List: As quoted and discussed below, Peirce stated in 1903 that a Percept "does not stand for anything," thus implying that a Percept *is not* a Sign. In a letter to William James dated October 1904, he added, "Percepts are signs for psychology; but they are not so for phenomenology" (CP 8.300). However, as quoted in another thread last week, he stated in 1906 that "a Percept is a Seme" and then referred to "the Percept, which is a Seme" (CP 4.539-540), thus implying that a Percept *is *a Sign--specifically, something "which serves for any purpose as a substitute for an object of which it is, in some sense, a representative or Sign" (CP 4.538). Further digging turned up the following, which the EP 2 editors dated to late 1904.
CSP: Some of the requisites of communication which analysis has signalized are obvious enough; others are not so. Thus, it is said to be a necessary result of the analysis that the object represented by the sign, and whose characters are independent of such representation, should itself be of the nature of a sign, so that its characters are not independent of *all *representation. This is intelligible from the point of view of pragmatism, according to which the objects of which ordinary general propositions have to be true, if they are to be true at all, are the body of future percepts. But percepts are themselves signs, whether veracious or not. The fact that the characters of the future percepts are independent of what they have been expected to be does not in the least prevent their being signs. (EP 2:328) My first observation is that Peirce clearly affirmed here that Percepts *are* Signs, consistent with the 1906 passage. I therefore have to wonder if he rather abruptly changed his mind about this near the end of 1904; and if so, whether it had anything to do with the other new developments in his thinking around the same time, such as recognizing two Objects and three Interpretants. My second observation is that this is another place where Peirce implied that the Object of a Sign must also be of the nature of a Sign, similar to one that I brought up a while back. CSP: Every sign stands for an object independent of itself; but it can only be a sign of that object in so far as that object is itself of the nature of a sign or thought. For the sign does not affect the object but is affected by it; so that the object must be able to convey thought, that is, must be of the nature of thought or of a sign. (CP 1.538; 1903) I suggested then that Peirce was hinting at either the uncontroversial Dynamic/Immediate Object distinction or the speculative General/Dynamic Object distinction that I am currently advocating. It is interesting that in the 1904 quote he identified "the objects of which ordinary general propositions have to be true" as "the body of future percepts." My guess is that this is a reference to the idea of *conditional necessity*, consistent with understanding the General Object as what a Sign (Type) *would *denote at the end of infinite inquiry by an infinite community. Likewise, his statement that this Object's "characters are not independent of *all *representation" is consistent with understanding the Final Interpretant as what a Sign (Type) *would *signify in accordance with the ultimate opinion. I keep finding myself drawn back to Peirce's summary of this regulative hope, also written in 1904. CSP: The purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being, then, the Universe *qua *fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP 2:304) Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt On Fri, Sep 14, 2018 at 5:06 PM, Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> wrote: > ... phenomenology is the study of phenomena *in themselves*, while > Normative Science is the study of phenomena *in their relations to ends* > (cf. EP 2:197; 1903). However, Peirce placed Logic as Semeiotic under the > latter, rather than the former, precisely because he viewed its subject > matter as "those things whose end is to represent something" (EP > 2:200)--not Signs as merely *apparent*, but Signs as *purposive*. > > Perhaps this is the basis for distinguishing mediation as 3ns in > phenomenology from Signs as 3ns in Normative Science. If so, then my > previous suggestion that there might be counterparts in Esthetics and > Ethics to Speculative Grammar in Logic as Semeiotic should have likewise > distinguished quality/reaction as 1ns/2ns in phenomenology from > feeling/exertion as 1ns/2ns in Normative Science. Of course, these are not > rigid separations, but they reflect different shades of meaning with > respect to each Category. Phenomenology deals with what we *perceive*, > while Normative Science deals with the resulting *effects *on us and how > we *ought *to respond accordingly. > > I think that a key question, then, is whether a Percept is *itself *a > Sign. It came up a couple of days ago that Peirce called a Percept a Seme > at CP 4.538 (1906), but elsewhere he said otherwise. > > CSP: Let us say that, as I sit here writing, I see on the other side of > my table, a yellow chair with a green cushion. That will be what > psychologists term a "percept" (*res percepta*). They also frequently > call it an "image." With this term I shall pick no quarrel. Only one must > be on one’s guard against a false impression that it might insinuate. > Namely, an "image" usually means something intended to > represent,--virtually professing to represent,--something else, real or > ideal. So understood, the word "image" would be a misnomer for a percept. > The chair I appear to see makes no professions of any kind, essentially > embodies no intentions of any kind, does not stand for anything. It > obtrudes itself upon my gaze; but not as a deputy for anything else, not > "as" anything. It simply knocks at the portal of my soul and stands there > in the doorway. (CP 7.619; 1903) > > > A Percept does not *represent *anything--it simply is what it is, or > rather appears as it does; and as such, it only includes the elements of > 1ns and 2ns (cf. CP 7.625). The subsequent Perceptual Judgment then > *represents > *the Percept, and thus introduces 3ns (cf. CP 7.630). I wonder if that > is why Peirce felt constrained "to invent the term *percipuum *to include > both percept and perceptual judgment" (CP 7.629), and affirmed later in the > same manuscript, "We can know nothing about the percept,--but only > experience it in its totality,--except through the perceptual judgment, and > this likewise compels acceptance without any assignable reason" (CP 7.659; > 1903). *Experiencing *the Phaneron is a matter of Percepts (1ns and > 2ns), which *are not* Signs; but *studying *the Phaneron requires > Perceptual Judgments (3ns), which *are *Signs. >
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