Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[John F. Sowa]

Auke,
I support your decision, for the same reasons I wrote in my
response to Edwina:

AvB> As a consequence of a suitable dash
of indifference on both sides, we didn't get into outright conflict, but
we also did not reach agreement on the goal, and thus also not about the
means in reaching it. This does not exclude us to have profitted from it,
looked at from the goal each of us entertains.
John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Auke van Breemen]

 
Jon Alen,

AvB:  So, in the end we proved not to communicate.

JAS: I am sincerely sorry that you see it that way.  I personally found it to 
be a stimulating discussion and appreciate the dialogue.
--

No need to feel sorry. I make a distinction between monologue, dialogue and 
communication. The difference between dialoque and communication being a common 
goal missing in dialogue and present in communication. 

There is stil another way of putting this. In negotiation we can imagine three 
extreme strategies: 
1. leaving each other at rest, Each entertaining its own monologue in persuit 
of its own goal. 'Indifference' is a suitable term for extreme cases.
2. trying to convince the other to adopt the own goal. A dialogue that at its 
extreme, in zero sum games, is 'conflict'
3. Clarifying the goal aimed at and working towards its realization. 'Goal 
orientedness' is a suitable term.

If we put this at the corners of a ternary plot, each interaction can be 
perceived to score somewhere as a mixture to some degree.

As a consequence of a suitable dash of indifference on both sides, we didn't 
get into outright conflict, but we also did not reach agreement on the goal, 
and thus also not about the means in reaching it. This does not exclude us to 
have profitted from it, looked at from the goal each of us entertains. 


Best,
Auke van Breemen






Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 2:00 AM < a.bree...@chello.nl 
mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:

Jon Alan,

You wrote:

Why would you say that?  We have not been talking about a series of 
interpretant signs within the continuous process of semeiosis [

-

No, we only dealt with the sign, sign interpretation, interpretant sign segment 
of such a process, And on top of tbhat only in an analytical way in order to 
identify the different aspects. Not the continuous process. That would make 
things more difficult.

You wrote:

] but rather the three different interpretants as distinguished by analysis in 
speculative grammar. 

--

First remark. This statement is to vague. What do you mean by this? Do you 
think we discussed speculative grammar or Peirce's text on speculative grammar? 
You pick your choice, so it appears to me, as is convenient for you. As far as 
i am concerned I have been clear enough in my interest: i.e. my interest is 
systematic not biographical. 

Second remark. We have been discussing the question whether only three 
interpretants are distinguished by Peirce. Lots of other names are to be found 
in his text and it would be foolish to suppose that Peirce used such a lot of 
different terms, just to indicate the three very same interpretants every time. 
Why would he? Boredom, flashes of madness?  

Last remark. You were talking about the three different interpretants only. I 
was not, I was talking about making sense of the lot.

So, in the end we proved not to communicate.

Best,

Auke 

Op 22 april 2020 om 2:34 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt < jonalanschm...@gmail.com 
mailto:jonalanschm...@gmail.com >:

Auke, List:

AvB:  You seem to forget that 'the interpretant of a sign' differs from the 
'interpretant sign', which in itself is a full blown sign, in need of its own 
qualisign, sinsign, etc, etc, and interpretant aspects.

Why would you say that?  We have not been talking about a series of 
interpretant signs within the continuous process of semeiosis, but rather the 
three different interpretants as distinguished by analysis in speculative 
grammar.  Moreover, not all signs have further signs as their dynamical 
interpretants (usuals); some produce exertions (percussives), while others 
produce only feelings (sympathetics).

AvB:  ... the structure is given for the interpretant regarded as a sign 1. A;  
2. B. a.b.; 3. C. abc. 

That structure is given for any sign whatsoever, as follows (R 339:386[253r], 
1905 Oct 8).
* A is the "Division according to the matter of the sign," S = 
qualisign/sinsign/legisign.
* Under B are the "Divisions according to the Object."
o B.a is "According to the Immediate Object (how represented)," Oi = 
indefinite/singular/distributively general.
o Under B.b are the divisions "According to the Dynamic Object."
+ B.b.α is according to the "Matter of the Dynamic Object," Od = 
abstract/concrete/collection.
+ B.b.β is according to the "Mode of representing object," Od-S = 
icon/index/symbol.
* Under C are the "Division[s] according to Interpretant."
o C.a is "According to Immediate Interpretant (How represented)," Ii = 
clamatory/imperative/representative.
o Under C.b are the divisions "According to Dynamic Interpretant."
+ C.b.α is according to the "Matter of Dynamic Interpretant," Id = 
feeling/conduct/thought.
+ C.b.β is according to the "Mode of Affecting Dynamic Interp.," S-Id = by 
sympathy/compulsion/reason.
o Under C.c are the divisions "According to Representative Interpretant."
+ C.c.α is according to the "Matter of Representative Interpretant," If.
+ C.c.β is according to the "Mode of being 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AvB:  Do you think we discussed speculative grammar or Peirce's text on
speculative grammar?


I think we discussed *both*, including how our different approaches
to speculative grammar *diverge *from strict application of Peirce's
relevant texts.

AvB:  Lots of other names are to be found in his text and it would be
foolish to suppose that Peirce used such a lot of different terms, just to
indicate the three very same interpretants every time. Why would he?


I already gave my answer to this question--I believe that he was *experimenting
*with different terms in an effort to figure out which combination was
best.  Consider what he wrote in two different draft letters to Lady Welby.

CSP:  For a "possible" Sign I have no better designation than a *Tone*,
though I am considering replacing this by "Mark." Can you suggest a really
good name? ...
For a Sign whose Dynamoid Object is a Necessitant, I have at present no
better designation than a *Collective*, which is not quite so bad a name as
it sounds to be until one studies the matter ... if the Immediate Object is
a Necessitant, I call the sign a *Copulant*; for in that case the Object
has to be so identified by the Interpreter that the Sign may represent a
necessitation. My name is certainly a temporary expedient. (EP 2:480, 1908)

CSP:  But I dare say some of my former names are better than those I now
use. I formerly called a Potisign a Tinge or Tone, an Actisign a Token, a
Famisign a Type, a Descriptive an Indefinite (but this was bad), a
Denominative a Designation, a Copulative (which is bad) a Distributive
(which is much better). I think Potisign/Actisign/Famisign might be called
Mark/Token/Type(?) while Descriptive/Denominative/Copulative might be
called Descriptive/Denominative/Distributive. (CP 8.363-364, EP 2:488, 1908)


There is nothing "foolish" about the hypothesis that Peirce was likewise
wrestling with alternative names for the three interpretants and their
divisions.  After all, within just a few days in late  December 1908, he
referred to them as Explicit/Effective/Destinate (EP 2:481),
Immediate/Dynamic/Normal (EP 2:482-483), and Immediate(or
Felt?)/Dynamical/Eventual (EP 2:489-490).  I find it utterly implausible
that he had eight (or nine?) *different* interpretants in mind, and I see
no reason *in these texts* to distinguish the normal interpretant from the
eventual interpretant, since both are explicitly assigned to the eighth
trichotomy.

AvB:  You were talking about the three different interpretants only. I was
not, I was talking about making sense of the lot.


I was also "talking about making sense of the lot," as should be evident
from my lengthy replies appended below, as well as my two detailed
responses (so far) to Gary Fuhrman's recent posts.  We just seem to have
come to very different conclusions.

AvB:  So, in the end we proved not to communicate.


I am sincerely sorry that you see it that way.  I personally found it to be
a stimulating discussion and appreciate the dialogue.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Wed, Apr 22, 2020 at 2:00 AM  wrote:

> Jon Alan,
>
> You wrote:
>
> Why would you say that?  We have not been talking about a series of
> interpretant signs within the continuous process of semeiosis [
>
> -
>
> No, we only dealt with the sign, sign interpretation, interpretant sign
> segment of such a process, And on top of tbhat only in an analytical way in
> order to identify the different aspects. Not the continuous process. That
> would make things more difficult.
>
> You wrote:
>
> ] but rather the three different interpretants as distinguished by
> analysis in speculative grammar.
>
> --
>
> First remark. This statement is to vague. What do you mean by this? Do you
> think we discussed speculative grammar or Peirce's text on speculative
> grammar? You pick your choice, so it appears to me, as is convenient for
> you. As far as i am concerned I have been clear enough in my interest: i.e.
> my interest is systematic not biographical.
>
> Second remark. We have been discussing the question whether only three
> interpretants are distinguished by Peirce. Lots of other names are to be
> found in his text and it would be foolish to suppose that Peirce used such
> a lot of different terms, just to indicate the three very same
> interpretants every time. Why would he? Boredom, flashes of madness?
>
> Last remark. You were talking about the three different interpretants
> only. I was not, I was talking about making sense of the lot.
>
> So, in the end we proved not to communicate.
>
> Best,
>
> Auke
>
> Op 22 april 2020 om 2:34 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com>:
>
> Auke, List:
>
> AvB:  You seem to forget that 'the interpretant of a sign' differs from
> the 'interpretant sign', which in itself is a full blown sign, in need of
> its own qualisign, sinsign, etc, etc, and interpretant aspects.
>
>
> Why would you say that?  We have not been talking about a series of
> interpretant signs within the 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[a . breemen]

Jon Alan,


You wrote:

Why would you say that?  We have not been talking about a series of 
interpretant signs within the continuous process of semeiosis [

-

No, we only dealt with the sign, sign interpretation, interpretant sign segment 
of such a process, And on top of tbhat only in an analytical way in order to 
identify the different aspects. Not the continuous process. That would make 
things more difficult.

