Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

You quoted a snippet from my previous email and responded:


GR: Your view would seem to imply that there is only one possible universe
for all time and in all space.


JAS: How so? I simply noted that the Big Bang theory is based on the
assumption that the physical laws of *our *actual universe have been
unchanging for billions of years, while Peirce insists that they must be
results of ongoing evolution. He explicitly denies that the creation of
*our *actual universe occurred in 4,004 BC or at any other assignable
date--i.e., in the *finite *past--maintaining instead that it has been
going on for an infinite time and is still in progress today.


This is a bit confusing to me. Not so much Peirce's view, but the one that
comes from my reflection on the Blackboard example as interpreted and
developed by you. As I recall (unfortunately I haven't time to reread your
paper since Thanksgiving preparations have begun in earnest) in your view
God scribes on something 'deeper, more 'ur-' even than Peirce's Blackboard.
Doesn't your Whiteboard expansion of the Blackboard example have God
scribing a *particular* universe with some particular characteristics out
of all the Platonic possibilities; so, for prime example, our universe? If
our universe has no beginning, then what is the purpose and meaning of God
scribing some particular potential Platonic ideas which will constitute
characters of *this* universe?

As for scientists' views of whether physical laws are immutable -- likely
the opinion of most every 19th and 20th century physicist -- today that may
be changing. Take, for example this article (one of several I quickly
found):

New findings suggest laws of nature not as constant as previously thought
(ScienceDaily)
Date:
April 27, 2020
Source:
University of New South Wales
Summary:
Not only does a universal constant seem annoyingly inconstant at the outer
fringes of the cosmos, it occurs in only one direction, which is downright
weird.
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2020/04/200427102544.htm


GR: "Semiosis. . . had no beginning and will have no end." Are you saying
that this is Peirce's view? I don't see strong support for this notion when
one considers the possibility of multi-universes.


JAS: I am saying that Peirce's view is that mind is primordial within
*our* actual universe,
which has no definite beginning or end. Accordingly, how could semiosis
have a definite beginning or end? Again, I do not see the relevance here of
"the possibility of multi-universes," because *our *time and space belong
only to *our *universe, which in Peirce's cosmology is a discontinuous mark
on the continuum of higher dimensionality that encompasses all true and
real possibilities.


I know that Peirce's view is that mind -- and not matter -- is primordial,
and definitely share that view, as do you, of course. But for me if this
universe is represented as (". . .  a discontinuous mark on the continuum
of higher dimensionality," that 'discontinuous mark' would seem to me at
least a preparatory 'phase' (so to speak since before time is) towards the
creation of our universe. And any other possible universe could also be
represented as a 'discontinuous mark'.

Now I thought your Whiteboard expansion of Peirce's Blackboard example was,
at least in part, meant to suggest that other universes were possible out
of the infinite number of Platonic characters which could be 'chosen', as
it were, by the Inscriber. Are all these possible universes -- were they to
be created -- also quasi-necessarily without beginning and end in your
view? Or is this a requirement of only ours? Or do multi-universe theories
seem to you far-fetched, something better suited to expositions in science
fiction literature and media? In addition, whether it concerns only ours or
other possible universes, how is that which has no beginning *created*?
After all, even if matter is a degenerated form of material, there is
certainly a heck of a lot of matter in the cosmos. Finally, what of
Peirce's view that this universe at least will at last deaden into
cold material
wholly lacking life and spirit?

GR: 'Mind' here must connote something quite different from God's Mind.


JAS: I have not said anything so far about *God's *mind. I have been
discussing only our *created *universe in which, according to Peirce, mind
and psychical laws are primordial, while matter and physical laws are
derived and special. I seem to recall that you view the blackboard in his
cosmological diagram ("ur-continuity") as representing the very mind of
God, but I understand it as instead representing *created *3ns, with God as
the one who makes it and draws the chalk marks on it.


I cannot myself think deeply about Peirce's cosmology without thinking of
God. Insofar as I think our -- or any other possible -- universe is
*created*, and that any given created universe *will* manifest a form of
cosmological time, it would seem that I am not in agreement with Peirce nor
you 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

GR: Your view would seem to imply that there is only one possible universe
for all time and in all space.


How so? I simply noted that the Big Bang theory is based on the assumption
that the physical laws of *our *actual universe have been unchanging for
billions of years, while Peirce insists that they must be results of
ongoing evolution. He explicitly denies that the creation of *our *actual
universe occurred in 4,004 BC or at any other assignable date--i.e.,
in the *finite
*past--maintaining instead that it has been going on for an infinite time
and is still in progress today.

GR: "Semiosis. . . had no beginning and will have no end." Are you saying
that this is Peirce's view? I don't see strong support for this notion when
one considers the possibility of multi-universes.


I am saying that Peirce's view is that mind is primordial within *our*
actual universe, which has no definite beginning or end. Accordingly, how
could semiosis have a definite beginning or end? Again, I do not see the
relevance here of "the possibility of multi-universes," because *our *time
and space belong only to *our *universe, which in Peirce's cosmology is a
discontinuous mark on the continuum of higher dimensionality that
encompasses all true and real possibilities.

GR: 'Mind' here must connote something quite different than God's Mind.


I have not said anything so far about *God's *mind. I have been discussing
only our *created *universe in which, according to Peirce, mind and
psychical laws are primordial, while matter and physical laws are derived
and special. I seem to recall that you view the blackboard in his
cosmological diagram ("ur-continuity") as representing the very mind of
God, but I understand it as instead representing *created *3ns, with God as
the one who makes it and draws the chalk marks on it.

GR: Again, I have suggested that a better subtitle might be "How Mind
Emerged from *constraints *on Matter," by which I mean that the mind in the
cosmos -- *not *God's mind-- but the kind of mind we call 'conscious' mind,
for example, is *not *given primordially, but evolves in the sense that the
whole cosmos is evolving.


I am having a hard time reconciling this suggestion with Peirce's objective
idealism, in which "the mind in the cosmos" *is *primordial and matter
comes about only as a peculiar sort of mind. Are you perhaps referring to
the origin of *individual *embodied minds as distinguished from mind *in
general*, which "is not necessarily connected with a brain" but "appears in
the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"?

