Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut:

Thanks for clarifying.  Regarding #1, any two actualities *objectively *have
a relation.

CSP:  In the metaphysical sense, *existence *is that mode of being which
consists in the resultant genuine dyadic relation of a strict individual
with all the other such individuals of the same universe. (CP 6.336; 1908)


Regarding #3, I prefer to avoid the term "reducible" altogether; projection
is *viewing *something from only one direction, but not *reducing *it to
that one perspective.

Regarding #5, any particular Object is unaffected by the Signs that
represent *that same Object*; but it is certainly affected by *other
Objects*, and perhaps by the Signs that represent those other Objects.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 5:27 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> supp.: Quote from Jon Awbrey´s Inquiry to inquiry:
>
> "As mathematical traps go, this one is hydra-headed.
>
> I don’t know if it’s possible to put a prior restraint on the varieties of
> relational reduction that might be considered, but usually we are talking
> about either one of two types of reducibility.
>
> *Compositional Reducibility.* All triadic relations are irreducible under
> relational composition, since the composition of two dyadic relations is a
> dyadic relation, by the definition of relational composition.
>
> *Projective Reducibility.* Consider the projections of a triadic relation 
> [image:
> L \subseteq X \times Y \times Z] on the coordinate planes [image: X
> \times Y, ~ X \times Z, ~ Y \times Z] and ask whether these dyadic
> relations uniquely determine [image: L.] If so, we say [image: L] is
> projectively reducible, otherwise it is projectively irreducible."
> Jon, list,
>
> I also try to stick with Peirce. Contradictions I dont see:
>
> 1.: I dont think that social is not logical, and subjectivity versus
> objectivity I see not as modes of being, but of chosen point of view.
>
> 2.: With triad I have meant triadic relation, and did not claim any
> identity.
>
> 3.: With projectional reducibility (Jon Awbrey) I have meant this
> involvement, the Peircean irreducibility is about compositional
> reducibility, which all triadic relations dont have.
>
> 4.: I agree
>
> 5.: But how then are objects changed?
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>
>  05. April 2019 um 23:38 Uhr
>  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
>
> Helmut, List:
>
> Again, I prefer to stick with Peirce on all of this.
>
>- A *logical *relation is *not *subjective, like *social *relationships
>are; it is simply "a fact about a number of things" (CP 3.416; 1892).
>- There is no "SOI triad," but a *triadic relation* between the Sign,
>Object, and Interpretant, none of which are *identical* (cf. CP 2.242,
>EP 2:290; 1903).
>- That triadic relation *involves *dyadic relations between its *external
>*correlates as I indicated previously, but it is *not reducible *to
>them (cf. CP 2.274; 1903).
>- There is no *distinct *Object-Interpretant relation because the
>Interpretant has the *same *relation to the Object that the Sign has
>(ibid).
>- The Object is *not *changed by *either *the Sign or the
>Interpretant; their triadic relation is *asymmetric* (cf. EP 2:544n22;
>1906).
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 3:22 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:
>
>> Jon, list,
>>
>> thank you for explaining, e.g. of the ten divisions of signs!
>> They contain correlates with single names, and relations too. About
>> "relation" I think, that to observe a relation it takes objectivity. But
>> objectivity is sometimes hard to achieve. For example, there is a man who
>> decides to become a stalker, and his intended-for victim, the stalker says
>> that they have a relation, and the intended-for victim says they dont. Do
>> they have one or not?
>>
>> A normal triad ABC (like in "A gives B to C") is compositionally
>> irreducible, and projectively (or projectionally, I forgot) reducible to
>> the dyads AB, BC, AC. The SOI- triad is noncompositionally, maybe also
>> called projectively, reducible to the dyads SS, SO, SI. So it is very
>> special kind of triadic relation. There is no relation OI, and in all dyads
>> S appears. So S plays a central, focal role.
>>
>> To avoid objectivity problems, I thought it is ok to look at the whole
>> thing from the sign´s point of view, that is to ask, which functions do S,
>> O, I and the further divisions have for S. Because the self-relation SS is
>> included, I think, that there is nothing more the (function of the) sign
>> consists of than these functions for it. That is why I called it
>> (functional) composition.
>>
>> But maybe there is a logical fault in this argument, because a function
>> of the sign might be that the object is changed. This might be a function
>> of the sign, but not a function for it. But maybe too, the object is
>> changed 

Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

supp.: Quote from Jon Awbrey´s Inquiry to inquiry:


"As mathematical traps go, this one is hydra-headed.

I don’t know if it’s possible to put a prior restraint on the varieties of relational reduction that might be considered, but usually we are talking about either one of two types of reducibility.

Compositional Reducibility. All triadic relations are irreducible under relational composition, since the composition of two dyadic relations is a dyadic relation, by the definition of relational composition.

Projective Reducibility. Consider the projections of a triadic relation  on the coordinate planes  and ask whether these dyadic relations uniquely determine  If so, we say  is projectively reducible, otherwise it is projectively irreducible."





Jon, list,

 

I also try to stick with Peirce. Contradictions I dont see:

 

1.: I dont think that social is not logical, and subjectivity versus objectivity I see not as modes of being, but of chosen point of view.

 

2.: With triad I have meant triadic relation, and did not claim any identity.

 

3.: With projectional reducibility (Jon Awbrey) I have meant this involvement, the Peircean irreducibility is about compositional reducibility, which all triadic relations dont have.

 

4.: I agree

 

5.: But how then are objects changed?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 05. April 2019 um 23:38 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 





Helmut, List:
 

Again, I prefer to stick with Peirce on all of this.



	A logical relation is not subjective, like social relationships are; it is simply "a fact about a number of things" (CP 3.416; 1892).
	There is no "SOI triad," but a triadic relation between the Sign, Object, and Interpretant, none of which are identical (cf. CP 2.242, EP 2:290; 1903).
	That triadic relation involves dyadic relations between its external correlates as I indicated previously, but it is not reducible to them (cf. CP 2.274; 1903).
	There is no distinct Object-Interpretant relation because the Interpretant has the same relation to the Object that the Sign has (ibid).
	The Object is not changed by either the Sign or the Interpretant; their triadic relation is asymmetric (cf. EP 2:544n22; 1906).







Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 3:22 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




Jon, list,

 

thank you for explaining, e.g. of the ten divisions of signs!

They contain correlates with single names, and relations too. About "relation" I think, that to observe a relation it takes objectivity. But objectivity is sometimes hard to achieve. For example, there is a man who decides to become a stalker, and his intended-for victim, the stalker says that they have a relation, and the intended-for victim says they dont. Do they have one or not?

 

A normal triad ABC (like in "A gives B to C") is compositionally irreducible, and projectively (or projectionally, I forgot) reducible to the dyads AB, BC, AC. The SOI- triad is noncompositionally, maybe also called projectively, reducible to the dyads SS, SO, SI. So it is very special kind of triadic relation. There is no relation OI, and in all dyads S appears. So S plays a central, focal role.

 

To avoid objectivity problems, I thought it is ok to look at the whole thing from the sign´s point of view, that is to ask, which functions do S, O, I and the further divisions have for S. Because the self-relation SS is included, I think, that there is nothing more the (function of the) sign consists of than these functions for it. That is why I called it (functional) composition.

 

But maybe there is a logical fault in this argument, because a function of the sign might be that the object is changed. This might be a function of the sign, but not a function for it. But maybe too, the object is changed rather by the interpretant, and there is an act of determination from the changed object to the new sign that the interpretant becomes. In the actual sign, the not-yet-changed object determines the sign, and the sign the interpretant. The possibility or necessity of object change is in the interpretant that is determined by the sign, so maybe this determining function of the sign is also a function for it.

 

Best,

Helmut







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Aw: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, list,

 

I also try to stick with Peirce. Contradictions I dont see:

 

1.: I dont think that social is not logical, and subjectivity versus objectivity I see not as modes of being, but of chosen point of view.

 

2.: With triad I have meant triadic relation, and did not claim any identity.

 

3.: With projectional reducibility (Jon Awbrey) I have meant this involvement, the Peircean irreducibility is about compositional reducibility, which all triadic relations dont have.

 

4.: I agree

 

5.: But how then are objects changed?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 05. April 2019 um 23:38 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 





Helmut, List:
 

Again, I prefer to stick with Peirce on all of this.



	A logical relation is not subjective, like social relationships are; it is simply "a fact about a number of things" (CP 3.416; 1892).
	There is no "SOI triad," but a triadic relation between the Sign, Object, and Interpretant, none of which are identical (cf. CP 2.242, EP 2:290; 1903).
	That triadic relation involves dyadic relations between its external correlates as I indicated previously, but it is not reducible to them (cf. CP 2.274; 1903).
	There is no distinct Object-Interpretant relation because the Interpretant has the same relation to the Object that the Sign has (ibid).
	The Object is not changed by either the Sign or the Interpretant; their triadic relation is asymmetric (cf. EP 2:544n22; 1906).







Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt







 


On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 3:22 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




Jon, list,

 

thank you for explaining, e.g. of the ten divisions of signs!

They contain correlates with single names, and relations too. About "relation" I think, that to observe a relation it takes objectivity. But objectivity is sometimes hard to achieve. For example, there is a man who decides to become a stalker, and his intended-for victim, the stalker says that they have a relation, and the intended-for victim says they dont. Do they have one or not?

 

A normal triad ABC (like in "A gives B to C") is compositionally irreducible, and projectively (or projectionally, I forgot) reducible to the dyads AB, BC, AC. The SOI- triad is noncompositionally, maybe also called projectively, reducible to the dyads SS, SO, SI. So it is very special kind of triadic relation. There is no relation OI, and in all dyads S appears. So S plays a central, focal role.

 

To avoid objectivity problems, I thought it is ok to look at the whole thing from the sign´s point of view, that is to ask, which functions do S, O, I and the further divisions have for S. Because the self-relation SS is included, I think, that there is nothing more the (function of the) sign consists of than these functions for it. That is why I called it (functional) composition.

 

But maybe there is a logical fault in this argument, because a function of the sign might be that the object is changed. This might be a function of the sign, but not a function for it. But maybe too, the object is changed rather by the interpretant, and there is an act of determination from the changed object to the new sign that the interpretant becomes. In the actual sign, the not-yet-changed object determines the sign, and the sign the interpretant. The possibility or necessity of object change is in the interpretant that is determined by the sign, so maybe this determining function of the sign is also a function for it.

 

Best,

Helmut







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Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

Again, I prefer to stick with Peirce on all of this.

   - A *logical *relation is *not *subjective, like *social *relationships
   are; it is simply "a fact about a number of things" (CP 3.416; 1892).
   - There is no "SOI triad," but a *triadic relation* between the Sign,
   Object, and Interpretant, none of which are *identical* (cf. CP 2.242,
   EP 2:290; 1903).
   - That triadic relation *involves *dyadic relations between its *external
   *correlates as I indicated previously, but it is *not reducible *to them
   (cf. CP 2.274; 1903).
   - There is no *distinct *Object-Interpretant relation because the
   Interpretant has the *same *relation to the Object that the Sign has
   (ibid).
   - The Object is *not *changed by *either *the Sign or the Interpretant;
   their triadic relation is *asymmetric* (cf. EP 2:544n22; 1906).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 5, 2019 at 3:22 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Jon, list,
>
> thank you for explaining, e.g. of the ten divisions of signs!
> They contain correlates with single names, and relations too. About
> "relation" I think, that to observe a relation it takes objectivity. But
> objectivity is sometimes hard to achieve. For example, there is a man who
> decides to become a stalker, and his intended-for victim, the stalker says
> that they have a relation, and the intended-for victim says they dont. Do
> they have one or not?
>
> A normal triad ABC (like in "A gives B to C") is compositionally
> irreducible, and projectively (or projectionally, I forgot) reducible to
> the dyads AB, BC, AC. The SOI- triad is noncompositionally, maybe also
> called projectively, reducible to the dyads SS, SO, SI. So it is very
> special kind of triadic relation. There is no relation OI, and in all dyads
> S appears. So S plays a central, focal role.
>
> To avoid objectivity problems, I thought it is ok to look at the whole
> thing from the sign´s point of view, that is to ask, which functions do S,
> O, I and the further divisions have for S. Because the self-relation SS is
> included, I think, that there is nothing more the (function of the) sign
> consists of than these functions for it. That is why I called it
> (functional) composition.
>
> But maybe there is a logical fault in this argument, because a function of
> the sign might be that the object is changed. This might be a function of
> the sign, but not a function for it. But maybe too, the object is changed
> rather by the interpretant, and there is an act of determination from the
> changed object to the new sign that the interpretant becomes. In the actual
> sign, the not-yet-changed object determines the sign, and the sign the
> interpretant. The possibility or necessity of object change is in the
> interpretant that is determined by the sign, so maybe this determining
> function of the sign is also a function for it.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>

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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, list,

 

thank you for explaining, e.g. of the ten divisions of signs!

They contain correlates with single names, and relations too. About "relation" I think, that to observe a relation it takes objectivity. But objectivity is sometimes hard to achieve. For example, there is a man who decides to become a stalker, and his intended-for victim, the stalker says that they have a relation, and the intended-for victim says they dont. Do they have one or not?

 

A normal triad ABC (like in "A gives B to C") is compositionally irreducible, and projectively (or projectionally, I forgot) reducible to the dyads AB, BC, AC. The SOI- triad is noncompositionally, maybe also called projectively, reducible to the dyads SS, SO, SI. So it is very special kind of triadic relation. There is no relation OI, and in all dyads S appears. So S plays a central, focal role.

 

To avoid objectivity problems, I thought it is ok to look at the whole thing from the sign´s point of view, that is to ask, which functions do S, O, I and the further divisions have for S. Because the self-relation SS is included, I think, that there is nothing more the (function of the) sign consists of than these functions for it. That is why I called it (functional) composition.

 

But maybe there is a logical fault in this argument, because a function of the sign might be that the object is changed. This might be a function of the sign, but not a function for it. But maybe too, the object is changed rather by the interpretant, and there is an act of determination from the changed object to the new sign that the interpretant becomes. In the actual sign, the not-yet-changed object determines the sign, and the sign the interpretant. The possibility or necessity of object change is in the interpretant that is determined by the sign, so maybe this determining function of the sign is also a function for it.

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 

03. April 2019 um 23:06 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:







Helmut, List:
 

I prefer to stick with Peirce's terminology--every Sign is one correlate of an irreducible triadic relation, along with its Object and its Interpretant.  In this context, external vs internal has nothing to do with "spatial composition"--according to his definitions, the Immediate Object and Immediate Interpretant are both internal to the Sign; while the Dynamic Object, Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant are all external to the Sign.  Logical extension is what Peirce preferred to call "breadth" and associated with the Object, while logical intension is what he preferred to call "depth" and associated with the Interpretant.

 

However, again, it seems to me that your "third level composition" nicely fits the ten divisions of Signs that Peirce posited in various manuscripts from 1906 to 1908.

