Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Stephen C. Rose]

Clark here are a few things that may answer your Brent question"


This remarkable text is drawn from Joseph Brent,  Charles Sanders Peirce: A
Life, Bloomington and Indianapolis 1993, Page 331. "There are only three
fundamental kinds of relations: monadic, dyadic and triadic; ... by
combining triads, all relations greater than the number  three can be
generated; and ... all those of a greater number than three can be reduced
to triads. Since, in addition, triads cannot be reduced to dyads, nor dyads
to monads, monads, dyads and triads constitute the fundamental categories
of relations. At the same time, triads are made up of dyads and monads, and
dyads of monads. Hence, in logical order, monads are first, dyads second,
and triads third, which gives a second group of relations: first,
second, and third. Hypostatic abstraction provides a third group of
relations: firstness, secondness, and thirdness, which contain first second
and third, which in turn contain monads, dyads, and triads. Altogether,
these elements constitute the abstract,formal mathematical categories and
relations that constitute the elements of thought." And the remarkable
truth: When we move beyond two we enter the realm of Triadic Philosophy.

"If I had a son, I should instill into him this view of morality (that is,
that Ethics is the science of the method of bringing Self-Control to bear
to gain satisfaction) and force him to see that there is but one thing that
raises one individual animal above another,--Self-Mastery; and should teach
him that the Will is free only in the sense that, by employing the proper
appliances, he can make himself behave in the way he really desires to
behave. As to what one ought to desire, it is, I should teach him, what he
will desire if he sufficiently considers it, and that will be to make his
life beautiful, admirable. Now the science of the Admirable is true
Esthetics." (As quoted in Brent, Peirce: A Life, p49).

Parsing Peirce's Neglected Argument



I think within the NA text there is ample basis for inferring that at the
time of its writing CSP had long practiced what he advocated - a damningly
unstructured mode of thinking that he advocated almost universally and
certainly for persons untrained in the philosophy that is the basis for
most Peirce studies. Rising from play, pure play, linking the barely
described universes of experience, but saying enough to imply a triadic
semiotic originating in vagueness and progressing through rude shock to a
creative linkage that might have the chance to move toward activation, even
habit. If this is not meta-physical, then what is? I think CSP has been
virtually ignored regarding what might be called his populist or everyman
assertions. Turning to revelation and mysticism, I am inclined to credit
Brent with insight into the way CSP dealt with the realization of his
situation and his experience in the Episcopal Church and to call that
mystical in the sense of it being something that siezed him, not something
he simply realized. I do not think revelation means more than a description
of that experience. I do not think the NA could have been written without
that foundational event. I do not see science as an object of worship for
Peirce, rather as a simple acknowledgement that things, perhaps extending
as far as the mystical, can be measured and evaluated in terms of their
practical effect.
The Working of Peirce's Threes



Oddly enough it was Brent, whose biography of Peirce
 I am not in
love with because it is, in a word, binary, who explained to my initial
satisfaction the working of Threes which I must assume to be the basic
structure of semiosis or semiotics at least for Peirce. To condense, the
First as excitation the Second as Blunt Truth and the Third as experimental
hypothesis or theory of how one might practically move forward beyond One
and Two. I thought I have actually been operating and thinking this way in
my own life and that I got into trouble mainly when I reverted to the
binary. I thought that most of the back and forth in Congress resulted from
being caught in the binary. I thought Obama is a Peircean either
consciously or not.



amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Tue, Feb 7, 2017 at 7:28 AM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:

> Thanks very much for responding Clark. I am going to fish around and see
> if there is a post on Brent I could pass on, A bare summary is that he
> takes Peirce's icon, index, symbol triad and makes it clear (to me at least
> and we all read and understand somewhat differently) that he was creating a
> mode 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Stephen C. Rose]

Thanks very much for responding Clark. I am going to fish around and see if
there is a post on Brent I could pass on, A bare summary is that he takes
Peirce's icon, index, symbol triad and makes it clear (to me at least and
we all read and understand somewhat differently) that he was creating a
mode of thinking that did in fact have practical consequences. Again what
is this about without such consequences? What difference does it make to
speak of living according to a triadic maxim?

On consciousness and continuity my take differs in many respects. I see
logic as a utility within consciousness, even the abductive logic that
Peirce lauds in ordinary mores of thought. Consciousness is the state
within which we make decisions according to the values we hold, which may
or may not be conscious. The more conscious they are the better I think. I
see continuity as having less with consciousness than simple chronology.
Everything is in motion from time itself to all within time. Continuity is
a sort of hint about teleology just as logic is a hint about goodness just
as consciousness is a hint about freedom and choice which accords with
Peirce's general sense of possibility and chance. The theological
implications of all this are immense.

We all live on the basis of different triggers. For me  Brent was big in
spite of his awkward and wooden effort to create a binary portrait of
Peirce. If you can get the updated book it is worth a look but I will scour
about and see f I have ever explained this reasoning. Cheers, S

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 11:19 PM, CLARK GOBLE  wrote:

