Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[John F. Sowa]

Edwina,
When I was talking about model-relative theories of reality, I
was definitely *not* advocating a kind of cognitive relativism. 

> we have to consider that some models more accurately represent this
external reality than others - and also, Peirce did feel that we could,
among the 'community of scholars', over time - reach a more and more
accurate representation of this reality...
Yes.  When I listed those
many different models in my previous note, I was not claiming that they
were contradictory.  All I said is that each one emphasized aspects of
reality that the others did not consider
The results of chemical
experiments, as they were described in 19th c. books, are just as valid
today as they were then:  Na + CL -> NaCl + Heat.  The fact that
physicists today can calculate the amount of heat by quantum mechanics
does not invalidate the old results.  For most purposes, the amount of
heat is easier to measure that to calculate.
Similarly, Newtonian
mechanics is just as reliable as relativity and quantum mechanics for the
motions of common objects on the earth's surface.  And engineers continue
to use it because the calculations are simpler.
>   we must not
move into 'cognitive relativism' so to speak, where we simply accept a
diversity of models and their cognitive interpretations without evaluating
them for their realism.
Certainly.  But the most accurate model of
physics -- quantum electrodynamics -- is so complex, that engineers almost
never use it -- except for extreme cases, such as computing what happens
in a nuclear explosion.
See the attached file -- CP8_187.txt for
some quotations.  Note the passage that begins "Now the different
sciences deal with different kinds of truth ;
mathematical truth is
one thing, ethical truth is another, the actually
existing state of
the universe is a third..."
John

CP 8.187.  Confining ourselves to science, inference, in the broadest sense,
is coextensive with the deliberate adoption, in any measure, of an
assertion as true.  For deliberation implies that the adoption is
voluntary; and consequently, the observation of perceptual facts that
are forced upon us in experience is excluded.  General principles, on
the other hand, if deliberately adopted, must have been subjected to
criticism; and any criticism of them that can be called scientific and
that results in their acceptance must involve an argument in favor of
their truth.  My statement was that an inference, in the broadest sense,
is a deliberate adoption, in any measure, of an assertion as true.  The
phrase "in any measure" is not as clear as might be wished.  "Measure,"
here translates modus.  The modes of acceptance of an assertion that are
traditionally recognized are the necessary, the possible, and the
contingent.  But we shall learn more accurately, as our inquiry
proceeds, how the different measures of acceptance are to be enumerated
and defined.  Then, as to the word "true," I may be asked what this
means.  Now the different sciences deal with different kinds of truth ;
mathematical truth is one thing, ethical truth is another, the actually
existing state of the universe is a third; but all those different
conceptions have in common something very marked and clear.  We all hope
that the different scientific inquiries in which we are severally
engaged are going ultimately to lead to some definitely established
conclusion, which conclusion we endeavor to anticipate in some measure.
Agreement with that ultimate proposition that we look forward to, —
agreement with that, whatever it may turn out to be, is the scientific
truth.

CP 8.188.  Perhaps there will here be no harm in indulging in a little
diagrammatic psychology after the manner of the old writers' discussions
concerning the primum cognitum; for however worthless it may be as
psychology, it is not a bad way to get orientated in our logic.  No man
can recall the time when he had not yet begun a theory of the universe,
when any particular course of things was so little expected that nothing
could surprise him, even though it startled him.  The first surprise
would naturally be the first thing that would offer sufficient handle
for memory to draw it forth from the general background.  It was
something new.  Of course, nothing can appear as definitely new without
being contrasted with a background of the old.  At this, the infantile
scientific impulse, — what becomes developed later into various kinds of
intelligence, but we will call it the scientific impulse because it is
science that we are now endeavoring to get a general notion of, — this
infantile scientific impulse must strive to reconcile the new to the
old.  The first new feature of this first surprise is, for example, that
it is a surprise; and the only way of accounting for that is that there
had been before an expectation.  Thus it is that all knowledge begins by
the discovery that there has been an erroneous expectation of which we
had before hardly been conscious.  Each 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[John F. Sowa]

Edwina,
I agree with that point, and I believe that Peirce would
too:
> we have to consider that some models more accurately
represent this external reality than others - and also, Peirce did feel
that we could, among the 'community of scholars', over time - reach a more
and more accurate representation of this reality. 
But Peirce also
recognized that no finite list of discrete symbols could capture the full
richness, complexity, and continuity of any aspect of the universe. If we
view "reality" through microscopes and telescopes of greater and
greater power, we get totally different "model-based views" at
each order of magnitude from electrons to galaxies.
Even at a human
level, a physicist, chemist, biologist, geologist, physician, pharmacist,
linguist, anthropologist, engineer, lawyer, banker, real-estate developer,
and poet would have radically different models and ways of describing the
same scene. 
 And if you gave them the same instruments for viewing
the scene, they would still have widely different models at each level. 
For that matter, those roles I mentioned above are not mutually
exclusive.  The same person, for different purposes, could apply widely
different models.
John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[John F. Sowa]

Jeff, Jon, Dan...
For the past few months, I have been busy with
some critical deadlines and activities that limited my participation in
email discussions.  But I'd like to comment on the many possible views of
reality.
Two points by Peirce:
1. Reality is independent of
anything we may think about it.  Although there are many different ways of
thinking and talking about time, there is enough commonality among all
those views to indicate that time is real in some sense.
2. There
are three fundamental universes of discourse:  possibilities, actualities,
and necessities.  Even if some view(s) might banish time from some way of
talking about what actually exists at the current moment, it could still
be real in thinking and talking about memories, plans, hopes, and
fears.
And for current discussions in science, I'd like to mention 
"model-dependent realism", as discussed by Stephen Hawking and
Leonard Mlodinow in their 2010 book, _The Grand Design_.
They
"argue that the quest to discover a final theory may in fact never
lead
to a unique set of equations. Every scientific theory, they write, comes
 with its own model of reality, and it may not make sense to talk of
what reality actually is."  That quotation come from a review in
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-elusive-thoery-of-everything/
.
Many physicists have objected to that view because it would mean
that further progress in physics is impossible.  Others have argued that
it might only be impossible with current technology, and new methods might
be discovered at some time in the future -- perhaps even the far distant
future.
But the notion of model-dependent realism could also be
extended to linguistics, phenomenology, and anthropology.  Every language,
culture, and individual has implicit models that determine the ways of
interpreting experiences and talking about them.  The experiences may be
caused by something actual, but the connection to their language may be
obscure .
For a summary of some of the issues, see
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Model-dependent_realism
John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

Prescissive facts are *signified *by propositions (as predicates), while
abstract qualities and concrete things are *denoted *by terms (as
subjects).  Put another way, when we say that a true proposition *represents
*a fact, what we mean is not that a fact is its *object*, but that a fact
is its *interpretant*.  The *immediate object *of a proposition is "the
logical universe of discourse" (CP 2.323, EP 2:283; 1903), the collection
of all the qualities and things that its subjects *possibly could* denote
to someone with the requisite collateral experience (NEM 3:885; 1908 Dec 5
and CP 8.178, EP 2:498; 1909 Mar 14).  Its *immediate interpretant* is the
range of states of things that its predicate *possibly could* signify to
someone with the requisite sign system acquaintance (CP 8.179, EP 2:494;
1909 Feb 26), which is "all that the Sign conveys" (EP 2:480; 1908 Dec 23).