You wrote:

] but rather the three different interpretants as distinguished by analysis in 
speculative grammar. 

--

First remark. This statement is to vague. What do you mean by this? Do you 
think we discussed speculative grammar or Peirce's text on speculative grammar? 
You pick your choice, so it appears to me, as is convenient for you. As far as 
i am concerned I have been clear enough in my interest: i.e. my interest is 
systematic not biographical. 

Second remark. We have been discussing the question whether only three 
interpretants are distinguished by Peirce. Lots of other names are to be found 
in his text and it would be foolish to suppose that Peirce used such a lot of 
different terms, just to indicate the three very same interpretants every time. 
Why would he? Boredom, flashes of madness?  

Last remark. You were talking about the three different interpretants only. I 
was not, I was talking about making sense of the lot.

So, in the end we proved not to communicate.


Best,

Auke 

> Op 22 april 2020 om 2:34 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  You seem to forget that 'the interpretant of a 
> sign' differs from the 'interpretant sign', which in itself is a full blown 
> sign, in need of its own qualisign, sinsign, etc, etc, and interpretant 
> aspects.
> > 
> > > 
> Why would you say that?  We have not been talking about a series of 
> interpretant signs within the continuous process of semeiosis, but rather the 
> three different interpretants as distinguished by analysis in speculative 
> grammar.  Moreover, not all signs have further signs as their dynamical 
> interpretants (usuals); some produce exertions (percussives), while others 
> produce only feelings (sympathetics).
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  ... the structure is given for the interpretant 
> regarded as a sign 1. A;  2. B. a.b.; 3. C. abc. 
> > 
> > > 
> That structure is given for any sign whatsoever, as follows (R 
> 339:386[253r], 1905 Oct 8).
> * A is the "Division according to the matter of the sign," S = 
> qualisign/sinsign/legisign.
> * Under B are the "Divisions according to the Object."
>   o B.a is "According to the Immediate Object (how represented)," 
> Oi = indefinite/singular/distributively general.
>   o Under B.b are the divisions "According to the Dynamic Object."
> + B.b.α is according to the "Matter of the Dynamic 
> Object," Od = abstract/concrete/collection.
> + B.b.β is according to the "Mode of representing 
> object," Od-S = icon/index/symbol.
> * Under C are the "Division[s] according to Interpretant."
>   o C.a is "According to Immediate Interpretant (How 
> represented)," Ii = clamatory/imperative/representative.
>   o Under C.b are the divisions "According to Dynamic 
> Interpretant."
> + C.b.α is according to the "Matter of Dynamic 
> Interpretant," Id = feeling/conduct/thought.
> + C.b.β is according to the "Mode of Affecting Dynamic 
> Interp.," S-Id = by sympathy/compulsion/reason.
>   o Under C.c are the divisions "According to Representative 
> Interpretant."
> + C.c.α is according to the "Matter of Representative 
> Interpretant," If.
> + C.c.β is according to the "Mode of being represented by 
> Representative Interpretant," S-If.
> + C.c.γ is according to the "Mode of being represented to 
> represent its object by Repr. Interp.," Od-S-If.
> These are the same ten trichotomies that Peirce consistently identifies 
> between 1905 and 1909.  The terminology varies over that time--"dynamic" vs. 
> "dynamical," the names of the three interpretants, and the names of the 
> classes within each division--but the overall scheme remains unchanged.  
> Francesco Bellucci discusses what was basically the very last wrinkle on pp. 
> 346-347 of his book, Peirce's Speculative Grammar:  Logic as Semiotic--the 
> suggestion of a hierarchical rather than linear order.
> 
> 
> > > CSP:  The light which the 2 trichotomies referred to in 
> the last paragraph but one above [Od-S and S-Id] throw upon each other 
> suggests a method of study that I have hitherto employed only in getting as 
> clear ideas as I have (and they ought to be more definite) of the 1st and 2nd 
> trichotomies [S and Oi] or (using the excellent notation of 1905 Oct 12) A 
> and Ba. I am now applying the same 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AvB:  You seem to forget that 'the interpretant of a sign' differs from the
'interpretant sign', which in itself is a full blown sign, in need of its
own qualisign, sinsign, etc, etc, and interpretant aspects.


Why would you say that?  We have not been talking about a series of
interpretant signs within the continuous process of semeiosis, but rather
the three different interpretants as distinguished by analysis in
speculative grammar.  Moreover, not all signs have further signs as their
dynamical interpretants (usuals); some produce exertions (percussives),
while others produce only feelings (sympathetics).

AvB:  ... the structure is given for the interpretant regarded as a sign 1.
A;  2. B. a.b.; 3. C. abc.


That structure is given for *any sign whatsoever*, as follows (R
339:386[253r], 1905 Oct 8).

   - A is the "Division according to the matter of the sign," S =
   qualisign/sinsign/legisign.
   - Under B are the "Divisions according to the Object."
  - B.a is "According to the Immediate Object (how represented)," Oi =
  indefinite/singular/distributively general.
  - Under B.b are the divisions "According to the Dynamic Object."
 - B.b.α is according to the "Matter of the Dynamic Object," Od =
 abstract/concrete/collection.
 - B.b.β is according to the "Mode of representing object," Od-S =
 icon/index/symbol.
  - Under C are the "Division[s] according to Interpretant."
  - C.a is "According to Immediate Interpretant (How represented)," Ii
  = clamatory/imperative/representative.
  - Under C.b are the divisions "According to Dynamic Interpretant."
 - C.b.α is according to the "Matter of Dynamic Interpretant," Id =
 feeling/conduct/thought.
 - C.b.β is according to the "Mode of Affecting Dynamic Interp.,"
 S-Id = by sympathy/compulsion/reason.
  - Under C.c are the divisions "According to Representative
  Interpretant."
  - C.c.α is according to the "Matter of Representative Interpretant,"
 If.
 - C.c.β is according to the "Mode of being represented by
 Representative Interpretant," S-If.
 - C.c.γ is according to the "Mode of being represented to
 represent its object by Repr. Interp.," Od-S-If.

These are the same ten trichotomies that Peirce consistently identifies
between 1905 and 1909.  The terminology varies over that time--"dynamic"
vs. "dynamical," the names of the three interpretants, and the names of the
classes within each division--but the overall scheme remains unchanged.
Francesco Bellucci discusses what was basically the very last wrinkle on
pp. 346-347 of his book, *Peirce's Speculative Grammar:  Logic as
Semiotic*--the
suggestion of a hierarchical rather than linear order.

CSP:  The light which the 2 trichotomies referred to in the last paragraph
but one above [Od-S and S-Id] throw upon each other suggests a method of
study that I have hitherto employed only in getting as clear ideas as I
have (and they ought to be more definite) of the 1st and 2nd trichotomies
[S and Oi] or (using the excellent notation of 1905 Oct 12) A and Ba. I am
now applying the same method to Bbβ and Cbβ. It ought to be applied not
merely to A and Ba but further to A, Ba, and Ca taken together. Also to A
Ba Bbα to A Ba Cbα to Bbα Cbα. Then to A Bβ Ccγ etc. to Ba Bbα Ccα to A
Bbα Ccα etc. (R 339:541[360r], 1909 Nov 1)


The designations here are the same as above, although the reference is to a
longer entry in the Logic Notebook written a few days later.  As Bellucci
summarizes, "the ten trichotomies are arranged in a *tree-structure*, not
as a *linear succession,*" but "Peirce never managed to apply to his
tenfold taxonomy of signs the new step-by-step method."  Bellucci does not
attempt to do so himself; and as far as I know, no one else has tried yet
either.

Regards,

Jon S.