GR: Deacon's theory, at least at face value, may seem to be a kind of
"materialist doctrine;" but I see no reason to suppose that his scientific
insights "suppose that a certain kind of *mechanism *will feel." Rather a
certain kind of *organism *will feel.


I take Peirce's point to be that if the physical law is primordial and the
psychical law is derived and special, then dead matter must somehow feel as
a brute fact--"an ultimate, inexplicable regularity"--in order for a living
organism ever to develop from it. That is why he considers materialism to
be "quite as repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense" and rejects
it accordingly, despite acknowledging that there is much to be said for it.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Tue, Nov 23, 2021 at 1:11 AM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Jon, List,
>
> JAS: It seems clear to me that Champagne wrote his article "from a more
> general and abstract semeiotic perspective," which is why I have sought to
> address it accordingly. However, I have also commented on some of its
> cosmological implications and will do so again now.
>
>
> GR: I agree "that Champagne wrote his article "from a more general and
> abstract semeiotic perspective," while I see no reason to limit my
> thinking about it to that "more general and abstract semeiotic
> perspective." and I am certainly relieved that you do not as well as you
> are also reflecting "on some of its cosmological implications." In truth, I
> actually find Champagne's view to be in some ways problematic in the
> extreme.
>
> JAS: As I have said before, I see no place for any *definite *beginning
> of the universe in Peirce's cosmology, including the Big Bang.
>
>
> GR: I disagree. Your view would seem to imply that there is only one
> possible universe for all time and in all space. Peirce's cosmological
> lectures of 1898 seem to me to allow for any number of possible universes,
> that is, so many ways for universes with characters far different from
> our own to be born out of the infinite Platonic qualities Peirce
> adumbrated. Why limit God's power to create to a single universe?
>
> JAS: In that sense, [Peirce] maintains that semiosis likewise had no
> beginning and will have no end, while 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

JAS: It seems clear to me that Champagne wrote his article "from a more
general and abstract semeiotic perspective," which is why I have sought to
address it accordingly. However, I have also commented on some of its
cosmological implications and will do so again now.


GR: I agree "that Champagne wrote his article "from a more general and
abstract semeiotic perspective," while I see no reason to limit my thinking
about it to that "more general and abstract semeiotic perspective." and I
am certainly relieved that you do not as well as you are also reflecting
"on some of its cosmological implications." In truth, I actually find
Champagne's view to be in some ways problematic in the extreme.

JAS: As I have said before, I see no place for any *definite *beginning of
the universe in Peirce's cosmology, including the Big Bang.


GR: I disagree. Your view would seem to imply that there is only one
possible universe for all time and in all space. Peirce's cosmological
lectures of 1898 seem to me to allow for any number of possible universes,
that is, so many ways for universes with characters far different from
our own to be born out of the infinite Platonic qualities Peirce
adumbrated. Why limit God's power to create to a single universe?

JAS: In that sense, [Peirce] maintains that semiosis likewise had no
beginning and will have no end, while *physico*semiosis came about with the
very first instance when primordial mind became specialized and partially
deadened as matter.

GR: "Semiosis. . . had no beginning and will have no end.  ." Are you
saying that this is Peirce's view? I don't see strong support for this
notion  when one considers the possibility of multi-universes. And
while "primordial
mind became specialized and partially deadened as matter" is certainly true
in one sense, it can't be so in, for example, another strictly theistic
sense (God's 'mind' "partially deadened as matter"? --that makes no sense).
Mind' here must connote something quite different than God's Mind.

So, a question: what do we (including Peirce) mean when we refer to
"primordial mind"? From a theological standpoint, is that 'mind' created or
uncreated?

You quoted me as writing: "Several Peircean concepts are involved in
Deacon's theory of the emergence of life and mind," and commented:
JAS: That might be so, but again, [Deacon's] book's subtitle is *How Mind
Emerged from Matter.*

GR: Again, I have suggested that a better subtitle might be "How Mind
Emerged from *constraints* on Matter," by which I mean that the mind in the
cosmos -- *not* God's mind-- but the kind of mind we call 'conscious' mind,
for example, is *not* given primordially, but evolves in the sense that the
whole cosmos is evolving. 'Constraints', in this sense, result in habits,
result in evolutionary development.

JAS (quoting Peirce): "The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as
repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to
suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a
hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason. . ."

GR: Deacon's theory, at least at face value, may seem to be a kind of
"materialist doctrine;" but I see no reason to suppose that his scientific
insights "suppose that a certain kind of *mechanism* will feel." Rather a
certain kind of *organism* will feel. (I don't claim that this is *strictly*
Deacon's view, but it is in my view possible to argue it based in part on
certain of his insights; but Deacon himself is a materialist.)

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 10:06 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> GR: I have been reflecting on Champagne's article critically from a
> cosmological standpoint, perhaps especially that of the early cosmos, while
> you seem to have been looking at it from a more general and abstract
> semeiotic perspective.
>
>
> It seems clear to me that Champagne wrote his article "from a more general
> and abstract semeiotic perspective," which is why I have sought to address
> it accordingly. However, I have also commented on some of its cosmological
> implications and will do so again now.
>
> GR: If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which
> I, for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
> appear*? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
> singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
> formed?
>
>
> As I have said before, I see no place for any *definite *beginning of the
> universe in Peirce's cosmology, including the Big Bang. That particular
> theory is based on the assumption that the physical laws of the universe as
> we observe and understand them to be operating today have been unchanging
> 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

GR: I have been reflecting on Champagne's article critically from a
cosmological standpoint, perhaps especially that of the early cosmos, while
you seem to have been looking at it from a more general and abstract
semeiotic perspective.


It seems clear to me that Champagne wrote his article "from a more general
and abstract semeiotic perspective," which is why I have sought to address
it accordingly. However, I have also commented on some of its cosmological
implications and will do so again now.

GR: If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which
I, for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
appear*? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
formed?