The *dynamical object* of every proposition is the "one *individual*, or
completely determinate, state of things, namely, the all of reality" (CP
5.549, EP 2:378; 1906).  It encompasses "the entire universe--not merely
the universe of existents, but all that wider universe, embracing the
universe of existents as a part, the universe which we are all accustomed
to refer to as 'the truth' ... [which] is perfused with signs, if it is not
composed exclusively of signs" (CP 5.448n, EP 2:394; 1906).

CSP:  ... all propositions whatsoever refer to one common universe,--the
Universal Universe or aggregate of all Singulars, which in ordinary
language we denominate the Truth. (EP 2:168; 1903)

CSP:  … all propositions have one Subject in common which we call the
*Truth*. It is the aggregate of all realities ... (EP 2:173; 1903)

CSP:  All propositions relate to the same ever-reacting singular; namely,
to the totality of all real objects. (CP 5.152, EP 2:209; 1903)

CSP:  Indeed, all propositions refer to one and the same determinately
singular subject, well-understood between all utterers and interpreters;
namely, to The Truth, which is the universe of all universes, and is
assumed on all hands to be real. (CP 5.506; c. 1905)


As such, "the Universe is a vast representamen ... working out its
conclusions in living realities ... that Universe being precisely an
argument" (CP 5.119, EP 2:193-194; 1903).  It obviously can never be
captured fully in any single *dynamical interpretant*, the definite and
determinate fact that an individual token of a proposition *actually does*
signify to someone--the *purportedly* realized state of things as prescinded
from reality (CP 5.549, EP 2:378).  "[I]t is something of which our
knowledge can never be complete; so that there is always a difference
between the experienced thing and our idea of it" (CP 7.281; c. 1895).  A
proposition's *final interpretant* is the habit that results from adopting
it as a belief.  For a *true* proposition, this would never be confounded
by any future experience, such that it *necessarily would* be included in
the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community.

CSP:  What we call a "fact" is something having the structure of a
proposition, but supposed to be an element of the very universe itself. The
purpose of every sign is to express "fact," and by being joined with other
signs, to approach as nearly as possible to determining an interpretant
which would be the *perfect Truth*, the absolute Truth, and as such (at
least, we may use this language) would be the very Universe. Aristotle
gropes for a conception of perfection, or *entelechy*, which he never
succeeds in making clear. We may adopt the word to mean the very fact, that
is, the ideal sign which should be quite perfect, and so identical,--in
such identity as a sign may have,--with the very matter denoted united with
the very form signified by it. The entelechy of the Universe of being,
then, the Universe *qua *fact, will be that Universe in its aspect as a
sign, the "Truth" of being. The "Truth," the fact that is not abstracted
but complete, is the ultimate interpretant of every sign. (EP 2:304; 1904)


The adoption of a proposition as a belief is a *habit-change*, the final
interpretant of an argument--i.e., what happens when we *learn *something.

CSP:  Reasoning is a new experience which involves something old and
something hitherto unknown. The past as above remarked is the *ego*. My
recent past is my uppermost *ego*; my distant past is my more generalized
*ego*. The past of the community is *our ego*. In attributing a flow of
time to unknown events we impute a quasi-*ego *to the universe. The present
is the immediate representation we are just learning that brings the
future, or *non-ego*, to be assimilated into the *ego*. (CP 7.536; 1899)


This leads naturally to another passage where Peirce characterizes the
ultimate opinion in similar terms.

CSP:  Now the Berkeleyan idea, when we come to reflect upon it, amounts to
this, that past experience is, in some sense, my *ego*, that future

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

Combining what I wrote below about sequence with my earlier observation
that both semeiosis and time conform to Gary R.'s vector of
*determination *(2ns→1ns→3ns,
object→sign→interpretant, past→present→future) prompts some additional
suggestions.  Peirce's speculative grammar posits an individual dynamical
object determining an individual sign token to determine an individual
dynamical interpretant.  What I have been learning and pondering over the
past year-plus is that along with instants in time and positions in space
for describing *physical *motion, these discrete correlates are creations
of thought for describing the real *inferential *process of semeiosis,
which is likewise continuous.

CSP:  Just as it is strictly correct to say that nobody is ever in an exact
Position (except instantaneously, and an Instant is a fiction, or *ens
rationis*), but Positions are either vaguely described states of motion of
small range, or else (what is the better view), are *entia rationis* (i.e.
fictions recognized to be fictions, and thus no longer fictions) invented
for the purposes of closer descriptions of states of motion; so likewise,
Thought (I am not talking Psychology, but Logic, or the essence of
Semeiotics) cannot, from the nature of it, be at rest, or be anything but
inferential process; and propositions are either roughly described states
of Thought-motion, or are artificial creations intended to render the
description of Thought-motion possible; and Names are creations of a second
order serving to render the representation of propositions possible. (R
295:117-118[102-103]; 1906)


We prescind *temporal *sequence from continuous time itself by arbitrarily
marking discrete instants that stand in the relations of before and after;
we prescind *spatial *sequence from continuous motion over time by
inventing discrete positions that stand in the relations of distance and
direction; and we prescind *logical *sequence from continuous
thought/semeiosis over time by artificially creating discrete propositions
that stand in the relations corresponding to leading principles.

CSP:  The idea of time must be employed in arriving at the conception of
logical consecution; but the idea once obtained, the time-element may be
omitted, thus leaving the logical sequence free from time. That done time
appears as an existential analogue of the logical flow ...

It is true that we know the conclusion later than we know the premisses;
but we do not so much think of our knowledge as following as we do that one
fact is logically sequent on the other. The instinct may, therefore, be
presumed to be an obscure perception that temporal succession is a mirror
of, or framework for, logical sequence. (CP 1.491&496; c. 1896)

CSP:  Practically, when a man endeavors to state what the process of his
thought has been, after the process has come to an end, he first asks
himself to what conclusion he has come. That result he formulates in an
assertion, which, we will assume, has some sort of likeness,--I am inclined
to think only a very conventionalized one,--with the attitude of his
thought at the cessation of the motion. That having been ascertained, he
next asks himself how he is justified in being so confident of it; and he
proceeds to cast about for a sentence expressed in words which shall strike
him as resembling some previous attitude of his thought, and which at the
same time shall be logically related to the sentence representing his
conclusion, in such a way that if the premiss-proposition be true, the
conclusion-proposition necessarily or naturally would be true. That
argument is a representation of the *last part* of his thought, so far as
its logic goes, that is, that the conclusion would be true supposing the
premiss is so. But the self-observer has absolutely no warrant whatever for
assuming that that premiss represented an attitude in which thought
remained stock-still, even for an instant ... Adopting that idea, the
logical argument only represents the last part of thought, for the reason
that it supposes a premiss which represents some attitude of thought which
can only have resulted from thinking. (CP 2.27; 1902)


Adapting a specific terminological distinction from "A Neglected Argument
for the Reality of God" (CP 6.456, EP 2:435; 1908), the *real *inferential
process (argument) is always continuous through time, while the
corresponding premisses and conclusion (argumentation) are discrete
representations of *hypothetical *instantaneous states that we formulate
only in retrospect.  That is why a series of sheets of assertion with
existential graphs scribed on them can serve as "a moving-picture of
Thought" (CP 4.11; 1906), just as with "a series of instantaneous
photographs ... no matter how closely they follow one another, there is no
more motion visible in any one of them than if they were taken at intervals
of centuries" (NEM 3:59; c. 1895).  Moreover, phenomenological perception
and logical reasoning are 

Fw: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hi Jon S, List


It looks like we are barking up the same trees.