On Tue, Apr 21, 2020 at 4:18 AM  wrote:

> Jon Allen,
>
> You seem to forget that 'the interpretant of a sign' differs from the
> 'interpretant sign', which in itself is a full blown sign, in need of its
> own qualisign, sinsign, etc, etc, and interpretant aspects. In the   page
> -
> (What a progress, i had to search the dusty corners of dusty university
> rooms in order to delve up the micro-fiche edition and have it printed) the
> structure is given for the interpretant regarded as a sign 1. A;  2. B.
> a.b.; 3. C. abc.
>
> best,
>
> Auke
>
> Op 21 april 2020 om 3:37 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt <
> jonalanschm...@gmail.com>:
>
> Auke, List:
>
> AvB:  You state that Peirce maintains that there are exactly three
> interpretants and your proof seems to be that you nowhere found more than
> three *names* for interpretants in the same passage.
>
> Indeed, I believe that if Peirce had held that there were more than three
> interpretants, he would have said so somewhere explicitly.  Instead, he
> experimented 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[a . breemen]

Jon Allen,

You seem to forget that 'the interpretant of a sign' differs from the 
'interpretant sign', which in itself is a full blown sign, in need of its own 
qualisign, sinsign, etc, etc, and interpretant aspects. In the   page 
https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/preview.php?from=search=13283
 - (What a progress, i had to search the dusty corners of dusty university 
rooms in order to delve up the micro-fiche edition and have it printed) the 
structure is given for the interpretant regarded as a sign 1. A;  2. B. a.b.; 
3. C. abc. 

best,

Auke


> Op 21 april 2020 om 3:37 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  You state that Peirce maintains that there are 
> exactly three interpretants and your proof seems to be that you nowhere found 
> more than three names for interpretants in the same passage.
> > 
> > > 
> Indeed, I believe that if Peirce had held that there were more than three 
> interpretants, he would have said so somewhere explicitly.  Instead, he 
> experimented with various combinations of different names for exactly three 
> interpretants, the most consistent of which are immediate/dynamical/final.  
> Emotional/energetic/logical only appear in the drafts for "Pragmatism" 
> (1907), and again, I see them as aligning directly with the divisions 
> according to the dynamical and final interpretants in other late taxonomies 
> as sympathetic/percussive/usual and gratific/actuous/temperative, 
> respectively.
> 
> The division according the mode of presentation of the immediate 
> interpretant as hypothetic/categorical/relative is admittedly not so 
> straightforward.  Peirce proposes it in a December 1908 draft letter to Lady 
> Welby "with great hesitation" (CP 8.369, EP 2:489), even though it appears in 
> his Logic Notebook as early as August 1906 (R 339:423-424[284r-285r]).  Of 
> course, the adjectives themselves are commonly used for three different kinds 
> of propositions (CP 2.271, 1903), which are distinguished in existential 
> graphs (EGs) by how many lines of identity each requires--zero, one, and two 
> or more, respectively.
> 
> 
> > > CSP:  Also note that by this system every proposition is 
> either hypothetical, categorical, or relative, according to the number of 
> heavy lines necessary to express its form. (R 481:10, LF 1:290, 1896).
> > 
> > > 
> However, an EG with no lines of identity can express a hypothetical 
> proposition only in the alpha system.  The beta system recognizes that such a 
> proposition is "expressed in precisely the same form" as a categorical 
> proposition (CP 3.445, 1896), while a spot with no lines of identity attached 
> is an incomplete proposition--i.e., a term or rheme, whose number of pegs 
> matches its valency (CP 4.560, 1906).  Therefore, the division according to 
> the immediate interpretant must come before the division according to the 
> nature of the influence of the sign; i.e., its relation to the final 
> interpretant.  This properly ensures that all hypothetics are terms/semes, 
> while all propositions/phemes are either categoricals or relatives.
> 
> Moreover, the sheet of assertion in EGs is strictly a logical quasi-mind, 
> so it can only be determined by signs whose dynamical interpretants are 
> further signs; i.e., usuals.  Therefore, the division according to the mode 
> of presentation of the immediate interpretant must come after the division 
> according to the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant, such that a 
> usual can be a hypothetic, a categorical, or a relative.  My proposed logical 
> order of determination for the three interpretant trichotomies (If→Id→Ii) is 
> consistent with this, while Robert Marty's (Ii→Id→If) is not.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  I follow Van Driel. Who followed, without knowledge 
> of it, the division according to interpretants in: Logic Notebook entry dated 
> 8 oct. 1905; Ms 339 p. 253r
> > 
> > > 
> But Peirce again identifies exactly three interpretants on that 
> manuscript page 
> https://rs.cms.hu-berlin.de/peircearchive/pages/preview.php?from=search=13283
>  --immediate, dynamic, and representative.  His trichotomies on this occasion 
> are clamatory/imperative/representative for the immediate interpretant and 
> feeling/conduct/thought for the dynamic interpretant, while he does not 
> assign any names for the representative interpretant.  The other three listed 
> divisions are for the interpretant relations--"Mode of Affecting Dynamic 
> Interp." (S-Id), which is "By Sympathy," "By Compulsion," or "By Reason"; 
> "Mode of being represented by Representative Interpretant" (S-If); and "Mode 
> of being represented to represent object by Repr. Interp." (Od-S-If).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> 

Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Helmut Raulien]

Auke, Jon, List,

 

I guess "categories" means a way of generalisation. So, if the subdivision of any secondness into two, and of any thirdness into three is possible for sign classes (for subsecond-and -thirdnesses too), why should that not be so for S, O, I?

So, as in sign classes, there are, according to your chosen level of analysis, 3, 6, 10, 15,... classes, I guess for the sign characters it is the same.

 

Best,

Helmut

 
 

 21. April 2020 um 03:37 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
wrote:



Auke, List:

 


AvB:  You state that Peirce maintains that there are exactly three interpretants and your proof seems to be that you nowhere found more than three names for interpretants in the same passage.


 

Indeed, I believe that if Peirce had held that there were more than three interpretants, he would have said so somewhere explicitly.  Instead, he experimented with various combinations of different names for exactly three interpretants, the most consistent of which are immediate/dynamical/final.  Emotional/energetic/logical only appear in the drafts for "Pragmatism" (1907), and again, I see them as aligning directly with the divisions according to the dynamical and final interpretants in other late taxonomies as sympathetic/percussive/usual and gratific/actuous/temperative, respectively.

 

The division according the mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant as hypothetic/categorical/relative is admittedly not so straightforward.  Peirce proposes it in a December 1908 draft letter to Lady Welby "with great hesitation" (CP 8.369, EP 2:489), even though it appears in his Logic Notebook as early as August 1906 (R 339:423-424[284r-285r]).  Of course, the adjectives themselves are commonly used for three different kinds of propositions (CP 2.271, 1903), which are distinguished in existential graphs (EGs) by how many lines of identity each requires--zero, one, and two or more, respectively.

 


CSP:  Also note that by this system every proposition is either hypothetical, categorical, or relative, according to the number of heavy lines necessary to express its form. (R 481:10, LF 1:290, 1896).


 

However, an EG with no lines of identity can express a hypothetical proposition only in the alpha system.  The beta system recognizes that such a proposition is "expressed in precisely the same form" as a categorical proposition (CP 3.445, 1896), while a spot with no lines of identity attached is an incomplete proposition--i.e., a term or rheme, whose number of pegs matches its valency (CP 4.560, 1906).  Therefore, the division according to the immediate interpretant must come before the division according to the nature of the influence of the sign; i.e., its relation to the final interpretant.  This properly ensures that all hypothetics are terms/semes, while all propositions/phemes are either categoricals or relatives.

 

Moreover, the sheet of assertion in EGs is strictly a logical quasi-mind, so it can only be determined by signs whose dynamical interpretants are further signs; i.e., usuals.  Therefore, the division according to the mode of presentation of the immediate interpretant must come after the division according to the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant, such that a usual can be a hypothetic, a categorical, or a relative.  My proposed logical order of determination for the three interpretant trichotomies (If→Id→Ii) is consistent with this, while Robert Marty's (Ii→Id→If) is not.

 


AvB:  I follow Van Driel. Who followed, without knowledge of it, the division according to interpretants in: Logic Notebook entry dated 8 oct. 1905; Ms 339 p. 253r


 

But Peirce again identifies exactly three interpretants on that manuscript page--immediate, dynamic, and representative.  His trichotomies on this occasion are clamatory/imperative/representative for the immediate interpretant and feeling/conduct/thought for the dynamic interpretant, while he does not assign any names for the representative interpretant.  The other three listed divisions are for the interpretant relations--"Mode of Affecting Dynamic Interp." (S-Id), which is "By Sympathy," "By Compulsion," or "By Reason"; "Mode of being represented by Representative Interpretant" (S-If); and "Mode of being represented to represent object by Repr. Interp." (Od-S-If).

 

Regards,

 







Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt






 


On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 6:14 AM Auke van Breemen  wrote:



Jon Alan,

This is a highly curious way of thinking of yours. You state that Peirce maintains that there are exactly three interpretants and your proof seems to be that you nowhere found more than three names for interpretants in the same passage.

It is nice to find that we agree upon at least one thing, i.e. we have Peirce's, your's and my take on the interpretants. I ragard them as three immediate 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AvB:  You state that Peirce maintains that there are exactly three
interpretants and your proof seems to be that you nowhere found more than
three *names* for interpretants in the same passage.


Indeed, I believe that if Peirce had held that there were more than three
interpretants, he would have said so somewhere explicitly.  Instead, he
experimented with various combinations of different names for *exactly
three* interpretants, the most consistent of which are
immediate/dynamical/final.  Emotional/energetic/logical only appear in the
drafts for "Pragmatism" (1907), and again, I see them as aligning directly
with the *divisions* according to the dynamical and final interpretants in
other late taxonomies as sympathetic/percussive/usual and
gratific/actuous/temperative, respectively.