As I have said before, I see no place for any *definite *beginning of the
universe in Peirce's cosmology, including the Big Bang. That particular
theory is based on the assumption that the physical laws of the universe as
we observe and understand them to be operating today have been unchanging
for all those alleged billions of years, whereas he was quite adamant that
they must be products of an evolutionary process that extends from the
infinite past through any assignable date to the infinite future. In that
sense, he maintains that semiosis likewise had no beginning and will have
no end, while *physico*semiosis came about with the very first instance
when primordial mind became specialized and partially deadened as matter.

GR: Several Peircean concepts are involved in Deacon's theory of the
emergence of life and mind.


That might be so, but again, his book's subtitle is *How Mind Emerged from
Matter*; and Peirce writes, "If mind is nothing but a highly complicated
arrangement of matter,--for which theory there is much to be said,--we are
landed in *materialism*, and nominalism is not much in error after all" (R
936:3, no date). Moreover, "The materialistic doctrine seems to me quite as
repugnant to scientific logic as to common sense; since it requires us to
suppose that a certain kind of mechanism will feel, which would be a
hypothesis absolutely irreducible to reason--an ultimate, inexplicable
regularity; while the only possible justification of any theory is that it
should make things clear and reasonable" (CP 6.24, EP 1:292, 1891).

Accordingly, Peirce takes exactly the opposite approach. "But if, on the
other hand, matter is nothing but effete mind,--mind so completely under
the domination of habit as to act with almost perfect regularity & to have
lost its powers of forgetting & of learning, then we are brought to the
more elevating theory of *idealism*" (R 936:3). "The one intelligible
theory of the universe is that of objective idealism, that matter is effete
mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.25, EP 1:293).

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 6:41 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gary F, Jon, Helmut, List,
>
> GF: "Perhaps Peirce’s cosmological theory implies a more inclusive
> definition of “life,” but I don’t think that justifies reducing an
> “interpretant” to one end of a dydadic relation, no matter how long the
> chain of efficient causations that precede it in time."
>
>
> GR: I, perhaps more strongly than you, support the notion that "Peirce’s
> cosmological theory implies a more inclusive definition of “life"." And
> at the moment I tend to strongly agree with you that, yet, that doesn't 
> "justif[y]
> reducing an “interpretant” to one end of a dyadic relation."
>
> I've also been thinking that it's possible that at least you and I, Jon,
> have been talking at cross purposes. I have been reflecting on
> Champagne's article critically from a cosmological standpoint, perhaps
> especially that of the early cosmos, while you seem to  have been looking
> at it from a more general and abstract semeiotic perspective.
>
> If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which I,
> for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
> appea*r? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
> singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
> formed? Or did it only first appear on some planet, such as our Earth, and
> as a necessary precursor to biosemiotics?
>
> Teerence Deacon remarks in the section of his book, *Incomplete Nature*,
> titled "Abiogenesis", that "the study of the origin of life has a
> paradoxical status compared to the rest of biology" (430).
>
> For to accept unconditionally the maxim, 'only life begets life'.  leads
> to a paradox: "Either life has been around forever in a universe without
> beginning, or else it originates from some other non-physical reality. . ."
> (431-32). [I should immediately note that Deacon is not a 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary F., List:

GF: Jon, you’ve obviously thought this through very carefully, but your
final paragraph is too much of a stretch for me.


I am not surprised, and some pushback is understandable, even welcome. It
comes down to whether one explains the intelligibility of the universe by
taking it to be (a) composed exclusively of signs or (b) merely perfused
with signs, either of which can be reasonably supported from Peirce's
writings and other considerations. I am trying to sort out the implications
of the stronger hypothesis, and to ascertain whether and how well I can
defend it.

GF: There are dyadic relations between A and B, and between B and C, but
there is no *triadic *relation between the three of them, not even a
degenerate one; there is only a chain of efficiently caused events.


On the contrary, a *degenerate *triadic relation is one that is reducible
to its constituent dyadic relations, and *any *sequential pair of
efficiently caused events involving exactly three correlates fits this
definition. I readily acknowledge that treating such a phenomenon as an
instance of physicosemiosis is not terribly insightful for studying it
within the special sciences. For me, its significance is instead
metaphysical, specifically cosmological--the idea being that triadic
semiosis alone is primordial, dyadic action is derived and special.

GF: For instance, a football is abiotic: if you kick it will be passively
moved, but it will not *respond *actively to a kick as a dog, being biotic,
probably would.


Does Peirce ever require an interpretant to be an *active *response to the
sign? As far as I know, he always describes the sign as the agent and the
interpretant as the patient within their dyadic relation; and likewise, he
always describes the object as the agent and the sign as the patient within
their dyadic relation. The object determines the sign, and the sign
determines the interpretant, but the key to a *genuine *triadic relation is
that it is *not *reducible to these two dyadic relations.

In other words, for *genuine *semiosis it is *not *sufficient that there is
a dynamical object that determines a *token *to determine a *dynamical
*interpretant--there
must be a *type *to which the token conforms, and the sign that it thus
embodies must be in a genuine triadic relation with its dynamical object
and its *final *interpretant. That leads me to suspect that another
distinguishing feature of (degenerate) physicosemiosis is its *lack *of a
final interpretant, since it is entirely a matter of efficient causation
rather than involving final causation.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 3:49 PM  wrote:

> Jon, you’ve obviously thought this through very carefully, but your final
> paragraph is too much of a stretch for me.
>
>
>
> JAS: … my own current view is that "purely material interactions" are
> *degenerate* triadic relations, reducible to their constituent *dyadic 
> *relations
> … Accordingly, a series of strictly physical events can be understood as a
> dynamical object determining a sign token to determine a dynamical
> interpretant.
>
>
>
> GF: Let’s take a moving billiard ball A, which collides with billiard ball
> B, efficiently causing it to collide with billard ball C, efficiently
> causing it to move in a particular direction. The movement of C is
> *dynamical*, all right, but it is not really an *interpretant *simply
> because some intelligent being chooses to call it so. There are dyadic
> relations between A and B, and between B and C, but there is no *triadic*
> relation between the three of them, not even a degenerate one; there is
> only a chain of efficiently caused events. There is no object-interpretant
> relation between A and C that is *in any way* different from the relation
> between B and C or the relation between A and B. A sequence of events has a
> temporal order, but that’s not sufficient to create a triadic sign
> relation, in my view.
>
>
>
> I think you’ve also glossed over a crucial difference between biotic and
> abiotic entities. For instance, a football is abiotic: if you kick it will
> be passively moved, but it will not *respond* actively to a kick as a
> dog, being biotic, probably would. Living embodied beings, even the
> simplest, are complex adaptive systems which *respond* to contacts with
> their environments, and semiosically respond to signs in such a way that
> their interpretant responses are triadically related to the signs *and
> their objects*. The cells of our immune systems respond to other
> microscopic entities by distinguishing between those that belong to the
> body-system and those that don’t, and attacking the latter kind. The attack
> is certainly an interpretant, in my view. I don’t see that you’ve given any
> examples of abiotic entities doing anything comparable to that.
>
>
>

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

List, This just published study may have some bearing on the topic of this
thread. GR

*ScienceAlert* summarizes a new cosmological theory:
Our Universe Is Finely Tuned For Life, And There's an Explanation For Why
That Is So

https://www.sciencealert.com/we-could-have-a-new-way-to-explain-why-our-universe-is-as-finely-tuned-for-life-as-it-is

Excerpt:

This latest suggestion mashes together the idea of unknown physics behind
the Higgs boson's shockingly itty-bitty mass with a kind of quantum
multiverse effect, one that this time could feasibly be tested.

Their model puts the Higgs particle at the center of the fine-tuning
explanation. By coupling the boson with other particles in such a way that
its low mass would effectively 'trigger' events in physics we observe, it
provides a link between forces and mass.

From there, the authors show how weakly interacting variables in a field
might affect different kinds of empty space, specifically patches of
nothingness with varying degrees of expansion. This potentially
demonstrates the link between Higgs bosons
 and the cosmological
constant.

It's a multiverse in a way, given the triggers occurring in different
patches of infinite expanding space could plausibly give rise to a
seemingly well balanced Universe like ours.

Their math suggests these triggers would be limited to a few possibilities,
and even has room for explanations of dark matter
. Better still, it also predicts
the existence of multiple Higgs particles of varying masses, all smaller
than the one we've already observed. That gives the hypothesis something
that can be tested, at least.

The study is published in *Physical Review *as:
Weak scale as a triggerNima Arkani-Hamed, Raffaele Tito D’Agnolo, and Hyung
Do KimPhys. Rev. D 104, 095014 – Published 15 November 2021
https://journals.aps.org/prd/abstract/10.1103/PhysRevD.104.095014

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 7:40 PM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> Gary F, Jon, Helmut, List,
>
> GF: "Perhaps Peirce’s cosmological theory implies a more inclusive
> definition of “life,” but I don’t think that justifies reducing an
> “interpretant” to one end of a dydadic relation, no matter how long the
> chain of efficient causations that precede it in time."
>
>
> GR: I, perhaps more strongly than you, support the notion that "Peirce’s
> cosmological theory implies a more inclusive definition of “life"." And
> at the moment I tend to strongly agree with you that, yet, that doesn't 
> "justif[y]
> reducing an “interpretant” to one end of a dyadic relation."
>
> I've also been thinking that it's possible that at least you and I, Jon,
> have been talking at cross purposes. I have been reflecting on
> Champagne's article critically from a cosmological standpoint, perhaps
> especially that of the early cosmos, while you seem to  have been looking
> at it from a more general and abstract semeiotic perspective.
>
> If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which I,
> for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
> appea*r? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
> singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
> formed? Or did it only first appear on some planet, such as our Earth, and
> as a necessary precursor to biosemiotics?
>
> Teerence Deacon remarks in the section of his book, *Incomplete Nature*,
> titled "Abiogenesis", that "the study of the origin of life has a
> paradoxical status compared to the rest of biology" (430).
>
> For to accept unconditionally the maxim, 'only life begets life'.  leads
> to a paradox: "Either life has been around forever in a universe without
> beginning, or else it originates from some other non-physical reality. . ."
> (431-32). [I should immediately note that Deacon is not a theist and has
> little to say about spiritual views of the origins of life, for example, a
> word or two on *elan vital.* In short he rejects the notion that life
> "originates from some other non-physical reality."]
>
> It is not possible to summarize Deacon's own teleodynamic theory of the
> origins of life and mind in a short message or, perhaps, at all. The
> exposition of that theory takes nearly 600 pages involving some new
> technical vocabulary (essential to his theory), and some argumentation
> which is *necessarily*, in my view, involved and complex. Gary, you no
> doubt recall our attempt to get a discussion of *Incomplete Nature* going
> on the LIst a few years back. After a very few weeks I think we both had
> the feeling that few here 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Gary F, Jon, Helmut, List,

GF: "Perhaps Peirce’s cosmological theory implies a more inclusive
definition of “life,” but I don’t think that justifies reducing an
“interpretant” to one end of a dydadic relation, no matter how long the
chain of efficient causations that precede it in time."


GR: I, perhaps more strongly than you, support the notion that "Peirce’s
cosmological theory implies a more inclusive definition of “life"." And at
the moment I tend to strongly agree with you that, yet, that doesn't "justif[y]
reducing an “interpretant” to one end of a dyadic relation."

I've also been thinking that it's possible that at least you and I, Jon,
have been talking at cross purposes. I have been reflecting on Champagne's
article critically from a cosmological standpoint, perhaps especially that
of the early cosmos, while you seem to  have been looking at it from a more
general and abstract semeiotic perspective.

If for argument's sake we assume the reality of physiosemiosis (which I,
for one, do), then for me one important question is *when did it first
appea*r? At the Big Bang, or perhaps some nanoseconds following that
singularity; or maybe billions of years later when galaxies and stars
formed? Or did it only first appear on some planet, such as our Earth, and
as a necessary precursor to biosemiotics?

Teerence Deacon remarks in the section of his book, *Incomplete Nature*,
titled "Abiogenesis", that "the study of the origin of life has a
paradoxical status compared to the rest of biology" (430).