As Peirce points out in the 8th Cambridge Conferences Lecture in RLT, the 
self-returning character of a space or time manifold is a topological character 
of unbounded manifolds generally. We don't need to add in postulates concerning 
straightness and a line called the absolute needed for a projective geometry 
for the point about the self-returning character of hyperbolic manifolds to 
hold.


Hyperbolic manifolds come in different shapes. Some have an odd number of 
twists (i.e., cross-caps) in them. Others have an even number or no twists at 
all. Some manifolds, for instance, have the intrinsic character of a torus with 
no twists. If a torus has two or more holes, then it is hyperbolic in 
character. If it has one hole it is parabolic. If it has no holes, then it is 
elliptical. Roughly, a similar point holds for the number of cross caps found 
in a manifold.


Peirce makes this point when he suggests that the first question we should ask 
about our experience of time is its Euler characteristic or Listing number. On 
my reading of Peirce, it is important that we start by asking these kinds of 
questions about the topological character of our experience of time before 
turning to questions of how time is ordered--projectively or metrically.


That is, we need to ask these phenomenological questions about our experience 
of time before turning to metaphysical questions about its real nature. By 
asking these phenomenological questions about the character of our experience, 
we put ourselves in a better position to analyze the surprising observations 
that are calling out for metaphysical hypotheses. For example, we ask:  why 
does our experience of space seem have three dimension while time has only one, 
and why is time ordered in a manner that space is not? In turn, we hope to put 
ourselves in a better position to measure the data that are being used to test 
those explanations.


--Jeff




Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Monday, March 9, 2020 9:23:49 AM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

Jeff, List:

How can time be hyperbolic, yet return into itself?  The answer is found in 
projective geometry, which introduces a "line at infinity" such that the 
different conic sections are distinguished only by how many times they 
intersect it--zero for an ellipse, which is finite; one for a parabola, which 
extends to infinity in only one direction, either positive or negative; and two 
for a hyperbola, which extends to infinity in two directions, both positive and 
negative.  All three can then be conceptualized as closed curves such that the 
line at infinity never intersects an ellipse, is tangent to a parabola at one 
point, and crosses a hyperbola at two points (see attached "Projective 
Conics.jpg"; read its 
source<https://cre8math.com/2017/07/10/what-is-projective-geometry/> to learn 
more).

These two points are the limits that divide a hyperbolic continuum into two 
portions, which have both of those limits in common.  As Peirce explains, we 
can then proceed to measure each portion using numbers such that one limit 
corresponds to positive infinity and the other to negative infinity.

CSP:  A hyperbolic quantity is one which varies from zero through all positive 
values to positive infinity (a "logarithmic" infinity, which is not equal to 
negative infinity), through that to a wholly new line of quantity where it 
descends through positive values to a sort of zero upon another line and thence 
through negative values through negative infinity to ordinary negative 
quantities, and so back to zero. (NEM 2:266; 1895)

CSP:  A circuit of states is a line of variation of states which returns into 
itself and has no extreme states ...
The order of states in a line of variation may be shown by attaching to 
sensibly different states different numbers. For if the line of variation forms 
a circuit, its states are related to one another like the real numbers, 
rational and irrational, positive and negative, including ∞ [infinity] ...
The numbers may occur in every assignable part of the circuit [parabolic], or 
may be contained between two limits [hyperbolic], or a part of the series of 
numbers may cover the whole circuit [elliptical]. In the last case 
[elliptical], we suppose the remaining numbers to be assigned to the circuit 
taken over and over again in regular arithmetical progression. In the second 
case [hyperbolic], we are at liberty to fill up the vacant part of the circuit 
with a second series of numbers which will be distinguished by having a 
quantity not a number added to it ...
[Measurement is] Hyperbolic, when the entire line of [real]* numbers occupies 
but a portion of the circuit of variation, and leaves a p

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Jeff, List:

JD:  As Peirce points out in the 8th Cambridge Conferences Lecture in
RLT, the self-returning character of a space or time manifold is a
topological character of unbounded manifolds generally. We don't need to
add in postulates concerning straightness and a line called the absolute
needed for a projective geometry for the point about the self-returning
character of hyperbolic manifolds to hold.


I have not dug into RLT on this topic yet, since I only have a hard copy
rather than a searchable PDF.  Which specific pages do you have in mind?

JD:  Hyperbolic manifolds come in different shapes. Some have an odd number
of twists (i.e., cross-caps) in them. Others have an even number or no
twists at all. Some manifolds, for instance, have the intrinsic character
of a torus with no twists. If a torus has two or more holes, then it is
hyperbolic in character. If it has one hole it is parabolic. If it has no
holes, then it is elliptical. Roughly, a similar point holds for the number
of cross caps found in a manifold.


I have already admitted that projective geometry is a conceptual stretch
for me, and topology is even more so.  Is there a relatively simple primer
anywhere online for hyperbolic/parabolic/elliptical toruses in topology,
like the one that I found and linked for hyperbolic/parabolic/elliptical
circles in projective geometry?

JD:  Peirce makes this point when he suggests that the first question we
should ask about our experience of time is its Euler characteristic or
Listing number. On my reading of Peirce, it is important that we start by
asking these kinds of questions about the topological character of our
experience of time before turning to questions of how time is
ordered--projectively or metrically.


"Topological character" is mathematical, while "our experience of time" is
phenomenological.  How would you suggest that we translate back and forth
between the two sciences?

JD:  That is, we need to ask these phenomenological questions about our
experience of time before turning to metaphysical questions about its real
nature. By asking these phenomenological questions about the character of
our experience, we put ourselves in a better position to analyze the
surprising observations that are calling out for metaphysical hypotheses.


I agree, and so does Peirce.

CSP:  The only important thing here is our metaphysical phenomenon, or
familiar notion, that the past is a matter for knowledge but not for
endeavor, that the future is an object that we may hope to influence, but
which cannot affect us except through our anticipations, and that the
present is a moment immeasurably small through which, as their limit, past
and future can alone act upon one another. Whether this be an illusion or
not, it is the phenomenon of which the metaphysician has to give an
account. (CP 8.113; c. 1900)


Our *phenomenological *experience of time prompts our *mathematical *hypotheses
about time.  We then employ *logical/semeiotic* principles in order to
ascertain the *metaphysical *reality of time.

JD:  For example, we ask: why does our experience of space seem have three
dimension while time has only one, and why is time ordered in a manner that
space is not? In turn, we hope to put ourselves in a better position to
measure the data that are being used to test those explanations.


The Peirce quote above explains how our phenomenological experience
requires something like the "arrow of time" to account for the undeniable
difference between our memory of the past and our anticipation of the
future.  Elsewhere he suggests that this is precisely what *requires *time
to be one-dimensional, which is obviously not the case with space.

