Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Phyllis, List:

I am basically suggesting that formal logic = mathematical logic = *logica
utens*, while normative logic = semeiotic (speculative grammar + critic +
methodeutic) = *logica docens*. I have in mind Peirce's distinction in CP
2.439 (1902) between mathematics as the science which *draws* necessary
conclusions (strictly deductive) and logic as the science of *drawing*
conclusions (abductive/retroductive, deductive, and inductive).

Regards,

Jon S.

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 5:52 PM Phyllis Chiasson <
phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I don't see that formal logic is logica utens. Are you defining formal and
> normative differently.
>
> On Sat, Sep 11, 2021, 3:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
>> Gary F., List:
>>
>> As far as I can tell, Peirce makes no distinction between "mathematical
>> logic" and "the logic of mathematics"; they are one and the same, namely,
>> formal logic.
>>
>> CSP: Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed,
>> is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic,
>> or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic
>> proper.(CP 4.240, 1902)
>>
>>
>> Formal logic is a *logica utens* because it is strictly deductive and
>> thus requires no carefully developed theory of reasoning, unlike
>> abduction/retroduction and induction. The fact that John Sowa and others
>> teach formal logic does not make it a *logica docens*. Mathematical
>> reasoning in accordance with formal logic can be extremely sophisticated,
>> requiring years of training and practice, but it always remains a *logica
>> utens*.
>>
>> CSP: There are certain parts of your *logica utens* which nobody really
>> doubts. Hegel and his have loyally endeavored to cast a doubt upon it. The
>> effort has been praiseworthy; but it has not succeeded. The truth of it is
>> too evident. Mathematical reasoning holds. Why should it not? It relates
>> only to the creations of the mind, concerning which there is no obstacle to
>> our learning whatever is true of them. The method of this book, therefore,
>> is to accept the reasonings of pure mathematics as beyond all doubt. It is
>> fallible, as everything human is fallible. Twice two may perhaps not be
>> four. But there is no more satisfactory way of assuring ourselves of
>> anything than the mathematical way of assuring ourselves of mathematical
>> theorems. No aid from the science of logic is called for in that field. (CP
>> 2.192, 1902)
>>
>>
>> Nor, for that matter, in the fields of phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics.
>>
>> Regards,
>>
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>
>> On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 4:44 PM  wrote:
>>
>>> John, Phyllis,
>>>
>>> I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
>>> mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic
>>> is a *logica utens* or a *logica docens*. Since you teach the subject
>>> yourself, John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires
>>> explicit instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s
>>> “Logic of Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its
>>> reasonings by a *logica utens* which it develops for itself, and has no
>>> need of any appeal to a *logica docens.*” Unless he changed his mind
>>> about this after c. 1896 (which I doubt), the implication is that the *logic
>>> of mathematics* is a *logica utens* while *mathematical logic* is a *logica
>>> docens*.
>>>
>>> If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the
>>> question with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics
>>> it draws upon for principles is the *logic of mathematics* or *mathematical
>>> logic*. Since phaneroscopy is *cenoscopic*, according to Peirce, that
>>> would seem to rule out any special *logica docens* being an essential
>>> part of it.
>>>
>>> Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
>>> mathematics involved is really the *logic of relatives*, which (being
>>> mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical
>>> logic.) Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a 
>>> *logica
>>> utens*? What do you think?
>>>
>>> By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
>>> phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.
>>>
>>> Gary f.
>>>
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[Phyllis Chiasson]

I don't see that formal logic is logica utens. Are you defining formal and
normative differently.