>
> On Feb 6, 2017, at 8:01 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
>
> Here is my answer. Triadic thinking is conscious consideration by
> individuals. The first stage is that vague reality that comes up as a sign
> and ends up becoming more likely a word than anything else. That enables
> consideration, a second stage, an indexical query, sort of. For me that is
> a list of values which are in effect an index of what Peirce called
> memorial maxims. What Jeff calls metaphysical refers to the third stage
> which is indeed the effect or action or expression that results from the
> consideration of the first, the sign.  That is the effect, the practical
> outcome of the triadic consideration. For Peirce is this not the sine qua
> non of inquiry itself?
>
>
> I’m not sure I’d agree with the conscious part. What’s so interesting to
> me in Peirce’s semiotic is the place of continuity which presupposes a kind
> of unconscious/hidden aspect to all sign processes. Likewise his
> externalism makes me think that most of what happens happens outside of
> consciousness.
>
> That’s not to say his semiotic isn’t extremely useful for thinking through
> conscious deliberation but I think the consequence of that analysis will
> always be that a lot more is going on.
>
> Any way you slice it I cannot help thinking that this is what Brent was
> trying to understand in his generally maligned biography of Peirce. It was
> that chapter toward the end that helped me to see it. And I think Brent was
> also, like me, fishing for the actual reason why Peirce could make the
> outlandish claim that he would be built on like Aristotle. In any case, I
> want to at least establish my question as legitimate. What does this all
> aim at if not the way a practical person thinks, which would need to be
> taught to replace the largely binary understandings that permeate culture
> and understanding generally.
>
>
> I must have missed a post. I assume you mean Joseph Brent’s biography. I
> confess I’ve not read it. Could you possibly summarize that? I’m missing
> something here. (Undoubtedly my fault - my apologies I sometimes can’t keep
> up with the list and never quite find the time to go back and catch up)
>
>
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>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Feb 6, 2017, at 8:01 PM, Stephen C. Rose  wrote:
> 
> Here is my answer. Triadic thinking is conscious consideration by 
> individuals. The first stage is that vague reality that comes up as a sign 
> and ends up becoming more likely a word than anything else. That enables 
> consideration, a second stage, an indexical query, sort of. For me that is a 
> list of values which are in effect an index of what Peirce called memorial 
> maxims. What Jeff calls metaphysical refers to the third stage which is 
> indeed the effect or action or expression that results from the consideration 
> of the first, the sign.  That is the effect, the practical outcome of the 
> triadic consideration. For Peirce is this not the sine qua non of inquiry 
> itself?

I’m not sure I’d agree with the conscious part. What’s so interesting to me in 
Peirce’s semiotic is the place of continuity which presupposes a kind of 
unconscious/hidden aspect to all sign processes. Likewise his externalism makes 
me think that most of what happens happens outside of consciousness.

That’s not to say his semiotic isn’t extremely useful for thinking through 
conscious deliberation but I think the consequence of that analysis will always 
be that a lot more is going on.

> Any way you slice it I cannot help thinking that this is what Brent was 
> trying to understand in his generally maligned biography of Peirce. It was 
> that chapter toward the end that helped me to see it. And I think Brent was 
> also, like me, fishing for the actual reason why Peirce could make the 
> outlandish claim that he would be built on like Aristotle. In any case, I 
> want to at least establish my question as legitimate. What does this all aim 
> at if not the way a practical person thinks, which would need to be taught to 
> replace the largely binary understandings that permeate culture and 
> understanding generally. 

I must have missed a post. I assume you mean Joseph Brent’s biography. I 
confess I’ve not read it. Could you possibly summarize that? I’m missing 
something here. (Undoubtedly my fault - my apologies I sometimes can’t keep up 
with the list and never quite find the time to go back and catch up)
-
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[CLARK GOBLE]

> On Feb 6, 2017, at 5:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like Mill's, 
> are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like Peirce's, that 
> are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of metaphysics, 
> then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the things that the 
> realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to presuppose less (which 
> is a virtue, no doubt). 

I’ll confess it’s been a while since I last studied Mill in any depth, but 
going by my distant memory I’d say the bigger facet between Mill and Peirce is 
vagueness. That is much of Mill’s writing presupposes that the entities in 
question are present in some way to consciousness or at least to some logical 
analysis. Peirce in contrast has a very significant logic of vagueness such 
that some properties are indeterminate but not available to the inquirer.  

This obviously problematizes Mill’s meta-ethic. My distant memory is that it 
also is a problem for his epistemology. His associationism I just don’t 
remember well at all so that may avoid this problem but I’d not be shocked to 
discover that depends upon fully determinate parts out of which larger 
knowledge is built. (My distance memory is that Mill is somewhat similar to 
Husserl & Russell in therms of knowledge by acquaintance but I might be 
completely wrong on that)

That’s somewhat of a tangent to your point but I raise it more to note that 
there are other elements of logic/metaphysics that are pretty crucial in 
distinguishing Peirce from his rough contemporaries. 

In a sense the nominalist presupposes less, but there are practical 
implications for what they do presuppose and often they presuppose more than 
Peirce. (The common assumption of completeness that really didn’t come under 
sustained attack until the mid to late 20th century is an example) I think 
externalism is an other example of this. Admittedly those who allow for robust 
knowledge by acquaintance can do more here. But I think that a more robust 
externalism is pretty important metaphysically although that does become 
significant in the more early 20th century with Sartre, Heidegger and others. 
(The reemergence of pragmatism as strong position with Putnam and others also 
comes to question these assumptions)

All of this is a round about way of saying I’m pretty skeptical the issue is 
always realism/nominalism. I think I’d want to see a solid argument to think 
it’s not dwarfed by other factors.
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Stephen C. Rose]

I keep wondering to what these wonderful posts refer. I am not being
ironical or sarcastic. Jeff's first paragraph sweeping description of
first, second and third is beautiful. But to what does it refer? What is
its practical effect? How is it used?

Here is my answer. Triadic thinking is conscious consideration by
individuals. The first stage is that vague reality that comes up as a sign
and ends up becoming more likely a word than anything else. That enables
consideration, a second stage, an indexical query, sort of. For me that is
a list of values which are in effect an index of what Peirce called
memorial maxims. What Jeff calls metaphysical refers to the third stage
which is indeed the effect or action or expression that results from the
consideration of the first, the sign.  That is the effect, the practical
outcome of the triadic consideration. For Peirce is this not the sine qua
non of inquiry itself?