The division according the mode of presentation of the immediate
interpretant as hypothetic/categorical/relative is admittedly not so
straightforward.  Peirce proposes it in a December 1908 draft letter to
Lady Welby "with great hesitation" (CP 8.369, EP 2:489), even though it
appears in his Logic Notebook as early as August 1906 (R
339:423-424[284r-285r]).  Of course, the adjectives themselves are commonly
used for three different kinds of *propositions* (CP 2.271, 1903), which
are distinguished in existential graphs (EGs) by how many lines of identity
each requires--zero, one, and two or more, respectively.

CSP:  Also note that by this system every proposition is either
hypothetical, categorical, or relative, according to the number of heavy
lines necessary to express its form. (R 481:10, LF 1:290, 1896).


However, an EG with no lines of identity can express a hypothetical
proposition only in the *alpha* system.  The *beta* system recognizes that
such a proposition is "expressed in precisely the same form" as a
categorical proposition (CP 3.445, 1896), while a spot with no lines of
identity attached is an *incomplete* proposition--i.e., a term or rheme,
whose number of pegs matches its valency (CP 4.560, 1906).  Therefore, the
division according to the immediate interpretant must come *before *the
division according to the nature of the influence of the sign; i.e., its
relation to the final interpretant.  This properly ensures that all
hypothetics are terms/semes, while all propositions/phemes are either
categoricals or relatives.

Moreover, the sheet of assertion in EGs is strictly a *logical* quasi-mind,
so it can only be determined by signs whose dynamical interpretants are
further signs; i.e., usuals.  Therefore, the division according to the mode
of presentation of the immediate interpretant must come *after* the
division according to the mode of being of the dynamical interpretant, such
that a usual can be a hypothetic, a categorical, or a relative.  My
proposed *logical *order of determination for the three
interpretant trichotomies (If→Id→Ii) is consistent with this, while Robert
Marty's (Ii→Id→If) is not.

AvB:  I follow Van Driel. Who followed, without knowledge of it, the
division according to interpretants in: *Logic Notebook entry dated 8 oct.
1905; Ms 339 p. 253r*


But Peirce again identifies *exactly three* interpretants on that
manuscript page
--immediate,
dynamic, and representative.  His trichotomies on this occasion are
clamatory/imperative/representative for the immediate interpretant and
feeling/conduct/thought for the dynamic interpretant, while he does not
assign any names for the representative interpretant.  The other three
listed divisions are for the interpretant *relations*--"Mode of Affecting
Dynamic Interp." (S-Id), which is "By Sympathy," "By Compulsion," or "By
Reason"; "Mode of being represented by Representative Interpretant" (S-If);
and "Mode of being represented to represent object by Repr. Interp."
(Od-S-If).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Apr 20, 2020 at 6:14 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Jon Alan,
>
> This is a highly curious way of thinking of yours. You state that Peirce
> maintains that there are exactly three interpretants and your proof seems
> to be that you nowhere found more than three *names* for interpretants in
> the same passage.
>
> It is nice to find that we agree upon at least one thing, i.e. we have
> Peirce's, your's and my take on the interpretants. I ragard them as three
> immediate objects that try to capture the process of semiosis as regarded
> the dynamical object.
>
> JAS: there is arguably a sense in which I posit *nine *different
> interpretants.  However, I strongly prefer *not *to characterize them
> that way
>
> If I understand the passage right you follow Shorts orthogonal
> arrangement, Zeman entertaning a more sober arrangement with only six
> interpretants. I follow Van Driel. Who followed, without knowledge 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon Alan,

This is a highly curious way of thinking of yours. You state that Peirce 
maintains that there are exactly three interpretants and your proof seems to be 
that you nowhere found more than three names for interpretants in the same 
passage.

 

It is nice to find that we agree upon at least one thing, i.e. we have 
Peirce's, your's and my take on the interpretants. I ragard them as three 
immediate objects that try to capture the process of semiosis as regarded the 
dynamical object.


JAS: there is arguably a sense in which I posit nine different interpretants.  
However, I strongly prefer not to characterize them that way

If I understand the passage right you follow Shorts orthogonal arrangement, 
Zeman entertaning a more sober arrangement with only six interpretants. I 
follow Van Driel. Who followed, without knowledge of it, the division according 
to interpretants in:

Logic Notebook entry dated 8 oct. 1905; Ms 339 p. 253r


Best,

Auke



> Op 20 april 2020 om 3:30 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> 
> > > JAS:  Peirce consistently maintains that there are 
> exactly three interpretants.
> > 
> > > 
> > > AvB:  This sentence most certainly is not true.
> > 
> > > 
> Please provide a citation or quote where Peirce assigns specific names to 
> more than three interpretants in the same passage.  Unless you can do that, I 
> stand by my statement.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  In the alpha part of semiotics it may seem so, but 
> not in the beta part (see my other mail) where he deals with the 
> interprtetation of the sign.
> > 
> > > 
> Peirce did not designate "alpha" and "beta" parts of semeitoic, that is 
> your idea.  The same is true of your subsequent enumeration of six 
> interpretants, especially since you admit that "Peirce hemself did not 
> connect them directly."  In fact, everything that you outline below is in 
> accordance with your speculative grammar, not Peirce's, although it is 
> recognizably Peircean in spirit.  The same is true of my own approach, which 
> is different from both yours and his.  For example, since I understand the 
> immediate/dynamical/final and emotional/energetic/logical divisions to be 
> orthogonal to each other, there is arguably a sense in which I posit nine 
> different interpretants.  However, I strongly prefer not to characterize them 
> that way, just like I reject describing the 1903 taxonomy as having nine 
> different "sign aspects."
> 
> Instead, I maintain that there are exactly three interpretants--immediate 
> as whatever a type possibly could signify to someone with mere sign system 
> acquaintance (essential knowledge); dynamical as whatever a token with its 
> tones actually does signify to someone with relevant collateral 
> experience/observation (informed knowledge); and final as whatever the sign 
> itself necessarily would signify to someone in the ultimate opinion 
> (substantial knowledge).  I go on to add that the immediate interpretant 
> includes a range of possible feelings (emotional) for all signs, exertions 
> (energetic) for indexical and symbolic signs, and further signs (logical) for 
> symbolic signs; the dynamical interpretant is an actual feeling (emotional), 
> exertion (energetic), or further sign (logical); and the final interpretant 
> is a habit of feeling (emotional), action (energetic), or thought (logical).
> 
> Regards,
> 
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran 
> Laymanhttp://www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt
> -http://twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
> 
> On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 6:27 AM Auke van Breemen < a.bree...@chello.nl 
> mailto:a.bree...@chello.nl > wrote:
> 
> > > 
> > Jon,
> > 
> > You wrote:
> > 
> > Peirce consistently maintains that there are exactly three 
> > interpretants.
> > 
> > -
> > 
> > This sentence most certainly is not true. In the alpha part of 
> > semiotics it may seem so, but not in the beta part  (see my other mail) 
> > where he deals with the interprtetation of the sign. lets do the count:
> > 
> > 1. emotional interpretant, the interpretive view on the qualisign 
> > aspect
> > 
> > Heading for a subdivision: energetic interpretant to be subdivided 
> > into
> > 
> > 2. mental interpretant (iconic signaspect) and
> > 
> > 3. effort interpretant (sinsign aspect)
> > 
> > heading for a subdivision: logical intepretant to be sub-divided 
> > into:
> > 
> > 4. immediate interpretant (rheme aspect)
> > 
> > 5. dynamical interpretant (dicent aspect)
> > 
> > 6. normal interpretant (the argument aspects in which all lower 
> > aspects are involved).
> > 
> > Peirce hemself did not connect them directly. Probably because as a 
> > logicean with an eye on the sheet of assertion he did not take the 
> > apprehension 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

JAS:  Peirce consistently maintains that there are exactly three
interpretants.

AvB:  This sentence most certainly is not true.


Please provide a citation or quote where Peirce assigns specific names to
more than three interpretants in the same passage.  Unless you can do that,
I stand by my statement.

AvB:  In the alpha part of semiotics it may seem so, but not in the beta
part (see my other mail) where he deals with the interprtetation of the
sign.


Peirce did not designate "alpha" and "beta" parts of semeitoic, that is
your idea.  The same is true of your subsequent enumeration of six
interpretants, especially since you admit that "Peirce hemself did not
connect them directly."  In fact, everything that you outline below is in
accordance with *your *speculative grammar, not Peirce's, although it is
recognizably Peircean in spirit.  The same is true of my own approach,
which is different from both yours and his.  For example, since I
understand the immediate/dynamical/final and emotional/energetic/logical
divisions to be orthogonal to each other, there is arguably a sense in
which I posit *nine *different interpretants.  However, I strongly prefer *not
*to characterize them that way, just like I reject describing the 1903
taxonomy as having nine different "sign aspects."