For to accept unconditionally the maxim, 'only life begets life'.  leads to
a paradox: "Either life has been around forever in a universe without
beginning, or else it originates from some other non-physical reality. . ."
(431-32). [I should immediately note that Deacon is not a theist and has
little to say about spiritual views of the origins of life, for example, a
word or two on *elan vital.* In short he rejects the notion that life
"originates from some other non-physical reality."]

It is not possible to summarize Deacon's own teleodynamic theory of the
origins of life and mind in a short message or, perhaps, at all. The
exposition of that theory takes nearly 600 pages involving some new
technical vocabulary (essential to his theory), and some argumentation
which is *necessarily*, in my view, involved and complex. Gary, you no
doubt recall our attempt to get a discussion of *Incomplete Nature* going
on the LIst a few years back. After a very few weeks I think we both had
the feeling that few here -- if any -- had read the book which, again,
really needs not only to be read, but also studied (esp., for example, the
material on constraints, homo-, morpho-, and teleodynamics, supervenience,
and top-down causality is challenging).

Several Peircean concepts are involved in Deacon's theory of the emergence
of life and mind. For example, his central notion of *constraints* is "a
complementary concept to order, habit, and organization because something
that is ordered or organized is restricted in its range and/or dimensions
of variation, and consequently tends to exhibit. . . regularities." What
Deacon calls "constraint propagation" has more than a family resemblance to
Peirce's notion of "habits begetting habits" (see: 183-85, 197, esp. 202-3).

Several features of Peirce semeiotic also appear prominently in *Incomplete
Nature*, For example, interpretants are discussed in consideration of the
communication theory involved in Deacon's theory (see, for example, 443).
However, in an endnote he remarks that he is "less satisfied" with his
"effort to map Peirce's object terms" onto his theory than he is with his
use of the concept of interpretants (564, n.9), a remark which I found
telling.

I hope my comments aren't too much of a divergence from the topic of
abioticsemiosis while they most likely are from Champagne's article.

Best,

Gary R





“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Mon, Nov 22, 2021 at 4:49 PM  wrote:

> Jon, you’ve obviously thought this through very carefully, but your final
> paragraph is too much of a stretch for me.
>
>
>
> JAS: … my own current view is that "purely material interactions" are
> *degenerate* triadic relations, reducible to their constituent *dyadic 
> *relations
> … Accordingly, a series of strictly physical events can be understood as a
> dynamical object determining a sign token to determine a dynamical
> interpretant.
>
>
>
> GF: Let’s take a moving billiard ball A, which collides with billiard ball
> B, efficiently causing it to collide with billard ball C, efficiently
> causing it to move in a particular direction. The movement of C is
> *dynamical*, all right, but it is not really an *interpretant *simply
> because some intelligent being chooses to call it so. 

RE: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[gnox]

Jon, you’ve obviously thought this through very carefully, but your final 
paragraph is too much of a stretch for me.

 

JAS: … my own current view is that "purely material interactions" are 
degenerate triadic relations, reducible to their constituent dyadic relations … 
Accordingly, a series of strictly physical events can be understood as a 
dynamical object determining a sign token to determine a dynamical interpretant.

 

GF: Let’s take a moving billiard ball A, which collides with billiard ball B, 
efficiently causing it to collide with billard ball C, efficiently causing it 
to move in a particular direction. The movement of C is dynamical, all right, 
but it is not really an interpretant simply because some intelligent being 
chooses to call it so. There are dyadic relations between A and B, and between 
B and C, but there is no triadic relation between the three of them, not even a 
degenerate one; there is only a chain of efficiently caused events. There is no 
object-interpretant relation between A and C that is in any way different from 
the relation between B and C or the relation between A and B. A sequence of 
events has a temporal order, but that’s not sufficient to create a triadic sign 
relation, in my view.

 

I think you’ve also glossed over a crucial difference between biotic and 
abiotic entities. For instance, a football is abiotic: if you kick it will be 
passively moved, but it will not respond actively to a kick as a dog, being 
biotic, probably would. Living embodied beings, even the simplest, are complex 
adaptive systems which respond to contacts with their environments, and 
semiosically respond to signs in such a way that their interpretant responses 
are triadically related to the signs and their objects. The cells of our immune 
systems respond to other microscopic entities by distinguishing between those 
that belong to the body-system and those that don’t, and attacking the latter 
kind. The attack is certainly an interpretant, in my view. I don’t see that 
you’ve given any examples of abiotic entities doing anything comparable to that.

 

Perhaps Peirce’s cosmological theory implies a more inclusive definition of 
“life,” but I don’t think that justifies reducing an “interpretant” to one end 
of a dydadic relation, no matter how long the chain of efficient causations 
that precede it in time. 

 

Gary f.

 

From: peirce-l-requ...@list.iupui.edu  On 
Behalf Of Jon Alan Schmidt
Sent: 21-Nov-21 21:09
To: Peirce-L 
Subject: Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

 

Gary R., List:

 

GR: But why limit the meaning of 'bio-' here, that is, in consideration of the 
near certainly that, for Peirce, it has a much broader and deeper meaning than 
its modern biological one?

 

I agree that Peirce often advocates a much broader and deeper conception of 
"life" and "living," such that he might plausibly be understood as viewing 
"biotic" vs. "abiotic" semiosis to be a false dichotomy. I was simply 
highlighting the narrower conception that Champagne evidently adopts in the 
article, presumably because his purpose is to propose a rigorous criterion for 
a phenomenon to qualify as physicosemiosis, which he defines as "sign-action 
purportedly occurring at the level of purely material interactions." Consider 
how he restates his thesis near the end.

 

MC: [F]or a sign to be truly abiotic, confirmation that a sign-vehicle and 
object are abiotic does not suffice, as the interpretant which such a pair 
produces must likewise not depend on a living entity.

 

Aside from the inclusion of the problematic term "sign-vehicle," this seems 
like a reasonable limitation as far as it goes, but its validity ultimately 
hinges on what is allowed to count as an interpretant. Champagne references an 
earlier paper of his 
(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275293999_A_Note_on_M_Barbieri's_Scientific_Biosemiotics)
 "for more on the often misunderstood term-of-art 'interpretant.'"

