Jon Schmidt, List,
Jon S: I specifically asked for references where Peirce supposedly endorses your claim that "a law of logic governs the relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion of an argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of such a law." In the earlier email, I directly referred to the distinction Peirce draws between genuine triadic relations and thoroughly genuine triadic relations in "The Logic of Mathematics, an attempt to develop my categories from within." In this essay, he is working on a classificatory system of different kinds of relations. Having examined monadic and dyadic relations, he turns to triadic relations. Consider the tripartite division between three kinds of genuine triads. Genuine triads are of three kinds. For while a triad if genuine cannot be in the world of quality nor in that of fact, yet it may be a mere law, or regularity, of quality or of fact. But a thoroughly genuine triad is separated entirely from those worlds and exists in the universe of representations. Indeed, representation necessarily involves a genuine triad. For it involves a sign, or representamen, of some kind, outward or inward, mediating between an object and an interpreting thought. Now this is neither a matter of fact, since thought is general, nor is it a matter of law, since thought is living. [CP 1.480] For the sake of clarity, I take Peirce to be making a distinction between three kinds of genuine triadic relations: (1) mere laws or regularities that govern the relations between qualities, (2) mere laws or regularities that govern the relations between facts, and (3) representations. The third class of representations are all thoroughly genuine in their triadic character. The reason is that representations involve general principles of logic that do not have the status of mere matters of fact nor the status of law because "thought is living". Having said that much about thoroughly genuine triadic relations involving representations, let's focus on the second class: the laws of fact. He says: The laws of fact divide themselves at the outset into those which must be true if there be any true answer to every question that has a meaning, or, as we say, into laws logically necessary and laws logically contingent. To this division another is intimately connected. Namely, of laws logically contingent the most universal are of such a kind that they must be true provided every form which by logical necessity must be thought of a given subject is also a form of its real being. Calling this kind of necessity, metaphysical necessity, we may divide laws logically contingent into laws metaphysically necessary and laws metaphysically contingent. [CP 1.483] In talking about laws logically necessary, Peirce is referring to the laws of logic. That is what is says two paragraphs later. His point is that these laws, as laws that are logically necessary, govern facts. How do they govern facts? I am working on the suppositions that the laws of logic govern the intelligibility of those facts. Again, we are not talking about the third class of thoroughly genuine triadic relations that have the character of representations. Rather, we are talking about laws governing facts. Consider what he says about the general law of logic insofar as it is a law of facts. The general law of logic has likewise its three clauses. The monadic clause is that fact is in its existence perfectly definite. Inquiry properly carried on will reach some definite and fixed result or approximate indefinitely toward that limit. Every subject is existentially determinate with respect to each predicate. The dyadic clause is that there are two and but two possible determinations of each subject with reference to each predicate, the affirmative and the negative. Not only is the dyadic character manifest by the double determination, but also by the double prescription; first that the possibilities are two at least, and second that they are two at most. The determination is not both affirmative and negative, but it is either one or the other. A third limiting form of determination belongs to any subject [with regard] to [some other] one whose mode of existence is of a lower order, [the limiting case involving] a relative zero, related to the subjects of the affirmation and the negation as an inconsistent hypothesis is to a consistent one. [CP 1.485] In each clause, Peirce is viewing the matter from two complementary points of view. On the one hand, he considers how the law of logic governs subjects, predicates and the relations between the two. That is, he is considering the intelligibility of some fact that holds between a given subject and a given predicate. On the other hand, he considers how the law of logic governs our inquiry concerning the facts expressed in the propositions having those subjects and predicates. Compare this discussion to the points Peirce makes about genuinely triadic relations in "A Guess at the Riddle." Nature herself often supplies the place of the intention of a rational agent in making a Thirdness genuine and not merely accidental; as when a spark, as third, falling into a barrel of gunpowder, as first, causes an explosion, as second. But how does nature do this? By virtue of an intelligible law according to which she acts. If two forces are combined according to the parallelogram of forces, their resultant is a real third. Yet any force may, by the parallelogram of forces, be mathematically resolved into the sum of two others, in an infinity of different ways. Such components, however, are mere creations of the mind. What is the difference? As far as one isolated event goes, there is none; the real forces are no more present in the resultant than any components that the mathematician may imagine. But what makes the real forces really there is the general law of nature which calls for them, and not for any other components of the resultant. Thus, intelligibility, or reason objectified, is what makes Thirdness genuine. [CP 1.366] (my emphasis). What is the real difference between the laws of fact, as a genuine triadic relations, and representations, as thoroughly genuine triadic relations? That, I think, is an especially interesting question. In order to dig into that