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021, 3:28 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary F., List:
>
> As far as I can tell, Peirce makes no distinction between "mathematical
> logic" and "the logic of mathematics"; they are one and the same, namely,
> formal logic.
>
> CSP: Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed,
> is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic,
> or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic
> proper.(CP 4.240, 1902)
>
>
> Formal logic is a *logica utens* because it is strictly deductive and
> thus requires no carefully developed theory of reasoning, unlike
> abduction/retroduction and induction. The fact that John Sowa and others
> teach formal logic does not make it a *logica docens*. Mathematical
> reasoning in accordance with formal logic can be extremely sophisticated,
> requiring years of training and practice, but it always remains a *logica
> utens*.
>
> CSP: There are certain parts of your *logica utens* which nobody really
> doubts. Hegel and his have loyally endeavored to cast a doubt upon it. The
> effort has been praiseworthy; but it has not succeeded. The truth of it is
> too evident. Mathematical reasoning holds. Why should it not? It relates
> only to the creations of the mind, concerning which there is no obstacle to
> our learning whatever is true of them. The method of this book, therefore,
> is to accept the reasonings of pure mathematics as beyond all doubt. It is
> fallible, as everything human is fallible. Twice two may perhaps not be
> four. But there is no more satisfactory way of assuring ourselves of
> anything than the mathematical way of assuring ourselves of mathematical
> theorems. No aid from the science of logic is called for in that field. (CP
> 2.192, 1902)
>
>
> Nor, for that matter, in the fields of phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 4:44 PM  wrote:
>
>> John, Phyllis,
>>
>> I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
>> mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic
>> is a *logica utens* or a *logica docens*. Since you teach the subject
>> yourself, John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires
>> explicit instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s
>> “Logic of Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its
>> reasonings by a *logica utens* which it develops for itself, and has no
>> need of any appeal to a *logica docens.*” Unless he changed his mind
>> about this after c. 1896 (which I doubt), the implication is that the *logic
>> of mathematics* is a *logica utens* while *mathematical logic* is a *logica
>> docens*.
>>
>> If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the
>> question with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics
>> it draws upon for principles is the *logic of mathematics* or *mathematical
>> logic*. Since phaneroscopy is *cenoscopic*, according to Peirce, that
>> would seem to rule out any special *logica docens* being an essential
>> part of it.
>>
>> Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
>> mathematics involved is really the *logic of relatives*, which (being
>> mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical
>> logic.) Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a *logica
>> utens*? What do you think?
>>
>> By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
>> phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.
>>
>> Gary f.
>>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

As far as I can tell, Peirce makes no distinction between "mathematical
logic" and "the logic of mathematics"; they are one and the same, namely,
formal logic.

CSP: Mathematical logic is formal logic. Formal logic, however developed,
is mathematics. Formal logic, however, is by no means the whole of logic,
or even its principal part. It is hardly to be reckoned as a part of logic
proper.(CP 4.240, 1902)


Formal logic is a *logica utens* because it is strictly deductive and thus
requires no carefully developed theory of reasoning, unlike
abduction/retroduction and induction. The fact that John Sowa and others
teach formal logic does not make it a *logica docens*. Mathematical
reasoning in accordance with formal logic can be extremely sophisticated,
requiring years of training and practice, but it always remains a *logica
utens*.

CSP: There are certain parts of your *logica utens* which nobody really
doubts. Hegel and his have loyally endeavored to cast a doubt upon it. The
effort has been praiseworthy; but it has not succeeded. The truth of it is
too evident. Mathematical reasoning holds. Why should it not? It relates
only to the creations of the mind, concerning which there is no obstacle to
our learning whatever is true of them. The method of this book, therefore,
is to accept the reasonings of pure mathematics as beyond all doubt. It is
fallible, as everything human is fallible. Twice two may perhaps not be
four. But there is no more satisfactory way of assuring ourselves of
anything than the mathematical way of assuring ourselves of mathematical
theorems. No aid from the science of logic is called for in that field. (CP
2.192, 1902)


Nor, for that matter, in the fields of phaneroscopy, esthetics, or ethics.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sat, Sep 11, 2021 at 4:44 PM  wrote:

> John, Phyllis,
>
> I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
> mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic
> is a *logica utens* or a *logica docens*. Since you teach the subject
> yourself, John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires
> explicit instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s
> “Logic of Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its
> reasonings by a *logica utens* which it develops for itself, and has no
> need of any appeal to a *logica docens.*” Unless he changed his mind
> about this after c. 1896 (which I doubt), the implication is that the *logic
> of mathematics* is a *logica utens* while *mathematical logic* is a *logica
> docens*.
>
> If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the question
> with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics it draws
> upon for principles is the *logic of mathematics* or *mathematical logic*.
> Since phaneroscopy is *cenoscopic*, according to Peirce, that would seem
> to rule out any special *logica docens* being an essential part of it.
>
> Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
> mathematics involved is really the *logic of relatives*, which (being
> mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical
> logic.) Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a *logica
> utens*? What do you think?
>
> By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
> phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.
>
> Gary f.
>
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
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RE: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[gnox]

John, Phyllis,

I think it’s clear enough that “formal logic” (in Peirce at least) is
mathematical logic. The still unanswered question is whether formal logic is
a logica utens or a logica docens. Since you teach the subject yourself,
John, it would seem to be the latter, something that requires explicit
instruction before the student can make use of it. But Peirce’s “Logic of
Mathematics” paper says that “mathematics performs its reasonings by a
logica utens which it develops for itself, and has no need of any appeal to
a logica docens.” Unless he changed his mind about this after c. 1896 (which
I doubt), the implication is that the logic of mathematics is a logica utens
while mathematical logic is a logica docens.

If we accept that compound statement as non-paradoxical, then the question
with respect to phaneroscopic analysis is whether the mathematics it draws
upon for principles is the logic of mathematics or mathematical logic. Since
phaneroscopy is cenoscopic, according to Peirce, that would seem to rule out
any special logica docens being an essential part of it.

Bellucci’s paper does not choose between those two, but says that the
mathematics involved is really the logic of relatives, which (being
mathematical in nature) is not part of “logic proper,” i.e. critical logic.)
Is the logic of relatives, or the mathematical basis of it, a logica utens?
What do you think?

By the way, I don’t see as much connection between “oenoscopy” and
phaneroscopy as ADT apparently does.

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On
Behalf Of sowa @bestweb.net
Sent: 11-Sep-21 15:39
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu; g...@gnusystems.ca
Subject: re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

 

Gary F,

 

That diagram shows six different aspects of experiences with wine.  There
are many other possible experiences:  worrying about the cost, spitting out
the vinegar, spilling it on the tablecloth or your pants..  But phaneroscopy
is more than just having an experience.  The primary focus is on analyzing
the experience, determining elements, classifying the elements, and mapping
them to a diagram (or other hypoicon) that shows their connections and
interrelationships. 

 

In that regard, Albert Upton's exercises are better examples of phaneroscopy
than ADT's. But Upton goes farther into semeiotic by mapping the experience
to words and sentences and evaluating the results by something similar to
Peirce's methodeutic.

 

John

 

 

 

  _  

From: g...@gnusystems.ca <mailto:g...@gnusystems.ca> 
Sent: Saturday, September 11, 2021 7:51 AM

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu)
<https://peirce.iupui.edu/publications.html#presentations>  site. 

Gary f.

 



 

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re: [PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[sowa @bestweb.net]

Gary F,

 That diagram shows six different aspects of experiences with wine.  There are 
many other possible experiences:  worrying about the cost, spitting out the 
vinegar, spilling it on the tablecloth or your pants..  But phaneroscopy is 
more than just having an experience.  The primary focus is on analyzing the 
experience, determining elements, classifying the elements, and mapping them to 
a diagram (or other hypoicon) that shows their connections and 
interrelationships.

 In that regard, Albert Upton's exercises are better examples of phaneroscopy 
than ADT's. But Upton goes farther into semeiotic by mapping the experience to 
words and sentences and evaluating the results by something similar to Peirce's 
methodeutic.

 John





 From: g...@gnusystems.ca
Sent: Saturday, September 11, 2021 7:51 AM

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne's slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) site.

Gary f.






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[PEIRCE-L] André De Tienne: Slow Read slide 44

[gnox]

Continuing our slow read on phaneroscopy, here is the next slide of André De 
Tienne’s slideshow posted on the Peirce Edition Project (iupui.edu) 
  site. 

Gary f.

 



 

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