CSP:  For example, every-day experience is that events occur in time, and
that time has but one dimension. So much appears necessary. For we should
be utterly bewildered by the suggestion that two events were each anterior
to the other or that, happening at different times, one was not anterior to
the other. But a two-dimensional anteriority is easily shown to involve a
self-contradiction. So, then, that time is one-dimensional is, for the
present, necessary; and we know not how to appeal to special experience to
disprove it. But that space is three dimensional involves no such
necessity. We can perfectly well suppose that atoms or their corpuscles
move freely in four or more dimensions. (CP 1.273; 1902)


Along similar lines, a manuscript that was presumably an early draft of
some ideas for RLT, "Abstracts of 8 Lectures" (R 942), begins with this
interesting passage.

CSP:  We thus see that the bare Nothing of Possibility logically leads to
continuity.
For the first step a unidimensional continuum is formed.
Logically, this step is of the nature of induction. Now induction arranges
possible experience after the type of logical law. But the logical law *par
excellence* is that of logical sequence. Hence, the first dimension of the
continuum of quality is a sequence. A 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

tate of things in the infinite future. [2]
> The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the
> nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state
> of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which
> consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity. [3]
> Between these, we have on *our *side a state of things in which there is
> some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity
> to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of *habit* ...
> [4] As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which leads back
> from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by
> contraries. (CP 8.317; 1891)
>
>
> The *cosmological* basis for the "arrow of time" is Gary R.'s vector of
> *process *(1ns→3ns→2ns).  The universe is evolving from an absolutely
> *indeterminate *state of things at the hypothetical instant corresponding
> to "the *commencement *of all time" (NEM 3:1075; c. 1905), when
> everything would have been in the *future*, toward an absolutely
> *determinate *state of things at the hypothetical instant corresponding
> to "the *completion *of all time" (ibid), when everything would be in the
> *past*.  As I said at the end of my initial post, what is always realized
> in the *present *is an indefinitely gradual state of change, and this
> terminology conveniently lends itself to another categorial analysis--the
> present is an *indefinitely *gradual state of change in its 1ns, an
> indefinitely gradual state of *change *in its 2ns, and an indefinitely
> *gradual *(i.e., continuous) state of change in its 3ns.
>
> Returning to mathematics, in a List post
> <https://list.iupui.edu/sympa/arc/peirce-l/2019-09/msg00055.html> last
> September I proposed five properties that are jointly necessary and
> sufficient for a true Peircean continuum.  (Incidentally, I am pleased to
> report that my essay based on that and several related List discussions,
> "Peirce's Topical Continuum:  A 'Thicker' Theory," has been accepted for
> publication in *Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society*.)  The
> first was *regularity*, which I now prefer to call *rationality*--every
> portion conforms to one general law or Idea, which is the final cause by
> which the ontologically prior whole calls out its parts (cf. CP 7.535; 1899
> and CP 7.535n6; 1908).  I now suggest that time is a *real *Peircean
> continuum, and that an indefinitely gradual state of change is the one
> general law or Idea to which every lapse of it conforms; i.e., every moment
> when it is *present*.
>
> Since this has gotten quite lengthy, I will try to take up your specific
> questions in a later post.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 1:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard <
> jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:
>
>> Jon, List,
>>
>> Consider what Peirce says about his cosmological conception of time in a
>> letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin. For the sake of clarity, I'll separate
>> and number the points he makes.
>>
>> 1.   I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has
>> been to develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the
>> world is *hyperbolic,* that is, proceeds from one state of things in the
>> infinite past, to a different state of things in the infinite future.
>>
>> 2.   The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the
>> nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state
>> of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which
>> consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity.
>>
>> 3.   Between these, we have on *our *side a state of things in which
>> there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of
>> conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth
>> of *habit.*
>>
>> 4.   As to the part of time on the *further* side of eternity which leads
>> back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds
>> by contraries.  8.316
>>
>> Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the
>> contrast being made between *our* side of things, and the part of time
>> that is on the *further* side of eternity?
>>
>> A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical diagram.
>> What kind of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic evolution 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[michaelcjm]

All,
I often read that space is distinct from time,
Then we have in the slit experiment a hint that there are things we can 
see "sometimes".
This gave me the idea that time (where we always "are") is an extrusion, 
and dimensions other than time are an intrusion.

(Three of the latter, we are equipped to "know")
Michael Mitchell
amateur philosopher
Home-self-schooling catcher upper


On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 1:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard
 wrote:

Jon, List,

Consider what Peirce says about his cosmological conception of time
in a letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin. For the sake of clarity,
I'll separate and number the points he makes.

1.   I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has
been to develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of
the world is hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things
in the infinite past, to a different state of things in the infinite
future.

2.   The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu,
the nothingness of which consists in the total absence of
regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, the
nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and
absence of all spontaneity.

3.   Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which
there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some
degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase
owing to the growth of habit.

4.   As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which
leads back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it
evidently proceeds by contraries.  8.316

Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the
contrast being made between our side of things, and the part of time
that is on the further side of eternity?

A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical
diagram. What kind of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic
evolution from the infinite past to the infinite future? Using this
diagram, what is the contrast between our side of things and the
further side of eternity?

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354
-

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:37:06 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

Hello Jon, List,

At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in
"mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical"
inquiries concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we
might tease out the different threads? Each seems to involve
somewhat different methods.

--Jeff

Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

-
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Re: Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Edwina Taborsky]

to develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the
world is hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the
infinite past, to a different state of things in the infinite future. 
 

2.   The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu,
the nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity.
The state of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness
of which consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all
spontaneity. 

3.   Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which
there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some
degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase
owing to the growth of   habit. 

4.   As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which
leads back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it
evidently proceeds by contraries.  8.316 
Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the
contrast being made between our side of things, and the part of time
that is on the further side of eternity?  

A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical
diagram. What kind of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic
evolution from the infinite past to the infinite future? Using this
diagram, what is the contrast between our side of things and the
further side of eternity? 

--Jeff   Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354
-
 From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
 Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:37:06 PM
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time   

Hello Jon, List, 

At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in
"mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical"
inquiries concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we
might tease out the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat
different methods. 

--Jeff   Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354 
- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L
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[2] http://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
[3] http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
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Aw: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Helmut Raulien]

ce of regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity.

3.   Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of  habit.

4.   As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which leads back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by contraries.  8.316

 

Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the contrast being made between our side of things, and the part of time that is on the further side of eternity? 

A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical diagram. What kind of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic evolution from the infinite past to the infinite future? Using this diagram, what is the contrast between our side of things and the further side of eternity?

--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354





From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:37:06 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time



Hello Jon, List,

At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.