Instead, I maintain that there are exactly three interpretants--immediate
as whatever a type *possibly could* signify to someone with mere sign
system acquaintance (*essential *knowledge); dynamical as whatever a token
with its tones *actually does* signify to someone with relevant collateral
experience/observation (*informed *knowledge); and final as whatever the
sign itself *necessarily would* signify to someone in the ultimate
opinion (*substantial
*knowledge).  I go on to add that the immediate interpretant includes a
range of *possible *feelings (emotional) for all signs, exertions
(energetic) for indexical and symbolic signs, and further signs (logical)
for symbolic signs; the dynamical interpretant is an *actual *feeling
(emotional), exertion (energetic), or further sign (logical); and the final
interpretant is a *habit *of feeling (emotional), action (energetic), or
thought (logical).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Apr 19, 2020 at 6:27 AM Auke van Breemen 
wrote:

> Jon,
>
> You wrote:
>
> Peirce consistently maintains that there are *exactly three*
> interpretants.
>
> -
>
> This sentence most certainly is not true. In the alpha part of semiotics
> it may seem so, but not in the beta part  (see my other mail) where he
> deals with the interprtetation of the sign. lets do the count:
>
> 1. emotional interpretant, the interpretive view on the qualisign aspect
>
> Heading for a subdivision: energetic interpretant to be subdivided into
>
> 2. mental interpretant (iconic signaspect) and
>
> 3. effort interpretant (sinsign aspect)
>
> heading for a subdivision: logical intepretant to be sub-divided into:
>
> 4. immediate interpretant (rheme aspect)
>
> 5. dynamical interpretant (dicent aspect)
>
> 6. normal interpretant (the argument aspects in which all lower aspects
> are involved).
>
> Peirce hemself did not connect them directly. Probably because as a
> logicean with an eye on the sheet of assertion he did not take the
> apprehension of the sign as an object into account.
>
> Notice that the index, the symbol and the legisign aspect are still
> missing. Those emerge in the gamma part, that deals with the interaction of
> two signs. What follows has to be read as an analytical reconstruction in
> fragments only.
>
> Suppose our interaction as a communication between two semiotic sheets A
> and B, and that our conversation by mail is the intersection of our sheets.
> Lets further accept that Shannon covers the transmission of the sign as an
> object (i.e. qualisign, sinsign and icon aspect of our words).   Lets take
> the word 'god'. On the pc the legisign is covered by the asci value of the
> signs to be transmitted and the interoperability in their value
> interpretation on both our computers.
>
> For *our* reading the screen, the legisign aspect is not covered. Each of
> the sheets develops out of its inscripton (reading the screen) the
> emotional, mental and physical interpretants for further processing as a
> legisign.  It is by being inscribed in our respective sheets, that we are
> able to develop the import of the sign for our respective universes of
> discourse. The indexical sign aspect covers this, but we have to
> distinguish index A from index B, for instance by tincture as in the gamma
> part of EG. The legisign aspect is the habit of interpretation that is
> pertinent to our respective sheets if we technically read the sign. I don't
> expect much difference here between A and B, both will notice a difference
> in capitalization in different 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Auke van Breemen]

Jon,

You wrote:

Peirce consistently maintains that there are exactly three interpretants.

-

This sentence most certainly is not true. In the alpha part of semiotics it may 
seem so, but not in the beta part  (see my other mail) where he deals with the 
interprtetation of the sign. lets do the count:

1. emotional interpretant, the interpretive view on the qualisign aspect

Heading for a subdivision: energetic interpretant to be subdivided into

2. mental interpretant (iconic signaspect) and

3. effort interpretant (sinsign aspect)

heading for a subdivision: logical intepretant to be sub-divided into:

4. immediate interpretant (rheme aspect)

5. dynamical interpretant (dicent aspect)

6. normal interpretant (the argument aspects in which all lower aspects are 
involved).


Peirce hemself did not connect them directly. Probably because as a logicean 
with an eye on the sheet of assertion he did not take the apprehension of the 
sign as an object into account. 

Notice that the index, the symbol and the legisign aspect are still missing. 
Those emerge in the gamma part, that deals with the interaction of two signs. 
What follows has to be read as an analytical reconstruction in fragments only.

Suppose our interaction as a communication between two semiotic sheets A and B, 
and that our conversation by mail is the intersection of our sheets. Lets 
further accept that Shannon covers the transmission of the sign as an object 
(i.e. qualisign, sinsign and icon aspect of our words).   Lets take the word 
'god'. On the pc the legisign is covered by the asci value of the signs to be 
transmitted and the interoperability in their value interpretation on both our 
computers.

For our reading the screen, the legisign aspect is not covered. Each of the 
sheets develops out of its inscripton (reading the screen) the emotional, 
mental and physical interpretants for further processing as a legisign.  It is 
by being inscribed in our respective sheets, that we are able to develop the 
import of the sign for our respective universes of discourse. The indexical 
sign aspect covers this, but we have to distinguish index A from index B, for 
instance by tincture as in the gamma part of EG. The legisign aspect is the 
habit of interpretation that is pertinent to our respective sheets if we 
technically read the sign. I don't expect much difference here between A and B, 
both will notice a difference in capitalization in different occurences, but 
that is all that has to be covered by the legisign. With the symbol things 
differ. A person consistently writing 'God' may be expected to have other 
concepts evoked than a person consistently writing 'god'. If we want to know 
the difference, we have to look at the dynamical interpretant aspects developed 
out of the rhematic possibilities the sign offers for A and for those in B. If 
the dynamical interpretants agree to sufficient degree they will be the same, 
i.e. we evolved the same symbol aspect of the sign 'god'.  But how can we know? 
We need the argument, on each sheet, that connects all involved aspects to 
produce a response. The response being a sign on the intersection of sheet A 
and B, which is the screen. The alpha part of semiotics may be indifferent to 
the differences between sheets, it abstracts. But in gamma we need to make sure 
to keep count of the sheets to which the signs are connected. Your 
representational interpretant of 'God' as a symbol probably differs from mine 
in a lot of respects, leading to differences in response. They add up in 
different ways on the sheets A and B. And habit change may occur on both. Not 
neccesarilly in any intended direction. By being indexically commected with the 
respective sheets, the incriptions may becomme relevant for other exchanges of 
sheet A and B in other processes with C, etc., by becomming relevant for the 
representational interpretant of that other proces's goal. 


Best,

Auke



> Op 18 april 2020 om 3:24 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Auke, List:
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  I read these quotes as indicating two concepts, as 
> the terms choosen already suggest, i.e. 'eventual' and 'normal'.
> > 
> > > 
> Understood, but by contrast I read "eventual interpretant" and "normal 
> interpretant" as two tentative terms (with tentative definitions) for the 
> same concept, which were eventually superseded by "final interpretant."  
> While the names vary over time, Peirce consistently maintains that there are 
> exactly three interpretants, since this is required by his categorial 
> analysis as Robert's podium diagram helpfully illustrates.
> 
> 
> > > AvB:  I suggested a distinction between 'dynamical 
> interpretant' (aspectual) and 'dynamical interpretant response' (typical) for 
> disambiguation pusposes.
> > 
> > > 
> Again, I do not read Peirce as defining two different "dynamical 
> interpretants," but rather working out in his Logic Notebook some candidate 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Auke, List:

AvB:  I read these quotes as indicating two concepts, as the terms choosen
already suggest, i.e. 'eventual' and 'normal'.


Understood, but by contrast I read "eventual interpretant" and "normal
interpretant" as two *tentative *terms (with *tentative *definitions) for
the *same *concept, which were eventually superseded by "final
interpretant."  While the names vary over time, Peirce consistently
maintains that there are *exactly three* interpretants, since this is
required by his categorial analysis as Robert's podium diagram helpfully
illustrates.

AvB:  I suggested a distinction between 'dynamical interpretant'
(aspectual) and 'dynamical interpretant response' (typical) for
disambiguation pusposes.


Again, I do not read Peirce as defining two *different *"dynamical
interpretants," but rather working out in his Logic Notebook some candidate
ideas for defining *the *dynamical interpretant.  In this case, a dynamical
interpretant as "the determination of a field of consciousness" is a *logical
*interpretant producing a *further sign* in the interpreter such that the
sign itself is a *usual*, while a dynamical interpretant as "the commanded
act in the mere doing of it" is an *energetic *interpretant producing an
*effort* in the interpreter such that the sign itself is a *percussive*.

AvB (in another thread):  Semiotics must be developed by a study of signs
and sign processes, not by speculations on particular concepts of god, not
even Peirce's.


