Jack,
Your latest summary is very clear. Unfortunately, there are three criticisms
that make it unacceptable for any serious publication:
According to three ways of interpreting the phrase "in itself", your claim is
(1) obvious and irrelevant, (2) complex and unprovable, (3) irrelevant to
anything Peirce wrote about Kant's claim.
Re point #1; Two people looking at the same thing at the same time will see
different views of it. That is obvious and irrelevant to the claim that
anything about the object is unrecognizable..
Re #2: There are an uncountable infinity (continuous range of perspectives and
aspects) of any object that can be detected and recognized by the open-ended
range of scientific instruments available now or in the future. There is ZERO
evidence that any aspect of any physical object can be forever unrecognizable..
Re #3: Peirce's claim was much simpler and much easier to prove than total
recognition of everything (as in #2). He denied that their were any properties
or aspects of any Ding an sich that could never be recognized (i,e,, detected
or observed in any way). For any object x, this point can be proved by tests
on objects or parts of objects that are similar to x.
There was strong evidence for point #3 when Peirce made it, and the evidence
has become stronger every year since then.
Suggestion: Please print out this note and my note note from yesterday. Then
let us know what your adviser says about them.
John
----------------------------------------
From: "JACK ROBERT KELLY CODY" <jack.cody.2...@mumail.ie>
My drawing skills are clearly fallible, but the structure is as presented (as I
analyze it).
The "object" (in itself) never is cognized as it is in itself.
Via linguistic structuralism, which here is recursive entailment, we see how
one person's O' (iterative/derivational "copy/experience/representation") of
the thing in itself as "object" exists within that person's frame of reference.
But, also, why it is not necessary (or plausible) that the thing as it is in
itself should/could be cognized as it is in its "in itself" aspect.
This is how, structurally, people come to argue about the objective validity of
any given object, which object is "common" but idiosyncratic. It is both
"shared" yet from each "cogito"
(personhood/individuality/perspective-experience), it is necessarily
derivational and thus recursive. Universal Grammar, at core, functions, (I
arrive at publication soon), in its nativist principles - poverty of stimulus,
recursion, and so on - because the thing in itself is as Kant described. Now, I
am open to all counter arguments which can situate this very basic structure,
of the below, sui generis, within a Peircean frame and thus dislodge the
Kantian "price" (of the incognizable). That would be me citing any of you as my
conclusion if it is possible to articulate. Many will be/are cited anyway
(their literature).
It is this:
H1)O(H2
H1[O'])O(H2[O']
-----------------
")"=experience, necessarily mediated, thus "representation/frame".
-----------------
All objects in themselves - O - are experienced individually, "refracted" or
"represented" ("copied", Kant says, "represented", Peirce says, though I treat
them as calques) and thus, within cognition it doesn't only seem surplus to
requirements that the thing in itself should be cognized but that it cannot be,
as per its Kantian definition, seems, to me, to pose no problem at all. It
rather answers so many: Chomsky, Godel, Peirce, Saussure, Jakobson, Bourdieu,
Foucault, Russell, Einstein, Newton, string/quantum, and on and on.
If it is wrong, the thing in itself, then none of these make any real coherent
sense. If it is true, all of these need to make more sense than they currently
do. That is the frame which my (many theses) are engaging with. The treatment
here, however, is narrowed: Hume, Kant, Peirce, Godel, Chomsky. The latter two
merely are canonical logical/empirical support for the necessary proof of the
thing in itself as incognizable and thus a more coherent understanding of what
we call "cognition" itself.
As to where it falls, it doesn't bother me. I'm not an ideologue in this
matter. If either can be disproven, then I go where the truth goes.
Best
Jack
P.S.
I'll refrain from replying now except to thank all for their contributions in a
fruitful dialogue (but will of course read any and all responses). JFS is right
when he says we can go back and forth too much and until I publish, and situate
with nuance, which goes to peer review, anyway, it isn't strictly right of me
to allude to things that I cannot delineate here in full context. It's not
about quotations for me - it's deconstruction of the very structural process of
mediation/communication/language/physics itself and then quotations as and when
necessary (I've received many here already which I am framing constantly).
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