--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354














 


















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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Daniel L. Everett]

ds,
>>  
>> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
>> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
>> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>>  
>> On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 1:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
>>  wrote:
>>> Jon, List,
>>> 
>>> Consider what Peirce says about his cosmological conception of time in a 
>>> letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin. For the sake of clarity, I'll separate 
>>> and number the points he makes.
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> 1.   I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has been 
>>> to develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is 
>>> hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite 
>>> past, to a different state of things in the infinite future.
>>> 
>>> 2.   The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the 
>>> nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state 
>>> of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which 
>>> consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity.
>>> 
>>> 3.   Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is 
>>> some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity 
>>> to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit.
>>> 
>>> 4.   As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which leads 
>>> back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds 
>>> by contraries.  8.316
>>> 
>>>  
>>> 
>>> Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the 
>>> contrast being made between our side of things, and the part of time that 
>>> is on the further side of eternity? 
>>> 
>>> A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical diagram. What 
>>> kind of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic evolution from the 
>>> infinite past to the infinite future? Using this diagram, what is the 
>>> contrast between our side of things and the further side of eternity?
>>> 
>>> --Jeff
>>> 
>>> Jeffrey Downard
>>> Associate Professor
>>> Department of Philosophy
>>> Northern Arizona University
>>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
>>> Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:37:06 PM
>>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>>> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
>>> Hello Jon, List,
>>> 
>>> At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in 
>>> "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries 
>>> concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out 
>>> the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.
>>> 
>>> --Jeff
>>> 
>>> Jeffrey Downard
>>> Associate Professor
>>> Department of Philosophy
>>> Northern Arizona University
>>> (o) 928 523-8354
>>>  
>> - PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or 
>> "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go 
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>> 
>> -
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>> the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
> 

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[PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Edwina Taborsky]

 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354
-
 From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
 Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:37:06 PM
 To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu [5]
 Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time   

Hello Jon, List, 

At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in
"mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical"
inquiries concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we
might tease out the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat
different methods. 

--Jeff   Jeffrey Downard
 Associate Professor
 Department of Philosophy
 Northern Arizona University
 (o) 928 523-8354 
- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply
List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Daniel L. Everett]

 Between these, we have on 
> our side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity 
> counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly 
> on the increase owing to the growth of habit ... [4] As to the part of time 
> on the further side of eternity which leads back from the infinite future to 
> the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by contraries. (CP 8.317; 1891)
>  
> The cosmological basis for the "arrow of time" is Gary R.'s vector of process 
> (1ns→3ns→2ns).  The universe is evolving from an absolutely indeterminate 
> state of things at the hypothetical instant corresponding to "the 
> commencement of all time" (NEM 3:1075; c. 1905), when everything would have 
> been in the future, toward an absolutely determinate state of things at the 
> hypothetical instant corresponding to "the completion of all time" (ibid), 
> when everything would be in the past.  As I said at the end of my initial 
> post, what is always realized in the present is an indefinitely gradual state 
> of change, and this terminology conveniently lends itself to another 
> categorial analysis--the present is an indefinitely gradual state of change 
> in its 1ns, an indefinitely gradual state of change in its 2ns, and an 
> indefinitely gradual (i.e., continuous) state of change in its 3ns.
>  
> Returning to mathematics, in a List post last September I proposed five 
> properties that are jointly necessary and sufficient for a true Peircean 
> continuum.  (Incidentally, I am pleased to report that my essay based on that 
> and several related List discussions, "Peirce's Topical Continuum:  A 
> 'Thicker' Theory," has been accepted for publication in Transactions of the 
> Charles S. Peirce Society.)  The first was regularity, which I now prefer to 
> call rationality--every portion conforms to one general law or Idea, which is 
> the final cause by which the ontologically prior whole calls out its parts 
> (cf. CP 7.535; 1899 and CP 7.535n6; 1908).  I now suggest that time is a real 
> Peircean continuum, and that an indefinitely gradual state of change is the 
> one general law or Idea to which every lapse of it conforms; i.e., every 
> moment when it is present.
>  
> Since this has gotten quite lengthy, I will try to take up your specific 
> questions in a later post.
>  
> Regards,
>  
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>  
> On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 1:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard 
>  wrote:
>> Jon, List,
>> 
>> Consider what Peirce says about his cosmological conception of time in a 
>> letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin. For the sake of clarity, I'll separate 
>> and number the points he makes.
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> 1.   I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has been to 
>> develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is 
>> hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite past, 
>> to a different state of things in the infinite future.
>> 
>> 2.   The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the 
>> nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state 
>> of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists 
>> in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity.
>> 
>> 3.   Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is 
>> some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity 
>> to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit.
>> 
>> 4.   As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which leads back 
>> from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by 
>> contraries.  8.316
>> 
>>  
>> 
>> Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the contrast 
>> being made between our side of things, and the part of time that is on the 
>> further side of eternity? 
>> 
>> A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical diagram. What 
>> kind of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic evolution from the 
>> infinite past to the infinite future? Using this diagram, what is the 
>> contrast between our side of things and the further side of eternity?
>> 
>> --Jeff
>> 
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>> From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
>> Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Helmut Raulien]

or Idea, which is the final cause by which the ontologically prior whole calls out its parts (cf. CP 7.535; 1899 and CP 7.535n6; 1908).  I now suggest that time is a real Peircean continuum, and that an indefinitely gradual state of change is the one general law or Idea to which every lapse of it conforms; i.e., every moment when it is present.

 

Since this has gotten quite lengthy, I will try to take up your specific questions in a later post.




 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt






 


On Thu, Mar 5, 2020 at 1:56 AM Jeffrey Brian Downard <jeffrey.down...@nau.edu> wrote:




Jon, List,

Consider what Peirce says about his cosmological conception of time in a letter to Christine Ladd-Franklin. For the sake of clarity, I'll separate and number the points he makes.

 

1.   I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has been to develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite past, to a different state of things in the infinite future. 

2.   The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity.

3.   Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit.

4.   As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which leads back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by contraries.  8.316

 

Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the contrast being made between our side of things, and the part of time that is on the further side of eternity? 

A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical diagram. What kind of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic evolution from the infinite past to the infinite future? Using this diagram, what is the contrast between our side of things and the further side of eternity?

--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354





From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:37:06 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time



Hello Jon, List,

At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.

--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354














 


















- PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .




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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

ite past, to a different state of things in the infinite future.
>
> 2.   The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the
> nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state
> of things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which
> consists in the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity.
>
> 3.   Between these, we have on *our *side a state of things in which
> there is some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of
> conformity to law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth
> of *habit.*
>
> 4.   As to the part of time on the *further* side of eternity which leads
> back from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds
> by contraries.  8.316
>
> Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the
> contrast being made between *our* side of things, and the part of time
> that is on the *further* side of eternity?
>
> A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical diagram. What
> kind of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic evolution from the
> infinite past to the infinite future? Using this diagram, what is the
> contrast between our side of things and the further side of eternity?
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> --
> *From:* Jeffrey Brian Downard
> *Sent:* Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:37:06 PM
> *To:* peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> *Subject:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
>
> Hello Jon, List,
>
> At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical,
> phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time.
> Do you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different
> threads? Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.
>
> --Jeff
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
>

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Daniel L. Everett]

Jeff,

Having reviewed Logic and Spiritualism I am once again reminded that I wish I 
had discovered Peirce much earlier in my career. My Dark Matter of the Mind is 
to my mind compatible with Peirce. If I were to reframe parts of it, I would 
have brought Peirce’s concept of “habit” into the mix. As I wrote that book, I 
was primarily thinking of William James and Michael Polanyi (and Aristotle) as 
representing earlier positions similar to my own

Peirce’s/Reid’s commonsensism is a position I find appealing. With one big 
caveat. Neither of them was a student of culture. I believe that Peirce’s work 
is compatible with the findings of modern cross-cultural research (psychology, 
anthropology, linguistics, etc), but that one needs to recognize that 
common-sense, while found in all cultures, is not identical in all cultures. 
Like Peirce, I am a Darwinian, so I would not say a priori what could not be 
innate. But I do believe that the evidence shows that concepts are not innate 
(of course many, many disagree), but that often when Peirce referred to 
phylogenetic habits, some of these can be reframed as “apperceptional/cultural 
habits” that begin in the womb, rather than in the genes.