 





1.1.1. Sign (S)





2.1.1. Immediate Object (IO)





2.2.1. Dynamic Object (DO)





2.2.2. Dyadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Object (S-DO)





3.1.1. Immediate Interpretant (II)





3.2.1. Dynamic Interpretant (DI)





3.2.2. Dyadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant (S-DI)





3.3.1. Final Interpretant (FI)





3.3.2. Dyadic Relation of the Sign to the Final Interpretant (S-FI)







3.3.3. Triadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Object and the Final Interpretant (DO-S-FI)





 

Note that the first level is Sign/Object/Interpretant, the second level is Immediate/Dynamic/Final, and the third level is monadic/dyadic/triadic.  While certainly reflecting different aspects of Peirce's phenomenological Categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns, these levels clearly are not the "categorical modes" or Universes of Possibles/Existents/Necessitants into which Signs are divided within each trichotomy.  Instead, they are the basis for identifying those trichotomies in the first place, such that we can subsequently derive the ten Sign classes of 1903 from three of them (1.1.1, 2.2.2, 3.3.2) or the 66 Sign classes of 1908 from all ten.  Such an approach is supported by the following passages.

 




CSP:  A Sign, or Representamen, is a First which stands in such a genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its Object, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its Interpretant, to assume the same triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same Object. (CP 2.274, EP 2:272-273; 1903)

 





CSP:  I will just mention that among Firstnesses there is no distinction of the genuine and the degenerate, while among Thirdnesses we find not only a genuine but two distinct grades of degeneracy.

But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where you have a triplet you have three pairs; and where you have a pair, you have two units. Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though not of Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

I prefer to stick with Peirce's terminology--every Sign is one correlate of
an irreducible triadic relation, along with its Object and its
Interpretant.  In this context, external vs internal has nothing to do with
"spatial composition"--according to his definitions, the Immediate Object
and Immediate Interpretant are both *internal to the Sign*; while the
Dynamic Object, Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant are all *external
to the Sign*.  Logical *extension* is what Peirce preferred to call
"breadth" and associated with the *Object*, while logical *intension *is
what he preferred to call "depth" and associated with the *Interpretant*.

However, again, it seems to me that your "third level composition" nicely
fits the ten divisions of Signs that Peirce posited in various manuscripts
from 1906 to 1908.

1.1.1. Sign (S)
2.1.1. Immediate Object (IO)
2.2.1. Dynamic Object (DO)
2.2.2. Dyadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Object (S-DO)
3.1.1. Immediate Interpretant (II)
3.2.1. Dynamic Interpretant (DI)
3.2.2. Dyadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Interpretant (S-DI)
3.3.1. Final Interpretant (FI)
3.3.2. Dyadic Relation of the Sign to the Final Interpretant (S-FI)

3.3.3. Triadic Relation of the Sign to the Dynamic Object and the Final
Interpretant (DO-S-FI)


Note that the first level is Sign/Object/Interpretant, the second level is
Immediate/Dynamic/Final, and the third level is monadic/dyadic/triadic.
While certainly reflecting *different *aspects of Peirce's phenomenological
Categories of 1ns/2ns/3ns, these levels clearly are *not *the "categorical
modes" or Universes of Possibles/Existents/Necessitants into which Signs
are divided *within *each trichotomy.  Instead, they are the basis for
*identifying
*those trichotomies in the first place, such that we can *subsequently *derive
the ten Sign classes of 1903 from three of them (1.1.1, 2.2.2, 3.3.2) or
the 66 Sign classes of 1908 from all ten.  Such an approach is supported by
the following passages.

CSP:  A *Sign*, or *Representamen*, is a First which stands in such a
genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its *Object*, as to be capable
of determining a Third, called its *Interpretant*, to assume the same
triadic relation to its Object in which it stands itself to the same
Object. (CP 2.274, EP 2:272-273; 1903)

CSP:  I will just mention that among Firstnesses there is no distinction of
the genuine and the degenerate, while among Thirdnesses we find not only a
genuine but two distinct grades of degeneracy.
But now I wish to call your attention to a kind of distinction which
affects Firstness more than it does Secondness, and Secondness more than it
does Thirdness. This distinction arises from the circumstance that where
you have a triplet you have three pairs; and where you have a pair, you
have two units. Thus, Secondness is an essential part of Thirdness though
not of Firstness, and Firstness is an essential element of both Secondness
and Thirdness. Hence there is such a thing as the Firstness of Secondness
and such a thing as the Firstness of Thirdness; and there is such a thing
as the Secondness of Thirdness. But there is no Secondness of pure
Firstness and no Thirdness of pure Firstness or Secondness. (CP 1.529-530;
1903)


The Sign is a First (1ns of 1ns), so it has no degenerate correlate.  The
Object is a Second, so it has one degenerate correlate (Immediate, 1ns of
2ns) and one genuine correlate (Dynamic, 2ns of 2ns).  The Interpretant is
a Third, so it has two degenerate correlates (Immediate, 1ns of 3ns;
Dynamic, 2ns of 3ns) and one genuine correlate (Final Interpretant, 3ns of
3ns).  As *internal* to the Sign (1ns), the Immediate correlates have
no *distinct
*relations with it; but as *external *to the Sign (2ns and 3ns), the
Dynamic and Final correlates have *dyadic *relations with it; and the Final
Interpretant (3ns of 3ns) facilitates the overall *triadic *relation.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 3, 2019 at 12:02 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

>
> Supp.: I admit, what I wrote may be what do you call it, botching?
> Bungling? And I was not aware of Peirces 1908 work, and dont know what e.g.
> S-DO, and DO-S-FI means. Maybe also, intension and extension of a concept
> is only about type-signs... Anyway, making up things is more fun to me than
> closely reading Peirce. Bad, I know.
> *Corrected: 19th and 21st line.*
> Jon, Edwina, list,
> ok, if I cannot say that a sign consists of S, O, I, maybe I can say, that
> the function of a sign consists of the functions of S, O, I?  To call it
> functional composition?
> In this aspect, it applies to any, every, each sign, so it has not much to
> do with classification at this point. Functional composition in my theory
> also is not about externality or internality, that would be spatial
> composition, and is another, third, topic.
> I think it is interesting, that the six parts of sign function, further
> analysed on the third level, give ten functional parts 

[PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut - I think we'll have to agree-to-disagree on a lot!

However, I do consider that the triadic Sign is a function. f{x}=y,
where 'f' is the mediative Representamen, 'x' is the input data from
the DO and 'y' of course is the output Interpretant. I personally
consider that the Function is an excellent example of the triadic
semiosic process.

Again, I caution about confusing the mediative Representamen, also
called 'sign', with the full triadic Sign of O-R-I. The mediative
Representamen/sign does not 'exist' on its own; it's always part of
the semiosic triad.

I'm afraid that I don't understand your list of 'functional
parts'...where you have, for instance, the Immediate Object within
the categorical modes of 2.1.1.  I simply don't get this. The IO is a
part of the triad - and could be in any one of the three categories
[1ns, 2ns, 3ns] - and so, I don't get your point.

Edwina
 On Wed 03/04/19  9:47 AM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Jon, Edwina, list, ok, if I cannot say that a sign consists of S,
O, I, maybe I can say, that the function of a sign consists of the
functions of S, O, I?  To call it functional composition? In this
aspect, it applies to any, every, each sign, so it has not much to do
with classification at this point. Functional composition in my theory
also is not about externality or internality, that would be spatial
composition, and is another, third, topic. I think it is interesting,
that the six parts of sign function, further analysed on the third
level, give ten functional parts (again, not to be confused with the
ten sign classes). My proposal is:   1.1.1. Sign 2.1.1. Immediate
object 2.2.1. Intended dynamic object 2.2.2. Extended dynamic object
3.1.1. Immediate interpretant 3.2.1. Intended dynamic interpretant
3.2.2. Extended dynamic interpretant 3.3.1. Intended final
interpretant 3.3.2. Extended final interpretant 3.3.3. True final
interpretant.   Intended DO plus intended FI make that what is called
"intension" in other concept theories. Extended DO plus extended FI
make what is called "extension". True FI is what is called "truth" in
metaphysics, it only is the last point, and remains the last point in
further analysis (4th level, 5th level...), so truth´s percentage of
the whole thing gets smaller and smaller, the further the analysis is
carried out.   Functional composition is the composition of any sign
affair, regarding it is generalisation. Classification is not
generalisation, but the opposite: Specification. Generalisation and
specification are two different ways of analysis, and should not be
mixed, this only brings confusion, also the whole external-internal
talk, which is a third, different affair, the spatiality of signs.  
Best, Helmut  02. April 2019 um 22:55 Uhr
  "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
 wrote:   Helmut, List:   A Sign does not consist of three parts;
rather, there is an irreducible triadic relation between a Sign, its
Object, and its Interpretant.  This can be further analyzed into the
Sign, its two Objects (Immediate and Dynamic), and its three
Interpretants (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final); and besides the
triadic relation with its Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant, the
Sign has three external dyadic relations--with its Dynamic Object,
Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant.  Each of these six
correlates and four relations can be divided into three classes,
according to whether they belong to the Universe of Possibles,
Existents, or Necessitants.   If we were to arrange these ten
trichotomies into a logical order, and then apply the "rule of
determination" (EP 2:481; 1908), they would produce a total of 66
classes of Signs.  I have proposed in the past that the proper
sequence for this is DO>IO>S>S-DO>FI>DI>II>S-FI>S-DI>DO-S-FI, but it
is a matter of considerable controversy in the secondary literature,
since Peirce never finished working out his own arrangement beyond
DO>IO>S.  Nevertheless, when we focus on only three of these
trichotomies--for the Sign itself, its  relation with its Dynamic
Object, and its relation with its Dynamic Interpretant, in that
order--we obtain the 10 classes of his 1903 taxonomy.   Your "second
level composition" seems to fit the six correlates--S (1.1), IO
(2.1), DO (2.2), II (3.1), DI (3.2), FI (3.3).  Your "third level
composition" seems to fit the ten divisions of 1908--S (1.1.1), IO
(2.1.1), DO (2.2.1), S-DO (2.2.2), II (3.1.1), DI (3.2.1), S-DI
(3.2.2), FI (3.3.1), S-FI (3.3.2), DO-S-FI (3.3.3).  Your "third
level classification" seems to fit the ten classes of 1903, once we
reverse the order of the trichotomies to match Peirce's naming
convention--Qualisign (1/1/1), Iconic Sinsign (1/1/2), Iconic
Legisign (1/1/3), Rhematic Indexical Sinsign (1/2/2), Rhematic
Indexical Legisign (1/2/3), Rhematic Symbol (1/3/3), Dicent Sinsign
(2/2/2), Dicent Indexical Legisign (2/2/3), Dicent Symbol (2/3/3),
Argument (3/3/3).   Regards,Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe,

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

 



 
Supp.: I admit, what I wrote may be what do you call it, botching? Bungling? And I was not aware of Peirces 1908 work, and dont know what e.g. S-DO, and DO-S-FI means. Maybe also, intension and extension of a concept is only about type-signs... Anyway, making up things is more fun to me than closely reading Peirce. Bad, I know.

Corrected: 19th and 21st line.




Jon, Edwina, list,

ok, if I cannot say that a sign consists of S, O, I, maybe I can say, that the function of a sign consists of the functions of S, O, I?  To call it functional composition?

In this aspect, it applies to any, every, each sign, so it has not much to do with classification at this point. Functional composition in my theory also is not about externality or internality, that would be spatial composition, and is another, third, topic.

I think it is interesting, that the six parts of sign function, further analysed on the third level, give ten functional parts (again, not to be confused with the ten sign classes). My proposal is:

 

1.1.1. Sign

2.1.1. Immediate object

2.2.1. Intended dynamic object

2.2.2. Extended dynamic object

3.1.1. Immediate interpretant

3.2.1. Intended dynamic interpretant

3.2.2. Extended dynamic interpretant

3.3.1. Intended final interpretant

3.3.2. Extended final interpretant

3.3.3. True final interpretant.

 

Intended DO plus intended DI plus intended FI make that what is called "intension" in other concept theories.

Extended DO plus extended DI plus extended FI make what is called "extension".

True FI is what is called "truth" in metaphysics, it only is the last point, and remains the last point in further analysis (4th level, 5th level...), so truth´s percentage of the whole thing gets smaller and smaller, the further the analysis is carried out.

 

Functional composition is the composition of any sign affair, regarding it is generalisation.

Classification is not generalisation, but the opposite: Specification.

Generalisation and specification are two different ways of analysis, and should not be mixed, this only brings confusion, also the whole external-internal talk, which is a third, different affair, the spatiality of signs.

 

Best,

Helmut

 


 02. April 2019 um 22:55 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:

 

Helmut, List:

 

A Sign does not consist of three parts; rather, there is an irreducible triadic relation between a Sign, its Object, and its Interpretant.  This can be further analyzed into the Sign, its two Objects (Immediate and Dynamic), and its three Interpretants (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final); and besides the triadic relation with its Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant, the Sign has three external dyadic relations--with its Dynamic Object, Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant.  Each of these six correlates and four relations can be divided into three classes, according to whether they belong to the Universe of Possibles, Existents, or Necessitants.

 

If we were to arrange these ten trichotomies into a logical order, and then apply the "rule of determination" (EP 2:481; 1908), they would produce a total of 66 classes of Signs.  I have proposed in the past that the proper sequence for this is DO>IO>S>S-DO>FI>DI>II>S-FI>S-DI>DO-S-FI, but it is a matter of considerable controversy in the secondary literature, since Peirce never finished working out his own arrangement beyond DO>IO>S.  Nevertheless, when we focus on only three of these trichotomies--for the Sign itself, its relation with its Dynamic Object, and its relation with its Dynamic Interpretant, in that order--we obtain the 10 classes of his 1903 taxonomy.

 

Your "second level composition" seems to fit the six correlates--S (1.1), IO (2.1), DO (2.2), II (3.1), DI (3.2), FI (3.3).  Your "third level composition" seems to fit the ten divisions of 1908--S (1.1.1), IO (2.1.1), DO (2.2.1), S-DO (2.2.2), II (3.1.1), DI (3.2.1), S-DI (3.2.2), FI (3.3.1), S-FI (3.3.2), DO-S-FI (3.3.3).  Your "third level classification" seems to fit the ten classes of 1903, once we reverse the order of the trichotomies to match Peirce's naming convention--Qualisign (1/1/1), Iconic Sinsign (1/1/2), Iconic Legisign (1/1/3), Rhematic Indexical Sinsign (1/2/2), Rhematic Indexical Legisign (1/2/3), Rhematic Symbol (1/3/3), Dicent Sinsign (2/2/2), Dicent Indexical Legisign (2/2/3), Dicent Symbol (2/3/3), Argument (3/3/3).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









 

On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 3:10 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




Edwina, list,

 

I just think that the six subcategories as well as the six sign parts are a matter of composition, and that composition is a different topic than classification, and that compositional and classificational affairs should not be blended together too easily.