 

MC: Peirce insisted that a representamen must be capable of determining an 
interpretant which will "assume the same triadic relation to its Object" ... 
such that the interpretant in question is henceforth "capable of determining a 
Third of its own" and lead interpretation to the same object. (quotations are 
from EP 2:272-273, 1903; emphasis added by Champagne)

 

In that particular text, Peirce indeed plainly maintains that the interpretant 
of every sign is another sign of the same object, which is consistent with his 
contemporaneous taxonomy for classifying signs. However, he abandons that 
position within a couple of years, after coming to recognize that a sign has 
three interpretants--immediate, dynamical, and final--and that the actual 
(dynamical) interpretant of a sign-token is not necessarily another sign but 
might instead be an exertion or a feeling (CP 4.536, 1906). In fact, he no 
longer requires a sign to have an actual (dynamical) interpretant at all-- 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Helmut, Gary R., List:

HR: I think, that abiotic semiosis follows efficient causation, which is
deductive necessity, the O-R-I follows rule-case-result ...


I am inclined to agree, in accordance with what I posted earlier about
physicosemiosis being *degenerate *semiosis, the result of "inveterate
habits becoming physical laws."

HR: Biotic semiosis also follows final causation, which is inductive
probability, the O-R-I is case-result-rule.


Peirce does not confine final causation to *biological* processes, he also
associates it with *statistical *phenomena.

CSP: Those non-conservative actions which seem to violate the law of
energy, and which physics explains away as due to chance-action among
trillions of molecules, are one and all marked by two characters. The first
is that they act in one determinate direction and tend asymptotically
toward bringing about an ultimate state of things. If teleological is too
strong a word to apply to them, we might invent the word *finious*, to
express their tendency toward a final state. The other character of
non-conservative actions is that they are *irreversible*. (CP 7.471, 1898)


The trillions of molecules are *individually *interacting with each other
in a strictly efficient-causal way, and yet the *overall *physical process
has a definite and irreversible "tendency toward a final state."

HR: If we say, that semiotics is about (a mind´s) representation of
objects, then in abiotic nature there are no discrete material objects,
because they are not represented, but just mindlessly interact.


Peirce generalizes 3ns from representation to mediation, and a discrete
material object S *can *mediate between two other discrete material objects
O and I. This is what happens in the situation where O efficiently causes
S, and then S efficiently causes I, such that O causes I by causing S; for
example, when three billiard balls impact each other sequentially. However,
the interaction of the three correlates is reducible to those two
*dyadic *relations
rather than being a genuine *triadic *relation.

Regards,

Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt

On Sun, Nov 21, 2021 at 9:32 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Supplement: Maybe "If A then B", the law, is the dynamic object, and the
> law`s instantiation "A, therefore B" is the immediate object.
>
> Gary, Jon, List,
> "that it is not necessarily* only* biological organisms which are
> living", I think, is Peirce-related, as he claims a quasi-mind of the
> universe, given, that a quasi-mind makes a living being. If we say, that
> semiotics is about (a mind´s) representation of objects, then in abiotic
> nature there are no discrete material objects, because they are not
> represented, but just mindlessly interact. Maybe this is the real
> "not-real"-issue. But if we say, that the natural laws are the objects,
> then we can speak of representation: Each situation is a representamen
> denoting the object natural law, and determined by it. The result from this
> is the interpretant interaction.
>
> If we put a natural law in the form "If A then B", then "If A then B" is
> the object law, whose instantiation is "A, therefore B". "A" is the
> representamen situation, and "B" is the interpretant result, the
> interaction.
>
> Best,
> Helmut
>  21. November 2021 um 15:49 Uhr
> "Gary Richmond" 
> wrote:
> Helmut, Jon, List,
>
> You asked: "Is this far-fetching to press it into a table?"
>
> Whatever may be the case for biotic semiosis/biosemiosis (I'd suggest that
> 'nervous semiosis' is a form of the former), since semiosis has come to be
> seen by many researchers as always-already rather clearly in effect in the
> life forms on earth, it seems to me that you are begging the question to
> apply the O-R-I semiotic triad to abioticsemiosis when, it would appear,
> that the thrust of Champagne's article is that we ought to deeply reflect
> on the very conditions necessary to prove the reality of abioticsemiosis.
>
> While Deely finds support for the idea of the reality of abioticsemiosis
> in the work of Poinsot and Peirce (for example, consider this well known
> CSP quote that Jon offered: "Thought [. . .] appears in the work of bees,
> of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"); and while the 
> "inference
> to the best explanation" (that the 'absence of semiosis outside the living
> world would turn out to be more. . . unlikely than its presence' " is, at
> least for me, rather compelling, yet merely asserting that
> abioticsemiosis is a scientific fact is obviously in itself insufficient as
> a proof of its reality (apparently the motivation behind Champagne's
> article, which centers on what he believes is necessary for such a proof of
> abioticsemiosis).
>
> Yet I am also questioning Champagne's claim that "in order to truly
> establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living world, 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Jon Alan Schmidt]

Gary R., List:

GR: But why limit the meaning of 'bio-' here, that is, in consideration of
the near certainly that, for Peirce, it has a much broader and deeper
meaning than its modern biological one?


I agree that Peirce often advocates a much broader and deeper conception of
"life" and "living," such that he might plausibly be understood as viewing
"biotic" vs. "abiotic" semiosis to be a false dichotomy. I was simply
highlighting the narrower conception that Champagne evidently adopts in the
article, presumably because his purpose is to propose a rigorous criterion
for a phenomenon to qualify as *physico*semiosis, which he defines as
"sign-action purportedly occurring at the level of purely material
interactions." Consider how he restates his thesis near the end.

MC: [F]or a sign to be truly abiotic, confirmation that a sign-vehicle and
object are abiotic does not suffice, as the *interpretant* which such a
pair produces must likewise not depend on a living entity.


