Aw: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Helmut Raulien]

Jerry, John, List,

you wrote:

"
> If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
> I would say "What do you mean? Why are you asking
> that question? What would you do with the answer?”

Very well stated from the CSP spirit of inquiry perspective!

".

I dont understand this. If anybody asks, if relations have parts, why can this not be an intrinsically motivated question? Why does the CSP spirit suggest, that this question must be extrinsically motivated, so that the asker does not just want to know the answer, because he/she finds it interesting, but has obscure motives, and wants to use the answer for something weird, something other than just gaining knowledge? Ok, you can always ask: Why do you want to gain knowledge? That is always a good question, I admit. But: If the knowledge gainer shares this knowledge, then I think it is clear to see, that she/he just wants to commit to the scientific progress, and is not Dr. No, or Frankenstein.

 


I can imagine, that there are simple relations that donot have parts, but there are also composed relations, that consist of other relations, which are their parts (given that I may use the term "parts" in this functional way, but maybe not, this still has got to be discussed, or is already, and I might have missed it).

 

Best,

Helmut

 

 


22. Dezember 2017 um 17:55 Uhr
 "Jerry LR Chandler" 
 

List, John:

Comments inserted within text:

> On Dec 22, 2017, at 9:38 AM, John F Sowa  wrote:
>
> On 12/22/2017 7:50 AM, g...@gnusystems.ca wrote:
>> for instance, you can say that a dicisign has subject(s) and predicate, but in late Peircean semeiotics, the analysis into these “parts” is somewhat arbitrary, and in some cases, so is the choice of whether it has one “subject” or several.
>
> But that doesn't answer the question whether a sign has parts.
>
> A sign is a triadic relation. But it's not clear whether
> you can or should say that a relation has parts. For example,
> consider the dyadic relation greater-than or its symbol '>'.
>
> If you write "7 > 2", that statement has three symbols,
> and it expresses a relationship between 7 and 2.
> But those three symbols aren't parts of the relation.
>
Well stated!
But, this is traditional mathematical usage because of the role of well-defined, separate, clear and distinct symbols of the orderly display of numbers that must be aligned in sequence along a one-dimensional geometric line.

The formation of collections of pairs of atoms generates relations that depend on symbols as parts of the molecule (Mereology). This is essential to the emergence of the whole, as in the formation of chiral centers. The alignment of the parts of the chiral molecule are in space. This proven by well-defined emanations necessary for the patterns of x-ray diffraction of the sinsign.

In the material world of the chirality of molecular genetics, the symbols where A is the symbol for adenosine and G is the symbol for guanosine, the three symbols,

A > G

makes no logical sense.

In other words, the mathematization of symbols is dependent of the symbol system under inquiry.

(A few days ago, John referenced the paper by Church on semantics and syntax which is highly relevant to this discussion.)

> That particular relationship has 7 and 2 as parts, but the
> relation named greater-than can "have" infinitely many
> relationships. And as Aristotle observed, "have as part"
> is only one of many ways of "having”.

A chemical example of this is the abductive set of isomers of a given molecular formula, such as was discussed for Pastuer's chiral forms of tartaric acid.
>
> One might say that the *extension* of greater-than is an
> infinite set of pairs. But that does not imply that
> greater-than has infinitely many parts.

Agreed.
>
> The *intension* of greater-than is defined by axioms
> (several statements with multiple symbols). But those
> axioms aren't considered "parts" of the relation.

Agreed.
Abstractly, this is one component of the “alphabetic” sign system for chemical notation. The composition of the names of the parts (as names of atoms) generates a new name for the molecule that is the "difference that makes a difference” between atoms and molecules. The new name must give an exact accounting of the spatial organization of the parts, as with tartaric acid and virtually all other biochemicals.
>
> In summary, I would avoid using the word 'part' to
> describe any relation, including the sign relation.
Agreed.
>
> If anybody asked me "Do relations have parts?",
> I would say "What do you mean? Why are you asking
> that question? What would you do with the answer?”

Very well stated from the CSP spirit of inquiry perspective!

>From my perspective, I would suggest that John assertions are closely tied to the general problem of taxonomy / categorization / classification / order and organization which are intrinsic to the mathematization of natural sorts and kinds, as well as a host of 

Re: Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[kirstima]

Helmut,

I was not using a metaphor. Nor was I suggesting what you inferred I 
did. I just posed two questions, one on sign, one on meaning. Which, of 
course, are deeply related. But how?


To my mind both questions are worth careful ponderings. Especially in 
connection with this phase in the Lowell lectures.


Peirce was an experimentalist. In philosophy one does not need a 
laboratory, but one needs though experiments.


I was inviting to participate in such experimenting. Writing down the 
question and searching for answers which logically fit with the 
question, is such an experiment.


Simplest math is recommended by CSP as starting point. To clear our 
logical muddles and confusions, so I have inferred.


EGs are based on simple geometrical ideas, such as points and lines. 
Which are cafefully developed into logical instruments, vehicles for 
logical thinking.


Comments?

Kirsti


Helmut Raulien kirjoitti 21.12.2017 21:32:

Gary, Kirsti, List,
I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of",
geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a
part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is
meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line
metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the
point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional
part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical
part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear
spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not
geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think
they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry.
Best,
Helmut

 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
 wrote:

Kirsti, list,

Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has
points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last
month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/ [1]. By the way,
according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for
_point_ before Euclid.

Gary f.

-Original Message-
 From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
 Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25

Listers,

Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for
geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it
as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word
instead of the earlier STIGME . - But (with latin) the Romans & later
Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.

Does a sign have parts? - How about meaning?

Best, Kirsti

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Aw: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Lowell Lecture 3.6

[Helmut Raulien]

Gary, Kirsti, List,

I do not agree, that the geometrical metaphor suits. "Part of", geometrically or spatially understood, is only one kind of being a part of. Kirsti suggested, that meaning is a part of a sign. But is meaning metaphorizable as a point on the line, with the line metphorizable as a sign? Ok, a common speech metaphor is "I get the point" for "I get the meaning". But still I think, that a functional part is something completely different from a spatial, geometrical part, a compartment. A sign is a function, not a range with a clear spatial border, and there are different laws applying, which are not geometrical, though there may be geometrical metaphors, but I think they stumble. And: Metaphorization is not analysis. It is poetry.

Best,

Helmut

 

 21. Dezember 2017 um 15:39 Uhr
 g...@gnusystems.ca
wrote:




Kirsti, list,

 

Asking whether a sign has parts is like asking whether a line has points. Peirce has a comment on that in one of my blog posts from last month, http://gnusystems.ca/wp/2017/11/stigmata/. By the way, according to my sources, Aristotle used the word σημεῖον for point before Euclid.

 

Gary f.

 

-Original Message-
From: kirst...@saunalahti.fi [mailto:kirst...@saunalahti.fi]
Sent: 21-Dec-17 01:25
 

 

Listers,

 

Perhaps It is good to remember historical changes with names used for geometrical point. Euclid introduced the word SEMEION, and defined it as that which has no parts, and his followers started to that word instead of the earlier STIGME . – But (with latin) the Romans & later Boethius changed it to PUNCTUM in their commentaries.

 

Does a sign have parts?  - How about meaning?

 

Best, Kirsti

 

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