Sign parts are a composition of classes, and the ten classes of 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

 
 

Corrected: 19th and 21st line.




Jon, Edwina, list,

ok, if I cannot say that a sign consists of S, O, I, maybe I can say, that the function of a sign consists of the functions of S, O, I?  To call it functional composition?

In this aspect, it applies to any, every, each sign, so it has not much to do with classification at this point. Functional composition in my theory also is not about externality or internality, that would be spatial composition, and is another, third, topic.

I think it is interesting, that the six parts of sign function, further analysed on the third level, give ten functional parts (again, not to be confused with the ten sign classes). My proposal is:

 

1.1.1. Sign

2.1.1. Immediate object

2.2.1. Intended dynamic object

2.2.2. Extended dynamic object

3.1.1. Immediate interpretant

3.2.1. Intended dynamic interpretant

3.2.2. Extended dynamic interpretant

3.3.1. Intended final interpretant

3.3.2. Extended final interpretant

3.3.3. True final interpretant.

 

Intended DO plus intended DI plus intended FI make that what is called "intension" in other concept theories.

Extended DO plus extended DI plus extended FI make what is called "extension".

True FI is what is called "truth" in metaphysics, it only is the last point, and remains the last point in further analysis (4th level, 5th level...), so truth´s percentage of the whole thing gets smaller and smaller, the further the analysis is carried out.

 

Functional composition is the composition of any sign affair, regarding it is generalisation.

Classification is not generalisation, but the opposite: Specification.

Generalisation and specification are two different ways of analysis, and should not be mixed, this only brings confusion, also the whole external-internal talk, which is a third, different affair, the spatiality of signs.

 

Best,

Helmut

 


 02. April 2019 um 22:55 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:

 

Helmut, List:

 

A Sign does not consist of three parts; rather, there is an irreducible triadic relation between a Sign, its Object, and its Interpretant.  This can be further analyzed into the Sign, its two Objects (Immediate and Dynamic), and its three Interpretants (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final); and besides the triadic relation with its Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant, the Sign has three external dyadic relations--with its Dynamic Object, Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant.  Each of these six correlates and four relations can be divided into three classes, according to whether they belong to the Universe of Possibles, Existents, or Necessitants.

 

If we were to arrange these ten trichotomies into a logical order, and then apply the "rule of determination" (EP 2:481; 1908), they would produce a total of 66 classes of Signs.  I have proposed in the past that the proper sequence for this is DO>IO>S>S-DO>FI>DI>II>S-FI>S-DI>DO-S-FI, but it is a matter of considerable controversy in the secondary literature, since Peirce never finished working out his own arrangement beyond DO>IO>S.  Nevertheless, when we focus on only three of these trichotomies--for the Sign itself, its relation with its Dynamic Object, and its relation with its Dynamic Interpretant, in that order--we obtain the 10 classes of his 1903 taxonomy.

 

Your "second level composition" seems to fit the six correlates--S (1.1), IO (2.1), DO (2.2), II (3.1), DI (3.2), FI (3.3).  Your "third level composition" seems to fit the ten divisions of 1908--S (1.1.1), IO (2.1.1), DO (2.2.1), S-DO (2.2.2), II (3.1.1), DI (3.2.1), S-DI (3.2.2), FI (3.3.1), S-FI (3.3.2), DO-S-FI (3.3.3).  Your "third level classification" seems to fit the ten classes of 1903, once we reverse the order of the trichotomies to match Peirce's naming convention--Qualisign (1/1/1), Iconic Sinsign (1/1/2), Iconic Legisign (1/1/3), Rhematic Indexical Sinsign (1/2/2), Rhematic Indexical Legisign (1/2/3), Rhematic Symbol (1/3/3), Dicent Sinsign (2/2/2), Dicent Indexical Legisign (2/2/3), Dicent Symbol (2/3/3), Argument (3/3/3).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









 

On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 3:10 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




Edwina, list,

 

I just think that the six subcategories as well as the six sign parts are a matter of composition, and that composition is a different topic than classification, and that compositional and classificational affairs should not be blended together too easily.

Sign parts are a composition of classes, and the ten classes of signs are a classification of possible compositions.

 

In categorial composition, subcategory numbers can only stay the same or go down, the result in the second level is six, and in the third level ten:

1, 2, 3 are composed of 1.1; 2.1, 2.2; 3.1, 3.2, 3.3., that is six.

Further analysis would make 1.1.1; 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.2.2; 3.1.1, 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Jon, Edwina, list,

ok, if I cannot say that a sign consists of S, O, I, maybe I can say, that the function of a sign consists of the functions of S, O, I?  To call it functional composition?

In this aspect, it applies to any, every, each sign, so it has not much to do with classification at this point. Functional composition in my theory also is not about externality or internality, that would be spatial composition, and is another, third, topic.

I think it is interesting, that the six parts of sign function, further analysed on the third level, give ten functional parts (again, not to be confused with the ten sign classes). My proposal is:

 

1.1.1. Sign

2.1.1. Immediate object

2.2.1. Intended dynamic object

2.2.2. Extended dynamic object

3.1.1. Immediate interpretant

3.2.1. Intended dynamic interpretant

3.2.2. Extended dynamic interpretant

3.3.1. Intended final interpretant

3.3.2. Extended final interpretant

3.3.3. True final interpretant.

 

Intended DO plus intended FI make that what is called "intension" in other concept theories.

Extended DO plus extended FI make what is called "extension".

True FI is what is called "truth" in metaphysics, it only is the last point, and remains the last point in further analysis (4th level, 5th level...), so truth´s percentage of the whole thing gets smaller and smaller, the further the analysis is carried out.

 

Functional composition is the composition of any sign affair, regarding it is generalisation.

Classification is not generalisation, but the opposite: Specification.

Generalisation and specification are two different ways of analysis, and should not be mixed, this only brings confusion, also the whole external-internal talk, which is a third, different affair, the spatiality of signs.

 

Best,

Helmut

 


 02. April 2019 um 22:55 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:

 

Helmut, List:

 

A Sign does not consist of three parts; rather, there is an irreducible triadic relation between a Sign, its Object, and its Interpretant.  This can be further analyzed into the Sign, its two Objects (Immediate and Dynamic), and its three Interpretants (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final); and besides the triadic relation with its Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant, the Sign has three external dyadic relations--with its Dynamic Object, Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant.  Each of these six correlates and four relations can be divided into three classes, according to whether they belong to the Universe of Possibles, Existents, or Necessitants.

 

If we were to arrange these ten trichotomies into a logical order, and then apply the "rule of determination" (EP 2:481; 1908), they would produce a total of 66 classes of Signs.  I have proposed in the past that the proper sequence for this is DO>IO>S>S-DO>FI>DI>II>S-FI>S-DI>DO-S-FI, but it is a matter of considerable controversy in the secondary literature, since Peirce never finished working out his own arrangement beyond DO>IO>S.  Nevertheless, when we focus on only three of these trichotomies--for the Sign itself, its relation with its Dynamic Object, and its relation with its Dynamic Interpretant, in that order--we obtain the 10 classes of his 1903 taxonomy.

 

Your "second level composition" seems to fit the six correlates--S (1.1), IO (2.1), DO (2.2), II (3.1), DI (3.2), FI (3.3).  Your "third level composition" seems to fit the ten divisions of 1908--S (1.1.1), IO (2.1.1), DO (2.2.1), S-DO (2.2.2), II (3.1.1), DI (3.2.1), S-DI (3.2.2), FI (3.3.1), S-FI (3.3.2), DO-S-FI (3.3.3).  Your "third level classification" seems to fit the ten classes of 1903, once we reverse the order of the trichotomies to match Peirce's naming convention--Qualisign (1/1/1), Iconic Sinsign (1/1/2), Iconic Legisign (1/1/3), Rhematic Indexical Sinsign (1/2/2), Rhematic Indexical Legisign (1/2/3), Rhematic Symbol (1/3/3), Dicent Sinsign (2/2/2), Dicent Indexical Legisign (2/2/3), Dicent Symbol (2/3/3), Argument (3/3/3).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt









 

On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 3:10 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:




Edwina, list,

 

I just think that the six subcategories as well as the six sign parts are a matter of composition, and that composition is a different topic than classification, and that compositional and classificational affairs should not be blended together too easily.

Sign parts are a composition of classes, and the ten classes of signs are a classification of possible compositions.

 

In categorial composition, subcategory numbers can only stay the same or go down, the result in the second level is six, and in the third level ten:

1, 2, 3 are composed of 1.1; 2.1, 2.2; 3.1, 3.2, 3.3., that is six.

Further analysis would make 1.1.1; 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.2.2; 3.1.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3., that is ten.

 

In categorial 

Re: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut - I see things very differently from you;

 1.1; 2.1, 2.2; 3.1, 3.2, 3.3., These are the categorical modes as
operative in the Relations between, for example, the Representamen
and the Dynamic Object. So, 1-1, would be a Relation functioning in
pure 1ns. And 2-1 would be a Relation functioning in a mode of
2ns-as-1ns. Peirce describes these very carefully. [I'm away from my
texts...]

The triads of, eg, 1-1-2 are the description of the triadic SIGN in
its three Relations of, in this example, that between the R and I;
between the R and O, and the Relation of the Representamen-in-itself.

Edwina
 On Tue 02/04/19  4:10 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
  Edwina, list,   I just think that the six subcategories as well as
the six sign parts are a matter of composition, and that composition
is a different topic than classification, and that compositional and
classificational affairs should not be blended together too easily.
Sign parts are a composition of classes, and the ten classes of signs
are a classification of possible compositions.   In categorial
composition, subcategory numbers can only stay the same or go down,
the result in the second level is six, and in the third level ten: 1,
2, 3 are composed of 1.1; 2.1, 2.2; 3.1, 3.2, 3.3., that is six.
Further analysis would make 1.1.1; 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.2.2; 3.1.1, 3.2.1,
3.2.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3., that is ten.   In categorial
classification, numbers can only stay the same or go up, the
numerical results are the same, first six, then ten: The classes 1,
2, 3 can be first classified as 1/1, 1/2, 1/3; 2/2, 2/3; 3/3, that is
six. Further classification makes 1/1/1, 1/1/2, 1/1/3, 1/2/2, 1/2/3,
1/3/3; 2/2/2, 2/2/3, 2/3/3; 3/3/3., that is ten.   Because a sign
consists of three parts, not of two, the second level classification
does not make much sense, so mostly the third level (classification
of three composites) with ten classes is regarded.   Best, Helmut
02. April 2019 um 20:42 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
 wrote:  

Helmut - no, I don't think such a set-up would function very well. 

The way you've set it up, - indeed, in either set up - you've got
the mediative function of the Representamen operating in a mode of
either 1-1 or 2-2. And you've got the three Interpretants functioning
in various modes of Thirdness. You can't have the Interpretants as
MORE complex in organization than the mediative Representamen. 

Take a look at the ten classes of Signs; 2.236 and on. You'll see
that the Interpretants are never in a more complex mode than the
Representamen. They can be the same or less complex - but never
higher in complexity. After all - one would have to ask, where do
they get that extra information to function in such an increased
complexity? 

And the only class with the Interpretants in Thirdness - is a pure
syllogism, the Argument Symbolic Legisign, where ALL nodes of the
triadic Sign - are in the mode of Thirdness. 

Edwina
 On Tue 02/04/19 2:24 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:   
Edwina, list,   you wrote:  

"Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us
to examine the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic
informational format is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad
is further broken down into more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end
up with six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such a framework enables more
information transformation at each nodal site. 

In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of
data/information. BUT again, he increased the complexity capacity of
these three modes by introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms:
So- we have 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note
that Thirdness, the action of knowledge storage has THREE methods to
carry out this action: iconic, indexical and symbolic. That's a
powerful tool." 

Now please forgive me for assuming, that "DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI", written
"R-IO-DO-II-DI-FI" is in accord with "(1.1), (2.1), (2.2), (3.1),
(3.2), (3.3)" as more than a coincidence. It would be quite a
coincidence. 

Best, 

Helmut  01. April 2019 um 19:35 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky"
List: 

I'm continuing with my interest in the pragmatics of Peircean
semiosis; that is, the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure to
examine the dynamic operations within the organic chemical, the
biological, the societal [economic systems, population behaviour] -
and the cognitive  [which includes AI]. 

Basically, it's all about 'information processing' , which includes
the self-organization of an organism's capacity and actions of
knowledge development and maintenance, , adaptation of knowledge and
behaviour, anticipation tactics, entropy problems and so on. 

Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us
to 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, List:

A Sign *does not* consist of three parts; rather, there is an
irreducible *triadic
relation* between a Sign, its Object, and its Interpretant.  This can be
further analyzed into the Sign, its *two *Objects (Immediate and Dynamic),
and its *three *Interpretants (Immediate, Dynamic, and Final); and besides
the triadic relation with its Dynamic Object and Final Interpretant, the
Sign has three *external *dyadic relations--with its Dynamic Object,
Dynamic Interpretant, and Final Interpretant.  Each of these six correlates
and four relations can be divided into three classes, according to whether
they belong to the Universe of Possibles, Existents, or Necessitants.

If we were to arrange these ten trichotomies into a logical order, and then
apply the "rule of determination" (EP 2:481; 1908), they would produce a
total of 66 classes of Signs.  I have proposed in the past that the proper
sequence for this is DO>IO>S>S-DO>FI>DI>II>S-FI>S-DI>DO-S-FI, but it is a
matter of considerable controversy in the secondary literature, since
Peirce never finished working out his own arrangement beyond DO>IO>S.
Nevertheless, when we focus on only three of these trichotomies--for the
Sign itself, its *relation *with its Dynamic Object, and its *relation *with
its Dynamic Interpretant, *in that order*--we obtain the 10 classes of his
1903 taxonomy.

