Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[kirstima]

John, Jon,

I agree with John on the issue of "every word.."

Opening the pdf by John did not succeed. So a little note on his wording 
in:



JFS; In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is as

open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs.
It's best to distinguish the act of drawing an EG from any use or
speech act, such as assertion.


Shouldn*t the last word be "asserting", thus using the verb, not the 
noun?
This may sound trifle, but I do think it is important to make clear 
whether and when one is talking about an act, or an entitity.


Kirsti

John F Sowa kirjoitti 28.11.2017 22:03:

Jon A and Kirsti,

Jon, replying to JFS

[In] a proof by contradiction... there would be no universe about
which the statements on the paper could be true.


In that case we may say that a sign's set of denoted objects is empty.


Yes, but there are several reasons why Peirce's original discussion
about the Sheet of Assertion is too restrictive.

Jon

By the way, to assert “Every word makes an assertion”
is either word magic, word animism (?), or nominalism...


No.  Every use of signs, especially natural language, can only
be interpreted in context.  The sentence that precedes the in
question states the context:  "This syntax is so simple that
I will describe it." (NEM 3:162)

I didn't quote that sentence because the context was a  comparison
with the Lowell lectures, in which Peirce distinguished "verbs"
that named rhemes (or predicates) from "nouns" that named the kinds
of entities in the universe of discourse.

In 1911, he did not limit the part of speech of the words or phrases
that named rhemes or predicates.  See Peirce's own examples in
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm :

From the first two graphs:  -man, -eats.  Fig 1:  -phoenix.
Fig 3: -thunder, -lightening.   Unlabeled graph:  -is-.
Fig 5: -will die.  Fig 7: -boy, -industrious.
Fig 9: -known for certain, -communication with-.  Fig 10: -deceased.

Kirsti

If there exists a sheet of assertion, for example a blackboard or
a piece of paper, there has to have been some co-operative human
beings to make even the empty ones.


Yes, and those people must have some reason or intention for doing so.
Assertion is just one reason among many.

Peirce discussed the kinds of "speech acts" long before John Austin.
Any of those acts may be performed with EGs:  metalanguage (talking
about an EG); hypothesis (suggesting an EG without claiming it's true);
proof (drawing implications before the conclusion is known); teaching
the syntax and rules for EGs (what Peirce was doing in his lectures)...

In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is as
open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs.
It's best to distinguish the act of drawing an EG from any use or
speech act, such as assertion.

For more examples of contexts in language and logic, see the
slides in http://jfsowa.com/contexts.pdf .

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[kirstima]

John & Jon,

The two paragraphs offered by John to clarify the meaning of the verb 
'to indentify'  did not do the job for me. Quite the contrary.  Many 
questions arose.


JFS:  "In mathematics, it is common practice to "identify" two 
structures that are isomorphic.  Some mathematicians call that practice 
"abuse of notation" and insist on adding some annotations to the marks 
in order to distinguish the references.  But most do not bother to 
clutter their notations with such annotations."


Question:  Which (variety of) notations do you mean?   2 = 2  and  a = a 
?

Both can be read aloud as – equals – ,  OR – is identical with – .

The mark remains the same, but there is change of meaning, depending on 
the (mathematical) context.
With cardinals,  2 = 2 can be taken as equal and identical with  1+1 = 
1+1. With a = a the situation is not that simple.


With ordinals this does not apply.  As was shown by CSP in his cyclical 
arithmetics.


Not only does "how many?" count, "how many times? " counts. (This is a 
joke, mind you).


Positions within multiple cycles begin to mean a lot.

Also zero becomes very interesting, indeed.

When zero was introduced (by arabic influence) to our number system, it 
brought with it not only calculus, but also the arabic numbering system.


Thus 000 = 00 (etc.), but 10  and 100 and 1000 (etc.) make a huge 
difference. (As we all may,  sorely or happily, know by looking at one's 
bank accounts.)  This is not as trivial as it may seem to some.  Neither 
mathematically,  nor logically.


The first zero, the second zero, the third zero … acquire a  different 
meaning by their relative position in the chain of numbers.  Which is 
not trivial, either.


Relational logic is needed.  Which is just as complex ( and perplex) as 
CSP has shown it to be.


