subject:"Aw\: Re\: Re\: \[PEIRCE\-L\] Direct experience and immediate object"

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-14 Thread Helmut Raulien


Jon, list,

 

Thank you for clarification! Is it so, that the general object and the final interpretant (of a rheme) are what in some other theory is the extension and the intension of a term?

 

Before, I had assumed, that these (in- and extension) might be the two submodes (2.2.1) and (2.2.2) of the DO.

 

How does the general object fit into the categorial-modal affair?

 

And is it so, that we are talking about language-communication-signs, for which the sign system is two or more individuals, and that it is also possible to talk about a thought-sign of one person who hears, reads, or just thinks the term, and that in this case the stuff applies I had written, with primisense, altersense, medisense?

 

Best,

Helmut

 

14. September 2018 um 00:26 Uhr
 "Jon Alan Schmidt"  wrote:
 


Edwina, Helmut, List:
 

I could comment on what I consider to be several fundamental misunderstandings throughout this exchange, but Gary R. already pointed out a few of them; so instead, I will simply take the opportunity to illustrate (and hopefully clarify further) why I am now advocating the notion of a General Object for every Sign (Type).

 

The word "dog" is a common noun, which makes it a term in traditional logic, a Rheme in Peirce's 1903 taxonomy ("_ is a dog"), and a Seme in his later taxonomies.  As such, the Immediate Interpretant is its meaning within the Sign System of written English, and the Immediate Object is the range of what a Replica of "dog" possibly could denote accordingly to someone with mere Sign System Acquaintance, consisting entirely of all such definitions and nothing else (Essential Knowledge).

 

The Dynamic Object is the individual that a Replica of "dog" actually does denote to someone with previous Collateral Experience of dogs in a single concrete Instance of the Sign, which is an occurrence that produces a feeling, exertion, or other Sign-Instance as the Dynamic Interpretant in accordance with fallible Interpretative Habits (Informed Knowledge).  I agree with Edwina that this only (or at least primarily) happens when the Replica of the term/Rheme/Seme is involved in a Replica of a proposition/Dicisign/Pheme, such as "Buster is a dog," "Any dog is a mammal," "This dog is a poodle," "Some dog is black," or even a child simply pointing at a dog and saying "Dog!"

 

The General Object is the collection of all Real dogs, which is what the Sign (Type) necessarily would denote in the final opinion at the end of infinite inquiry by an infinite community, corresponding to the Final Interpretant that would be produced in accordance with infallible Interpretative Habits (Substantial Knowledge).  I disagree with Edwina that this implies Platonism, because--entirely consistent with Aristotelianism, specifically Peirce's extreme scholastic realism--the General Object is a Reality that only exists in its members, which are all particular dogs.  Likewise, the Sign (Type) only exists in its Replicas; or more precisely, in its Instances (Tokens).

 

Regards,

 





Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt





 

On Thu, Sep 13, 2018 at 3:25 PM, Edwina Taborsky  wrote:


Helmut, you wrote:

"I think, a specific dog is not the DO of the rheme, but of the dicent the rheme is part of, that would be Buster in "Buster is a dog"."

Yes - you have to process the Rhematic Iconic Qualisign further to get the specifics, but - the FACT that a rhematic iconic qualisign emerged in your sensations - is due to the fact that a dog or something/animal is in the room. Your experience of that dog is as a rhematic iconic qualisign, i.e, that sensation/feeling of something there..You then process it further - and can interpret as 'a dog' and even 'that dog'...

Edwina

On Thu 13/09/18 4:19 PM , "Helmut Raulien" h.raul...@gmx.de sent:



Edwina, list,

 

I think I agree that the extension is not the DO. I also agree, that, if you look very closely at a rheme, it has no object, is just a feeling, like what Peirce called "primisense".