Any way you slice it I cannot help thinking that this is what Brent was
trying to understand in his generally maligned biography of Peirce. It was
that chapter toward the end that helped me to see it. And I think Brent was
also, like me, fishing for the actual reason why Peirce could make the
outlandish claim that he would be built on like Aristotle. In any case, I
want to at least establish my question as legitimate. What does this all
aim at if not the way a practical person thinks, which would need to be
taught to replace the largely binary understandings that permeate culture
and understanding generally.

amazon.com/author/stephenrose

On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 7:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Clark, List,
>
>
> The central point I am making is that Peirce works out conceptions
> concerning the nature of the real first and foremost within the context of
> the normative theory of logic. He develops a nominal conception of the real
> that is needed for the sake of an account of deduction, and then he moves
> to richer notions as he tries to classify, explain and justify principles
> of synthetic inference. With that in hand, he then turns to questions of
> metaphysics.
>
>
> If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like
> Mill's, are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like
> Peirce's, that are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of
> metaphysics, then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the
> things that the realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to
> presuppose less (which is a virtue, no doubt). Having said that, the
> differences come to the fore when we shift attention from the character of
> the conclusions we have already drawn in metaphysics (or in the special
> sciences) to inquiries in the normative sciences about the ideals and
> principles that ought to govern inquiry.
>
>
> On that front, I believe the differences between these types of
> positions are quite striking--and it is much easier to see that there are
> real practical differences between the views with respect to understanding
> how we ought to engage in inquiry (including inquiry in the normative
> theory of logic itself). Having seen the differences more clearly from
> within the context of the logical theory, it is considerably easier to
> engage in the disputes in metaphysics with some assurance that we are
> engaged in real disputes over questions that really matter.
>
>
> When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their
> proper order, I support these sorts of moves.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
>
> ----------
> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, February 6, 2017 5:12 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
>
>
> On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
> As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and
> realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's *System of
> Logic* and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different
> philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning.
>
>
> Do you think these end up being tied to nominalism? I’d be extremely
> interested if you can give some examples of that. I confess I’m skeptical
> since to my eyes from a logical perspective there’s not a lot of difference
> between a real general and a term indexing to a bunch of real particulars.
> Now the logical properties of various notions of infinity do of course
> matter a great deal. There you find say an Aristotilean potential infinity
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list:



It is statements like the following that makes the whole matter of adopting
CP 5.189 and not CP 5.402 that much more baffling.



“When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their
proper order, I support these sorts of moves.” ~Jeff



Oh well, I suppose this yet another instance where

"The reason is that these several objects are not equally obvious to us.



…so let us now discuss the method to be adopted in tracing the elements
predicated as constituting the definable form.



Now since we have shown above that attributes predicated as belonging to
the essential nature are necessary and that universals are necessary, and
since the attributes which we select as inhering in triad, or in any other
subject whose attributes we select in this way, are predicated as belonging
to its essential nature, triad will thus possess these attributes
necessarily.



Divisions according to differentiae are a useful accessory to this method.



But, in fact, the order in which the attributes are predicated does make a
difference — it matters whether we say animal-tame-biped, or
biped-animal-tame.



In establishing a definition by division one should keep three objects in
view:



(1) the admission only of elements in the definable form,

(2) the arrangement of these in the right order,

(3) the omission of no such elements.



The right order will be achieved if the right term is assumed as primary,
and this will be ensured if the term selected is predicable of all the
others but not all they of it; since there must be one such term.



On the other hand, in so far as the One results from composition (by a
consilience of the Many), whereas they result from disintegration the Many
are more ‘elementary’ than the One, and prior to it in their nature.”
~Aristotle



Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 6:25 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Clark, List,
>
>
> The central point I am making is that Peirce works out conceptions
> concerning the nature of the real first and foremost within the context of
> the normative theory of logic. He develops a nominal conception of the real
> that is needed for the sake of an account of deduction, and then he moves
> to richer notions as he tries to classify, explain and justify principles
> of synthetic inference. With that in hand, he then turns to questions of
> metaphysics.
>
>
> If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like
> Mill's, are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like
> Peirce's, that are more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of
> metaphysics, then we will find that the nominalists can say many of the
> things that the realists say--but in more limited terms that seem to
> presuppose less (which is a virtue, no doubt). Having said that, the
> differences come to the fore when we shift attention from the character of
> the conclusions we have already drawn in metaphysics (or in the special
> sciences) to inquiries in the normative sciences about the ideals and
> principles that ought to govern inquiry.
>
>
> On that front, I believe the differences between these types of
> positions are quite striking--and it is much easier to see that there are
> real practical differences between the views with respect to understanding
> how we ought to engage in inquiry (including inquiry in the normative
> theory of logic itself). Having seen the differences more clearly from
> within the context of the logical theory, it is considerably easier to
> engage in the disputes in metaphysics with some assurance that we are
> engaged in real disputes over questions that really matter.
>
>
> When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their
> proper order, I support these sorts of moves.
>
>
> --Jeff
>
>
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
>
> --------------
> *From:* Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, February 6, 2017 5:12 PM
> *To:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
>
>
> On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
> As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and
> realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's *System of
> Logic* and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different
> philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning.
>
>
> Do you think these end up being tied to nominalism? I’d be extremely
> interested if you can give some examples of that. I confess I’m skeptical
> since to my eyes from a logical perspective there’s n

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Clark, List,


The central point I am making is that Peirce works out conceptions concerning 
the nature of the real first and foremost within the context of the normative 
theory of logic. He develops a nominal conception of the real that is needed 
for the sake of an account of deduction, and then he moves to richer notions as 
he tries to classify, explain and justify principles of synthetic inference. 
With that in hand, he then turns to questions of metaphysics.