I agree, and my point was not to say anything one way or the other about
theism--only that Peirce considers the entire universe to be a *sign*,
specifically an argument; and as such, like *every *sign, it necessarily
has a final interpretant.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Fri, Apr 17, 2020 at 3:11 AM  wrote:

> Jon Alen,
>
> This comment probably does not come as a surprise.
>
> CSP:  The Eventual Interpretant of [a] Sign is all that General Truth that
> it destines, in view of the other general truths of the universe,
> conditionally upon its full acceptance. It is the sum and substance of all
> the real difference that its acceptance will make. ... Any Eventual
> Interpretant must be of the nature of a Habit or Law. (RS 46:6-7, c. 1906)
>
> CSP:  …and there is the Normal Interpretant, which is the true
> Interpretand, which the sign *ought *to produce. Its *true value*. Take,
> for example, a witness in court. ... The Normal Interpretant is the
> modification of the verdict of the jury in which this testimony ought
> logically to result. (R 499(s):2-4, c. 1906)
>
> I read these quotes as indicating two concepts, as the terms choosen
> already suggest, i.e. 'eventual' and 'normal'. The normal is judged by the
> truth value: is the interpretant the effect the sign (sic) ought to
> produce. It is an understanding of the import of this sign. It is
> restricted to the interpretation prosesses goals at hand.
>
> The eventual is not thus restricted: all general truth that it destines,
> in view of other general truths of the universe. It is the sum and
> substance of all the real difference that its acceptance will make, it must
> be a habit. It is what the normal interpretant of my former alinea might
> mean in other processes too. This difference can be looked at as a
> difference between an involved dicent aspect (of the normal i) of the sign
> and a rheme aspect (involved in eventual i,), the latter enabling its to
> involvement in other processes. The lines of identity that connect the
> processes (involved index element of legisigns and immediate interpretants
> that of themself act as a sign alike guaranty the possibility of this to
> actually happen).
>
> On the terminological side I regard Peirce as a ballerina that is able to
> make the finest and clearest distinctions between closely related gestures.
> He is not the butcher that only knows to make minced meat. He looks at each
> joint from all relevant (semiotically) perspectives and describes what you
> find if you cut from those perspectives.
>
> Closely related to this issue is the interpretation of 'dynamical
> interpretant'.  I found  passage's in Logical notebooks:
>
> The dynamical interpretant is the determination of a field of
> representation
> exterior to the sign. This eld is an interpreter's consciousness which
> determination is a ected by the sign (MS 339, 253r, October 8, 1905).
>
> The dynamical interpretant is just what is drawn from the sign by a
> given individual interpreter, [. . . ] (MS 339, 276r, April 2, 1906).
>
> I also found another shade of meaning in the first sentence below:
>
> The commanded act in the mere doing of it as in uenced by the command
> is the dynamical interpretant. (DIR; AvB) But insofar as that conduct
> involves the recognition of the command and is obedient to it and
> recognizes
> this correctly, 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, John, List:

I do not agree with a linear view of Peirce, either, and strongly concur
that one must take his entire vast corpus into account.  What I have said
is that I generally assume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary,
that his later writings reflect his *more considered* views--rarely (if
ever) *contradicting* his earlier writings, but typically seeking to
*clarify* them after further contemplation and refinement.

Peirce considered his inkstand to be an extension of his mind (CP 7.366,
1902), and I interpret many of his manuscripts accordingly--as
documentation of his ongoing thought process, not finished products that
always merit equal weight with whatever came subsequently or actually
appeared in print during his lifetime.  I can very much relate to such a
method myself; as the variously attributed saying goes, "I write to find
out what I think," both on the List and elsewhere.  My posts this week
express opinions that have evolved considerably from those that I held two
or three years ago, but the latter would still provide insight into how I
arrived at my current positions.

I readily admit to focusing a lot on terminology, as Peirce himself did,
since in some ways it is a specific object of study for semeiotic as a
distinct science.  However, I also acknowledge as he did the importance of
applying the results in *other* sciences--including not only metaphysics as
the third branch of philosophy, which I have discussed extensively, but
also the special sciences such as biology and sociology, which are *not *areas
in which I have much personal interest or expertise.  Nevertheless, if one
does not correctly *apprehend *Peirce's views on phenomenology, normative
sciences (including logic as semeiotic), and metaphysics, then one
obviously will not be able to *apply *them properly in the special sciences.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Apr 16, 2020 at 9:59 PM Edwina Taborsky  wrote:

> JAS - as usual, you and I, each in our personal opinions of Peirce, have
> great differences.
>
> I don't agree with a linear view of Peirce [early->late]; I think one has
> to take his whole works into consideration, for even if he was saying
> things in a different fashion, using different terms,  and working his
> analysis out in more detail - I think that Peirce was very consistent in
> his basic approach.
>
> Your focus seems to be on terminology;; on terms having a
> specific meaning, which you understand as increasingly clarified and
> 'accurate' as Peirce grows older;   and you tend to refrain from
> examining the functions of these terms in the real world. My focus is the
> pragmatic use of Peircean semiosis to explain the biological and societal
> realms.
>
> I gave my outline of the function of the Final Interpretant in enabling
> the adaptive capacity of habits. As for 'ultimate truth' - this is an
> entirely different function than an 'adaptive capacity of habits' -
> and refers to the scientific method of examining and analyzing objective
> reality. Nothing to do with the nature of habits, with adaptation, with
> generalization etc.
>
> So- we'll have to continue, each in our personal way, to disagree.
>
> Edwina
>

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Auke - thanks for your clear differentiation of two quite different
semiosic processes - regardless of their terms/names.

That is, as I see it, there IS such a thing as 'Truth' and there IS
such a thing as natural evolution. Both are semiosic actions and both
have different functions and yet both are a type of 'end' action. 

A] With regard to Truth - I consider that this refers to a specific
object/event where a final Interpretant about its singular identity
can eventually be made. This would be, as in the example, the verdict
of the jury. Or, the verdict of a number of scientists about the
'true' identity of a biological specimen. This sets up a closed 'end'
action.

B]  But this is very different from the 'final interpretant/eventual
interpretant which refers to the continuous act of the Universe in 
generalizing from all the existent and emerging differences and
developing a new habit/law. There is no ultimate truth, no final 'end
action'  in this process. Instead, there is a continuous growth of
diversity and networked complexity.

I suspect, but I may be quite wrong, that JAS considers that the
Universe is itself engaged in truth-seeking and is involved in a
search-action for some ultimate final truth. My view is that Peirce
uses both processes; the specific truth event and the generalized
open evolutionary process. 

Edwina
 On Fri 17/04/20  4:11 AM , a.bree...@chello.nl sent:
Jon Alen,

This comment probably does not come as a surprise.CSP:  The Eventual
Interpretant of [a] Sign is all that General Truth that it destines,
in view of the other general truths of the universe, conditionally
upon its full acceptance. It is the sum and substance of all the real
difference that its acceptance will make. ... Any Eventual
Interpretant must be of the nature of a Habit or Law. (RS 46:6-7, c.
1906) CSP:  …and there is the Normal Interpretant, which is the
true Interpretand, which the sign ought to produce. Its true value.
Take, for example, a witness in court. ... The Normal Interpretant is
the modification of the verdict of the jury in which this testimony
ought logically to result. (R 499(s):2-4, c. 1906)
I read these quotes as indicating two concepts, as the terms choosen
already suggest, i.e. 'eventual' and 'normal'. The normal is judged by
the truth value: is the interpretant the effect the sign (sic) ought
to produce. It is an understanding of the import of this sign. It is
restricted to the interpretation prosesses goals at hand.  

The eventual is not thus restricted: all general truth that it
destines, in view of other general truths of the universe. It is the
sum and substance of all the real difference that its acceptance will
make, it must be a habit. It is what the normal interpretant of my
former alinea might mean in other processes too. This difference can
be looked at as a difference between an involved dicent aspect (of
the normal i) of the sign and a rheme aspect (involved in eventual
i,), the latter enabling its to involvement in other processes. The
lines of identity that connect the processes (involved index element
of legisigns and immediate interpretants that of themself act as a
sign alike guaranty the possibility of this to actually happen).  

On the terminological side I regard Peirce as a ballerina that is
able to make the finest and clearest distinctions between closely
related gestures. He is not the butcher that only knows to make
minced meat. He looks at each joint from all relevant (semiotically)
perspectives and describes what you find if you cut from those
perspectives.
Closely related to this issue is the interpretation of 'dynamical
interpretant'.  I found  passage's in Logical notebooks: 

The dynamical interpretant is the determination of a  field of
representation
 exterior to the sign. This  eld is an interpreter's consciousness
which
 determination is a ected by the sign (MS 339, 253r, October 8,
1905).

The dynamical interpretant is just what is drawn from the sign by a
 given individual interpreter, [. . . ] (MS 339, 276r, April 2,
1906).

I also found another shade of meaning in the first sentence below:

The commanded act in the mere doing of it as in uenced by the
command
 is the dynamical interpretant. (DIR; AvB) But insofar as that
conduct
 involves the recognition of the command and is obedient to it and
recognizes
 this correctly, it is the representative interpretant (MS 339, 253r,
 October 9, 1905).

1. Note that the normal interpretant, is calles here the
representative. not without reason because with normal Peirce looks
at it from a truth functional perspective and with normal from a
representative.

2. More improtant, you will notice the difference between: 

A. 

The dynamical interpretant as 'the determination of a field of
consciousness' (The immediate interpretant/rheme got its index and

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[a . breemen]

Jon Alen,

This comment probably does not come as a surprise.