If you look less closely, but say that rheme is the complete sign, then I would say, that Peirces "altersense" comes into the game, when this feeling picks the connection towards the dog-species and its traits out of the interpreter´s memory, being rather a dicent or proposition then, like: "This feeling indicates to the dog-species and what I know about it:...". When the interpreter starts thinking about the traits of dogs, Peirces "medisense" is used too, and it even becomes argumental, like: "A cat is not a dog, because it does not bark".

So perhaps we are merely quibbling about the boundary of the sign, how closely you look at it, and whether you separate it into subsigns or not.

I think, a specific dog is not the DO of the rheme, but of the dicent the rheme is part of, that would be Buster in "Buster is a dog".

 

Best,

Helmut

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-07 Thread Helmut Raulien

Francesco, List,

I feel that I cannot work with an equation or model in which a variable (O) stands for two totally different things, with something as fundamental as the epistemic cut going right through it. Is the DO influenced by the sign or not? Sometimes it is, sometimes not. If people talk about the andromeda galaxy, it is clear, that the andromeda galaxy is no affected at all by the sign. If they are talking about their friendship, it (the DO "our friendship") certainly is (affected by the sign).

I am just looking for consistencies of models, and model´s applicational performances. Maybe expecting too much, please excuse my muttering!

Best,

Helmut

 07. September 2018 um 19:52 Uhr
 "Francesco Bellucci"  wrote:

Helmut, List

Subject in a sentence and object in the sentence as a sign are the same thing, yes. And the subject in the sentence is not external, so the object neither is. But the thing the object is about, is (external). So, is the thing the dynamic object, and the subject the immediate? I would be not happy with saying so, because the dynamic object is the object too.

It's enough to distinguish the real thing as the external object (i.e. external to the sign) and the subject of the sentence as the internal object (i.e. internal to the sign). Or, as Peirce did, to distinguish a dynamic from an immediate object. At that point, the dynamic object is the object too, but so is the subject of the sentence

F

To solve this problem, as the only way it seems to me to say:

The immediate object is what the sign carries for information about the thing. The dynamic object is not the thing, but the role the thing plays in the sign minus the immediate object. That would be e.g. the knowledge that the thing exists (or doesn´t, like a phenix), and that there is a lot about the thing unknown by the sign´s interpreter/s.

But that would be saying, that the dynamic object is internal to the sign in the way that it is plaing a role for it (has a function), and external, in the way that it is knowledge not shared by the sign´s interpreter´s.

So I think that both, immediate and dynamic object, are not the thing, but its roles or functions within the sign. Unknown knowledge is internal in the way, that, although the knowledge is external, the knowledge that the knowledge is unknown is a function inside the sign.

So the DO is external, but that doesn´t mean that it is not internal. Problem solved, Peirce not contradicted, everybody happy. If only that would be so easy.

Best, Helmut

 07. September 2018 um 16:39 Uhr

"John F Sowa"  wrote:

Francesco, Edwina, and Jon AS,

FB
> "Subject and Object are the same thing except for trifling distinctions" (EP 2:494)

Yes! And they're the same as the "arguments" of relations by
logicians today. This quotation and the others cited by Francesco
confirm the point I was trying to make: From age 12 to 74, Peirce
was a logician. Every version of logic that he used or invented
had a precise mapping to his algebra of 1885, to his later EGs,
and to the most widely used logics today.

Peirce was also a professional lexicographer. Note his letter
to the editor of the Century Dictionary, Benjamin E. Smith, who
had also been one of his students at Johns Hopkins:

> The task of classifying all the words of language, or what's the
> same thing, all the ideas that seek _expression_, is the most
> stupendous of logical tasks. Anybody but the most accomplished
> logician must break down in it utterly; and even for the strongest
> man, it is the severest possible tax on the logical equipment and
> faculty.