If we try to understand the differences between positions that, like Mill's, 
are more radically nominalist in orientation and those, like Peirce's, that are 
more radically realist, by focusing solely on matters of metaphysics, then we 
will find that the nominalists can say many of the things that the realists 
say--but in more limited terms that seem to presuppose less (which is a virtue, 
no doubt). Having said that, the differences come to the fore when we shift 
attention from the character of the conclusions we have already drawn in 
metaphysics (or in the special sciences) to inquiries in the normative sciences 
about the ideals and principles that ought to govern inquiry.


On that front, I believe the differences between these types of positions are 
quite striking--and it is much easier to see that there are real practical 
differences between the views with respect to understanding how we ought to 
engage in inquiry (including inquiry in the normative theory of logic itself). 
Having seen the differences more clearly from within the context of the logical 
theory, it is considerably easier to engage in the disputes in metaphysics with 
some assurance that we are engaged in real disputes over questions that really 
matter.


When it comes to matters of methodology and putting the pieces in their proper 
order, I support these sorts of moves.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Clark Goble <cl...@lextek.com>
Sent: Monday, February 6, 2017 5:12 PM
To: Peirce-L
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism


On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:36 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
<jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and 
realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's System of Logic and 
Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different philosophical 
accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning.

Do you think these end up being tied to nominalism? I'd be extremely interested 
if you can give some examples of that. I confess I'm skeptical since to my eyes 
from a logical perspective there's not a lot of difference between a real 
general and a term indexing to a bunch of real particulars. Now the logical 
properties of various notions of infinity do of course matter a great deal. 
There you find say an Aristotilean potential infinity playing a very different 
role. But I think many nominalists are perfectly content to allow terms to 
refer to an infinite number of entities even if some are more like mathematical 
constructivists requiring a bit more care.

As I think I said a week or two ago when we get to set theory things may get a 
bit trickier since of course famously allowing loose set membership leads to 
paradoxes. Perhaps one can make a stronger argument in set theory and set 
construction that realism vs. nominalism matters far more.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Clark Goble]

> On Feb 6, 2017, at 11:09 AM, Eric Charles  
> wrote:
> 
> There, as now, I'm not convinced that being a nominalist or realist would 
> adhere one to a particular sense of right or wrong in such a case. I would 
> imagine it was relatively trivial to argue in favor of, or against, dividing 
> the field in such a way, from either side, if your unrelated biases 
> predisposed you one way or the other. 

Nominalism and the more minority view of realism are still both very broad 
categories. Lots of different views can be found under each category. That’s 
partially why, as Ben noted, it’s hard to draw out implications. While I’m a 
big believer in looking at the cash value of an idea, with nominalism I’m not 
as convinced as some there is one. I mentioned the problem of what is 
changeable. I think a second consideration is a certain overskepticism towards 
generalities we find in nature.

However the reality is that the examples I gave of skepticism towards certain 
regularities science finds really aren’t due to nominalism. People completely 
ignorant of nominalism can make those same mistakes. Especially if there are 
political incentives towards doing so.



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

Peirce's architectonic required that metaphysics must derive its principles
from logic, rather than the other way around.  My impression is that there
is not consensus on this arrangement, and in particular, that at least some
nominalists would insist that metaphysics is more basic than logic.  Once
again, the question arises--what practical difference does it make?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 12:36 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard <
jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:

> Eric, Ben, List,
>
> Would it make any difference if, in addition to the different
> interpretations of the regularities concerning the apples in the orchard,
> we also included different interpretations of the principles of reasoning?
> As an example, why don't we compare historical examples of nominalist and
> realist positions in logic, such as what we find in Mill's *System of
> Logic* and Peirce's logical theory. When we do, we find very different
> philosophical accounts of the principles that govern valid reasoning. Does
> the adoption of these different theories of reasoning lead to different
> practical results when it comes to criticizing and evaluating the abductive
> and inductive inferences in virtue of which one formulates and tests
> hypotheses concerning the regularities we observe with respect to such
> things as apples in an orchard or bags of beans in a barn?
>
> To what extent can we evaluate the adequacy of competing metaphysical
> theories without also taking into account the theories of logic from which
> they derive their structure and much of their content.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354 <(928)%20523-8354>
>
> --
> *From:* Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com>
> *Sent:* Monday, February 6, 2017 11:09 AM
> *To:* Benjamin Udell
> *Cc:* Peirce-L
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
>
> Ben,
> There was an attempt, on the earlier thread I initiated, to provide an
> example similar to your east-west divide of the apple field. There, as now,
> I'm not convinced that being a nominalist or realist would adhere one to a
> particular sense of right or wrong in such a case. I would imagine it was
> relatively trivial to argue in favor of, or against, dividing the field in
> such a way, from either side, if your unrelated biases predisposed you one
> way or the other.
>
> I could, as a nominalist, insist that though the division be an arbitrary
> convention, we follow the rule none the less. I also could insist, as a
> realist, that east-west is far more than a *mere* convention of language,
> and explain the logic of using it as a criteria.
>
> Similarly I could, as a nominalist, insist that the arbitrary convention
> of east-west have no hold over my ability to pick apples where I please. I
> could also insist, as a realist, that east-west, while having a local
> relative meaning has no global meaning that would allow it to serve as a
> useful arbiter in this case.
>
> Etc., etc.
>
> Whether or not 'generals' are 'real' doesn't necessitate my using - or
> rejecting the use of - those concepts in such an abstracted example. Or, to
> phrase it differently, whether I suspect that, in the end times, the
> opinion of honest investigators will allow for 'east' and 'west', doesn't
> matter a lick to how divide up the field right now. This is similar to the
> how we can have fruitful discussions about the impact of race in America,
> and solutions to the problems race-based thinking has caused, all while
> also acknowledging that 'race' is a BS concept, which is likely to be done
> away with by honest inquirers long before the end times are here.
>
> If you think that being a nominalist is likely to correspond to certain
> other tendencies, based on your observations of the distribution of ideas
> we happen to see in current society, that is another matter all together.
> Such matters are not logical consequences of adopting one view or the
> other, they are happenstance correlates, and so (as far as I understand it)
> would not count for Peirce's pragmatic maxim.
>
> ---
> Eric P. Charles, Ph.D.
> Supervisory Survey Statistician
> U.S. Marine Corps
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Benjamin Udell]