> CSP:  The Eventual Interpretant of [a] Sign is all that General Truth that it 
> destines, in view of the other general truths of the universe, conditionally 
> upon its full acceptance. It is the sum and substance of all the real 
> difference that its acceptance will make. ... Any Eventual Interpretant must 
> be of the nature of a Habit or Law. (RS 46:6-7, c. 1906)
> 

> CSP:  …and there is the Normal Interpretant, which is the true Interpretand, 
> which the sign ought to produce. Its true value. Take, for example, a witness 
> in court. ... The Normal Interpretant is the modification of the verdict of 
> the jury in which this testimony ought logically to result. (R 499(s):2-4, c. 
> 1906)
> 


I read these quotes as indicating two concepts, as the terms choosen already 
suggest, i.e. 'eventual' and 'normal'. The normal is judged by the truth value: 
is the interpretant the effect the sign (sic) ought to produce. It is an 
understanding of the import of this sign. It is restricted to the 
interpretation prosesses goals at hand. 

The eventual is not thus restricted: all general truth that it destines, in 
view of other general truths of the universe. It is the sum and substance of 
all the real difference that its acceptance will make, it must be a habit. It 
is what the normal interpretant of my former alinea might mean in other 
processes too. This difference can be looked at as a difference between an 
involved dicent aspect (of the normal i) of the sign and a rheme aspect 
(involved in eventual i,), the latter enabling its to involvement in other 
processes. The lines of identity that connect the processes (involved index 
element of legisigns and immediate interpretants that of themself act as a sign 
alike guaranty the possibility of this to actually happen). 

On the terminological side I regard Peirce as a ballerina that is able to make 
the finest and clearest distinctions between closely related gestures. He is 
not the butcher that only knows to make minced meat. He looks at each joint 
from all relevant (semiotically) perspectives and describes what you find if 
you cut from those perspectives.


Closely related to this issue is the interpretation of 'dynamical 
interpretant'.  I found  passage's in Logical notebooks:

The dynamical interpretant is the determination of a field of representation
exterior to the sign. This eld is an interpreter's consciousness which
determination is a ected by the sign (MS 339, 253r, October 8, 1905).

The dynamical interpretant is just what is drawn from the sign by a
given individual interpreter, [. . . ] (MS 339, 276r, April 2, 1906).

I also found another shade of meaning in the first sentence below:

The commanded act in the mere doing of it as in uenced by the command
is the dynamical interpretant. (DIR; AvB) But insofar as that conduct
involves the recognition of the command and is obedient to it and recognizes
this correctly, it is the representative interpretant (MS 339, 253r,
October 9, 1905).

1. Note that the normal interpretant, is calles here the representative. not 
without reason because with normal Peirce looks at it from a truth functional 
perspective and with normal from a representative.

2. More improtant, you will notice the difference between:

A.

The dynamical interpretant as 'the determination of a field of consciousness' 
(The immediate interpretant/rheme got its index and became propositional for 
this interpreter. But still needed the representative content to enter the  
argument, being put under the general rule of inference (representational 
interpretant) and judged on its truth value (normal i). It indicates a moment 
in a process of interpretation.

and B.

Dynamical interpretant as "The commanded act in the mere doing of it." In this 
case A must be fullfiled for B to happen. In A we are speaking in terms of sign 
aspects about the dynamical interpretant. In B it is a sign type, and it is the 
intended signtype in this argument (process) if communication is succesful. 

I suggested a distinction between 'dynamical interpretant' (aspectual) and 
'dynamical interpretant response' (typical) for disambiguation pusposes.


Best regards,


Auke van Breemen

> Op 17 april 2020 om 3:20 schreef Jon Alan Schmidt :
> 
> Edwina, List:
> 
> It should go without saying for all my posts, but the following is an 
> expression of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of Peirce's 
> writings.
> 
> I always include the year of publication or composition whenever I cite 
> them, because I believe that it is very important to pay attention to the 
> development of Peirce's thought over time.  CP 6.57-65 is from "The Doctrine 
> of Necessity Examined," which appeared in The Monist in 1892, so it is highly 
> tenuous (at best) to base the definition of the final interpretant on that 
> passage dating more than a decade before he ever began distinguishing a 

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[John F. Sowa]

Edwina and Jon,
Throughout his life, Peirce maintained a
consistent fallibilism.  He insisted that many of the things that we
believe are true are indeed true to the extent that they have been
tested.  It's even possible that some of them may be absolutely true.  But
we can never be certain whether any particular belief is absolutely
true.
ET>  I think that Peirce was very consistent in his basic
approach.
I agree that Peirce held many fundamental views that
continued throughout his life.  Over the years, his thought developed in
richer and deeper ways, but there are basic themes that continue
throughout.  Since the earlier views are often simpler, studying them can
help clarify the later train of thought.
When Peirce discovered a
flaw or weakness in his earlier views, he was careful to point them out. 
But if he didn't explicitly reject an earlier view, it's safe to assume
that it is consistent or compatible with his later views.
JAS> In
summary, the final interpretant is not itself a process, but rather the
telos of the continuous process of semeiosis, the final cause toward which
it tends in the long run.  As for whether it is  proper to attribute the
notion of perfection to it, I will once again let Peirce speak for
himself.
Peirce never attributed perfection to any claim.  He was
very consistent  in his fallibilism, In all those quotations, he mentions
or implies a specific sign that is being considered.   The complete phrase
is "the final interpretant of a *some* sign that is being
considered".  For many signs, the final interpretant is
"Falsum".  And there are very few, if any, signs for which mere
mortals can conclude "Verum without any reservations".
All
his life, Peirce was a logician, a mathematician, and a scientist.  He
insisted that no scientist could ever claim that any particular statement
is true without any lingering doubt.  The best that a scientist can claim
is that a certain statement is true about a certain range of possible
observations on which it has been thoroughly tested,
John

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message. More at 
http://www.cspeirce.com/peirce-l/peirce-l.htm .

Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

 BODY { font-family:Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;font-size:12px;
}JAS - as usual, you and I, each in our personal opinions of Peirce,
have great differences. 

I don't agree with a linear view of Peirce [early->late]; I think
one has to take his whole works into consideration, for even if he
was saying things in a different fashion, using different terms,  and
working his analysis out in more detail - I think that Peirce was very
consistent in his basic approach.

Your focus seems to be on terminology;; on terms having a specific
meaning, which you understand as increasingly clarified and
'accurate' as Peirce grows older;   and you tend to refrain from
examining the functions of these terms in the real world. My focus is
the pragmatic use of Peircean semiosis to explain the biological and
societal realms. 

I gave my outline of the function of the Final Interpretant in
enabling the adaptive capacity of habits. As for 'ultimate truth' -
this is an entirely different function than an 'adaptive capacity of
habits' - and refers to the scientific method of examining and
analyzing objective reality. Nothing to do with the nature of habits,
with adaptation, with generalization etc.

So- we'll have to continue, each in our personal way, to disagree.

Edwina
 On Thu 16/04/20  9:20 PM , Jon Alan Schmidt jonalanschm...@gmail.com
sent:
 Edwina, List:
 It should go without saying for all my posts, but the following is
an expression of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of
Peirce's writings.
 I always include the year of publication or composition whenever I
cite them, because I believe that it is very important to pay
attention to the development of Peirce's thought over time.  CP
6.57-65 is from "The Doctrine of Necessity Examined," which appeared
in  The Monist in 1892, so it is highly tenuous (at best) to base the
definition of the final interpretant on that passage dating more than
a decade before he ever began distinguishing a sign's three different
interpretants--initially calling this one "its interpretant in itself"
(CP 8.333, 1904) and "its signified interpretant" (CP 8.337, 1904). 
Besides, a quick perusal of the online [1]  Commens Dictionary is all
that it takes to see most of his own explicit definitions of the final
interpretant, as well as its "near synonyms"--eventual interpretant,
rational interpretant, and normal interpretant.  Here they are, along
with a couple of other relevant excerpts.
 CSP:  … when we speak of the interpretant of a sign, we may mean
the  rational interpretant which fairly and justly interprets it ...
(R 284:59-60[54-55], 1905)
 CSP:  The Eventual Interpretant of [a] Sign is all that General
Truth that it destines, in view of the other general truths of the
universe, conditionally upon its full acceptance. It is the sum and
substance of all the real difference that its acceptance will make.
... Any Eventual Interpretant must be of the nature of a Habit or
Law. (RS 46:6-7, c. 1906) 
 CSP:  …and there is the Normal Interpretant, which is the true
Interpretand, which the sign ought to produce. Its true value. Take,
for example, a witness in court. ... The Normal Interpretant is the
modification of the verdict of the jury in which this testimony ought
logically to result. (R 499(s):2-4, c. 1906) 
 CSP:  Finally there is what I provisionally term the Final
Interpretant, which refers to the manner in which the Sign tends to
represent itself to be related to its Object. I confess that my own
conception of this third interpretant is not yet quite free from
mist. (CP 4.536, 1906) 
 CSP:  ... the Normal Interpretant, or effect that would be produced
on the mind by the Sign after sufficient development of thought.
...The ten respects according to which the chief divisions of signs
are determined are as follows: ... 8th, according to the Nature of
the Normal Interpretant ... (CP 8.343-344, EP 2:482-483, 1908) 
 CSP:  VIII. According to the Purpose of the Eventual Interpretant:
Gratific; To produce action; To produce self-control. (CP 8.372, EP
2:490, 1908)
  CSP:  But we must also note that there is certainly a third kind of
Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that
which would finally be decided to be the true interpretation if
consideration of the matter were carried so far that an ultimate
opinion were reached. (EP 2:496, 1909)
 CSP:  But the Significance of it, the Ultimate, or Final,
Interpretant is her purpose in asking it, what effect its answer will
have as to her plans for the ensuing day ... The Final Interpretant is
the sum of the Lessons of the reply, Moral, Scientific, etc. (CP
8.314, EP 2:498, 1909) 
 CSP:  The Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in which
any mind does act but in the way in which every mind would act. That
is, it consists in a truth which might be expressed in a conditional
proposition of this type: “If so and so were to happen to any mind
this sign would 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Edwina, List:

It should go without saying for all my posts, but the following is an
expression of my personal opinions based on my interpretations of Peirce's
writings.