I am working on a chapter for a current book project on Peirce as the founder 
of the best theory of cognitive sciences available. And certainly Logic and 
Spiritualism is a building block of what I see as Peircean Cognitive Science. 

Back to the problem of knowledge I had mentioned earlier, though, if all 
thought is semiosis then to account for knowledge that is anti-Whorfian (which 
in fact is crucial for scientific progress), then we can have objects and 
interpretations that lead us to fill the empty space of the sign/representamen. 
Thus when Murray Gell-Mann borrowed the term “quark” from Joyce, to name a 
particle he had the particle (the object) and its behavior and fit in his 
theory (interpretation) so plugged in a representamen. Much science seems to 
work in this anti-Whorfian manner.  

Taken at face value Whorf would have been a good Peircean - if we lack a sign 
we lack the thought that goes with it. But that is an oversimplification of 
Peirce’s position I believe. 

As I try to point out in my How Language Began and on-going work with 
archaeologist Larry Barham (U of Liverpool), what distinguishes the genus Homo 
from other animals is the ability to create symbols freely, subject to cultural 
constraints. Science, culture and Peirce himself (a creator of many symbols) 
illustrates this. 

Thus Descartes, Plato, Chomsky and others (as I point out in Dark Matter of the 
Mind) miss out on the real bases for cognitive science. As Marc Champagne makes 
clear in his excellent monograph, modern cognitive science borrowed from 
Peirce, but stopped short (thus Jerry Fodor borrowed type and token, but 
crucially not tone, thus leaving his theory of the mind doa - my view). 

I look forward to corrections.

Dan

> On Mar 5, 2020, at 12:04 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> 
> Dan, List,
> 
> 
> 
> Given the approach to exploring our capacities for understanding one another 
> that you adopt in Dark Matter of the Mind, you will likely find the following 
> discussion of time to be of special interest:
> 
> 
> 
> "Logic and Spiritualism", CP 6.557-6.587
> 
> 
> 
> If you want to talk through the points Peirce makes in this piece about the 
> character of unconscious inference and our experience of time, I'd be willing 
> to take it up with you.
> 
> 
> 
> --Jeff
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> 
> 
> From: Dan Everett 
> Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 8:00 AM
> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
>  
> This is a fascinating topic and discussion. The syntax, semantics, 
> pragmatics, and anthropology of temporal reference in natural languages is a 
> very hot topic these days. I am, modulo coronavirus travel restrictions, due 
> to participate in a workshop on time at Cambridge University next month. One 
> of the phiosophers whose work on the language of time is most influential is 
> Reichenbach. 30 years ago I published a paper on a “neoReichenbachian” theory 
> of linguistic time (tense, etc) in the journal, Pragmatics and Cognition. 
> Link to two versions: https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005062 , 
> https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.1.1.07eve ).
> However, I am now in the process of revisiting this research from a Peircean 
> perspective. I am particularly interested in what one might call (as I have) 
> an “Anti-Whorfian” effect, namely, clear evidence for knowledge of things 
> which are not found directly (as in terms or even propositions) 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Daniel L. Everett]

Many thanks, Jeff. 

Dan

> On Mar 5, 2020, at 12:04 PM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
> wrote:
> 
> 
> Dan, List,
> 
> 
> 
> Given the approach to exploring our capacities for understanding one another 
> that you adopt in Dark Matter of the Mind, you will likely find the following 
> discussion of time to be of special interest:
> 
> 
> 
> "Logic and Spiritualism", CP 6.557-6.587
> 
> 
> 
> If you want to talk through the points Peirce makes in this piece about the 
> character of unconscious inference and our experience of time, I'd be willing 
> to take it up with you.
> 
> 
> 
> --Jeff
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> Jeffrey Downard
> Associate Professor
> Department of Philosophy
> Northern Arizona University
> (o) 928 523-8354
> 
> 
> From: Dan Everett 
> Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 8:00 AM
> To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
> Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
> Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
>  
> This is a fascinating topic and discussion. The syntax, semantics, 
> pragmatics, and anthropology of temporal reference in natural languages is a 
> very hot topic these days. I am, modulo coronavirus travel restrictions, due 
> to participate in a workshop on time at Cambridge University next month. One 
> of the phiosophers whose work on the language of time is most influential is 
> Reichenbach. 30 years ago I published a paper on a “neoReichenbachian” theory 
> of linguistic time (tense, etc) in the journal, Pragmatics and Cognition. 
> Link to two versions: https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005062 , 
> https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.1.1.07eve ).
> However, I am now in the process of revisiting this research from a Peircean 
> perspective. I am particularly interested in what one might call (as I have) 
> an “Anti-Whorfian” effect, namely, clear evidence for knowledge of things 
> which are not found directly (as in terms or even propositions) in the 
> language of the knowledge holders - e.g. temporal knowledge without time 
> words. Other examples are plentiful. For example, some people have no color 
> words but can easily distinguish colors if asked to perform certain tasks. 
> And some have no numerals in their language but can do some simple numerical 
> tasks (another paper of mine: 
> https://langcog.stanford.edu/papers/FEFG-cognition.pdf)
> 
> Thus in Peircean theory we have on the one hand the theory of what time is 
> with the recognition that different languages will choose to slice up time in 
> different ways. On the other hand, we have societies which appear to have no 
> signs for a particular category but who nevertheless can undertake some 
> actions that reveal tacit knowledge of tasks without linguistic signs (a 
> book-lengh study here: 
> https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X)
> 
> So I am not only grateful for what has been said in these few extremely 
> useful posts, but any further discussions or pointers would be most welcome.
> 
> Dan Everett
> 
> 
>> On Mar 5, 2020, at 1:37 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard  
>> wrote:
>> 
>> Hello Jon, List,
>> 
>> At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, 
>> phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do 
>> you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? 
>> Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.
>> 
>> --Jeff
>> 
>> 
>> Jeffrey Downard
>> Associate Professor
>> Department of Philosophy
>> Northern Arizona University
>> (o) 928 523-8354
>> 
>> 
>> From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
>> Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 3:56 PM
>> To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
>> Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time
>>  
>> List:
>> 
>> Gary Richmond, Gary Fuhrman, and I have had various lengthy off-List 
>> exchanges over the last few months about Peirce's ideas pertaining to time.  
>> After a lot of reading and thinking about the mathematical, 
>> phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical aspects of that topic, I 
>> decided to post the following and see if it prompts any further discussion.
>> 
>> In a 1908 paper that established the parameters for many of the debates that 
>> have occurred within the philosophy of time since its publication, John 
>> Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of Time."  His basic claim is that 
>> time cannot be real because it is contradictory to predicate past, present, 
>> and future of the same moment or event; and he alleges that the obvious 
>> rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Dan, List,