question, I recommend considering Kant's point from the Grounding: laws govern facts in virtue of a natural necessity, but the laws of logic and morality govern the thoughts and actions of beings like in virtue of those laws being represented--i.e., as principles that function as imperatives. Imperatives give rise to a different kind of necessity than that which is involved in a natural law. They determine what ought to be done but do not always determine what is actually done. The editors of the CP have inserted "One, Two, Three, Fundamental Categories of Thought and Nature", which is a paper written earlier in 1885, at 1.369 to take the place of the missing second section of "A Guess at the Riddle." Notice that this essay, like the other in the series with the title "One, Two, Three..." starts with Kant's tripartite divisions between the logical modes of judgments and the categories of understanding. My suggestion is that reading Kant's writings on this subject is essential to understanding Peirce's inquiries in these essays. Reading Kant, like reading Peirce, can be challenging. At times, I find it helpful to read the secondary works of scholars on Kant, and on Peirce's reading of Kant. As I mentioned earlier, Richard Smyth's Reading Peirce Reading has been especially helpful on this front. That, at least, is the suggestion I am offering to those on the list who are willing to adopt the general approach to reading Peirce's texts I am recommending. Those who have different priorities and methods informing their readings of Peirce are, of course, free to pursue them as they see fit. Having said that, I do ask that they keep in mind the differences and not insist that I adopt those methods and priorities when taking the time to respond to points made or questions asked. --Jeff ________________________________ From: Jon Alan Schmidt <jonalanschm...@gmail.com> Sent: Saturday, August 8, 2020 1:35 PM To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Philosophy of Existential Graphs (was Peirce's best and final version of EGs) Jeff, List: JD: Jon S asked for references to texts where Peirce employs the distinction between principles and laws. I specifically asked for references where Peirce supposedly endorses your claim that "a law of logic governs the relations between the facts expressed in the premisses and conclusion of an argument. A principle, on the other hand, is our representation of such a law." JD: Peirce's definition in the Century Dictionary of the term "principle" is instructive on this point. Quoting those definitions would have been appreciated, rather than expecting everyone on the List to look them up for ourselves, although Ben Udell kindly provided a link to the ones for "principle" (another is below). JD: See the 4th and 5th senses and the examples of uses by Aristotle, Hamilton, etc. CSP: 4. A truth which is evident and general; a truth comprehending many subordinate truths; a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived: as, the principles of morality, of equity, of government, etc. In mathematical physics a principle commonly means a very widely useful theorem. ... 5. That which is professed or accepted as a law of action or a rule of conduct; one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of a system: as, the principles of the Stoics or the Epicureans; hence, a right rule of conduct; in general, equity; uprightness: as, a man of principle. (http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=06&page=294&query=principle) There are no accompanying examples of uses by Aristotle, and the only one from Hamilton--which mentions Aristotle--is for the 2nd sense, not the 4th or 5th. CSP: 2. Cause, in the widest sense; that by which anything is in any way ultimately determined or regulated. ... "Without entering into the various meanings of the term Principle, which Aristotle defines, in general, that from whence anything exists, is produced, or is known, it is sufficient to say that it is always used for that on which something else depends; and thus both for an original law and for an original element. In the former case it is a regulative, in the latter a constitutive, principle." Sir W. Hamilton, Reid, Note A, §5, Supplementary Dissertations Aristotle and Hamilton evidently define "principle" as "that on which something else depends," such as "an original law." The 4th sense similarly defines it as "a law on which others are founded, or from which others are derived." The 5th sense seems consistent with my interpretation, rather than yours--excluded middle "is professed or accepted as a law" within classical logic, such that it is "one of the fundamental doctrines or tenets of [that] system." In any case, Peirce never defines a principle as our representation of a law; on the contrary ... JD: Compare that the 3rd sense of "law" in his definition of the term. CSP: 3. A proposition which expresses the constant or regular order of certain phenomena, or the constant mode of action of a force; a general formula or rule to which all things, or all things or phenomena within the limits of a certain class or group, conform, precisely and without exception; a rule to which events really tend to conform. (http://triggs.djvu.org/century-dictionary.com/djvu2jpgframes.php?volno=04&page=705&query=law) It is a law, not a principle, that he defines as a proposition--i.e.,. a representation. He goes on to call it "a general formula or rule to which all things ... conform, precisely and without exception." As I said before, excluded middle is not a law, because it is not exceptionless. JD: Here is a famous passage [CP 1.405-406, c. 1896] where Peirce explicitly employs the Kantian distinction. Where do you see such a distinction in that passage? The only mention of the word "law" in what you quoted is naming it as something that calls for an explanation. Meanwhile, Peirce straightforwardly equates "a regulative principle" with "an intellectual hope," which is perfectly consistent with his description of the principle of excluded middle as a hope rather than a law in what I quoted previously from NEM 4:xiii. JD: At the same time, I'm trying to understand what Peirce is saying by reading what he is reading. That, I think, is necessary to understand