Your "second level composition" seems to fit the six correlates--S (1.1),
IO (2.1), DO (2.2), II (3.1), DI (3.2), FI (3.3).  Your "third level
composition" seems to fit the ten divisions of 1908--S (1.1.1), IO (2.1.1),
DO (2.2.1), S-DO (2.2.2), II (3.1.1), DI (3.2.1), S-DI (3.2.2), FI (3.3.1),
S-FI (3.3.2), DO-S-FI (3.3.3).  Your "third level classification" seems to
fit the ten classes of 1903, once we reverse the order of the trichotomies
to match Peirce's naming convention--Qualisign (1/1/1), Iconic Sinsign
(1/1/2), Iconic Legisign (1/1/3), Rhematic Indexical Sinsign (1/2/2),
Rhematic Indexical Legisign (1/2/3), Rhematic Symbol (1/3/3), Dicent
Sinsign (2/2/2), Dicent Indexical Legisign (2/2/3), Dicent Symbol (2/3/3),
Argument (3/3/3).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 3:10 PM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Edwina, list,
>
> I just think that the six subcategories as well as the six sign parts are
> a matter of composition, and that composition is a different topic than
> classification, and that compositional and classificational affairs should
> not be blended together too easily.
> Sign parts are a composition of classes, and the ten classes of signs are
> a classification of possible compositions.
>
> In categorial composition, subcategory numbers can only stay the same or
> go down, the result in the second level is six, and in the third level ten:
> 1, 2, 3 are composed of 1.1; 2.1, 2.2; 3.1, 3.2, 3.3., that is six.
> Further analysis would make 1.1.1; 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.2.2; 3.1.1, 3.2.1,
> 3.2.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3., that is ten.
>
> In categorial classification, numbers can only stay the same or go up, the
> numerical results are the same, first six, then ten:
> The classes 1, 2, 3 can be first classified as 1/1, 1/2, 1/3; 2/2, 2/3;
> 3/3, that is six.
> Further classification makes 1/1/1, 1/1/2, 1/1/3, 1/2/2, 1/2/3, 1/3/3;
> 2/2/2, 2/2/3, 2/3/3; 3/3/3., that is ten.
>
> Because a sign consists of three parts, not of two, the second level
> classification does not make much sense, so mostly the third level
> (classification of three composites) with ten classes is regarded.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>

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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, list,

 

I just think that the six subcategories as well as the six sign parts are a matter of composition, and that composition is a different topic than classification, and that compositional and classificational affairs should not be blended together too easily.

Sign parts are a composition of classes, and the ten classes of signs are a classification of possible compositions.

 

In categorial composition, subcategory numbers can only stay the same or go down, the result in the second level is six, and in the third level ten:

1, 2, 3 are composed of 1.1; 2.1, 2.2; 3.1, 3.2, 3.3., that is six.

Further analysis would make 1.1.1; 2.1.1, 2.2.1, 2.2.2; 3.1.1, 3.2.1, 3.2.2, 3.3.1, 3.3.2, 3.3.3., that is ten.

 

In categorial classification, numbers can only stay the same or go up, the numerical results are the same, first six, then ten:

The classes 1, 2, 3 can be first classified as 1/1, 1/2, 1/3; 2/2, 2/3; 3/3, that is six.

Further classification makes 1/1/1, 1/1/2, 1/1/3, 1/2/2, 1/2/3, 1/3/3; 2/2/2, 2/2/3, 2/3/3; 3/3/3., that is ten.
 

Because a sign consists of three parts, not of two, the second level classification does not make much sense, so mostly the third level (classification of three composites) with ten classes is regarded.

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 

 

 02. April 2019 um 20:42 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
wrote:


Helmut - no, I don't think such a set-up would function very well.

The way you've set it up, - indeed, in either set up - you've got the mediative function of the Representamen operating in a mode of either 1-1 or 2-2. And you've got the three Interpretants functioning in various modes of Thirdness. You can't have the Interpretants as MORE complex in organization than the mediative Representamen.

Take a look at the ten classes of Signs; 2.236 and on. You'll see that the Interpretants are never in a more complex mode than the Representamen. They can be the same or less complex - but never higher in complexity. After all - one would have to ask, where do they get that extra information to function in such an increased complexity?

And the only class with the Interpretants in Thirdness - is a pure syllogism, the Argument Symbolic Legisign, where ALL nodes of the triadic Sign - are in the mode of Thirdness.

Edwina

 

On Tue 02/04/19 2:24 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:




Edwina, list,

 

you wrote:


"Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us to examine the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic informational format is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad is further broken down into more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end up with six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such a framework enables more information transformation at each nodal site.

In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of data/information. BUT again, he increased the complexity capacity of these three modes by introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms: So- we have 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note that Thirdness, the action of knowledge storage has THREE methods to carry out this action: iconic, indexical and symbolic. That's a powerful tool."

Now please forgive me for assuming, that "DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI", written "R-IO-DO-II-DI-FI" is in accord with "(1.1), (2.1), (2.2), (3.1), (3.2), (3.3)" as more than a coincidence. It would be quite a coincidence.

Best,

Helmut


 

 01. April 2019 um 19:35 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky"
 


List:

I'm continuing with my interest in the pragmatics of Peircean semiosis; that is, the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure to examine the dynamic operations within the organic chemical, the biological, the societal [economic systems, population behaviour] - and the cognitive  [which includes AI].

Basically, it's all about 'information processing' , which includes the self-organization of an organism's capacity and actions of knowledge development and maintenance, , adaptation of knowledge and behaviour, anticipation tactics, entropy problems and so on.

Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us to examine the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic informational format is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad is further broken down into more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end up with six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such a framework enables more information transformation at each nodal site.

In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of data/information. BUT again, he increased the complexity capacity of these three modes by introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms: So- we have 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note that Thirdness, the action of knowledge storage has THREE methods to carry out this action: iconic, indexical and symbolic. That's a powerful tool.

Then, there are the 

[PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Helmut - no, I don't think such a set-up would function very well.

The way you've set it up, - indeed, in either set up - you've got
the mediative function of the Representamen operating in a mode of
either 1-1 or 2-2. And you've got the three Interpretants functioning
in various modes of Thirdness. You can't have the Interpretants as
MORE complex in organization than the mediative Representamen. 

Take a look at the ten classes of Signs; 2.236 and on. You'll see
that the Interpretants are never in a more complex mode than the
Representamen. They can be the same or less complex - but never
higher in complexity. After all - one would have to ask, where do
they get that extra information to function in such an increased
complexity?

And the only class with the Interpretants in Thirdness - is a pure
syllogism, the Argument Symbolic Legisign, where ALL nodes of the
triadic Sign - are in the mode of Thirdness.

Edwina
 On Tue 02/04/19  2:24 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:
 Edwina, list, you wrote:

"Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us
to examine the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic
informational format is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad
is further broken down into more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end
up with six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such a framework enables more
information transformation at each nodal site.

In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of
data/information. BUT again, he increased the complexity capacity of
these three modes by introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms:
So- we have 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note
that Thirdness, the action of knowledge storage has THREE methods to
carry out this action: iconic, indexical and symbolic. That's a
powerful tool."

Now please forgive me for assuming, that "DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI", written
"R-IO-DO-II-DI-FI" is in accord with "(1.1), (2.1), (2.2), (3.1),
(3.2), (3.3)" as more than a coincidence. It would be quite a
coincidence.

Best,

Helmut  01. April 2019 um 19:35 Uhr
  "Edwina Taborsky" 
List:

I'm continuing with my interest in the pragmatics of Peircean
semiosis; that is, the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure to
examine the dynamic operations within the organic chemical, the
biological, the societal [economic systems, population behaviour] -
and the cognitive  [which includes AI].

Basically, it's all about 'information processing' , which includes
the self-organization of an organism's capacity and actions of
knowledge development and maintenance, , adaptation of knowledge and
behaviour, anticipation tactics, entropy problems and so on.

Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us
to examine the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic
informational format is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad
is further broken down into more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end
up with six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such a framework enables more
information transformation at each nodal site.

In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of
data/information. BUT again, he increased the complexity capacity of
these three modes by introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms:
So- we have 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note
that Thirdness, the action of knowledge storage has THREE methods to
carry out this action: iconic, indexical and symbolic. That's a
powerful tool.

Then, there are the ten basic classes of Signs - [2:254] - which
explain the triads from the simple ''feeling' to the complex
cognitive.  Put this all together and I maintain that Peirce has
provided a powerful analytic framework for examining the dynamics -
and it IS a dynamical operation - of information generation,
adaptation, evolution and storage. These can, I suggest, be moved
into the broader scientific world - and would be, I think, of great
benefit.

I'd like to refer to two articles as examples of how this Peircean
framework could be put to use. I provide examples from  two reputable
journals: Biosystems and Entropy. I note that neither deal with
self-published works; the articles must go through a peer-review and
revision process.

The first article, from Biosystems, refers to the analogy between
the biological realm and the work being done in AI.The focus is on
'Anticipation' - which is an ability generated by the mode of
Thirdness. Understanding this mode and that there are THREE modes of
Thirdness [which I have elsewhere referred to as strong and weak
anticipation] would be, I suggest, of great benefit in the
development of AI.

The second article, from Entropy, also refers to the realm of
Thirdness - to 

Aw: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Helmut Raulien]

Edwina, list,

 

you wrote:


"Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us to examine the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic informational format is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad is further broken down into more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end up with six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such a framework enables more information transformation at each nodal site.

In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of data/information. BUT again, he increased the complexity capacity of these three modes by introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms: So- we have 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note that Thirdness, the action of knowledge storage has THREE methods to carry out this action: iconic, indexical and symbolic. That's a powerful tool."

Now please forgive me for assuming, that "DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI", written "R-IO-DO-II-DI-FI" is in accord with "(1.1), (2.1), (2.2), (3.1), (3.2), (3.3)" as more than a coincidence. It would be quite a coincidence.

Best,

Helmut


 

 01. April 2019 um 19:35 Uhr
 "Edwina Taborsky" 
 


List:

I'm continuing with my interest in the pragmatics of Peircean semiosis; that is, the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure to examine the dynamic operations within the organic chemical, the biological, the societal [economic systems, population behaviour] - and the cognitive  [which includes AI].

Basically, it's all about 'information processing' , which includes the self-organization of an organism's capacity and actions of knowledge development and maintenance, , adaptation of knowledge and behaviour, anticipation tactics, entropy problems and so on.

Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us to examine the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic informational format is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad is further broken down into more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end up with six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such a framework enables more information transformation at each nodal site.

In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of data/information. BUT again, he increased the complexity capacity of these three modes by introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms: So- we have 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note that Thirdness, the action of knowledge storage has THREE methods to carry out this action: iconic, indexical and symbolic. That's a powerful tool.

Then, there are the ten basic classes of Signs - [2:254] - which explain the triads from the simple ''feeling' to the complex cognitive.  Put this all together and I maintain that Peirce has provided a powerful analytic framework for examining the dynamics - and it IS a dynamical operation - of information generation, adaptation, evolution and storage. These can, I suggest, be moved into the broader scientific world - and would be, I think, of great benefit.

I'd like to refer to two articles as examples of how this Peircean framework could be put to use. I provide examples from  two reputable journals: Biosystems and Entropy. I note that neither deal with self-published works; the articles must go through a peer-review and revision process.

The first article, from Biosystems, refers to the analogy between the biological realm and the work being done in AI.The focus is on 'Anticipation' - which is an ability generated by the mode of Thirdness. Understanding this mode and that there are THREE modes of Thirdness [which I have elsewhere referred to as strong and weak anticipation] would be, I suggest, of great benefit in the development of AI.

The second article, from Entropy, also refers to the realm of Thirdness - to enable 'Interpretants/Understanding'. Again, this work sets up the act of 'anticipation' - and again, is focused on the development of AI.

Essentially, my suggestion is that the complex framework of Peircean semiosis - with those Six nodal sites, those Six modal actions and ten classes - provides a powerful tool for the examination of complex processes in the real pragmatic world.

Edwina

 

 


1]Anticipation: Beyond synthetic biology and cognitive robotics




Author links open overlay panelSlawomir J. Nasuto Yoshikatsu Hayashi




https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biosystems.2016.07.011


open access


 



Abstract


The aim of this paper is to propose that current  robotic technologies cannot have intentional states any more than is feasible within the sensorimotor variant of embodied cognition. It argues that anticipation is an emerging concept that can provide a bridge between both the deepest philosophical theories about the nature of life and cognition and the empirical biological and cognitive sciences steeped in reductionist and Newtonian conceptions of  causality.
 






2] The Understanding Capacity and 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dan, list,



Thank you for underscoring method.



With regard to method (light of the pragmatic maxim), Peirce gave us
different statements of the maxim,

even saying of one that it is in the form of a philosophical theorem and
that he has succeeded no better than that.



I also recall some other philosopher saying that there would be need of
*habituation* to see the things higher up,

so as to distinguish such from appearances.

And this is necessary because the transition for us would be rough.



Given this, then, to which statement were you referring when you said:



I simply mean to underscore method.

Not who might be correct on the terminology.

I always learn from these discussions.



For I see method here being applied but if we were to judge them by their
fruits, as members say we do,

then the fruits have so far, been rotten.

Moreover, when you call for underscoring of method, I interpret that as
saying,

‘let us consciously adopt the method’.



If, on the other hand, you say that any one of his different statements of
his ‘maxim of logic’ will serve just as well as any other,

then that surely would affirm Peirce as a perfect ignoramus when it comes
to esthetics.

And of course he is, for does he not say so?  Several times over, even?



With best wishes,
Jerry R



In order to be admitted to better philosophical standing

I have endeavored to put pragmatism as I understand it into the same form
of a philosophical theorem.

I have not succeeded any better than this:

On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 2:38 AM Daniel L Everett 
wrote:

> Jon
>
> I simply mean to underscore method.
>
> Not who might be correct on the terminology.
>
> I always learn from these discussions.
>
> Thanks
>
> Dan
>
>
> Sent from my iPhone
>
> On Apr 1, 2019, at 21:44, Jon Alan Schmidt 
> wrote:
>
> Dan, List:
>
> Where has anyone on the List engaged in "ad hominem arguments (based on a
> person's worth or unworth in a given subject)"?
>
> Our terminological disputes typically pertain to *Peirce's *usage, so the
> "experiment" by which they can be resolved is careful examination of the
> "data," which consists of the relevant texts in his writings.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 7:42 PM Dan Everett 
> wrote:
>
>> I agree with Edwina on ad hominem arguments (based on a person’s worth or
>> unworth in a given subject). But as I have said before here, one must be
>> able to distinguish interpretations based on their practical results. All
>> terms have to be interpreted in light of the pragmatic maxim. Straying away
>> from that moves into Popperian concerns about essentialism, which is
>> usually pointless.
>>
>> A terminological dispute that cannot be resolved via an experiment or via
>> some other form of data  is of lesser importance.
>>
>> Dan
>>
>
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON
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>
>
>
>
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

Here is what I actually said.

JAS:  As I have stated recently and repeatedly, each of us must make the
case for the views that we espouse, and then let readers decide for
themselves who is more persuasive that his/her position is an accurate
interpretation of what Peirce actually wrote.


