, the basic meaning of mythos is (1) word or speech; (2) 
public speech; (3) conversation; (4)  thing said, fact, matter; (5) thing 
thought, unspoken word

Re: [PEIRCE-L] [EXTERNAL] Aw: meaning

[JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY]

A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is 
in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an 
existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it 
is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling:

Helmut, List,

Is this an example of Peirce being abstract again? Because by "feeling" he 
often meant "tone" if I recall correctly. The problem I have (although I think 
it only exists with regard to this short extract as Peirce explains it better 
in detail) is that a "feeling" cannot easily be disregarded from that which 
embodies it. That is, the being -- or essence -- of "feeling" is not in feeling 
alone but also (and this is an anthropocentric point) requires the body (as 
conduit) which embodies the feeling as such.

I don't remember disagreeing with Peirce re "feeling" the last time I read 
through his texts at length so likely just a result of much context ommitted.

best

Jack

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  on 
behalf of Helmut Raulien 
Sent: Thursday, June 30, 2022 3:40 PM
To: s...@bestweb.net 
Cc: Peirce List ; CG 
Subject: [EXTERNAL] Aw: [PEIRCE-L] meaning

*Warning*

This email originated from outside of Maynooth University's Mail System. Do not 
reply, click links or open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know 
the content is safe.

John, Gary F., List,

first, here again the part of Gary´s Peirce quote, in which Peirce tells the 
three modes of being:

"
So, then, there are these three modes of being: first, the being of a feeling, 
in itself, unattached to any subject, which is merely an atmospheric 
possibility, a possibility floating in vacuo, not rational yet capable of 
rationalization; secondly, there is the being that consists in arbitrary brute 
action upon other things, not only irrational but anti-rational, since to 
rationalize it would be to destroy its being; and thirdly, there is living 
intelligence from which all reality and all power are derived; which is 
rational necessity and necessitation.
A feeling is what it is, positively, regardless of anything else. Its being is 
in it alone, and it is a mere potentiality. A brute force, as, for example, an 
existent particle, on the other hand, is nothing for itself; whatever it is, it 
is for what it is attracting and what it is repelling: its being is actual, 
consists in action, is dyadic. That is what I call existence. A reason has its 
being in bringing other things into connexion with each other; its essence is 
to compose: it is triadic, and it alone has a real power.
"

As I said, I not merely want to talk about reality, which is always meant 
universally, but also about false, but for a system viable, narratives. In this 
more general matter, not only talking about reality, but about pseudoreality as 
well, the third mode is not only the universal intelligible force, but also a 
system´s intentional force, creating false but viable narratives. I think, it 
is for all agreeable, that such things exist, and that it would be helpful to 
uncover them? Examples are galore.

Peirce says of the third mode, that its essence is composition. I think, before 
composition comes classification. A system can only compose its organs, if they 
first are classified and so specified. Example: The castes system in India, 
other feudal classification of people, and also classification of acts as good 
or bad. If classification of acts is in accord with the universal system (I 
think, the ten commandments mostly are), this is good at first glance, but if 
the system does not adress their origin as the universe´s nature, but as an act 
of its own, this is hijacking. Example: Liberal christians admit, that in 
Mahayana-Buddhism too similar values like compassion exist, but illiberal 
christians perhaps say, that good values only exist in the christian context, 
and since their prophets have declareded them.

Best Regards

Helmut

Gesendet: Mittwoch, 29. Juni 2022 um 21:44 Uhr
Von: "John F Sowa" 
An: "Peirce List" 
Cc: "CG" 
Betreff: RE: [PEIRCE-L] meaning
Helmut, Gary F, List

The many complex issues in this thread would require a lengthy commentary.  But 
I'll just make a few remarks on the word myth.

In classical Greek, the basic meaning of mythos is (1) word or speech; (2) 
public speech; (3) conversation; (4)  thing said, fact, matter; (5) thing 
thought, unspoken word, purpose, design.  (Liddell & Scott, 9th edition)

>From those basic meanings, it came to be applied to tales, stories, and 
>narratives.  Since many of those stories contained a mixture of fact and 
>fiction and sometimes more fiction than fact, critics such as Plato condemned 
>them as false.

But the same criticism could be made of any scientific theories of any time 
past, present, or future.  The goal of science is a deeper understanding of 
experience, but any theory is at best a good generalization of certain kinds of 
e