I have presented my thoughts as simply as I possibly can, but it does 
not follow that the thoughts are inherently simple.


With ordered chains of numbers (or other kindred marks) the problem of 
reversibility and irreversibility acquire a new acuity.


CPS deals with the problem a lot in Lowell Lectures.

I'll leave my second question on the meaning of identifying to a later 
date.


Best,
Kirsti Määttänen



John F Sowa kirjoitti 2.12.2017 23:06:

On 12/2/2017 2:20 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

Re: Peirce List Discussion • John Sowa

JFS:
   In 1911, Peirce clarified [the] issues by using two distinct terms:
   ‘the universe’ and ‘a sheet of paper’.  The sheet is no longer
   identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
   couldn’t or shouldn’t shade a blank area of a sheet.

There is a difference between being a universe of discourse
and representing a universe of discourse.


On your website, please do not imply that I was confusing being
and representing.

In mathematics, it is common practice to "identify" two structures
that are isomorphic.  Some mathematicians call that practice
"abuse of notation" and insist on adding some annotations to the
marks in order to distinguish the references.  But most do not
bother to clutter their notations with such annotations.

If you are not convinced by mathematical practice, note the first
definition of 'identify' in the Merriam-Webster dictionary:
"1 a: to cause to be or become identical b: to conceive as united
(in spirit, outlook, or principle)."

Request:  Please remove the initials "JFS" from that page on your
website, or please insert the above two paragraphs to clarify the
meaning of the word 'identify'.

John



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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[John F Sowa]

On 12/2/2017 2:20 PM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

Re: Peirce List Discussion • John Sowa

JFS:
   In 1911, Peirce clarified [the] issues by using two distinct terms:
   ‘the universe’ and ‘a sheet of paper’.  The sheet is no longer
   identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
   couldn’t or shouldn’t shade a blank area of a sheet.

There is a difference between being a universe of discourse
and representing a universe of discourse.


On your website, please do not imply that I was confusing being
and representing.

In mathematics, it is common practice to "identify" two structures
that are isomorphic.  Some mathematicians call that practice
"abuse of notation" and insist on adding some annotations to the
marks in order to distinguish the references.  But most do not
bother to clutter their notations with such annotations.

If you are not convinced by mathematical practice, note the first
definition of 'identify' in the Merriam-Webster dictionary:
"1 a: to cause to be or become identical b: to conceive as united
(in spirit, outlook, or principle)."

Request:  Please remove the initials "JFS" from that page on your
website, or please insert the above two paragraphs to clarify the
meaning of the word 'identify'.

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, John,

Thanks for this clarification, Gary, as it was very helpful, perhaps
especially.

Gf: Peirce’s terminology in referring to a graph as a “word” is rather
sloppy, but after all, this is a personal letter from a self-described
“garrulous old man” to a new acquaintance. It is not an explanation of EGs
intended for publication. I’d like to know your reasons for claiming that
this presentation is Peirce’s “preferred” version of EGs.


I too would like to know why John  sees this as the "preferred" version of
EGs (John's made a few comments on this matter, but I'm still not entirely
clear as to the reasons for this preference).

Best,

Gary R


[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Tue, Nov 28, 2017 at 6:07 PM,  wrote:

> John, Gary R,
>
>
>
> See my insertions below …
>
>
>
> Gary f.
>
> -Original Message-
> From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net]
> Sent: 28-Nov-17 15:52
>
> On 11/28/2017 3:07 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
>
> > why he and others think Peirce would have written this as late as 1911
>
> > (unless it is. indeed, simply " sloppy pedagogical rhetoric."
>
>
>
> There was nothing sloppy about Peirce's note or my comment.
>
> Following is the context from my note of 12 noon, Nov. 27:
>
>
>
> > But that is just one of many ways of using logic.  In 1911, [Peirce]
>
> > wrote about "whatever universe" and "the whole sheet":
>
> >> Every word makes an assertion.  Thus ——man means "There is a man"
>
> >> in whatever universe the whole sheet refers to.
>
>
>
> Gf: Peirce’s example, “*—*man”, is also part of the context; and shows
> that “every word” means, in the syntax of EGs, every graph composed of a
> line of identity connected to the “peg” or “hook” of a “spot” or rheme. It
> could be argued that Peirce’s terminology in referring to a graph as a
> “word” is rather sloppy, but after all, this is a personal letter from a
> self-described “garrulous old man” to a new acquaintance. It is not an
> explanation of EGs intended for publication. I’d like to know your reasons
> for claiming that this presentation is Peirce’s “preferred” version of EGs.
>
>
>
> And note my response to Jon at 3:03 pm, Nov. 28:
>
>
>
> >> [Jon A] By the way, to assert “Every word makes an assertion”
>
> >> is either word magic, word animism (?), or nominalism...
>
> >
>
> > No.  Every use of signs, especially natural language, can only be
>
> > interpreted in context.  The sentence that precedes the one in
>
> > question states the context:  "This syntax is so simple that I will
>
> > describe it." (NEM 3:162)
>
> >
>
> > I didn't quote that sentence because the context was a comparison with
>
> > the Lowell lectures, in which Peirce distinguished "verbs"
>
> > that named rhemes (or predicates) from "nouns" that named the kinds of
>
> > entities in the universe of discourse.
>
>
>
> Gf: No, Peirce only made this distinction in the *Cambridge Lectures of
> 1898*, from which I included a couple of excerpts in one of my comments.
> As I also posted, the main distinction in this part of Lowell 2 is between
> general terms and signs that refer to individuals, such as proper nouns,
> demonstrative pronoouns and “marked points” such as the ends of lines of
> identity.
>
>
>
> John
>
>
> -
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>
>
>
>
>
>

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RE: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[gnox]

John, Gary R,

 

See my insertions below …

 

Gary f.

-Original Message-
From: John F Sowa [mailto:s...@bestweb.net] 
Sent: 28-Nov-17 15:52



On 11/28/2017 3:07 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:

> why he and others think Peirce would have written this as late as 1911 

> (unless it is. indeed, simply " sloppy pedagogical rhetoric."

 

There was nothing sloppy about Peirce's note or my comment.

Following is the context from my note of 12 noon, Nov. 27:

 

> But that is just one of many ways of using logic.  In 1911, [Peirce] 

> wrote about "whatever universe" and "the whole sheet":

>> Every word makes an assertion.  Thus ——man means "There is a man"

>> in whatever universe the whole sheet refers to.

 

Gf: Peirce’s example, “—man”, is also part of the context; and shows that 
“every word” means, in the syntax of EGs, every graph composed of a line of 
identity connected to the “peg” or “hook” of a “spot” or rheme. It could be 
argued that Peirce’s terminology in referring to a graph as a “word” is rather 
sloppy, but after all, this is a personal letter from a self-described 
“garrulous old man” to a new acquaintance. It is not an explanation of EGs 
intended for publication. I’d like to know your reasons for claiming that this 
presentation is Peirce’s “preferred” version of EGs.

 

And note my response to Jon at 3:03 pm, Nov. 28:

 

>> [Jon A] By the way, to assert “Every word makes an assertion”

>> is either word magic, word animism (?), or nominalism...

> 

> No.  Every use of signs, especially natural language, can only be 

> interpreted in context.  The sentence that precedes the one in 

> question states the context:  "This syntax is so simple that I will 

> describe it." (NEM 3:162)

> 

> I didn't quote that sentence because the context was a comparison with 

> the Lowell lectures, in which Peirce distinguished "verbs"

> that named rhemes (or predicates) from "nouns" that named the kinds of 

> entities in the universe of discourse.

 

Gf: No, Peirce only made this distinction in the Cambridge Lectures of 1898, 
from which I included a couple of excerpts in one of my comments. As I also 
posted, the main distinction in this part of Lowell 2 is between general terms 
and signs that refer to individuals, such as proper nouns, demonstrative 
pronoouns and “marked points” such as the ends of lines of identity.

 

John


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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[John F Sowa]

On 11/28/2017 3:07 PM, Gary Richmond wrote:
why he and others think Peirce would have written this as late as 1911 
(unless it is. indeed, simply " sloppy pedagogical rhetoric."