In other words, I stated *exactly the opposite* of the attitude that you
are falsely attributing to me.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Apr 2, 2019 at 7:39 AM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Gary R, thanks for your response. I know you try to mediate and smooth out
> differences among the posters and I know it's not easy.
>
> But Jon didn't say that "  [everyone] should be allowed to read and
> interpret Peirce's work on their own." After all, that doesn't set up what
> is clearly required by him - an "accurate understanding of Peirce's work ".
> Who defines what is 'accurate'?
>
> And he wrote:" Newcomers to Peirce should first be made aware of Peirce's
> own analytic frame, including his typically very precise terminology."
> Who holds the content of this 'accurate and precise information' - and
> provides it to newcomers who thus are not allowed to interpret Peirce on
> their own but must FIRST accept an authorized 'analytic frame' and 'very
> precise terminology'.
>
> The Final Interpretant/Truth may not be reached - and we can't assume that
> we hold it, firmly and accurately, in our control and we can't ask that
> newcomers accept our views as the FI.
>
> By the way - Auke's image of the three women - is a nice one!
>
> Edwina
>
> On Tue 02/04/19 12:05 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, Jon, List,
>
> Jon quoted Edwina, then quoted her again as response to her question:
>
> ET:  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide on, as you
> say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?
>
>
> JAS: You answered your own question ...
>
> ET:  ... don't you think that they should be allowed to read and interpret
> Peirce's work on their own[?]
>
>
> Edwina, I think you misinterpreted Jon's response. You wrote:
>
> JAS: "  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide on, as
> you say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?
>
> ET: No- I didn't answer this question and I've no idea why you wrote this.
>  ET: I asked YOU to answer it
>
> Jon was merely saying that the answer to your question "who do you think
> should be the authorities who decide on, as you say, what is 'an accurate
> understanding of Peirce's work'?  " was, as you wrote: " [everyone]
> should be allowed to read and interpret Peirce's work on their own."
>
> And that is all.
>
> Best,
>
> Gary
> Gary Richmond
> Philosophy and Critical Thinking
> Communication Studies
> LaGuardia College of the City University of New York
>
> On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 10:06 PM Edwina Taborsky 
> wrote:
>
>> JAS - I repeat
>>
>> ET:  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide on, as you
>> say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?
>>
>> No- I didn't answer this question and I've no idea why you wrote this.
>>
>>  I asked YOU to answer it - since you yourself introduced the phrase of
>> 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'.  That phrase, after all, sets
>> up an axiom that there is one such understanding - and I'd like to know
>> who.makes.that.decision. You insist that it is 'the starting point'. Again
>> - who sets up this definition of The Accurate Understanding?
>>
>> And you wrote:" Newcomers to Peirce should first be made aware of Peirce's
>> own analytic frame, including his typically very precise
>> terminology." Why can't they read Peirce on their own and decide for
>> themselves what is his analytic frame?? Who are you suggesting should 'make
>> them aware' of it?? Who should inform them of this 'analytic frame' - and
>> after all - we do have disagreements about the nature of this frame - so,
>> WHO defines the 'accurate one'? And WHO defines the 'very precise
>> terminology' - since from what I've seen on this list, the terminology is
>> not in the least precise and not everyone agrees with the meanings of these
>> terms. You've participated in months of arguments about terminology!
>>
>> Finally - with reference to the term of 'unPeircean' - You are offering
>> a red herring argument that such a term hasn't been used in 2019. It's
>> been used quite often before.  Name-Calling? Give me an example.
>>
>> Again - this is going nowhere. My whole point is that the Peircean
>> analytic framework is a powerful means of analyzing pragmatic reality, the
>> real-life situations in chemistry, biology, economics, societal
>> organization, AI etc - and being met with derision and derogatory comments
>> when examples of research are offered that could be examined within this
>> framework - is not 

[PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Gary R, thanks for your response. I know you try to mediate and
smooth out differences among the posters and I know it's not easy. 

But Jon didn't say that "  [everyone] should be allowed to read and
interpret Peirce's work on their own." After all, that doesn't set up
what is clearly required by him - an "accurate understanding of
Peirce's work ". Who defines what is 'accurate'?

And he wrote:" Newcomers to Peirce should first be made aware of
Peirce's own analytic frame, including his typically very precise
terminology." Who holds the content of this 'accurate and precise
information' - and provides it to newcomers who thus are not allowed
to interpret Peirce on their own but must FIRST accept an authorized
'analytic frame' and 'very precise terminology'.

The Final Interpretant/Truth may not be reached - and we can't
assume that we hold it, firmly and accurately, in our control and we
can't ask that newcomers accept our views as the FI.

By the way - Auke's image of the three women - is a nice one!

Edwina
 On Tue 02/04/19 12:05 AM , Gary Richmond gary.richm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, Jon, List,
 Jon quoted Edwina, then quoted her again as response to her
question: 
  ET:  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide on,
as you say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?
 JAS: You answered your own question ...
 ET:  ... don't you think that they should be allowed to read and
interpret Peirce's work on their own[?] 
 Edwina, I think you misinterpreted Jon's response. You wrote:
 JAS: "  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide
on, as you say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?
 ET: No- I didn't answer this question and I've no idea why you
wrote this. ET: I asked YOU to answer it 
 Jon was merely saying that the answer to your question "who do you
think should be the authorities who decide on, as you say, what is
'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?  " was, as you wrote: "
[everyone] should be allowed to read and interpret Peirce's work on
their own."
 And that is all. 
 Best,
 Gary
 Gary Richmond
 Philosophy and Critical ThinkingCommunication Studies LaGuardia
College of the City University of New York
 On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 10:06 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS - I repeat

ET:  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide on,
as you say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?

No- I didn't answer this question and I've no idea why you wrote
this.

 I asked YOU to answer it - since you yourself introduced the phrase
of 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'.  That phrase, after
all, sets up an axiom that there is one such understanding - and I'd
like to know who.makes.that.decision. You insist that it is 'the
starting point'. Again - who sets up this definition of The Accurate
Understanding? 

And you wrote:" Newcomers to Peirce should first be made aware of
Peirce's own analytic frame, including his typically very precise
terminology." Why can't they read Peirce on their own and decide for
themselves what is his analytic frame?? Who are you suggesting should
'make them aware' of it?? Who should inform them of this 'analytic
frame' - and after all - we do have disagreements about the nature of
this frame - so, WHO defines the 'accurate one'? And WHO defines the
'very precise terminology' - since from what I've seen on this list,
the terminology is not in the least precise and not everyone agrees
with the meanings of these terms. You've participated in months of
arguments about terminology! 

Finally - with reference to the term of 'unPeircean' - You are
offering a red herring argument that such a term hasn't been used in
2019. It's been used quite often before.  Name-Calling? Give me an
example.

Again - this is going nowhere. My whole point is that the Peircean
analytic framework is a powerful means of analyzing pragmatic
reality, the real-life situations in chemistry, biology, economics,
societal organization, AI etc - and being met with derision and
derogatory comments when examples of research are offered that could
be examined within this framework - is not conducive to scholarly
work.  

As I've said - there ARE scholars who are using Peirce to examine
what's going on in biology, in economics, in AI - and my view is that
they are right to do so - since his analytic framework is indeed a
powerful tool to do so.  Do they have to persuade the members of this
list? No - they have to persuade their colleagues in the pragmatic
world they work in. And - they have, in many cases, achieved such a
result. This list should at least acknowledge that it CAN be done. 

Edwina 
 On Mon 01/04/19  9:37 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
[2] sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  ... who do you think should be 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Daniel L Everett]

Jon

I simply mean to underscore method. 

Not who might be correct on the terminology. 

I always learn from these discussions. 

Thanks

Dan


Sent from my iPhone

> On Apr 1, 2019, at 21:44, Jon Alan Schmidt  wrote:
> 
> Dan, List:
> 
> Where has anyone on the List engaged in "ad hominem arguments (based on a 
> person's worth or unworth in a given subject)"?
> 
> Our terminological disputes typically pertain to Peirce's usage, so the 
> "experiment" by which they can be resolved is careful examination of the 
> "data," which consists of the relevant texts in his writings.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
>> On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 7:42 PM Dan Everett  wrote:
>> I agree with Edwina on ad hominem arguments (based on a person’s worth or 
>> unworth in a given subject). But as I have said before here, one must be 
>> able to distinguish interpretations based on their practical results. All 
>> terms have to be interpreted in light of the pragmatic maxim. Straying away 
>> from that moves into Popperian concerns about essentialism, which is usually 
>> pointless. 
>> 
>> A terminological dispute that cannot be resolved via an experiment or via 
>> some other form of data  is of lesser importance. 
>> 
>> Dan
> 
> -
> PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON 
> PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu 
> . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu 
> with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
> http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
> 
> 
> 
> 

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Gary Richmond]

Edwina, Jon, List,

Jon quoted Edwina, then quoted her again *as* response to her question:

ET:  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide on, as you
say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?


JAS: You answered your own question ...

ET:  ... don't you think that they should be allowed to read and interpret
Peirce's work on their own[?]


Edwina, I think you misinterpreted Jon's response. You wrote:

JAS: "  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide on, as
you say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?

ET: No- I didn't answer this question and I've no idea why you wrote this.
 ET: I asked YOU to answer it

Jon was merely saying that the answer to your question "who do you think
should be the authorities who decide on, as you say, what is 'an accurate
understanding of Peirce's work'? " was, as you wrote: " [everyone] should
be allowed to read and interpret Peirce's work on their own."

And that is all.

Best,

Gary


*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*




On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 10:06 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS - I repeat
>
> ET:  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide on, as you
> say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?
>
> No- I didn't answer this question and I've no idea why you wrote this.
>
>  I asked YOU to answer it - since you yourself introduced the phrase of
> 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'.  That phrase, after all, sets
> up an axiom that there is one such understanding - and I'd like to know
> who.makes.that.decision. You insist that it is 'the starting point'. Again
> - who sets up this definition of The Accurate Understanding?
>
> And you wrote:" Newcomers to Peirce should first be made aware of Peirce's
> own analytic frame, including his typically very precise
> terminology." Why can't they read Peirce on their own and decide for
> themselves what is his analytic frame?? Who are you suggesting should 'make
> them aware' of it?? Who should inform them of this 'analytic frame' - and
> after all - we do have disagreements about the nature of this frame - so,
> WHO defines the 'accurate one'? And WHO defines the 'very precise
> terminology' - since from what I've seen on this list, the terminology is
> not in the least precise and not everyone agrees with the meanings of these
> terms. You've participated in months of arguments about terminology!
>
> Finally - with reference to the term of 'unPeircean' - You are offering
> a red herring argument that such a term hasn't been used in 2019. It's
> been used quite often before.  Name-Calling? Give me an example.
>
> Again - this is going nowhere. My whole point is that the Peircean
> analytic framework is a powerful means of analyzing pragmatic reality, the
> real-life situations in chemistry, biology, economics, societal
> organization, AI etc - and being met with derision and derogatory comments
> when examples of research are offered that could be examined within this
> framework - is not conducive to scholarly work.
>
> As I've said - there ARE scholars who are using Peirce to examine what's
> going on in biology, in economics, in AI - and my view is that they are
> right to do so - since his analytic framework is indeed a powerful tool to
> do so.  Do they have to persuade the members of this list? No - they have
> to persuade their colleagues in the pragmatic world they work in. And -
> they have, in many cases, achieved such a result. This list should at least
> acknowledge that it CAN be done.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon 01/04/19 9:37 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide on, as you
> say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?
>
>
> You answered your own question ...
>
> ET:  ... don't you think that they should be allowed to read and interpret
> Peirce's work on their own[?]
>
>
> As I have stated recently and repeatedly, each of us must make the case
> for the views that we espouse, and then let readers decide for themselves
> who is more persuasive that his/her position is an accurate interpretation
> of what Peirce actually wrote.  The rhetoric of righteous indignation is no
> more appropriate here than the rhetoric of authoritative pronouncement.
>
> ET:  However, being told that one's views are 'unPeircean' is not
> disagreement.
>
>
> No one on the List has used that word to describe someone else's views even
> once so far in 2019.  On the other hand, only one person on the List
> routinely resorts to Absurd Name-Calling With Capitalization.
>
> All I have said is that I find some of what you characterize as
> "Peircean" to be inconsistent with Peirce's texts.  In other words, I
> disagree that your "analytic frame" is the same as Peirce's "analytic
> frame."  That is my opinion--nothing more, 

Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS - I repeat

ET:  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide on,
as you say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?

No- I didn't answer this question and I've no idea why you wrote
this.

 I asked YOU to answer it - since you yourself introduced the phrase
of 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'.  That phrase, after
all, sets up an axiom that there is one such understanding - and I'd
like to know who.makes.that.decision. You insist that it is 'the
starting point'. Again - who sets up this definition of The Accurate
Understanding?

And you wrote:" Newcomers to Peirce should first be made aware of
Peirce's own analytic frame, including his typically very precise
terminology." Why can't they read Peirce on their own and decide for
themselves what is his analytic frame?? Who are you suggesting should
'make them aware' of it?? Who should inform them of this 'analytic
frame' - and after all - we do have disagreements about the nature of
this frame - so, WHO defines the 'accurate one'? And WHO defines the
'very precise terminology' - since from what I've seen on this list,
the terminology is not in the least precise and not everyone agrees
with the meanings of these terms. You've participated in months of
arguments about terminology!

Finally - with reference to the term of 'unPeircean' - You are
offering a red herring argument that such a term hasn't been used in
2019. It's been used quite often before.  Name-Calling? Give me an
example.

Again - this is going nowhere. My whole point is that the Peircean
analytic framework is a powerful means of analyzing pragmatic
reality, the real-life situations in chemistry, biology, economics,
societal organization, AI etc - and being met with derision and
derogatory comments when examples of research are offered that could
be examined within this framework - is not conducive to scholarly
work. 

As I've said - there ARE scholars who are using Peirce to examine
what's going on in biology, in economics, in AI - and my view is that
they are right to do so - since his analytic framework is indeed a
powerful tool to do so.  Do they have to persuade the members of this
list? No - they have to persuade their colleagues in the pragmatic
world they work in. And - they have, in many cases, achieved such a
result. This list should at least acknowledge that it CAN be done. 

Edwina
 On Mon 01/04/19  9:37 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide on,
as you say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?
 You answered your own question ...
  ET:  ... don't you think that they should be allowed to read and
interpret Peirce's work on their own[?]
 As I have stated recently and repeatedly, each of us must make the
case for the views that we espouse, and then let readers decide for
themselves who is more persuasive that his/her position is an
accurate interpretation of what Peirce actually wrote.  The rhetoric
of righteous indignation is no more appropriate here than the
rhetoric of authoritative pronouncement. 
 ET:  However, being told that one's views are 'unPeircean' is not
disagreement.
 No one on the List has used that word to describe someone else's
views even once so far in 2019.  On the other hand, only one person
on the List routinely resorts to Absurd Name-Calling With
Capitalization. 
 All I have said is that I find some of what you characterize as
"Peircean" to be inconsistent with Peirce's texts.  In other words, I
disagree that your "analytic frame" is the same as Peirce's "analytic
frame."  That is my opinion--nothing more, nothing less, with all the
weight (or lack thereof) that it carries accordingly.
 Regards,
  Jon S.
 On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 7:37 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
JAS - with regard to your post - who do you think should be the
authorities who decide on, as you say, what is 'an accurate
understanding of Peirce's work'??? Is there some kind of - oh, upper
level hierarchy of Peircean scholars, who are set up [how? by whom?] 
to decide on what is 'such an accurate understanding"??? What happens
if these elites decide that your research 'does not show an accurate
understanding'? Is it deemed - 'unPeircean'?