Implication: Over the years, Peirce had described his logics and
the versions designed by other logicians in various ways. He also
explored other versions in his Gamma graphs, 3-valued logic, modal
logics, and metalanguage. But his first-order logic was equivalent
to the core (Alpha + Beta) of existential graphs, and to "classical
first-order logic" today. For the history, see "Peirce the logician"
by Hilary Putnam: http://jfsowa.com/peirce/putnam.htm

When trying to relate different terminologies by Peirce and others,
always ask how or whether they could be mapped to FOL. If they
can't, then ask what extensions or variations would be needed.

ET
> I'm trying to emphasize... that Peircean semiotics is not
> expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic
> application to material life.
>
> My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce
> is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since
> Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the
> vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental
> nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.

I completely agree. But Peirce's logic was constant while his
terminology was changing. Peirce put far more emphasis on mapping
logic to and from perception and action than anyone else. But

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-06 Thread Helmut Raulien

Jon, list,

I agree with Edwina, because to make my ideas clearer, I need to check them with real-life-affairs, such as biosemiotics, and other special sciences like physics. Especially if I want to overcome the somehow ever-present idea of mind-matter-duality, to explain it away by replacing it with mind-monism, would be to reconstruct it with the idea of spatiotemporal scales. E.g. that matter is effete mind, is a time-scale thing, I would say. And therefore it helps very much, I think, to regard biosemiotics, with its different time scales in the evolution of matter/energy, organisms, animals, mammals, humans, and cultural habits. So, only speaking for myself, I get good aha-experiences more likely by switching between cenoscopy and idioscopy (or between pure reason and examples from experience) all the time from the start.

Best,

Helmut

06. September 2018 um 19:31 Uhr
"Jon Alan Schmidt" wrote:

Edwina, John S., List:

As I have said before (more than once), my own purpose in focusing so much on Peirce's concepts and terminology in logic as semeiotic is not for its own sake, but primarily for the purpose of making our ideas clear. This is a necessary and important step before we can properly identify and explicate the resulting "pragmatic applications" in other fields, beginning with Metaphysics and continuing on to the Special Sciences such as biosemiotics. After all, Peirce defined pragmatism as "no attempt to determine any truth of things," but rather "merely a method of ascertaining the meanings of hard words and of abstract concepts" (CP 5.464, EP 2:400; 1907).

Also, as far as I know, no one on the List is advocating "Platonic idealism." Why keep bringing it up?

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA

Professional Engineer, Amateur Philosopher, Lutheran Layman

www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Thu, Sep 6, 2018 at 11:09 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:

John, list

Yes, but I'm trying to emphasize, or perhaps remind ourselves, that Peircean semiotics is not expressed simply in language and/or logic, but in its pragmatic application to material life. That is - there are three 'parts' so to speak; language/logic/pragmatic application.

My concern is that much of the focus of our examination of Peirce is often on terminology, on which term he used for..___. Since Peirce often changed these terms, then, to me, they are not the vital ground of Peircean semiosis and even sidesteps the fundamental nature of Peircean semiotics - which is its pragmaticism.

And an ever-present danger when we confine ourselves to this rhetoric [but not logic] - is that easy slip into Platonic idealism - which actually denies pragmaticism because it separates Mind and Matter.

Edwina

On Thu 06/09/18 11:35 AM , John F Sowa s...@bestweb.net sent:

On 9/6/2018 11:07 AM, Edwina Taborsky wrote:
> I agree with your linking Peirce's semiotic with his logic, but
> my concern is that one can lose the vital nature of Peirce; namely,
> that his logic-as-formal semiotic is a pragmatic system.

I agree with your concerns. I know many logicians who get lost
in the technical details and ignore all the issues about relating
logic to language, thought, and life.

I also admit that it's much easier to write many pages of ordinary
language than to write a few lines of precisely stated mathematics
or mathematical logic. Peirce knew that. But he also knew that
precision required a restatement in terms of some version of logic.

Basic point: It's vastly easier to translate logic to language,
than to translate language to logic. But the exercise of writing
the logic is necessary for precision.