There was nothing sloppy about Peirce's note or my comment.
Following is the context from my note of 12 noon, Nov. 27:


But that is just one of many ways of using logic.  In 1911,
[Peirce] wrote about "whatever universe" and "the whole sheet":

Every word makes an assertion.  Thus ——man means "There is a man"
in whatever universe the whole sheet refers to.


And note my response to Jon at 3:03 pm, Nov. 28:


[Jon A] By the way, to assert “Every word makes an assertion”
is either word magic, word animism (?), or nominalism...


No.  Every use of signs, especially natural language, can only
be interpreted in context.  The sentence that precedes the one
in question states the context:  "This syntax is so simple that
I will describe it." (NEM 3:162)

I didn't quote that sentence because the context was a comparison
with the Lowell lectures, in which Peirce distinguished "verbs"
that named rhemes (or predicates) from "nouns" that named the kinds
of entities in the universe of discourse. 


John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[Gary Richmond]

Jon A, John, Kirsti, list,

Jon A wrote:

By the way, to assert “Every word makes an assertion”
is either word magic, word animism (?), or nomimalism,
the very ilk of ills that Peirce's theory of signs is
prescribed to cure us against.  In Peirce's case I'll
chalk it up to simple sloppy pedagogical rhetoric.


I would tend to agree that it is not so "that every word [or rheme] makes
an assertion" *except*, *perhaps*, in the very limited technical sense in
which Peirce gives "  ——man means "There is a man" as an example.

Yet Peirce can rarely, at least in my experience, be accused of "sloppy
pedagogical rhetoric." So I'd be very interested in why John singled out
this comment, and why he and others think Peirce would have written this as
late as 1911 (unless it is. indeed, simply " sloppy pedagogical rhetoric."

Best,

Gary R



[image: Gary Richmond]

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
*718 482-5690*

On Mon, Nov 27, 2017 at 4:00 PM, Jon Awbrey  wrote:

> John, List ...
>
> JFS:
>
>> This is less restrictive than the definition in the Lowell lectures.
>> For example, it would allow a logician to use a sheet of paper to
>> write a proof by contradiction.  In that case, there would be no
>> universe about which the statements on the paper could be true.
>>
>
> In that case we may say that a sign's set of denoted objects is empty.
> I think this tactic probably goes back to my earliest algebra courses,
> where our teachers cautioned us to remember that the “solution set”
> of a formula could be the empty set.  By apt analogy, then, we may
> well call “a sign's set of denoted objects” its “denotation set”.
> Of course an empty set is a subset of every set, but nothing
> about this requires the universe of discourse to be empty,
> much less not to exist.
>
> By the way, to assert “Every word makes an assertion”
> is either word magic, word animism (?), or nomimalism,
> the very ilk of ills that Peirce's theory of signs is
> prescribed to cure us against.  In Peirce's case I'll
> chalk it up to simple sloppy pedagogical rhetoric.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon
>
>
>
> On 11/27/2017 12:00 PM, John F Sowa wrote:
>
>> On 11/27/2017 10:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:
>>
>>> JFS:
>>>
 In 1911, Peirce clarified the issues by using two distinct terms:
 'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'.  The sheet is no longer
 identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
 couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet.

>>>
>>> There is a difference between *being* a universe of discourse
>>> and *representing* a universe of discourse...
>>>
>>
>> I agree.
>>
>> In the Lowell lectures, Peirce defined the Sheet of Assertion
>> as the representation of a universe that was constructed during
>> a discourse between Graphist and Grapheus.
>>
>> But that is just one of many ways of using logic.  In 1911,
>> he wrote about "whatever universe" and "the whole sheet":
>>
>>> Every word makes an assertion.  Thus ——man means
>>> "There is a man" in whatever universe the whole sheet refers to.
>>>
>>
>> This is less restrictive than the definition in the Lowell lectures.
>> For example, it would allow a logician to use a sheet of paper to
>> write a proof by contradiction.  In that case, there would be no
>> universe about which the statements on the paper could be true.
>>
>> John
>>
>>
> --
>
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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[John F Sowa]

Jon A and Kirsti,

Jon, replying to JFS

[In] a proof by contradiction... there would be no universe about
which the statements on the paper could be true.