As for newcomers to Peirce's work, don't you think that they should
be allowed to read and interpret Peirce's work on their own - rather
than being told to accept The Right Way To Think About Peirce by this
set of assumed Peircean authorities? 

And as for disagreement - as I've always said - I'm fine with that.
That's the whole point of a list where we are all equal explorers.
However, being told that one's views are 'unPeircean' is not
disagreement. It is the setting up of one person as the Ultimate
Authority/Gatekeeper - and the other person is defined as 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Dan, List:

Where has anyone on the List engaged in "ad hominem arguments (based on a
person's worth or unworth in a given subject)"?

Our terminological disputes typically pertain to *Peirce's *usage, so the
"experiment" by which they can be resolved is careful examination of the
"data," which consists of the relevant texts in his writings.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 7:42 PM Dan Everett  wrote:

> I agree with Edwina on ad hominem arguments (based on a person’s worth or
> unworth in a given subject). But as I have said before here, one must be
> able to distinguish interpretations based on their practical results. All
> terms have to be interpreted in light of the pragmatic maxim. Straying away
> from that moves into Popperian concerns about essentialism, which is
> usually pointless.
>
> A terminological dispute that cannot be resolved via an experiment or via
> some other form of data  is of lesser importance.
>
> Dan
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  ... who do you think should be the authorities who decide on, as you
say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's work'?


You answered your own question ...

ET:  ... don't you think that they should be allowed to read and interpret
Peirce's work on their own[?]


As I have stated recently and repeatedly, each of us must make the case for
the views that we espouse, and then let readers *decide for themselves* who
is more persuasive that his/her position is an accurate interpretation of
what Peirce actually wrote.  The rhetoric of righteous indignation is no
more appropriate here than the rhetoric of authoritative pronouncement.

ET:  However, being told that one's views are 'unPeircean' is not
disagreement.


No one on the List has used that word to describe someone else's views *even
once* so far in 2019.  On the other hand, only one person on the List
routinely resorts to Absurd Name-Calling With Capitalization.

All I have said is that I find some of what you characterize as "Peircean"
to be inconsistent with Peirce's texts.  In other words, I disagree that *your
*"analytic frame" is the same as *Peirce's *"analytic frame."  That is *my
opinion*--nothing more, nothing less, with all the weight (or lack thereof)
that it carries accordingly.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 7:37 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS - with regard to your post - who do you think should be the
> authorities who decide on, as you say, what is 'an accurate understanding
> of Peirce's work'??? Is there some kind of - oh, upper level hierarchy of
> Peircean scholars, who are set up [how? by whom?]  to decide on what is
> 'such an accurate understanding"??? What happens if these elites decide
> that your research 'does not show an accurate understanding'? Is it deemed
> - 'unPeircean'?
>
> As for newcomers to Peirce's work, don't you think that they should be
> allowed to read and interpret Peirce's work on their own - rather than
> being told to accept The Right Way To Think About Peirce by this set of
> assumed Peircean authorities?
>
> And as for disagreement - as I've always said - I'm fine with that. That's
> the whole point of a list where we are all equal explorers. However, being
> told that one's views are 'unPeircean' is not disagreement. It is the
> setting up of one person as the Ultimate Authority/Gatekeeper - and the
> other person is defined as an ignoramus.
>
> Edwina
>
> On Mon 01/04/19 7:43 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  ... IF this particular Peirce list itself has no interest in
> examining how Peirce's work can be used in the pragmatic 'real' world -
> then, why am I even bothering to wish such a thing?
>
>
> The antecedent of this conditional is false.  Plenty of List participants
> have expressed their desire to foster such applications, and I have
> actually done so myself within my profession of structural engineering; but
> the starting point must be an accurate understanding of Peirce's work.
>
> ET:  I don't like to see Peirce 'publicized' so to speak, via an important
> list - as functioning only in that one area that this small group are
> focused on.  Peircean semiosis is much more than this - and I don't think
> we should accept such a reduction.
>
>
> What is posted on-List is whatever List members freely choose to post.
> Those of us with strong interest in Peirce's philosophical views just
> happen to be the ones who post the most these days; and we should not be
> deterred from continuing to have such discussions, either.  There is
> plenty of room on the List for all kinds of topics, as long as they pertain
> in some way to Peirce's thought--which is not much of a limitation, given
> the breadth of his competence.
>
> ET:  Furthermore - newcomers to Peirce should, I think, be made aware of
> the pragmatic functionality of the Peircean analytic frame - as I have
> outlined - and how it can be extended, as Peirce himself did, into
> examining the real existential world.
>
>
> Newcomers to Peirce should first be made aware of Peirce's own analytic
> frame, including his typically very precise terminology.  Then they will
> be in a position to compare it with various adjustments and alternatives,
> such as what you have outlined.
>
> ET:  So- just because I am met with either silence or hostility by a few
> ...
>
>
> Disagreement is not hostility.  This is an open forum, where anyone is
> welcome to state any opinion related to Peirce--as long as they do so
> respectfully, and are willing and able to back it up with evidence.  For
> example, I have repeatedly expressed and defended my opinion that some of
> what you characterize as "the Peircean analytic frame" is inconsistent with
> Peirce's own texts.  I stand by that opinion, which is not an insult--after
> all, I have acknowledged that some of  my own current views about
> Speculative Grammar are not identical to Peirce's.
>
> I have every right to compare what 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear list,



haha!



Though I am certain it is not our intention, I don’t think it is possible
to subvert the goal of spreading his method any better than to go on doing
what we are doing.



Perhaps our goal is not to win/come to consensus, but to push a tie
forever..



Dan suggests a useful way (guiding light) forward.. but why isn’t even
*that* working?



Best,
Jerry R

On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 7:42 PM Dan Everett  wrote:

> I agree with Edwina on ad hominem arguments (based on a person’s worth or
> unworth in a given subject). But as I have said before here, one must be
> able to distinguish interpretations based on their practical results. All
> terms have to be interpreted in light of the pragmatic maxim. Straying away
> from that moves into Popperian concerns about essentialism, which is
> usually pointless.
>
> A terminological dispute that cannot be resolved via an experiment or via
> some other form of data  is of lesser importance.
>
> Dan
>
> On Apr 1, 2019, at 8:37 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> JAS - with regard to your post - who do you think should be the
> authorities who decide on, as you say, what is 'an accurate understanding
> of Peirce's work'??? Is there some kind of - oh, upper level hierarchy of
> Peircean scholars, who are set up [how? by whom?]  to decide on what is
> 'such an accurate understanding"??? What happens if these elites decide
> that your research 'does not show an accurate understanding'? Is it deemed
> - 'unPeircean'?
>
> As for newcomers to Peirce's work, don't you think that they should be
> allowed to read and interpret Peirce's work on their own - rather than
> being told to accept The Right Way To Think About Peirce by this set of
> assumed Peircean authorities?
>
> And as for disagreement - as I've always said - I'm fine with that. That's
> the whole point of a list where we are all equal explorers. However, being
> told that one's views are 'unPeircean' is not disagreement. It is the
> setting up of one person as the Ultimate Authority/Gatekeeper - and the
> other person is defined as an ignoramus.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
>
>
>
> On Mon 01/04/19 7:43 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com sent:
>
> Edwina, List:
>
> ET:  ... IF this particular Peirce list itself has no interest in
> examining how Peirce's work can be used in the pragmatic 'real' world -
> then, why am I even bothering to wish such a thing?
>
>
> The antecedent of this conditional is false.  Plenty of List participants
> have expressed their desire to foster such applications, and I have
> actually done so myself within my profession of structural engineering; but
> the starting point must be an accurate understanding of Peirce's work.
>
> ET:  I don't like to see Peirce 'publicized' so to speak, via an important
> list - as functioning only in that one area that this small group are
> focused on.  Peircean semiosis is much more than this - and I don't think
> we should accept such a reduction.
>
>
> What is posted on-List is whatever List members freely choose to post.
> Those of us with strong interest in Peirce's philosophical views just
> happen to be the ones who post the most these days; and we should not be
> deterred from continuing to have such discussions, either.  There is
> plenty of room on the List for all kinds of topics, as long as they pertain
> in some way to Peirce's thought--which is not much of a limitation, given
> the breadth of his competence.
>
> ET:  Furthermore - newcomers to Peirce should, I think, be made aware of
> the pragmatic functionality of the Peircean analytic frame - as I have
> outlined - and how it can be extended, as Peirce himself did, into
> examining the real existential world.
>
>
> Newcomers to Peirce should first be made aware of Peirce's own analytic
> frame, including his typically very precise terminology.  Then they will
> be in a position to compare it with various adjustments and alternatives,
> such as what you have outlined.
>
> ET:  So- just because I am met with either silence or hostility by a few
> ...
>
>
> Disagreement is not hostility.  This is an open forum, where anyone is
> welcome to state any opinion related to Peirce--as long as they do so
> respectfully, and are willing and able to back it up with evidence.  For
> example, I have repeatedly expressed and defended my opinion that some of
> what you characterize as "the Peircean analytic frame" is inconsistent with
> Peirce's own texts.  I stand by that opinion, which is not an insult--after
> all, I have acknowledged that some of  my own current views about
> Speculative Grammar are not identical to Peirce's.
>
> I have every right to compare what anyone else writes with what Peirce
> wrote, and then to point out what I see as obvious discrepancies--and
> others have every right to do the same with what I write.  In fact, I see
> that as a major purpose of the List--enabling participants to compare
> notes, and hopefully help each other come to a better understanding of
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Dan Everett]

I agree with Edwina on ad hominem arguments (based on a person’s worth or 
unworth in a given subject). But as I have said before here, one must be able 
to distinguish interpretations based on their practical results. All terms have 
to be interpreted in light of the pragmatic maxim. Straying away from that 
moves into Popperian concerns about essentialism, which is usually pointless. 

A terminological dispute that cannot be resolved via an experiment or via some 
other form of data  is of lesser importance. 

Dan

> On Apr 1, 2019, at 8:37 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> JAS - with regard to your post - who do you think should be the authorities 
> who decide on, as you say, what is 'an accurate understanding of Peirce's 
> work'??? Is there some kind of - oh, upper level hierarchy of Peircean 
> scholars, who are set up [how? by whom?]  to decide on what is 'such an 
> accurate understanding"??? What happens if these elites decide that your 
> research 'does not show an accurate understanding'? Is it deemed - 
> 'unPeircean'?
> 
> As for newcomers to Peirce's work, don't you think that they should be 
> allowed to read and interpret Peirce's work on their own - rather than being 
> told to accept The Right Way To Think About Peirce by this set of assumed 
> Peircean authorities?
> 
> And as for disagreement - as I've always said - I'm fine with that. That's 
> the whole point of a list where we are all equal explorers. However, being 
> told that one's views are 'unPeircean' is not disagreement. It is the setting 
> up of one person as the Ultimate Authority/Gatekeeper - and the other person 
> is defined as an ignoramus.
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
>  
> 
> On Mon 01/04/19 7:43 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com 
>  sent:
> 
> Edwina, List:
> 
> ET:  ... IF this particular Peirce list itself has no interest in examining 
> how Peirce's work can be used in the pragmatic 'real' world - then, why am I 
> even bothering to wish such a thing?
> 
> The antecedent of this conditional is false.  Plenty of List participants 
> have expressed their desire to foster such applications, and I have actually 
> done so myself within my profession of structural engineering; but the 
> starting point must be an accurate understanding of Peirce's work.
> 
> ET:  I don't like to see Peirce 'publicized' so to speak, via an important 
> list - as functioning only in that one area that this small group are focused 
> on.  Peircean semiosis is much more than this - and I don't think we should 
> accept such a reduction.
> 
> What is posted on-List is whatever List members freely choose to post.  Those 
> of us with strong interest in Peirce's philosophical views just happen to be 
> the ones who post the most these days; and we should not be deterred from 
> continuing to have such discussions, either.  There is plenty of room on the 
> List for all kinds of topics, as long as they pertain in some way to Peirce's 
> thought--which is not much of a limitation, given the breadth of his 
> competence.
> 
> ET:  Furthermore - newcomers to Peirce should, I think, be made aware of the 
> pragmatic functionality of the Peircean analytic frame - as I have outlined - 
> and how it can be extended, as Peirce himself did, into examining the real 
> existential world.
> 
> Newcomers to Peirce should first be made aware of Peirce's own analytic 
> frame, including his typically very precise terminology.  Then they will be 
> in a position to compare it with various adjustments and alternatives, such 
> as what you have outlined.
> 
> ET:  So- just because I am met with either silence or hostility by a few ...
> 
> Disagreement is not hostility.  This is an open forum, where anyone is 
> welcome to state any opinion related to Peirce--as long as they do so 
> respectfully, and are willing and able to back it up with evidence.  For 
> example, I have repeatedly expressed and defended my opinion that some of 
> what you characterize as "the Peircean analytic frame" is inconsistent with 
> Peirce's own texts.  I stand by that opinion, which is not an insult--after 
> all, I have acknowledged that some of  my own current views about Speculative 
> Grammar are not identical to Peirce's.
> 
> I have every right to compare what anyone else writes with what Peirce wrote, 
> and then to point out what I see as obvious discrepancies--and others have 
> every right to do the same with what I write.  In fact, I see that as a major 
> purpose of the List--enabling participants to compare notes, and hopefully 
> help each other come to a better understanding of Peirce.  No one is 
> infallible, including Peirce himself, as he would have been the first to 
> insist; and accordingly, no one should block the way of inquiry by treating 
> their own pronouncements as somehow immune from well-founded criticism.
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur 

Re: Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS - with regard to your post - who do you think should be the
authorities who decide on, as you say, what is 'an accurate
understanding of Peirce's work'??? Is there some kind of - oh, upper
level hierarchy of Peircean scholars, who are set up [how? by whom?] 
to decide on what is 'such an accurate understanding"??? What happens
if these elites decide that your research 'does not show an accurate
understanding'? Is it deemed - 'unPeircean'?

As for newcomers to Peirce's work, don't you think that they should
be allowed to read and interpret Peirce's work on their own - rather
than being told to accept The Right Way To Think About Peirce by this
set of assumed Peircean authorities?

And as for disagreement - as I've always said - I'm fine with that.
That's the whole point of a list where we are all equal explorers.
However, being told that one's views are 'unPeircean' is not
disagreement. It is the setting up of one person as the Ultimate
Authority/Gatekeeper - and the other person is defined as an
ignoramus. 