Eric, Jon S., list,

I don't think that the nominalist and realist views are symmetrical as 
you suggest with regard to generals and individuals. A Peircean realist 
will say that individuals have some generality but still can only be in 
one place at a time, unlike "more-general" generals, and would never say 
that every term designating an individual is a mere _/flatus vocis/_ as 
many a nominalist has called every general term. The individual in 
Peirce's view is not a mere construct but instead is forced indexically 
on a mind by reaction and resistance. Peirce somewhere also says that a 
universe of discourse is likewise distinguished indexically. For Peirce, 
the individual is the reactive/resistant, and reaction/resistance is 
Secondness, a basic phaneroscopic category.


Let's bring into your apple-picker scenario some non-extraneous generals 
that would make a difference between the two apple pickers. For example, 
they get into an argument about which apples each of them is allowed to 
pick. Apple picker Alf says that he's allowed to pick any apples only in 
the eastern area and that apple picker Beth is allowed to pick any 
apples only in the western area, while Beth says that each of them 
should be able to pick any apples anywhere in the area. Alf says that 
the rules prescribe the east-west split, while Beth says that those 
rules are unfair and should be ignored or evaded. Alf says not that the 
rules are fair but instead that there is no such thing as "fair" apart 
from what the rules state in individual documents or announcements. Beth 
doesn't expound a full-blown doctrine of either natural law or 
revolutionary justice, but simply insists, "fair is fair." I won't say 
that Alf is a strict nominalist and Beth a strict scholastic realist, 
but just that they tend respectively toward nominalism (Alf) and realism 
(Beth). At their respective worsts, Alf promotes conformity with a cruel 
and unjust regime, while Beth promotes the breakdown of the rule of law. 
Alf's attitude is more congenial to the idea that there is no idea of 
fairness above that of the state. On the other hand, some nominalists 
would argue that nominalism and the more-nominalistic brands of 
positivism are at least a good holding action against the militant ideas 
that contributed to the vast bloodshed in the 20th Century. My picture 
doesn't quite converge with Edwina's picture but I don't mean to deny 
her picture either. Nominalism and realism are pretty general ideas that 
could get rooted in practice in disparate ways.


I once read a web page where somebody argued that HTML markup that 
complies with official, explicit HTML standards is right "by 
definition."  This was as if the standards themselves had not been 
devised according to some more general and probably less definite idea 
of what standards should be like and as if there could be no idea of 
HTML rightness that would require the revision of the official, explicit 
standards promulgated on individual dates in specific documents by the 
World Wide Web Consortium. Now, for a while the Mozilla Firefox browser 
adhered to the standards in certain cases where the standards were 
problematic. I don't think that the Firefox designers denied the need 
for revised standards, based on a more general idea of standards, but 
they didn't like the idea of rebellion by browser designers (such 
rebellion does make it more difficult to design web pages that work in 
all browsers). But they took this "letter of the law" attitude to an 
extreme.  (I'm thinking in particular of how Firefox treated two or more 
directly successive hyphens in a hidden comment - IIRC, it treated them 
as a hidden comment's closing tag (except the double hyphen in the 
opening tag), whereas other browsers and most webpage designers treated 
-->, a double hyphen followed directly by a greater-than sign, as the 
one and only way to do a hidden comment's closing tag. For a while I 
found myself deleting or replacing with equals-signs many strings of 
hyphens that Joe Ransdell had placed between hidden-comment tags at 
Arisbe. Anyway, Mozilla finally gave in and said something like "We 
don't have to change our browser for this, but we will.")


Best, Ben

On 2/6/2017 9:58 AM, Eric Charles wrote:

JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists 
entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to 
facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality 
consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to 
facilitate discourse.  If so, how does this help answer Eric's 
original question about the practical differences that one view 
manifests relative to the other?


Uh oh.

I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list 
discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were 
/just/ people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads 
to convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere) 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

I agree with your comments, but they involve a shift in the meaning of
"individual" from "singular subject" (logical/metaphysical) to "human
being" (social/political).  What I take Eric to be asking--and what has
come to interest me, as well--is whether there are other "conceivable
practical effects" (CP 5.196; 1903) that are clearly different between
these two concepts.

   - Extreme nominalism = reality consists entirely of individuals, so
   there are no real generals; just concepts/names that we use to think/talk
   about things that are similar in some way.
   - Extreme realism = reality consists entirely of generals, so there are
   no real individuals; just concepts/names that we use to think/talk about
   things that are distinct in some way.