Given the approach to exploring our capacities for understanding one another 
that you adopt in Dark Matter of the Mind, you will likely find the following 
discussion of time to be of special interest:


"Logic and Spiritualism", CP 6.557-6.587


If you want to talk through the points Peirce makes in this piece about the 
character of unconscious inference and our experience of time, I'd be willing 
to take it up with you.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Dan Everett 
Sent: Thursday, March 5, 2020 8:00 AM
To: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Cc: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

This is a fascinating topic and discussion. The syntax, semantics, pragmatics, 
and anthropology of temporal reference in natural languages is a very hot topic 
these days. I am, modulo coronavirus travel restrictions, due to participate in 
a workshop on time at Cambridge University next month. One of the phiosophers 
whose work on the language of time is most influential is Reichenbach. 30 years 
ago I published a paper on a “neoReichenbachian” theory of linguistic time 
(tense, etc) in the journal, Pragmatics and Cognition. Link to two versions: 
https://ling.auf.net/lingbuzz/005062 , 
https://www.jbe-platform.com/content/journals/10.1075/pc.1.1.07eve ).
However, I am now in the process of revisiting this research from a Peircean 
perspective. I am particularly interested in what one might call (as I have) an 
“Anti-Whorfian” effect, namely, clear evidence for knowledge of things which 
are not found directly (as in terms or even propositions) in the language of 
the knowledge holders - e.g. temporal knowledge without time words. Other 
examples are plentiful. For example, some people have no color words but can 
easily distinguish colors if asked to perform certain tasks. And some have no 
numerals in their language but can do some simple numerical tasks (another 
paper of mine: https://langcog.stanford.edu/papers/FEFG-cognition.pdf)

Thus in Peircean theory we have on the one hand the theory of what time is with 
the recognition that different languages will choose to slice up time in 
different ways. On the other hand, we have societies which appear to have no 
signs for a particular category but who nevertheless can undertake some actions 
that reveal tacit knowledge of tasks without linguistic signs (a book-lengh 
study here: 
https://www.amazon.com/Dark-Matter-Mind-Articulated-Unconscious/dp/022607076X)

So I am not only grateful for what has been said in these few extremely useful 
posts, but any further discussions or pointers would be most welcome.

Dan Everett


On Mar 5, 2020, at 1:37 AM, Jeffrey Brian Downard 
mailto:jeffrey.down...@nau.edu>> wrote:

Hello Jon, List,

At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, 
phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do 
you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? 
Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.

--Jeff


Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com>>
Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 3:56 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu<mailto:peirce-l@list.iupui.edu>
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

List:

Gary Richmond, Gary Fuhrman, and I have had various lengthy off-List exchanges 
over the last few months about Peirce's ideas pertaining to time.  After a lot 
of reading and thinking about the mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, 
and metaphysical aspects of that topic, I decided to post the following and see 
if it prompts any further discussion.

In a 1908 paper<http://www.ditext.com/mctaggart/time.html> that established the 
parameters for many of the debates that have occurred within the philosophy of 
time since its publication, John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of 
Time."  His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory 
to predicate past, present, and future of the same moment or event; and he 
alleges that the obvious rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, 
and future only at different times--is viciously circular.  McTaggart's 
implicit assumption is that time is a series of discrete positions, which are 
what he calls moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular 
moment.  In other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential 
subject, which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.

Of course, by contrast Peirce held that time is real and continuous.  Positions 
in time are instants that we artificially mark for some purpose, such as 
measurement, while moments are indefinite lapses of 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Jon, List,


Consider what Peirce says about his cosmological conception of time in a letter 
to Christine Ladd-Franklin. For the sake of clarity, I'll separate and number 
the points he makes.


1.   I may mention that my chief avocation in the last ten years has been to 
develop my cosmology. This theory is that the evolution of the world is 
hyperbolic, that is, proceeds from one state of things in the infinite past, to 
a different state of things in the infinite future.

2.   The state of things in the infinite past is chaos, tohu bohu, the 
nothingness of which consists in the total absence of regularity. The state of 
things in the infinite future is death, the nothingness of which consists in 
the complete triumph of law and absence of all spontaneity.

3.   Between these, we have on our side a state of things in which there is 
some absolute spontaneity counter to all law, and some degree of conformity to 
law, which is constantly on the increase owing to the growth of habit.

4.   As to the part of time on the further side of eternity which leads back 
from the infinite future to the infinite past, it evidently proceeds by 
contraries.  8.316


Focusing on the points made in 3 and 4, how might we understand the contrast 
being made between our side of things, and the part of time that is on the 
further side of eternity?


A helpful approach, I think, is to start with a mathematical diagram. What kind 
of diagram might we use to clarify the hyperbolic evolution from the infinite 
past to the infinite future? Using this diagram, what is the contrast between 
our side of things and the further side of eternity?


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354

From: Jeffrey Brian Downard
Sent: Wednesday, March 4, 2020 11:37:06 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time


Hello Jon, List,


At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, 
phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do 
you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? 
Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 3:56 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

List:

Gary Richmond, Gary Fuhrman, and I have had various lengthy off-List exchanges 
over the last few months about Peirce's ideas pertaining to time.  After a lot 
of reading and thinking about the mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, 
and metaphysical aspects of that topic, I decided to post the following and see 
if it prompts any further discussion.

In a 1908 paper<http://www.ditext.com/mctaggart/time.html> that established the 
parameters for many of the debates that have occurred within the philosophy of 
time since its publication, John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of 
Time."  His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory 
to predicate past, present, and future of the same moment or event; and he 
alleges that the obvious rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, 
and future only at different times--is viciously circular.  McTaggart's 
implicit assumption is that time is a series of discrete positions, which are 
what he calls moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular 
moment.  In other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential 
subject, which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.

Of course, by contrast Peirce held that time is real and continuous.  Positions 
in time are instants that we artificially mark for some purpose, such as 
measurement, while moments are indefinite lapses of time that we can only 
distinguish arbitrarily because "moment melts into moment. That is to say, 
moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be the 
same" (CP 7.656, 1903).  An event is "an existential junction of incompossible 
facts" (CP 1.492; c. 1896); as Peirce later elaborates ...

CSP:  The event is the existential junction of states (that is, of that which 
in existence corresponds to a statement about a given subject in 
representation) whose combination in one subject would violate the logical law 
of contradiction. The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not a 
subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode of being 
is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries 
can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence whereby that 
which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations 
in existence. (CP 1.494; c. 1896)

In logi

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jeffrey Brian Downard]

Hello Jon, List,


At the beginning of the post, you note that Peirce engaged in "mathematical, 
phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical" inquiries concerning time. Do 
you have any suggestions about how we might tease out the different threads? 
Each seems to involve somewhat different methods.


--Jeff



Jeffrey Downard
Associate Professor
Department of Philosophy
Northern Arizona University
(o) 928 523-8354



From: Jon Alan Schmidt 
Sent: Monday, March 2, 2020 3:56 PM
To: peirce-l@list.iupui.edu
Subject: [PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

List:

Gary Richmond, Gary Fuhrman, and I have had various lengthy off-List exchanges 
over the last few months about Peirce's ideas pertaining to time.  After a lot 
of reading and thinking about the mathematical, phenomenological, semeiotic, 
and metaphysical aspects of that topic, I decided to post the following and see 
if it prompts any further discussion.