what he's saying. I have no doubt that it is helpful and insightful, but I disagree that it is necessary. Surely it is not a requirement for anyone who wants to understand Peirce's vast corpus of writings to read everything that he was reading at the time, which would obviously be another vast corpus of writings. And would we not then also need to read whatever all those other authors were reading when they wrote what they wrote, in order to understand what they were saying? And so on, ad infinitum. On the contrary, I believe that in most cases a good writer is capable of being understood on his/her own terms. As Gary Fuhrman once summarized<https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2016-09/msg00179.html>, "I assume that he [Peirce] means exactly what he says and says exactly what he means, until I have sufficient reason to abandon that working assumption." Regards, Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt<http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt> - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt<http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt> On Fri, Aug 7, 2020 at 5:14 PM Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu<mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote: Jon Schmidt, John Sowa, Gary Fuhrman, Gary Richmond, Robert Marty, List, Jon S asked for references to texts where Peirce employs the distinction between principles and laws. Peirce's definition in the Century Dictionary of the term "principle" is instructive on this point. See the 4th and 5th senses and the examples of uses by Aristotle, Hamilton, etc. Compare that the 3rd sense of "law" in his definition of the term. Here is a famous passage where Peirce explicitly employs the Kantian distinction. It is especially pertinent to the passage you've quoted: But every fact of a general or orderly nature calls for an explanation; and logic forbids us to assume in regard to any given fact of that sort that it is of its own nature absolutely inexplicable. This is what Kant calls a regulative principle, that is to say, an intellectual hope. The sole immediate purpose of thinking is to render things intelligible; and to think and yet in that very act to think a thing unintelligible is a self-stultification. ... Among other regular facts that have to be explained is law or regularity itself. (1.405-6) I am confident that each of us is capable of looking up and analyzing other passages that use the terms "law", "principle" and "logic" in the CP. As such, I won't offer a laundry list of such passages. For my part, I don't think the distinction is new with Kant. In fact it is quite old. Kant simply tried to clarify well-established use of the conceptions. Notice how easily we slide from talking about the principles expressed in a theory, such as the principles of mechanics in Newton's theory of physics, to talk about the laws. Doing so is often elliptical. We are often saying on the supposition that this theory is true then the principles express the real laws in nature. It is not odd to say that the principles in a given theory turned out to be false. It is odd, however, to say the laws turned out to be false. Rather, we say our supposition that the laws taken to be real in given theory turned out to be false. One reason there the meaning of these two terms appears to have changed over time is that an original use of the term "law" is its juridical use. It appears that the English term of a legal requirement was later applied to the real regularities in nature. The order of Peirce's definitions suggests that he understands the history of this term. Notice the apparent differences in our respective approaches to reading these texts. In my post, I was drawing on a secondary reference that I hold in high esteem. Let me state the reference now, which is Richard Smyth's Reading Peirce Reading. In his interpretation of the early essays, he interprets key arguments in Peirce's justification of the validity of the laws of logic drawing on Kantian ideas. This is not surprising given the weight Peirce places on his reading of Kant's Critiques at this stage in the development of the theory of critical logic. When I'm trying to make sense of Peirce's writings, I find it is essential to draw on the secondary literature and to sort out what seems more and less helpful. At the same time, I'm trying to understand what Peirce is saying by reading what he is reading. That, I think, is necessary to understand what he's saying. John Sowa suggests that a richer understanding of Peirce's inquiries can be gained by seeing where they have taken later reachers who have followed in his wake. As such, there are five sources that seem important to reading Peirce: 1. the texts themselves; 2. the secondary literature on Peirce; 3. the inquiries of philosophers, scientists, mathematicians (etc.) Peirce was reading--especially those he was drawing on in a sustained manner; 4. the inquiries of those following in Peirce's wake (self-consciously or not). In addition to asking how Peirce used this or that term in a given text (as in 1, above), I think that it is essential that we (5) try to reconstruct his arguments and, at the same time, engage in the inquiries ourselves. After all, Peirce's writings were not written for armchair philosophers. Rather, they were written for inquirers willing to engage in philosophy as an experimental science. Are there other resources not on this list that should be considered when interpreting Peirce's arguments and inquiries? If so, then I think it is worth saying so. That way, we can talk about the relative importance of these different resources in our respective approaches. My hope is that we can compare notes, acknowledge our differences, and learn from one another. Doing so will put us all in a better position to engage with philosophers and other inquirers who are not following in Peirce's wake--and who insist that they have more fruitful assumptions and better methods than the pragmatic methods we are looking to Peirce for guidance in putting to better use. Hope that helps. --Jeff Jeffrey Downard Associate Professor Department of Philosophy Northern Arizona University (o) 928 523-8354
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