Given Peirce's nearly lifelong crusade against all forms of nominalism, it
seems like we should be able to identify additional "conditional
experiential consequences" (CP 6.470; 1908) that sharply distinguish it
from his own "extreme scholastic realism" (CP 8.208; c. 1905).  I think you
are probably on the right track with the idea that science studies objects
in their generality, rather than their individuality.  I also keep coming
back to the related notion that nominalism accepts aspects of reality as
incognizable and laws of nature as inexplicable, thus blocking the way of
inquiry.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Feb 6, 2017 at 10:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky <tabor...@primus.ca> wrote:

> Eric - great fun.
>
> But, both the nominalist and the realist, when dealing with individual
> 'things', acknowledge that those individual things exist in time and space.
> So, both can pick those apples quite happily in a similar fashion. [And
> after all, that is one valid definition of 'realism']. And in all
> probability, neither cares about such irrelevant ideas as 'generals'. So,
> does the concept of 'general' have any  value?
>
> I think so - not when one is busy at quantifying individual 'things'. But,
> when one is dealing with concepts which are common to a number of things
> and have continuity over time and space, such as 'wise', various moral
> concepts, and general concepts such as 'tree', 'water'..etc.. then,
> philosophical realism moves in to declare that these concepts have a
> general reality that is articulated in individual instantiations.
> TREE--->this particular tree.
>
> What's the point? As you say, in daily life it makes no difference. But I
> think that it does, socially and politically. Realism removes the
> individual as the key agent of thought and moves the community, the
> long-term community, into that role. It prevents subjective relativism,
> prevents the notion that each individual can directly and individually
> perfectly KNOW the world and insists instead on that community of scholars
> and indeed, denies full knowledge...because, realism says that information
> is not found in ONE individual object but in the GENERALITY of objects, and
> as such, requires a different approach than direct singular observation.
>
> I think the difference is important in the societal and political effects
> of the two different approaches. I don't think that there is any great
> difference in actual knowledge of our external world.
>
> Edwina
>
> - Original Message -
> *From:* Eric Charles <eric.phillip.char...@gmail.com>
> *To:* Peirce List <peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
> *Cc:* Nicholas Thompson (Google Docs) <nickthomp...@earthlink.net>
> *Sent:* Monday, February 06, 2017 9:58 AM
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism
>
> JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists
> entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate
> discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely
> of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse.
> If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the
> practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other?
>
> Uh oh.
>
> I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list
> discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were *just*
> people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads to
> convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere) Nominalists are again
> being attributed more positive beliefs, and my original question
> resurfaces: What difference does it make? That is, what
> distinction-of-consequences allows us to consider the ideas to be
> different. This seems like the context in which parables are helpful.
>
> -
>
> Imagine if you will, two apple pickers. They both pick apples, fill
> baskets, and deliver the baskets to the back of nearb

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Edwina Taborsky]

Eric - great fun.

But, both the nominalist and the realist, when dealing with individual 
'things', acknowledge that those individual things exist in time and space. So, 
both can pick those apples quite happily in a similar fashion. [And after all, 
that is one valid definition of 'realism']. And in all probability, neither 
cares about such irrelevant ideas as 'generals'. So, does the concept of 
'general' have any  value?

I think so - not when one is busy at quantifying individual 'things'. But, when 
one is dealing with concepts which are common to a number of things and have 
continuity over time and space, such as 'wise', various moral concepts, and 
general concepts such as 'tree', 'water'..etc.. then, philosophical realism 
moves in to declare that these concepts have a general reality that is 
articulated in individual instantiations. TREE--->this particular tree.

What's the point? As you say, in daily life it makes no difference. But I think 
that it does, socially and politically. Realism removes the individual as the 
key agent of thought and moves the community, the long-term community, into 
that role. It prevents subjective relativism, prevents the notion that each 
individual can directly and individually perfectly KNOW the world and insists 
instead on that community of scholars and indeed, denies full 
knowledge...because, realism says that information is not found in ONE 
individual object but in the GENERALITY of objects, and as such, requires a 
different approach than direct singular observation. 

I think the difference is important in the societal and political effects of 
the two different approaches. I don't think that there is any great difference 
in actual knowledge of our external world.

Edwina




  - Original Message - 
  From: Eric Charles 
  To: Peirce List 
  Cc: Nicholas Thompson (Google Docs) 
  Sent: Monday, February 06, 2017 9:58 AM
  Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism


  JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists entirely 
of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate discourse; 
while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely of generals, 
so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse.  If so, how does 
this help answer Eric's original question about the practical differences that 
one view manifests relative to the other?


  Uh oh. 


  I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list discussion, 
that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were just people who denied 
that collective inquiry into categories leads to convergence of ideas. But now 
(here and elsewhere) Nominalists are again being attributed more positive 
beliefs, and my original question resurfaces: What difference does it make? 
That is, what distinction-of-consequences allows us to consider the ideas to be 
different. This seems like the context in which parables are helpful. 


  -


  Imagine if you will, two apple pickers. They both pick apples, fill baskets, 
and deliver the baskets to the back of nearby trucks. At the end of the day, 
they get paid based on the number of baskets they deliver to the truck. "Look 
at  how similar those two are," you say to yourself one day while watching 
them. 


  "Heck no," someone next to you says, and you realize you must have been 
speaking your thoughts. You look inquisitively at the interlocutor, and he 
continues. "I've known those two my entire life, and they couldn't be more 
different. One is a nominalist, and the other is a Peircian realist." You 
continue to look inquisitively, and the stranger goes on. 


  "You see, Bill, on the left there, he doesn't believe that categories or 
generalities like 'apple' exist at all. He conceives of himself as picking up 
distinctly individual objects, and collecting them into baskets, with each 
basket being distinct in every way from the next basket. He sometimes points 
out, for example, that the 'red' color is not identical between any two 
picked-objects, and that any two containers of picked-objects are mind 
bogglingly different at an atomic level. The whole notion that he is collecting 
'apples' into 'baskets' that have any equivalence at all is just, he insists, a 
weird language game we have agreed to play, and doesn't correspond at all with 
reality." 


  After that barrage of ideas, the man settles into silence, watching the 
pickers. 


  "... and?..." you ply. 