John

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Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Supp.: E.G. in "Catfish tastes well", the term "Catfish" is a rheme (it carries information), because in children´s language "Catfish Hamlet" makes sense, it means "This catfish´s name is "Hamlet"". But in "all men are mortal", "all men Hamlet" does not make sense. Though it might mean "all men are like Hamlet", but that would be suggesting too much wisdom to the child speaking??

Dear Francesco,

That is very interesting and new to me. I had thought, a rheme was a term. In the below quotation from Commens Dictionary "rheme", Peirce writes, that it may be a term, but a term "contains no explicit recognition of its own fragmentary nature" . Now I wonder, does the replacement argument cover a term-as-rheme too? Maybe in children´s language?

1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:308-10

If from a propositional symbol we erase one or more of the parts which separately denote its objects, the remainder is what is called a rhema; but I shall take the liberty of calling it a term. [—] On the whole, it appears to me that the only difference between my rhema and the “term” of other logicians is that the latter contains no explicit recognition of its own fragmentary nature. But this is as much as to say that logically their meaning is the same; and it is for that reason that I venture to use the old, familiar word “term” to denote the rhema.

Best,

Helmut

02. September 2018 um 17:44 Uhr
"Francesco Bellucci"
wrote:

Dear Helmut

an example in which it works: if from the proposition "Every catholic adores some woman", its constituent "Every catholic" is removed, what remains is a rheme, because if we replace "Every catholic" with "John" we obtain "John adores some woman", which is again a proposition. Note that what is removed is not a rheme; the rheme is what remains (or "is extracted") of the proposition after the removal.

Best

Francesco
On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Dear Francesco, list,

For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works?

Best,

Helmut

02. September 2018 um 08:46 Uhr
"Francesco Bellucci"
wrote:

Dear All,

I am new in this list, so I think I should introduce myself. My name is Francesco Bellucci, I am Assitant Professor at the University of Bologna in Italy, and my principal research interest is in Peirce's logic.

Since some of the things which I wrote in my book (Peirce's Speculative Grammar, 2017) have been mentioned in a couple of threads here on Peirce's notion of immediate object, I would like to offer some further thoughts on this matter, in the hope to make some progress in the discussion.

One of the bones of contention is whether or not all signs have immediate objects. I think one argument in favour of the idea that not all signs have immediate objects is the fact – which has drawn little attention – that in the classification of signs of the period 1904–1906 (let's postpone discussion of 1908 for the moment) signs are divided according to their immediate object into vague, singular, and general. Now, the vague/singular/general division is, as Peirce sometimes says (Kaina Stoicheia) and as should be evident to those who know a little bit of the history of logic, a division of propositions according to their quantity: Peirce calls "vague" the proposition which traditionally is called particular (some men is wise), and "general" the proposition which traditionally is called universal (all men are wise). That the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division should suggest that in the phrase "signs divided according to their immediate object into...", we should take "sign" to mean "proposition". I think there has been some good posts in this list by Gary F. arguing that sometimes we should take "sign" to mean "proposition", or "complete sign", or at least that with "sign" we should sometimes mean what Peirce considered the "principal variety of signs", i.e. propositions.

Now, if the vague/singular/general division is a propositional division, then rhemes should not be capable of being divided according to their immediate objects. If the vague/singular/general division were applicable to rhemes, then I think we should conclude that "all men" is a rheme (a "general" rheme). For what does it mean that a trichotomy is applicable to a genus of signs, if not that that genus of signs has species corresponding to the members of that trichotomy? Thus I think that the supporters of the idea that all signs have immediate objects are forced to conclude that "all men" is a rheme.

Aw: Re: Re: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-09-02 Thread Helmut Raulien

Dear Francesco,

1904 [c.] | New Elements (Kaina stoiceia) | EP 2:308-10

Best,

Helmut

02. September 2018 um 17:44 Uhr
"Francesco Bellucci"
wrote:

Dear Helmut

Best

Francesco
On Sun, Sep 2, 2018 at 5:21 PM, Helmut Raulien wrote:

Dear Francesco, list,

For understanding the argument with the replacement by a proper name, can you give an example with a rheme, in which the replacement works?