In that case we may say that a sign's set of denoted objects is empty.


Yes, but there are several reasons why Peirce's original discussion
about the Sheet of Assertion is too restrictive.

Jon

By the way, to assert “Every word makes an assertion”
is either word magic, word animism (?), or nominalism...


No.  Every use of signs, especially natural language, can only
be interpreted in context.  The sentence that precedes the in
question states the context:  "This syntax is so simple that
I will describe it." (NEM 3:162)

I didn't quote that sentence because the context was a  comparison
with the Lowell lectures, in which Peirce distinguished "verbs"
that named rhemes (or predicates) from "nouns" that named the kinds
of entities in the universe of discourse.

In 1911, he did not limit the part of speech of the words or phrases
that named rhemes or predicates.  See Peirce's own examples in
http://jfsowa.com/peirce/ms514.htm :

From the first two graphs:  -man, -eats.  Fig 1:  -phoenix.
Fig 3: -thunder, -lightening.   Unlabeled graph:  -is-.
Fig 5: -will die.  Fig 7: -boy, -industrious.
Fig 9: -known for certain, -communication with-.  Fig 10: -deceased.

Kirsti

If there exists a sheet of assertion, for example a blackboard or
a piece of paper, there has to have been some co-operative human
beings to make even the empty ones.


Yes, and those people must have some reason or intention for doing so.
Assertion is just one reason among many.

Peirce discussed the kinds of "speech acts" long before John Austin.
Any of those acts may be performed with EGs:  metalanguage (talking
about an EG); hypothesis (suggesting an EG without claiming it's true);
proof (drawing implications before the conclusion is known); teaching
the syntax and rules for EGs (what Peirce was doing in his lectures)...

In summary, the range of contexts for writing or using EGs is as
open ended as the contexts for using any other kinds of signs.
It's best to distinguish the act of drawing an EG from any use or
speech act, such as assertion.

For more examples of contexts in language and logic, see the
slides in http://jfsowa.com/contexts.pdf .

John

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Re: [PEIRCE-L] Re: Lowell Lecture 2.13 and 2.14

[kirstima]

John, Jon, list,

Thank you for a most interesting discussion.

Not being so keen on set theory, or the utterly simple assertions formal 
logic has so far dealt with, I would like to draw your attention to 
these assertion of mine:


If there exists a sheet of assertion, for example a blackboard or a 
piece of paper, there has to have been some co-operative human beings to 
make even the empty ones.


If there exists any assertion stated on it, there has to have been a 
human individual to draw/write (etc) it.


As you can see, I have taken time into the timelessly considered issue 
of empty sets.


Thus, empty sheets may exist, but they can only become real (have any 
effect) if and only if some community (of whatever kind) not only 
exists, but has become real.


How about these? Comments?

These present some outcomes from taking BOTH formulations of the 
Pragmatic Maxim simultanously seriously. Which they usually are not. 
People tend to take sides at the outset.


I have made wonders with modulations of Aristotelian syllogisms on this 
basis. With the help of two new concepts, experiential time and 
experiential meaning. Which have been exploited, but not funded.


Which kind of reminds me of someone else... Who on earth could it be...

With kind regards,

Kirsti






John F Sowa kirjoitti 27.11.2017 19:00:

On 11/27/2017 10:30 AM, Jon Awbrey wrote:

JFS:

In 1911, Peirce clarified the issues by using two distinct terms:
'the universe' and 'a sheet of paper'.  The sheet is no longer
identified with the universe, and there is no reason why one
couldn't or shouldn't shade a blank area of a sheet.


There is a difference between *being* a universe of discourse
and *representing* a universe of discourse...


I agree.

In the Lowell lectures, Peirce defined the Sheet of Assertion
as the representation of a universe that was constructed during
a discourse between Graphist and Grapheus.

But that is just one of many ways of using logic.  In 1911,
he wrote about "whatever universe" and "the whole sheet":

Every word makes an assertion.  Thus ——man means "There is a man"
in whatever universe the whole sheet refers to.


This is less restrictive than the definition in the Lowell lectures.
For example, it would allow a logician to use a sheet of paper to
write a proof by contradiction.  In that case, there would be no
universe about which the statements on the paper could be true.

John



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