   "Well, you see," he continued, after some thought, "in contrast, Jim, over 
there on the right, believes that only generals are real, and the idea that 
these apples are individuals is the flaw in our thinking. After all, what makes 
'that apple' any less misleading than any other label of individuality. What 
about 'that apple' will be the same when it gets to the store shelf? Heck, he 
would even claim that it is odd to

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Eric Charles]

JS said: In other words, the nominalist says that reality consists entirely
of individuals, so generals are only names we use to facilitate discourse;
while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists entirely of
generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate discourse.  If
so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the practical
differences that one view manifests relative to the other?

Uh oh.

I was rather satisfied with having decided, aided by the list
discussion, that - from a pragmatist perspective - nominalists were *just*
people who denied that collective inquiry into categories leads to
convergence of ideas. But now (here and elsewhere) Nominalists are again
being attributed more positive beliefs, and my original question
resurfaces: What difference does it make? That is, what
distinction-of-consequences allows us to consider the ideas to be
different. This seems like the context in which parables are helpful.

-

Imagine if you will, two apple pickers. They both pick apples, fill
baskets, and deliver the baskets to the back of nearby trucks. At the end
of the day, they get paid based on the number of baskets they deliver to
the truck. "Look at  how similar those two are," you say to yourself one
day while watching them.

"Heck no," someone next to you says, and you realize you must have been
speaking your thoughts. You look inquisitively at the interlocutor, and he
continues. "I've known those two my entire life, and they couldn't be more
different. One is a nominalist, and the other is a Peircian realist." You
continue to look inquisitively, and the stranger goes on.

"You see, Bill, on the left there, he doesn't believe that categories or
generalities like 'apple' exist at all. He conceives of himself as picking
up distinctly individual objects, and collecting them into baskets, with
each basket being distinct in every way from the next basket. He sometimes
points out, for example, that the 'red' color is not identical between any
two picked-objects, and that any two containers of picked-objects are mind
bogglingly different at an atomic level. The whole notion that he is
collecting 'apples' into 'baskets' that have any equivalence at all is
*just*, he insists, a weird language game we have agreed to play, and
doesn't correspond at all with reality."

After that barrage of ideas, the man settles into silence, watching the
pickers.

"... and?..." you ply.

 "Well, you see," he continued, after some thought, "in contrast, Jim, over
there on the right, believes that only generals are real, and the idea that
these apples are individuals is the flaw in our thinking. After all, what
makes 'that apple' any less misleading than any other label of
individuality. What about 'that apple' will be the same when it gets to the
store shelf? Heck, he would even claim that it is odd to believe that
Bill-on-the-left is the same person he was a year ago. Bill-on-the-left has
the properties of being a singular thing, but the identity label itself
is just convenient ways to refer to complex composite beings, and don't get
at any sort of 'essence' at all. Those individual names are *just*, he
insist, a weird linguistic device to facilitate discourse. Quite to the
contrary, Jim would insist, if there is anything going on here that honest
inquirers would agree about after the dust settles, it is that 'apples'
were put in 'baskets', and that makes those generals real."

"Huh," you insist, "that is all very fascinating, but I can detect no
difference in their behavior that would correspond to such a dramatic
seeming difference in thinking. Do they not both pick, and bucket, and
deliver in the same manner? And wait in the same line, in the same way, to
receive the same pay, with the same sullenness?"

"Well yes," says the stranger, "but trust me, they are very, very
different. As I said, one is a nominalist, and the other a realist in the
pragmatic vein. Men with such contrasting sets of ideas couldn't be more
different."

"Huh," you repeat, "aside from the words and phrases they would invoke in a
conversation about the specific topic you brought up, what conditions could
we arrange so as to see the difference in belief manifest as clear
differences in behavior? (Granting probability, and all that.) "

"Well, you couldn't," says the stranger, "they are differences in belief,
not differences in habit."

"Ah," you reply confidently, "it is too bad your thinking is not as clear
as mine. Belief is habit. As such, if there is no difference in habit
between the two that would - granted probability, and all that - manifest
itself under some arranged circumstances, then the two beliefs are
equivalent, no matter what the words might mislead you into thinking. Thus,
if you don't mind, I'll continue to think that the two people are very
similar."

Another long pause ensued, and the man offered, sounding less certain,
"Well, I suppose they would relatively-reflexively complain differently,

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon S, Jon A, List,


In a discussion of individuals at 3.612-3 in the Collected Papers, Peirce 
points to the history of the conception as it has been used by scientists and 
philosophers. He notes that the conception was worked out in the sciences of 
astronomy and physics prior to Aristotle, who then provides an account for 
inquiries involving the classification of different species. After that, he 
makes a distinction between two logical conceptions of individuals--one drawing 
on Kant's account and the other on the Stoic account--and seems to support both.


§2. INDIVIDUAL

Used in logic in two closely connected senses.

(1) According to the more formal of these an individual is an object (or term) 
not only actually determinate in respect to having or wanting each general 
character and not both having and wanting any, but is necessitated by its mode 
of being to be so determinate. See Particular (in logic).

(2) Another definition which avoids the above difficulties is that an 
individual is something which reacts. That is to say, it does react against 
some things, and is of such a nature that it might react, or have reacted, 
against my will.



In "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within", 
he characterizes three clauses in the general law of logic.


The general law of logic has likewise its three clauses. The monadic clause is 
that fact is in its existence perfectly definite. Inquiry properly carried on 
will reach some definite and fixed result or approximate indefinitely toward 
that limit. Every subject is existentially determinate with respect to each 
predicate. The dyadic clause is that there are two and but two possible 
determinations of each subject with reference to each predicate, the 
affirmative and the negative. Not only is the dyadic character manifest by the 
double determination, but also by the double prescription; first that the 
possibilities are two at least, and second that they are two at most. The 
determination is not both affirmative and negative, but it is either one or the 
other. A third limiting form of determination belongs to any subject [with 
regard] to [some other] one whose mode of existence is of a lower order, [the 
limiting case involving] a relative zero, related to the subjects of the 
affirmation and the negation as an inconsistent hypothesis is to a consistent 
one.