Best,

Helmut

02. September 2018 um 08:46 Uhr
"Francesco Bellucci"
wrote:

Dear All,

But here is an argument why "all men" cannot be a rheme. Peirce defines a rheme as that which remains of a proposition after something replaceable by a proper name has been removed from it, where "replacebale" means that when the replacement has occurred, we have again a proposition. Thus, if "all men" is a rheme, there must exist a proposition from which it has been extracted by removing something replaceable by a proper name. Let us imagine that "all men" has been extracted from the proposition "all men are mortal" by removing "are mortal". If we replace the removed part with a proper name, like "Hamlet", this does not yield again a

Aw: RE: RE: [PEIRCE-L] Direct experience and immediate object

2018-07-02 Thread Helmut Raulien


Gary, yes, in the future. I will just have to wait when the train stops, because there is no schedule that says whether it has reached the terminal or will go on.

Best, Helmut

 

30. Juni 2018 um 22:47 Uhr
Von: g...@gnusystems.ca
 




Helmut,

Maybe you should finish your train of thought before you post it. That would make it easier for the rest of us to engage in dialogue with you.  

Gary f.

 



From: Helmut Raulien 
Sent: 30-Jun-18 16:07











  



Suppsuppsupp: Sorry, that this is becoming a monologue, this will be the last part of it.



Instead of "imaginary" in the initial post, I think, that "ideational" is better, and it is not limited to the immediate object, which contains only the ideas transported by the sign. The DO too has an ideational part, the ideas in the world outside the sign.



I wrote "really complicated", but maybe too, not:



A function is a kind of relation. Relations are there or not, they dont unfold, they dont take time. But a relation (so a function too) is a being, something ontological, too (John Deely said so). It can arouse another function: A function of a function. This is a time-taking process again, and as a being, the first function is part of the spatiotemporal world. This process has to do with, or is,  information. After all, every being is a function-that-is: Matter, e.g., is effete mind (Peirce), and mind is function or something like that. Instaead of "mattergy-world" I should have written "matter-energy-informedness-world". It includes functions-as-beings, but not functions-as-functioning, the part of theirs which does not exist, but is real. In German "reality" means "Wirklichkeit", which by regarding the word parts would mean (though not in the common use of the word) "effectliness": Not the things, but their effects. All this has very much to do with scopes and scales.





  



Suppsupp: And between spatiotemporal and functional composition. Time is merely a matter of spatiotemporal composition. Functions are instants not taking time, having nothing to do with time. Bridging the gap takes time due to the spatiotemporal side of the gap. It looks like a sign process would take time, but it doesnt. What is taking time is its constant (not continuous) reaffirmation towards or from the mattergy world.



All this gap-talk sounds like dualism, but only because it is crude. To uncrudify and undualize it would make it really complicated.




Supp.: So the epistemic gap, pansemiotically generalized, is the gap between existence (being) and reality, thing and its function, mattergy-world and phaneron.






List,



One way that would make sense to me would be: Determination as a time-taking process is the shaping (indicating by limiting) of an object by a subject. When this process is finished, the sign is there and denotes the object. The subject is a being, and the object is a wordly real (dynamical) and an imaginary real (immediate). Being means that the subject exists, and real means that it functions (as an object). "Object" is the fuction of a subject in a sign, and (functionally) consists of dynamical and immediate object. 



In a function there is no time delay, only in the forming of a function (of reality being shaped or formed by being).



To say that the subject determines the object means that it determines the sign via the object, as the object is a (functional) part of the sign. I guess that Peirce did not sufficiently distinguish between the subject and the dynamical object, or did not explicitly say that the object is not the thing but its function. Or maybe I am completey wrong, but this way makes the most sense to me.



Best,



Helmut



  



















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