Edwina
 On Mon 01/04/19  7:43 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 ET:  ... IF this particular Peirce list itself has no interest in
examining how Peirce's work can be used in the pragmatic 'real' world
- then, why am I even bothering to wish such a thing? 
 The antecedent of this conditional is false.  Plenty of List
participants have expressed their desire to foster such applications,
and I have actually done so myself within my profession of structural
engineering; but the starting point must be an accurate understanding
of Peirce's work.
 ET:  I don't like to see Peirce 'publicized' so to speak, via an
important list - as functioning only in that one area that this small
group are focused on.  Peircean semiosis is much more than this - and
I don't think we should accept such a reduction. 
 What is posted on-List is whatever List members freely choose to
post.  Those of us with strong interest in Peirce's philosophical
views just happen to be the ones who post the most these days; and we
should not be deterred from continuing to have such discussions,
either.  There is plenty of room on the List for all kinds of topics,
as long as they pertain in some way to Peirce's thought--which is not
much of a limitation, given the breadth of his competence. 
 ET:  Furthermore - newcomers to Peirce should, I think, be made
aware of the pragmatic functionality of the Peircean analytic frame -
as I have outlined - and how it can be extended, as Peirce himself
did, into examining the real existential world.
  Newcomers to Peirce should first be made aware of Peirce's own
analytic frame, including his typically very precise terminology. 
Then they will be in a position to compare it with various
adjustments and alternatives, such as what you have outlined.
 ET:  So- just because I am met with either silence or hostility by a
few ... 
 Disagreement is not hostility.  This is an open forum, where anyone
is welcome to state any opinion related to Peirce--as long as they do
so respectfully, and are willing and able to back it up with evidence.
 For example, I have repeatedly expressed and defended my opinion that
some of what you characterize as "the Peircean analytic frame" is
inconsistent with Peirce's own texts.  I stand by that opinion, which
is not an insult--after all, I have acknowledged that some of  my own
current views about Speculative Grammar are not identical to
Peirce's.
 I have every right to compare what anyone else writes with what
Peirce wrote, and then to point out what I see as obvious
discrepancies--and others have every right to do the same with what I
write.  In fact, I see that as a major purpose of the List--enabling
participants to compare notes, and hopefully help each other come to
a better understanding of Peirce.  No one is infallible, including
Peirce himself, as he would have been the first to insist; and
accordingly, no one should block the way of inquiry by treating their
own pronouncements as somehow immune from well-founded criticism.
 Regards,
Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USAProfessional Engineer, Amateur
Philosopher, Lutheran Laymanwww.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt [1]  -
twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt [2]
 On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 4:13 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Jerry, list

Yes - I understand what you are saying - that IF this particular
Peirce list itself has no interest in examining how Peirce's work can
be used in the pragmatic 'real' world - then, why am I even bothering
to wish such a thing?

My answer is two-fold. First - that this Peirce list does not 
consist of only the small handful who actually post to the list.
There are a lot more members.  Nor does the Peirce world community
consist of this handful - or even - of the members of this list.
There ARE people who are not on this list, who are interested in

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

ET:  ... IF this particular Peirce list itself has no interest in examining
how Peirce's work can be used in the pragmatic 'real' world - then, why am
I even bothering to wish such a thing?


The antecedent of this conditional is false.  Plenty of List participants
have expressed their desire to foster such applications, and I have
actually done so myself within my profession of structural engineering; but
the starting point must be an* accurate understanding* of Peirce's work.

ET:  I don't like to see Peirce 'publicized' so to speak, via an important
list - as functioning only in that one area that this small group are
focused on.  Peircean semiosis is much more than this - and I don't think
we should accept such a reduction.


What is posted on-List is whatever List members freely choose to post.
Those of us with strong interest in Peirce's *philosophical *views just
happen to be the ones who post the most these days; and we should not be
deterred from *continuing *to have such discussions, either.  There is
plenty of room on the List for all kinds of topics, as long as they pertain
in some way to Peirce's thought--which is not much of a limitation, given
the breadth of his competence.

ET:  Furthermore - newcomers to Peirce should, I think, be made aware of
the pragmatic functionality of the Peircean analytic frame - as I have
outlined - and how it can be extended, as Peirce himself did, into
examining the real existential world.


Newcomers to Peirce should *first *be made aware of *Peirce's own* analytic
frame, including his typically *very precise* terminology.  Then they will
be in a position to compare it with various *adjustments *and *alternatives*,
such as what you have outlined.

ET:  So- just because I am met with either silence or hostility by a few ...


Disagreement is not hostility.  This is an open forum, where anyone is
welcome to state any *opinion* related to Peirce--as long as they do so
*respectfully*, and are willing and able to back it up with *evidence*.
For example, I have repeatedly expressed and defended my opinion that *some
*of what you characterize as "the Peircean analytic frame" is inconsistent
with Peirce's own texts.  I stand by that opinion, which is not an
insult--after all, I have acknowledged that some of *my own* current views
about Speculative Grammar are not identical to Peirce's.

I have every right to compare what anyone else writes with what Peirce
wrote, and then to point out what I see as obvious discrepancies--and
others have every right to do the same with what I write.  In fact, I see
that as a major purpose of the List--enabling participants to compare
notes, and hopefully help each other come to a *better *understanding of
Peirce.  No one is infallible, including Peirce himself, as he would have
been the first to insist; and accordingly, no one should block the way of
inquiry by treating their own pronouncements as somehow immune from
well-founded criticism.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 4:13 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Jerry, list
>
> Yes - I understand what you are saying - that IF this particular Peirce
> list itself has no interest in examining how Peirce's work can be used in
> the pragmatic 'real' world - then, why am I even bothering to wish such a
> thing?
>
> My answer is two-fold. First - that this Peirce list does not  consist of
> only the small handful who actually post to the list. There are a lot more
> members.  Nor does the Peirce world community consist of this handful - or
> even - of the members of this list. There ARE people who are not on this
> list, who are interested in Peirce - and who work in AI, in biology, in
> physics, in economics. That is - their primary interest might be in 'how
> does biological adaptation function' - and they might find that the
> Peircean analytic framework is a powerful analytic means of explaining the
> dynamics of such.
>
> And therefore,  second - I feel that Peirce cannot be reduced to the
> particular interest of the few who post to this list. So, I don't like to
> see Peirce 'publicized' so to speak, via an important list - as functioning
> only in that one area that this small group are focused on.  Peircean
> semiosis is much more than this - and I don't think we should accept such a
> reduction.
>
> Furthermore - newcomers to Peirce should, I think, be made aware of
> the pragmatic functionality of the Peircean analytic frame - as I have
> outlined - and how it can be extended, as Peirce himself did, into
> examining the real existential world.
>
> So- just because I am met with either silence or hostility by a few, this
> doesn't mean that the Peircean analytic framework - as a pragmatic tool -
> deserves silence or rejection.
>
> Edwina
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jerry LR Chandler]

Jerry R:

Your remarks reflect, in many ways, the views of both the scientific and 
philosophic communities at large.
CSP scholars have yet to clearly demonstrate either how or why CSP writings are 
at least as good as other representations of nature or logic or of the nature 
of logic.

Intentionally, this statement is provocative. I am exceedingly curious about 
how contributors to this list will respond.

Cheers

Jerry C.


> On Apr 1, 2019, at 3:39 PM, Jerry Rhee  wrote:
> 
> Dear Edwina, list,
>  
> You said:
> “My point is only that there is a lot of work being done now in the actual 
> world, examining complex information dynamics - 
> and Peirce's framework, to me, is perfect as an analytic tool for that 
> purpose.
>  
> I just wish we could expand the knowledge of this framework –
> and see how very pragmatic and enlightening it could be.”
>  
> To which I would add, we seem to be getting along just fine without it. 
>  
> And given the constant snipping back and forth that goes on in this list
> (for instance, on even what a ‘subject’ is;
> I mean, who doesn’t know the difference between subject and predicate?),
> why would you recommend something to the community-at-large 
> a something that you can’t even justify to a list who claims to embrace 
> Peirce? 
>  
> That is, when you haven’t been able to persuade a group who say 
> ‘we honor that which you claim is not being used enough’ to take right action,
> why would an outside community ever think they could find any use for it, 
> whatsoever?
>  
> It all seems crazy from my point of view..
>  
> With best wishes,
> Jerry R
> 
> On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 1:11 PM Edwina Taborsky  > wrote:
> Thanks for your comments.
> 
> I don't see how anyone could try to say that I am stretching Peirce's words, 
> for after all, his framework has to be an analytic structure to DO something! 
> It doesn't make any sense to set up, for example, that semiosic triad - with 
> its full six nodes - without using it to explain the world. And - he does 
> indeed explain it in one such example - his ten classes. The same with the 
> categories and their complex natures - they are set up to examine and explain 
> the world.
> 
> My point is only that there is a lot of work being done now in the actual 
> world, examining complex information dynamics - and Peirce's framework, to 
> me, is perfect as an analytic tool for that purpose.
> 
> I just wish we could expand the knowledge of this framework - and see how 
> very pragmatic and enlightening it could be.
> 
> Edwina
> 
>  
> 
> On Mon 01/04/19 1:38 PM , Dan Everett danleveret...@gmail.com 
>  sent:
> 
> This seems very exciting to me, Edwina. It fits exactly my own view of Peirce 
> as coming up with ideas for empirical purposes. Even if someone were to think 
> that you were stretching Peirce’s words (I don’t), it wouldn’t change the 
> usefulness of what you are doing, I suspect. 
> 
> Thanks for sharing this stuff.
> 
> Dan
> 
>> On Apr 1, 2019, at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky > wrote:
>> 
>> List:
>> 
>> I'm continuing with my interest in the pragmatics of Peircean semiosis; that 
>> is, the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure to examine the dynamic 
>> operations within the organic chemical, the biological, the societal 
>> [economic systems, population behaviour] - and the cognitive  [which 
>> includes AI].
>> 
>> Basically, it's all about 'information processing' , which includes the 
>> self-organization of an organism's capacity and actions of knowledge 
>> development and maintenance, , adaptation of knowledge and behaviour, 
>> anticipation tactics, entropy problems and so on.
>> 
>> Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us to 
>> examine the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic 
>> informational format is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad is 
>> further broken down into more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end up with 
>> six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such a framework enables more information 
>> transformation at each nodal site.
>> 
>> In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness, Secondness 
>> and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of data/information. BUT 
>> again, he increased the complexity capacity of these three modes by 
>> introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms: So- we have 1-1, 2-2 AND 
>> 2-1. Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note that Thirdness, the action of 
>> knowledge storage has THREE methods to carry out this action: iconic, 
>> indexical and symbolic. That's a powerful tool.
>> 
>> Then, there are the ten basic classes of Signs - [2:254] - which explain the 
>> triads from the simple ''feeling' to the complex cognitive.  Put this all 
>> together and I maintain that Peirce has provided a powerful analytic 
>> framework for examining the dynamics - and it IS a dynamical operation - of 
>> information generation, adaptation, evolution and 

Re: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}Jerry, list

Yes - I understand what you are saying - that IF this particular
Peirce list itself has no interest in examining how Peirce's work can
be used in the pragmatic 'real' world - then, why am I even bothering
to wish such a thing?

My answer is two-fold. First - that this Peirce list does not 
consist of only the small handful who actually post to the list.
There are a lot more members.  Nor does the Peirce world community
consist of this handful - or even - of the members of this list.
There ARE people who are not on this list, who are interested in
Peirce - and who work in AI, in biology, in physics, in economics.
That is - their primary interest might be in 'how does biological
adaptation function' - and they might find that the Peircean analytic
framework is a powerful analytic means of explaining the dynamics of
such. 

And therefore,  second - I feel that Peirce cannot be reduced to the
particular interest of the few who post to this list. So, I don't like
to see Peirce 'publicized' so to speak, via an important list - as
functioning only in that one area that this small group are focused
on.  Peircean semiosis is much more than this - and I don't think we
should accept such a reduction.

Furthermore - newcomers to Peirce should, I think, be made aware of
the pragmatic functionality of the Peircean analytic frame - as I
have outlined - and how it can be extended, as Peirce himself did,
into examining the real existential world.

So- just because I am met with either silence or hostility by a few,
this doesn't mean that the Peircean analytic framework - as a
pragmatic tool - deserves silence or rejection. 

Edwina
 On Mon 01/04/19  4:39 PM , Jerry Rhee jerryr...@gmail.com sent:
Dear Edwina, list, 
You said: 

“My point is only that there is a lot of work being done now in
the actual world, examining complex information dynamics - 

and Peirce's framework, to me, is perfect as an analytic tool for
that purpose. 
I just wish we could expand the knowledge of this framework –  

and see how very pragmatic and enlightening it could be.” 
To which I would add, we seem to be getting along just fine without
it.   
And given the constant snipping back and forth that goes on in this
list  

(for instance, on even what a ‘subject’ is;  

I mean, who doesn’t know the difference between subject and
predicate?),  

why would you recommend something to the community-at-large 

a something that you can’t even justify to a list who claims to
embrace Peirce?   
That is, when you haven’t been able to persuade a group who say 

‘we honor that which you claim is not being used enough’ to take
right action,  

why would an outside community ever think they could find any use
for it, whatsoever? 
It all seems crazy from my point of view.. 
With best wishes, 

Jerry R
 On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 1:11 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
Thanks for your comments.

I don't see how anyone could try to say that I am stretching
Peirce's words, for after all, his framework has to be an analytic
structure to DO something! It doesn't make any sense to set up, for
example, that semiosic triad - with its full six nodes - without
using it to explain the world. And - he does indeed explain it in one
such example - his ten classes. The same with the categories and their
complex natures - they are set up to examine and explain the world. 

My point is only that there is a lot of work being done now in the
actual world, examining complex information dynamics - and Peirce's
framework, to me, is perfect as an analytic tool for that purpose. 

I just wish we could expand the knowledge of this framework - and
see how very pragmatic and enlightening it could be.

Edwina
 On Mon 01/04/19  1:38 PM , Dan Everett danleveret...@gmail.com [2]
sent:
 This seems very exciting to me, Edwina. It fits exactly my own view
of Peirce as coming up with ideas for empirical purposes. Even if
someone were to think that you were stretching Peirce’s words (I
don’t), it wouldn’t change the usefulness of what you are doing,
I suspect. 
 Thanks for sharing this stuff.
 Dan
 On Apr 1, 2019, at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 List:

I'm continuing with my interest in the pragmatics of Peircean
semiosis; that is, the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure to
examine the dynamic operations within the organic chemical, the
biological, the societal [economic systems, population behaviour] -
and the cognitive  [which includes AI]. 

Basically, it's all about 'information processing' , which includes
the self-organization of an organism's capacity and actions of
knowledge development and maintenance, , adaptation of knowledge and
behaviour, 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Jerry Rhee]

Dear Edwina, list,



You said:

“My point is only that there is a lot of work being done now in the actual
world, examining complex information dynamics -

and Peirce's framework, to me, is perfect as an analytic tool for that
purpose.



*I just wish* we could expand the knowledge of this framework –

and *see *how very pragmatic and enlightening it could be.”



To which I would add, we seem to be getting along just fine without it.



And given the constant snipping back and forth that goes on in this list

(for instance, on even what a ‘subject’ is;

I mean, who doesn’t know the difference between subject and predicate?),

why would you recommend something to the community-at-large

a something that you can’t even justify to a list who claims to embrace
Peirce?