In a 1908 paper<http://www.ditext.com/mctaggart/time.html> that established the 
parameters for many of the debates that have occurred within the philosophy of 
time since its publication, John Ellis McTaggart argues for "The Unreality of 
Time."  His basic claim is that time cannot be real because it is contradictory 
to predicate past, present, and future of the same moment or event; and he 
alleges that the obvious rejoinder--that a moment or event is past, present, 
and future only at different times--is viciously circular.  McTaggart's 
implicit assumption is that time is a series of discrete positions, which are 
what he calls moments, and an event is the discrete content of a particular 
moment.  In other words, he treats any single moment or event as an existential 
subject, which is why it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.

Of course, by contrast Peirce held that time is real and continuous.  Positions 
in time are instants that we artificially mark for some purpose, such as 
measurement, while moments are indefinite lapses of time that we can only 
distinguish arbitrarily because "moment melts into moment. That is to say, 
moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate and yet not be the 
same" (CP 7.656, 1903).  An event is "an existential junction of incompossible 
facts" (CP 1.492; c. 1896); as Peirce later elaborates ...

CSP:  The event is the existential junction of states (that is, of that which 
in existence corresponds to a statement about a given subject in 
representation) whose combination in one subject would violate the logical law 
of contradiction. The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is not a 
subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode of being 
is existential quasi-existence, or that approach to existence where contraries 
can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of existence whereby that 
which is existentially a subject is enabled to receive contrary determinations 
in existence. (CP 1.494; c. 1896)

In logic, existential subjects (i.e., concrete things) and their abstract 
qualities are denoted by terms--or, respectively, lines of identity and labeled 
spots in existential graphs--while states of things are signified by 
propositions (statements).  A fact is the state of things signified by a true 
proposition.

CSP:  Space, like Time, is a general respect to whose determinations 
realizations are relative. Only, in the case of space, the realizations instead 
of being of states of things signified by propositions are of objects 
representable by terms of propositions. Namely, if a proposition be so analyzed 
as to throw all general characters into the predicate,--as when we express 'all 
men are mortal' as 'whatever exists is either not a man or is mortal,'--then, 
if the universe of discourse is a collection of objects of a certain kind 
called things, each individual thing denoted by a subject of the proposition 
(reckoning as 'subjects' not only the subject nominative but the direct, 
indirect, and prepositional objects) each such individual exists and has such 
characters as it has, relatively to some determination of space. (NEM 3:1077; 
c. 1905)

CSP:  A state of things is an abstract constituent part of reality, of such a 
nature that a proposition is needed to represent it ... A fact is so highly a 
prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly represented in a 
simple proposition ... (CP 5.549, EP 2:378; 1906).

An event is not itself an existential subject, it is the state of things that 
is realized at a lapse of time when a definite change occurs.  An existential 
subject initially has one determination, such that a certain fact is realized, 
but then it receives a contradictory determination, such that a negation of 
that fact is realized. The continuous flow of time, which we directly perceive 
(NEM 3:59-60; c. 1895), is what facilitates this.

CSP:  Time is a certain general respect 

[PEIRCE-L] The Reality of Time

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

List:

Gary Richmond, Gary Fuhrman, and I have had various lengthy off-List
exchanges over the last few months about Peirce's ideas pertaining to
time.  After a lot of reading and thinking about the mathematical,
phenomenological, semeiotic, and metaphysical aspects of that topic, I
decided to post the following and see if it prompts any further discussion.

In a 1908 paper  that
established the parameters for many of the debates that have occurred
within the philosophy of time since its publication, John Ellis McTaggart
argues for "The Unreality of Time."  His basic claim is that time cannot be
real because it is contradictory to predicate past, present, and future of
the same moment or event; and he alleges that the obvious rejoinder--that a
moment or event is past, present, and future only at different times--is
viciously circular.  McTaggart's implicit assumption is that time is a
series of *discrete* positions, which are what he calls moments, and an
event is the *discrete* content of a particular moment.  In other words, he
treats any single moment or event as an existential subject, which is why
it is precluded from having incompatible determinations.

Of course, by contrast Peirce held that time is real and *continuous*.
Positions in time are *instants* that we artificially mark for some
purpose, such as measurement, while moments are indefinite *lapses* of time
that we can only distinguish arbitrarily because "moment melts into moment.
That is to say, moments may be so related as not to be entirely separate
and yet not be the same" (CP 7.656, 1903).  An event is "an existential
junction of incompossible facts" (CP 1.492; c. 1896); as Peirce later
elaborates ...

CSP:  The event is the existential junction of *states* (that is, of that
which in existence corresponds to a *statement* about a given subject in
representation) whose combination in one subject would violate the logical
law of contradiction. The event, therefore, considered as a junction, is
not a subject and does not inhere in a subject. What is it, then? Its mode
of being is *existential quasi-existence*, or that approach to existence
where contraries can be united in one subject. Time is that diversity of
existence whereby that which is existentially a subject is enabled to
receive contrary determinations in existence. (CP 1.494; c. 1896)


In logic, existential subjects (i.e., concrete things) and their abstract
qualities are denoted by *terms*--or, respectively, lines of identity and
labeled spots in existential graphs--while states of things are signified
by *propositions *(statements).  A fact is the state of things signified by
a *true* proposition.

CSP:  *Space*, like Time, is a general respect to whose determinations
realizations are relative. Only, in the case of space, the realizations
instead of being of states of things signified by propositions are of
objects representable by terms of propositions. Namely, if a proposition be
so analyzed as to throw all general characters into the predicate,--as when
we express 'all men are mortal' as 'whatever exists is either not a man or
is mortal,'--then, if the universe of discourse is a collection of objects
of a certain kind called *things*, each individual thing denoted by a
subject of the proposition (reckoning as 'subjects' not only the subject
nominative but the direct, indirect, and prepositional objects) each such
individual exists and has such characters as it has, relatively to some
determination of space. (NEM 3:1077; c. 1905)

CSP:  A *state of things* is an abstract constituent part of reality, of
such a nature that a proposition is needed to represent it ... A *fact *is
so highly a prescissively abstract state of things, that it can be wholly
represented in a simple proposition ... (CP 5.549, EP 2:378; 1906).


An event is not *itself* an existential subject, it is the state of things
that is *realized* at a lapse of time when a definite change occurs.  An
existential subject initially has one determination, such that a certain
fact is realized, but then it receives a contradictory determination, such
that a negation of that fact is realized. The continuous flow of time,
which we directly perceive (NEM 3:59-60; c. 1895), is what facilitates this.

CSP:  *Time *is a certain general respect relative to different
determinations of which states of things otherwise impossible may be
realized. Namely, if P and Q are two logically possible states of things,
(abstraction being made of time) but are logically incompossible, they may
be realized in respect to different determinations of time. (NEM 3:1074; c.
1905)


Hence time is also not *itself* an existential subject, and
past/present/future are not abstract qualities that *inhere* in
instants/moments or events as existential subjects.  Instead, time is a
real law that *governs* existential subjects, and past/present/future are
"the three *general* determinations of Time" (CP 5.458,