CP 1.485


Are each of your remarks about the conception of the individual meant to be an 
interpretation of the logical conception, or are you trying to offer 
suggestions about how to apply the the logical principles within metaphysics, 
as he does next, or are you suggesting that conceptions you are articulating 
the accounts drawn from the special sciences? I don't assume that the 
conception of the individual is meant to do quite the same work in each of 
these areas of inquiry.


--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com>
Sent: Friday, February 3, 2017 10:36 AM
To: Jon Awbrey
Cc: Peirce List
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

Jon A., List:

These comments strike me as getting to the heart of the matter.

JA:  It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake a 
general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn around and 
mistake an individual name for the name of an individual?

JA:  Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse, that 
is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse, and so he 
makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than an ontological 
essence.

JA:  This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy 
between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal thinkers 
that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily any less ideal than 
the denotations of general terms. Whether signs are secure in their denotations 
has to be determined on more solid practical grounds than mere grammatical 
category.

Am I right to interpret this as supporting the notion that all individuals are 
general (to some degree), rather than truly singular (determinate in every 
conceivable respect)?  In other words, the nominalist says that reality 
consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use to 
facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality consists 
entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to facilitate 
discourse.  If so, how does this help answer Eric's original question about the 
practical differences that one view manifests relative to the other?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - 
twitter.c

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jon A., List:

These comments strike me as getting to the heart of the matter.

JA:  It is a maxim of nominal(istic) thinking that we should not mistake a
general name for the name of a general. But should we then turn around and
mistake an individual name for the name of an individual?

JA:  Peirce makes the status of being an individual relative to discourse,
that is, a context of discussion or a specified universe of discourse, and
so he makes individuality an interpretive attribute rather than an
ontological essence.

JA:  This does nothing less than subvert the very basis of the controversy
between nominalism and realism by dispelling the illusion of nominal
thinkers that the denotations of individual terms are necessarily any less
ideal than the denotations of general terms. Whether signs are secure in
their denotations has to be determined on more solid practical grounds than
mere grammatical category.


Am I right to interpret this as supporting the notion that all individuals
are general (to some degree), rather than truly singular (determinate in
every conceivable respect)?  In other words, the nominalist says that
reality consists entirely of individuals, so generals are only names we use
to facilitate discourse; while the (Peircean) realist says that reality
consists entirely of generals, so individuals are only names we use to
facilitate discourse.  If so, how does this help answer Eric's original
question about the practical differences that one view manifests relative
to the other?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Feb 3, 2017 at 10:44 AM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> Peircers,
>
> I continue to review the multiple threads from January
> on Generals, Realism, Individuals, Nominalism (GRIN),
> forming as they do such a near-at-hand microcosm of
> eternally recurring themes.  In the process I found
> myself drawn back to previous encounters with the
> whole panoply of puzzles that always arises here.
> So here's a few pieces of prologue from the past:
>
> o~o~o~o~o~o~o
>
> November 2000
>
> JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20020322102614/http://www.virt
> ual-earth.de/CG/cg-list/msg03592.html
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/C.S._Peirce_%E2%
> 80%A2_Doctrine_Of_Individuals
>
> o~o~o~o~o~o~o
>
> November 2002
>
> JA:http://web.archive.org/web/20070226082502/http://suo.ieee
> .org/ontology/msg04332.html
>
> Any genuine appreciation of what Peirce has to say about identity,
> indices, names, proper or otherwise, and the putative distinctions
> between individual, particular, and general terms will have to deal
> with what he wrote in 1870 about the “doctrine of individuals”.
>
> Notice that this statement, together with the maxims
> that “Whatever has comprehension must be general”
> and “Whatever has extension must be composite”,
> pull the rug — and all of the elephants —
> out from underneath the nominal thinker's
> wishful thinking to find ontological
> security in individual names, which
> said nominal thinker has confused
> with the names of individuals,
> to turn a phrase back on same.
>
> http://intersci.ss.uci.edu/wiki/index.php/C.S._Peirce_%E2%
> 80%A2_Doctrine_Of_Individuals#DOI._Note_1
>
> o~o~o~o~o~o~o
>
> January 2015
>
> JA:https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2015-01/msg00175.html
>
> By theoretical entities I mean things like classes,
> properties, qualities, sets, situations, or states
> of affairs, in general, the putative denotations of
> theoretical concepts, formulas, sentences, in brief,
> the ostensible objects of signs.
>
> A conventional statement of Ockham's Razor is —
>
> • “Entities shall not be multiplied beyond necessity.”
>
> That is still good advice, as practical maxims go, but
> a pragmatist will read that as practical necessity or
> utility, qualifying the things that we need to posit
> in order to think at all, without getting lost in
> endless circumlocutions of perfectly good notions.
>
> Nominalistic revolts are well-intentioned when they
> naturally arise, seeking to clear away the clutter
> of ostentatious entities ostensibly denoted by
> signs that do not denote.
>
> But that is no different in its basic intention than
> what Peirce sought to do, clarifying metaphysics
> though the application of the Pragmatic Maxim.
>
> Taking the long view, then, pragmatism can be seen as
> a moderate continuation of Ockham's revolt, substituting
> a principled revolution for what tends to descend to
> a reign of terror.
>
> http://permalink.gmane.org/gmane.science.philosophy.peirce/15467
> https://inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/01/20/pragmatism-about-
> theoretical-entities-1/
>
> o~o~o~o~o~o~o
>
> March 2015
>