That is, when you haven’t been able to persuade a group who say

‘we honor that which you claim is not being used enough’ to take right
action,

why would an outside community ever think they could find any use for it,
whatsoever?



It all seems crazy from my point of view..



With best wishes,

Jerry R

On Mon, Apr 1, 2019 at 1:11 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> Thanks for your comments.
>
> I don't see how anyone could try to say that I am stretching Peirce's
> words, for after all, his framework has to be an analytic structure to DO
> something! It doesn't make any sense to set up, for example, that semiosic
> triad - with its full six nodes - without using it to explain the world.
> And - he does indeed explain it in one such example - his ten classes. The
> same with the categories and their complex natures - they are set up to
> examine and explain the world.
>
> My point is only that there is a lot of work being done now in the actual
> world, examining complex information dynamics - and Peirce's framework, to
> me, is perfect as an analytic tool for that purpose.
>
> I just wish we could expand the knowledge of this framework - and see how
> very pragmatic and enlightening it could be.
>
> Edwina
>
>
>
> On Mon 01/04/19 1:38 PM , Dan Everett danleveret...@gmail.com sent:
>
> This seems very exciting to me, Edwina. It fits exactly my own view of
> Peirce as coming up with ideas for empirical purposes. Even if someone were
> to think that you were stretching Peirce’s words (I don’t), it wouldn’t
> change the usefulness of what you are doing, I suspect.
>
> Thanks for sharing this stuff.
>
> Dan
>
> On Apr 1, 2019, at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
>
> List:
>
> I'm continuing with my interest in the pragmatics of Peircean semiosis;
> that is, the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure to examine the
> dynamic operations within the organic chemical, the biological, the
> societal [economic systems, population behaviour] - and the cognitive
> [which includes AI].
>
> Basically, it's all about 'information processing' , which includes the
> self-organization of an organism's capacity and actions of knowledge
> development and maintenance, , adaptation of knowledge and behaviour,
> anticipation tactics, entropy problems and so on.
>
> Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us to
> examine the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic
> informational format is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad is
> further broken down into more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end up with
> six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such a framework enables more information
> transformation at each nodal site.
>
> In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness,
> Secondness and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of
> data/information. BUT again, he increased the complexity capacity of these
> three modes by introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms: So- we have
> 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note that Thirdness,
> the action of knowledge storage has THREE methods to carry out this action:
> iconic, indexical and symbolic. That's a powerful tool.
>
> Then, there are the ten basic classes of Signs - [2:254] - which explain
> the triads from the simple ''feeling' to the complex cognitive.  Put this
> all together and I maintain that Peirce has provided a powerful analytic
> framework for examining the dynamics - and it IS a dynamical operation - of
> information generation, adaptation, evolution and storage. These can, I
> suggest, be moved into the broader scientific world - and would be, I
> think, of great benefit.
>
> I'd like to refer to two articles as examples of how this Peircean
> framework could be put to use. I provide examples from  two reputable
> journals: Biosystems and Entropy. I note that neither deal
> with self-published works; the articles must go through a peer-review and
> revision process.
>
> The first article, from Biosystems, refers to the analogy between the
> biological realm and the work being done in AI.The focus is on
> 'Anticipation' - which is an ability generated by the mode of Thirdness.
> Understanding this mode and that there are THREE 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Thanks for your comments.

I don't see how anyone could try to say that I am stretching
Peirce's words, for after all, his framework has to be an analytic
structure to DO something! It doesn't make any sense to set up, for
example, that semiosic triad - with its full six nodes - without
using it to explain the world. And - he does indeed explain it in one
such example - his ten classes. The same with the categories and their
complex natures - they are set up to examine and explain the world.

My point is only that there is a lot of work being done now in the
actual world, examining complex information dynamics - and Peirce's
framework, to me, is perfect as an analytic tool for that purpose. 

I just wish we could expand the knowledge of this framework - and
see how very pragmatic and enlightening it could be.

Edwina
 On Mon 01/04/19  1:38 PM , Dan Everett danleveret...@gmail.com sent:
 This seems very exciting to me, Edwina. It fits exactly my own view
of Peirce as coming up with ideas for empirical purposes. Even if
someone were to think that you were stretching Peirce’s words (I
don’t), it wouldn’t change the usefulness of what you are doing,
I suspect. 
 Thanks for sharing this stuff.
 Dan
 On Apr 1, 2019, at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
 List:

I'm continuing with my interest in the pragmatics of Peircean
semiosis; that is, the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure to
examine the dynamic operations within the organic chemical, the
biological, the societal [economic systems, population behaviour] -
and the cognitive  [which includes AI]. 

Basically, it's all about 'information processing' , which includes
the self-organization of an organism's capacity and actions of
knowledge development and maintenance, , adaptation of knowledge and
behaviour, anticipation tactics, entropy problems and so on. 

Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us
to examine the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic
informational format is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad
is further broken down into more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end
up with six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such a framework enables more
information transformation at each nodal site. 

In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of
data/information. BUT again, he increased the complexity capacity of
these three modes by introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms:
So- we have 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note
that Thirdness, the action of knowledge storage has THREE methods to
carry out this action: iconic, indexical and symbolic. That's a
powerful tool. 

Then, there are the ten basic classes of Signs - [2:254] - which
explain the triads from the simple ''feeling' to the complex
cognitive.  Put this all together and I maintain that Peirce has
provided a powerful analytic framework for examining the dynamics -
and it IS a dynamical operation - of information generation,
adaptation, evolution and storage. These can, I suggest, be moved
into the broader scientific world - and would be, I think, of great
benefit. 

I'd like to refer to two articles as examples of how this Peircean
framework could be put to use. I provide examples from  two reputable
journals: Biosystems and Entropy. I note that neither deal with
self-published works; the articles must go through a peer-review and
revision process. 

The first article, from Biosystems, refers to the analogy between
the biological realm and the work being done in AI.The focus is on
'Anticipation' - which is an ability generated by the mode of
Thirdness. Understanding this mode and that there are THREE modes of
Thirdness [which I have elsewhere referred to as strong and weak
anticipation] would be, I suggest, of great benefit in the
development of AI. 

The second article, from Entropy, also refers to the realm of
Thirdness - to enable 'Interpretants/Understanding'. Again, this work
sets up the act of 'anticipation' - and again, is focused on the
development of AI. 

Essentially, my suggestion is that the complex framework of Peircean
semiosis - with those Six nodal sites, those Six modal actions and ten
classes - provides a powerful tool for the examination of complex
processes in the real pragmatic world. 

Edwina
 1]Anticipation: Beyond synthetic biology and cognitive robotics 
Author links open overlay panelSlawomir J.  Nasuto
 Yoshikatsu  Hayashi
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biosystems.2016.07.011 open access

ABSTRACT
 The aim of this paper is to propose that current robotic 
technologies cannot have intentional states any more than is feasible
within the sensorimotor variant of embodied cognition. It argues that
anticipation is an emerging concept that can provide a bridge between
both the deepest 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Dan Everett]

This seems very exciting to me, Edwina. It fits exactly my own view of Peirce 
as coming up with ideas for empirical purposes. Even if someone were to think 
that you were stretching Peirce’s words (I don’t), it wouldn’t change the 
usefulness of what you are doing, I suspect. 

Thanks for sharing this stuff.

Dan

> On Apr 1, 2019, at 1:35 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:
> 
> List:
> 
> I'm continuing with my interest in the pragmatics of Peircean semiosis; that 
> is, the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure to examine the dynamic 
> operations within the organic chemical, the biological, the societal 
> [economic systems, population behaviour] - and the cognitive  [which includes 
> AI].
> 
> Basically, it's all about 'information processing' , which includes the 
> self-organization of an organism's capacity and actions of knowledge 
> development and maintenance, , adaptation of knowledge and behaviour, 
> anticipation tactics, entropy problems and so on.
> 
> Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us to examine 
> the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic informational format 
> is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad is further broken down into 
> more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end up with six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such 
> a framework enables more information transformation at each nodal site.
> 
> In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness, Secondness 
> and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of data/information. BUT 
> again, he increased the complexity capacity of these three modes by 
> introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms: So- we have 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. 
> Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note that Thirdness, the action of 
> knowledge storage has THREE methods to carry out this action: iconic, 
> indexical and symbolic. That's a powerful tool.
> 
> Then, there are the ten basic classes of Signs - [2:254] - which explain the 
> triads from the simple ''feeling' to the complex cognitive.  Put this all 
> together and I maintain that Peirce has provided a powerful analytic 
> framework for examining the dynamics - and it IS a dynamical operation - of 
> information generation, adaptation, evolution and storage. These can, I 
> suggest, be moved into the broader scientific world - and would be, I think, 
> of great benefit.
> 
> I'd like to refer to two articles as examples of how this Peircean framework 
> could be put to use. I provide examples from  two reputable journals: 
> Biosystems and Entropy. I note that neither deal with self-published works; 
> the articles must go through a peer-review and revision process.
> 
> The first article, from Biosystems, refers to the analogy between the 
> biological realm and the work being done in AI.The focus is on 'Anticipation' 
> - which is an ability generated by the mode of Thirdness. Understanding this 
> mode and that there are THREE modes of Thirdness [which I have elsewhere 
> referred to as strong and weak anticipation] would be, I suggest, of great 
> benefit in the development of AI.
> 
> The second article, from Entropy, also refers to the realm of Thirdness - to 
> enable 'Interpretants/Understanding'. Again, this work sets up the act of 
> 'anticipation' - and again, is focused on the development of AI.
> 
> Essentially, my suggestion is that the complex framework of Peircean semiosis 
> - with those Six nodal sites, those Six modal actions and ten classes - 
> provides a powerful tool for the examination of complex processes in the real 
> pragmatic world.
> 
> Edwina
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 1]Anticipation: Beyond synthetic biology and cognitive robotics
> 
> Author links open overlay panelSlawomir J. Nasuto 
> Yoshikatsu
>  Hayashi 
> 
> https://doi.org/10.1016/j.biosystems.2016.07.011 
> 
> open access
> Abstract
> The aim of this paper is to propose that current robotic 
> 
>  technologies cannot have intentional states any more than is feasible within 
> the sensorimotor variant of embodied cognition. It argues that anticipation 
> is an emerging concept that can provide a bridge between both the deepest 
> philosophical theories about the nature of life and cognition and the 
> empirical biological and cognitive sciences steeped in reductionist and 
> Newtonian conceptions of causality 
> .
>  
> 
> 2] The Understanding Capacity and Information Dynamics in the Human Brain
> Yan M. Yufik  
> <>
> Virtual Structures Research, Inc., Potomac, MD 20854, USA
> Received: 23 December 2018 / Revised: 8 March 2019 / 

[PEIRCE-L] Pragmatics and Peirce

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

List:

I'm continuing with my interest in the pragmatics of Peircean
semiosis; that is, the use of the Peircean analytic infrastructure to
examine the dynamic operations within the organic chemical, the
biological, the societal [economic systems, population behaviour] -
and the cognitive  [which includes AI]. 

Basically, it's all about 'information processing' , which includes
the self-organization of an organism's capacity and actions of
knowledge development and maintenance, , adaptation of knowledge and
behaviour, anticipation tactics, entropy problems and so on.

Peirce provided us with an analytic infrastructure than enables us
to examine the complexity within these actions. That is, his basic
informational format is the semiosic triad of O-R-I, BUT, this triad
is further broken down into more intricate 'nodal sites', and we end
up with six: DO-IO-R-II-DI-FI. Such a framework enables more
information transformation at each nodal site.

In addition - Peirce provided the three categories of Firstness,
Secondness and Thirdness - which are modes of organization of
data/information. BUT again, he increased the complexity capacity of
these three modes by introducing their so-called 'degenerate' forms:
So- we have 1-1, 2-2 AND 2-1. Then, we have 3-3 AND 3-1 and 3-2. Note
that Thirdness, the action of knowledge storage has THREE methods to
carry out this action: iconic, indexical and symbolic. That's a
powerful tool.

Then, there are the ten basic classes of Signs - [2:254] - which
explain the triads from the simple ''feeling' to the complex
cognitive.  Put this all together and I maintain that Peirce has
provided a powerful analytic framework for examining the dynamics -
and it IS a dynamical operation - of information generation,
adaptation, evolution and storage. These can, I suggest, be moved
into the broader scientific world - and would be, I think, of great
benefit.

I'd like to refer to two articles as examples of how this Peircean
framework could be put to use. I provide examples from  two reputable
journals: Biosystems and Entropy. I note that neither deal with
self-published works; the articles must go through a peer-review and
revision process.

The first article, from Biosystems, refers to the analogy between
the biological realm and the work being done in AI.The focus is on
'Anticipation' - which is an ability generated by the mode of
Thirdness. Understanding this mode and that there are THREE modes of
Thirdness [which I have elsewhere referred to as strong and weak
anticipation] would be, I suggest, of great benefit in the
development of AI.

The second article, from Entropy, also refers to the realm of
Thirdness - to enable 'Interpretants/Understanding'. Again, this work
sets up the act of 'anticipation' - and again, is focused on the
development of AI.

Essentially, my suggestion is that the complex framework of Peircean
semiosis - with those Six nodal sites, those Six modal actions and ten
classes - provides a powerful tool for the examination of complex
processes in the real pragmatic world.

Edwina
 1]Anticipation: Beyond synthetic biology and cognitive
roboticsAuthor links open overlay panelSlawomir J. Nasuto
 Yoshikatsu
Hayashihttps://doi.org/10.1016/j.biosystems.2016.07.011open access

ABSTRACT
The aim of this paper is to propose that current  robotic
technologies cannot have intentional states any more than is feasible
within the sensorimotor variant of embodied cognition. It argues that
anticipation is an emerging concept that can provide a bridge between
both the deepest philosophical theories about the nature of life and
cognition and the empirical biological and cognitive sciences steeped
in reductionist and Newtonian conceptions of  causality.
   BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}2] The Understanding Capacity and Information Dynamics in the Human
Brain Yan M. Yufik [1]  Virtual Structures Research, Inc., Potomac,
MD 20854, USAReceived: 23 December 2018 / Revised: 8 March 2019 /
Accepted: 15 March 2019 / Published: 21 March 2019  (This article
belongs to the Special Issue Information Dynamics in Brain and
Physiological Networks [2])   Full-Text|PDF [3517 KB,
uploaded 29 March 2019]| FiguresNo

ABSTRACT 

This article proposes a theory of neuronal processes underlying
cognition, focusing on the mechanisms of understanding in the human
brain. Understanding is a product of mental modeling. The paper
argues that mental modeling is a form of information production
inside the neuronal system extending the reach of human cognition
“beyond the information given” (Bruner, J.S.,  Beyond the
Information Given, 1973). Mental modeling enables forms of learning
and prediction (learning with understanding and prediction via
explanation) that are unique to humans, allowing robust performance
under unfamiliar conditions