I always include the year of publication or composition whenever I cite
them, because I believe that it is very important to pay attention to the
development of Peirce's thought over time.  CP 6.57-65 is from "The
Doctrine of Necessity Examined," which appeared in *The Monist* in 1892, so
it is highly tenuous (at best) to base the definition of the final
interpretant on that passage dating more than a decade before he ever began
distinguishing a sign's three different interpretants--initially calling
this one "its interpretant in itself" (CP 8.333, 1904) and "its signified
interpretant" (CP 8.337, 1904).  Besides, a quick perusal of the online
 Commens
Dictionary is all that it takes to see most of his own explicit definitions
of the final interpretant, as well as its "near synonyms"--eventual
interpretant, rational interpretant, and normal interpretant.  Here they
are, along with a couple of other relevant excerpts.

CSP:  … when we speak of the interpretant of a sign, we may mean the
*rational* interpretant which fairly and justly interprets it ... (R
284:59-60[54-55], 1905)


CSP:  The Eventual Interpretant of [a] Sign is all that General Truth that
it destines, in view of the other general truths of the universe,
conditionally upon its full acceptance. It is the sum and substance of all
the real difference that its acceptance will make. ... Any Eventual
Interpretant must be of the nature of a Habit or Law. (RS 46:6-7, c. 1906)

CSP:  …and there is the Normal Interpretant, which is the true
Interpretand, which the sign *ought *to produce. Its *true value*. Take,
for example, a witness in court. ... The Normal Interpretant is the
modification of the verdict of the jury in which this testimony ought
logically to result. (R 499(s):2-4, c. 1906)


CSP:  Finally there is what I provisionally term the Final Interpretant,
which refers to the manner in which the Sign tends to represent itself to
be related to its Object. I confess that my own conception of this third
interpretant is not yet quite free from mist. (CP 4.536, 1906)

CSP:  ... the *Normal Interpretant*, or effect that would be produced on
the mind by the Sign after sufficient development of thought. ...
The ten respects according to which the chief divisions of signs are
determined are as follows: ... 8th, according to the Nature of the Normal
Interpretant ... (CP 8.343-344, EP 2:482-483, 1908)

CSP:  VIII. According to the Purpose of the Eventual Interpretant:
Gratific; To produce action; To produce self-control. (CP 8.372, EP 2:490,
1908)


CSP:  But we must also note that there is certainly a third kind of
Interpretant, which I call the Final Interpretant, because it is that
which *would
*finally be decided to be the true interpretation if consideration of the
matter were carried so far that an ultimate opinion were reached. (EP
2:496, 1909)

CSP:  But the Significance of it, the *Ultimate*, or *Final*, *Interpretant
*is her *purpose *in asking it, what effect its answer will have as to her
plans for the ensuing day ... The *Final Interpretant* is the sum of
the *Lessons
*of the reply, Moral, Scientific, etc. (CP 8.314, EP 2:498, 1909)

CSP:  The Final Interpretant does not consist in the way in which any mind
does act but in the way in which every mind would act. That is, it consists
in a truth which might be expressed in a conditional proposition of this
type: “If so and so were to happen to any mind this sign would determine
that mind to such and such *conduct*.” (CP 8.315, EP 2:499, 1909)

CSP:  My Final Interpretant is, I believe, exactly the same as your
Significance; namely, the effect the Sign *would *produce upon any mind
upon which the circumstances should permit it to work out its full effect.
...
... the Final Interpretant is the one Interpretative result to which every
Interpreter is destined to come if the Sign is sufficiently considered. ...
The Final Interpretant is that toward which the actual tends. (SS 110-111,
1909)

CSP:  The third sense in which we may properly speak of the Interpretant is
that in which I speak of the Final Interpretant meaning that Habit in the
production of which the function of the Sign, as such, is exhausted. (ILS
285, 1910)


Taking all these into account, and giving more weight to the later texts as
presumably reflecting Peirce's more considered views--perhaps largely "free
from mist" by then--I still maintain that the final interpretant is
whatever a sign *necessarily would* signify under ideal conditions; i.e.,
in the ultimate opinion after infinite inquiry by an infinite community.

Notice that the logical interpretant, which Peirce discusses in various
drafts of "Pragmatism" (1907), is *not *considered a "near synonym" of the
final interpretant.  Although some scholars 

[PEIRCE-L] The final interpretant

[Edwina Taborsky]

 

Auke- I have a different view of the Final Interpretant -  I see it
as a means of 'changing habits'. 
   My view of the Final Interpretant is that it is a continuous and
infinite process of generalization, vital to the formation of habits.
That is, the Logical or Final or Destinate Interpretant [the name
isn't relevant] is an integral component of the universe's growth and
increasing complexity. ["Everywhere the main fact is growth and
increasing complexity" 6.58and "I, for my part, think that the
diversification, the specification, has been continually taking
place" 6.57. And "there is probably in nature some agency by which
the complexity and diversity of things can be increased" 6.58.  
What is this 'agency'? It's both 'pure spontaneity' or Firstness
[6.59] AND - how does this spontaneity move into the actualities of
Secondness? By means of habit formation. By means of Thirdness. "I
make use of chance chiefly to make room for a principle of
generalization, or tendency to form habits, which I hold has produced
all regularities'. 6.63. See also 6.64 and 6.65...the 'phenomen of
growth and developing complexity which appears to be universal'. 

That is, the semiosic process is one that is constantly enabling and
increasing both the diversity and complexity of life. Mind enables
Matter to become more diverse and complex.  To enable this - semiosis
does not just focus on the particular individual act of experience of
an external object and the interpretation of that external object.
Such a confinement of the world to Secondness  would deny the
realities of Types, of continuity and common adaptation and growth 
Semiosis also focuses on enhancing and expanding the depth and
breadth, the complexity, of the development of habits, the knowledge
base/Thirdness that is used within the process of the triadic
semiosis.  

It achieves this enhancement/expansion of habits, of generalization
- by means of the Final Interpretant, which is a process of constant
generalization of the informational results of the previous
Interpretants [the II and DI]. And this information comes from many
sites. I think it's important that the 'input' to the FI comes from
many sites. 

- "the logical interpretant should in all cases be a conditional
future" . The Interpretants are, after all 'a modification of
consciousness' 5.485. What is the nature of a conditional future?

- 'those signs that have a logical interpretant are either generals
or closely connected with generals" 5.488. See also 5.482 for this
focus on the Logical/Final Interpretant as a general and in the
'conditional mood' of 'would be. 

- "the interpretant is a modifier of consciousness" 5.485

-"the whole function of thought is to produce habits of action'
5.400; 6.262

- this 'logical interpretant' has the function of a 'habit-change'
[see 5.476

The works of Peirce are filled with these analyses - too many to
quote here. 

That is - my understanding of the Final Interpretant is that its
role is to develop and change habits, relevant to the actual world
[of Secondness] and yet capable of the obvious expansion of diversity
and complexity in life. In the biological  realm, what we see is that
the Final Interpretant accepts information/data from many individual
agents; it generalizes this data; and then,  this generalization
becomes dominant and acts to change the  species habits stored within
Thirdness such that, a bird develops a new beak; a moth develops
different coloured wings..and so on. 

The Final Interpretant is not 'often' used; most of life operates
within Firstness/Secondness - and a stable Thirdness. But, the Final
Interpretant is, I feel, the key to how we change habits.  

The Final Interpretant is a means of enabling the infinite evolution
of the world's diversity and complexity. It collects data from
multiple sites - generalizes them, and this new 'habit' becomes
dominant and changes the habits-of-formation of a species. 

With regard to your example of the changes in style in the life of
an artist - I'd say the process is similar, where the artist develops
a 'normative style of his art'..and then, by means of interaction with
others, with experience etc...comes to a Final Interpretant phase,
where he changes his 'normative style of art'. 

Notice that my view of the Final Interpretant is an evolutionary
one; there is no notion of a final Perfection, but instead, a concept
of infinite capacity, via input data from multiple sites, plus the
action of generalization.. to change the habits of a Type.

Edwina

-
PEIRCE-L subscribers: Click on "Reply List" or "Reply All" to REPLY ON PEIRCE-L 
to this message. PEIRCE-L posts should go to peirce-L@list.iupui.edu . To 
UNSUBSCRIBE, send a message not to PEIRCE-L but to l...@list.iupui.edu with the 
line "UNSubscribe PEIRCE-L" in the BODY of the message.