Aside from the inclusion of the problematic term "sign-vehicle," this seems
like a reasonable limitation as far as it goes, but its validity ultimately
hinges on what is allowed to count as an interpretant. Champagne references
an earlier paper of his (
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/275293999_A_Note_on_M_Barbieri's_Scientific_Biosemiotics)
"for more on the often misunderstood term-of-art 'interpretant.'"

MC: Peirce insisted that a representamen must be capable of determining an
interpretant which will "assume the same triadic relation to its Object"
... such that the interpretant in question is henceforth "capable of
determining a Third *of its own*" and lead interpretation to the same
object. (quotations are from EP 2:272-273, 1903; emphasis added by
Champagne)


In that particular text, Peirce indeed plainly maintains that the
interpretant of *every* sign is *another* sign of the same object, which is
consistent with his contemporaneous taxonomy for classifying signs.
However, he abandons that position within a couple of years, after coming
to recognize that a sign has *three* interpretants--immediate, dynamical,
and final--and that the *actual* (dynamical) interpretant of a sign-token
is not necessarily another sign but might instead be an exertion or a
feeling (CP 4.536, 1906). In fact, he no longer requires a sign to have an
*actual* (dynamical) interpretant at all-- "If a sign has no interpreter,
its interpretant is a 'would be,' i.e., is what it *would* determine in the
interpreter if there were one" (EP 2:409, 1907). Champagne is bluntly
dismissive of this approach in a footnote, calling it a "parlour trick."

MC: The crater *can* signify the meteor. This truth can be recast, if one
likes, as "The crater signifies the meteor *in potentia*." The slide in
surface grammar is permissible. What is not permissible is a reification
that would then latch onto the apparent actuality of "The crater signifies"
while dropping the all-important "*in potentia*" clause.


By contrast, for Peirce, the fact that the crater *could *signify the
meteor to an interpreter and *would *do so under the right circumstances is
sufficient to justify characterizing the crater as a sign, the meteor as
its object, and that conditional outcome as its interpretant--even if it
never *actually* comes about as a *dynamical* interpretant. The crater is
*interpretable* as a sign of the meteor by virtue of its *immediate*
interpretant,
and it *would* be so interpreted after infinite inquiry by an infinite
community in accordance with its *final* interpretant. Nevertheless,
Champagne's criterion is still admittedly not satisfied unless that
would-be interpretant is possible *without* a "biotic" interpreter. He
gives another example that emphasizes this point.

MC: Though the topic at hand might impress the uninitiated, the chemical
example reported in no way differs from the familiar “smoke signifying the
fire.” The events linked are physical--yet one’s taking the former to
“stand for” the latter does not bear witness to any "chemiosemiosis." Why
not? Because in the end what does the interpreting is a human agent.


Here the smoke is a sign, the fire is its object, and the (possible,
actual, or conditionally necessary) recognition that the former signifies
the latter--presumably by a human agent--is its interpretant. But what
about a case where an electronic smoke detector sounds an alarm? I suppose
that only shifts the human agent's involvement to the subsequent step of
hearing and responding to the noise. Perhaps a more promising scenario is
where a building's automatic sprinkler system activates to extinguish the
fire *without* any human intervention. However, this seems comparable to a
weathercock as "a human contrivance to show the direction of the wind, and
as such, uttered by its original inventor" (EP 2:406, 1907). Likewise, both
the detector and the sprinklers depend on human agents for their existence
and functions, even if none are present when 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Helmut, Jon, List,

You asked: "Is this far-fetching to press it into a table?"

Whatever may be the case for biotic semiosis/biosemiosis (I'd suggest that
'nervous semiosis' is a form of the former), since semiosis has come to be
seen by many researchers as always-already rather clearly in effect in the
life forms on earth, it seems to me that you are begging the question to
apply the O-R-I semiotic triad to abioticsemiosis when, it would appear,
that the thrust of Champagne's article is that we ought to deeply reflect
on the very conditions necessary to prove the reality of abioticsemiosis.

While Deely finds support for the idea of the reality of abioticsemiosis in
the work of Poinsot and Peirce (for example, consider this well known CSP
quote that Jon offered: "Thought [. . .] appears in the work of bees, of
crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"); and while the "inference
to the best explanation" (that the 'absence of semiosis outside the living
world would turn out to be more. . . unlikely than its presence' " is, at
least for me, rather compelling, yet merely asserting that
abioticsemiosis is a scientific fact is obviously in itself insufficient as
a proof of its reality (apparently the motivation behind Champagne's
article, which centers on what he believes is necessary for such a proof of
abioticsemiosis).

Yet I am also questioning Champagne's claim that "in order to truly
establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all the
components of a triadic sign – including the interpretant – would have to
be abiotic (that is,not  dependent on a living organism)." My thought is
that it is not necessarily* only* biological organisms which are living.

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sun, Nov 21, 2021 at 5:16 AM Helmut Raulien  wrote:

> Gary, List,
>
> I think, that abiotic semiosis follows  efficient causation, which is
> deductive necessity, the O-R-I follows rule-case-result (See Peirce´s
> example with the beans from the bag). E.g.: The rule is that masses attract
> each other (law as object), the case (representamen) is two masses with a
> certain distance and no relative velocity, the result (interpretant) is
> they are drawn towards each other and collide.
>
> Biotic semiosis also follows final causation, which is inductive
> probability, the O-R-I is case-result-rule. E.G.: An organism (objectively)
> needs food (case), it is hungry (result, representamen), when it then eats,
> the hunger and the need go away (rule, law, interpretant). The constraint
> on matter is the organism´s skin.
>
> Nervous semiosis also follows example causation (secularized causa
> exemplaris), which is abductive plausibility, the O-R-I is
> result-rule-case. E,g.: A neural image is a result (e.g of vision or
> smelling) and the object of an animal´s nervous system. About this object
> exists an abductive rule of plausibility, e.g. it is plausibly good or bad
> for the organism. This feeling of good or bad is the representamen. The
> case is that then the organism either pusues or flees it (interpretant).
>
> Is this far-fetching to press it into a table? Just an attempt.
>
> Best, Helmut
>
> *Gesendet:* Sonntag, 21. November 2021 um 07:32 Uhr
> *Von:* "Gary Richmond" 
> *An:* "Peirce-L" 
> *Cc:* "Jon Alan Schmidt" 
> *Betreff:* Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of
> abioticsemiosis"
> Jon, List,
>
> Jon quoted me, then commented:
>
>
> GR: A theist might argue that this aboriginal semiosis is *not *strictly
> 'a*bio*tic', that it comes from the 'action' (so to speak) of a "*living *
> God."
>
>
> JAS: Champagne presumably uses the term "abiotic" because he is referring
> specifically to the forms of life that fall within the well-established
> science of biology. No theist would include God among them, and it also
> excludes mere atoms despite Peirce's conception "that they are not
> absolutely dead" (CP 6.201, 1898). In fact ...
>
>
> I am not especially concerned here with Champagne's use of the prefix
> 'bio' from his likely standpoint of "the well-established science of
> biology." Rather, I was looking at "abiotic" and "biotic" more from an
> etymological point of view. The "well-established science of biology" is
> surely Champagne's focus; and, if one reduces considerations here to the
> "science of biology," then surely, as you wrote, "No theist would include
> God among them."
>
> But why limit the meaning of 'bio-' here, that is, in consideration of the
> near certainly that, for Peirce, it has a much broader and deeper meaning
> than its modern biological one? The Greek root, *bio*, means *life*, not
> merely life as considered in the "science of biology," but much more
> generally. After all, aren't we reflecting her on the metaphysical 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Jon, List,

Jon quoted me, then commented:

GR: A theist might argue that this aboriginal semiosis is *not *strictly 'a
*bio*tic', that it comes from the 'action' (so to speak) of a "*living *
God."


JAS: Champagne presumably uses the term "abiotic" because he is referring
specifically to the forms of life that fall within the well-established
science of biology. No theist would include God among them, and it also
excludes mere atoms despite Peirce's conception "that they are not
absolutely dead" (CP 6.201, 1898). In fact ...


I am not especially concerned here with Champagne's use of the prefix 'bio'
from his likely standpoint of "the well-established science of biology."
Rather, I was looking at "abiotic" and "biotic" more from an etymological
point of view. The "well-established science of biology" is surely
Champagne's focus; and, if one reduces considerations here to the "science
of biology," then surely, as you wrote, "No theist would include God among
them."

But why limit the meaning of 'bio-' here, that is, in consideration of the
near certainly that, for Peirce, it has a much broader and deeper meaning
than its modern biological one? The Greek root, *bio*, means *life*, not
merely life as considered in the "science of biology," but much more
generally. After all, aren't we reflecting her on the metaphysical nature
of the universe before 'life' in the sense of the modern science of
biology? That is, aren't we looking at this from a very broad -- even vast
-- cosmological standpoint?

I think, Jon, that you get closer to my purpose in introducing this topic
in writing "Peirce's view is that the evolution of the universe is still in
progress from living mind. . " As I see it, *living mind* is there from the
get-go in Peirce's sense (although, again, I agree, most likely, not
Champagne's). It would seem to me that from this Peircean perspective,
there is actually no need for a "proof of abioticsemiosis."

In a word, life (bio-) is always already there from, so to speak,
"foundation of the world."

Best,

Gary R


“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 10:34 PM Jon Alan Schmidt 
wrote:

> Gary R., List:
>
> Thanks for bringing this interesting and indeed very brief article to our
> attention (
> https://www.academia.edu/1237921/A_Necessary_Condition_for_Proof_of_Abiotic_Semiosis).
> I will likely offer some detailed comments about it in the near future, but
> for now I will just respond to a couple of your own remarks prompted by it.
>
> GR: A theist might argue that this aboriginal semiosis is *not *strictly
> 'a*bio*tic', that it comes from the 'action' (so to speak) of a "*living *
> God."
>
>
> Champagne presumably uses the term "abiotic" because he is referring
> specifically to the forms of life that fall within the well-established
> science of biology. No theist would include God among them, and it also
> excludes mere atoms despite Peirce's conception "that they are not
> absolutely dead" (CP 6.201, 1898). In fact ...
>
> GR: But then the question immediately arises: whence comes this "semiosis
> outside the living world"?
>
>
> According to Peirce, physicosemiosis is *not *"outside the living world"
> because "dead matter would be merely the final result of the complete
> induration of habit reducing the free play of feeling and the brute
> irrationality of effort to complete death. Now I would suppose that that
> result of evolution is not quite complete even in our beakers and
> crucibles" (ibid). Moreover, "all thought is in signs" (CP 5.253, EP 1:24,
> 1868), and "Thought is not necessarily connected with a brain. It appears
> in the work of bees, of crystals, and throughout the purely physical world"
> (CP 4.551, 1906). While bees are obviously biotic, crystals surely qualify
> as abiotic in Champagne's sense.
>
> In short, Peirce's view is that the evolution of the universe is still in
> progress from living mind toward dead matter--"the physical law as derived
> and special, the psychical law alone as primordial," such that "matter is
> effete mind, inveterate habits becoming physical laws" (CP 6.24-25, EP
> 1:292-293, 1891). He holds that "*matter *is a peculiar sort of *mind* ...
> mind so completely under the domination of habit as to act with almost
> perfect regularity & to have lost its powers of forgetting & of learning"
> (R 936:3, no date). This is precisely the opposite of Deacon's hypothesis
> that mind emerged from matter.
>
> Regards,
>
> Jon Alan Schmidt - Olathe, Kansas, USA
> Structural Engineer, Synechist Philosopher, Lutheran Christian
> www.LinkedIn.com/in/JonAlanSchmidt - twitter.com/JonAlanSchmidt
>
> On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 1:07 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> I recently came upon this quite short article, "A necessary 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Phyllis wrote: "I just have a vague sense of the connection."

There may very well be a connection -- it even seems likely to me. Perhaps
others here might have some insights as to the nature/structure of that
possible connection.

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 3:54 PM Phyllis Chiasson <
phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote:

> I just have a vague sense of the connection. I don't know enough about
> either of them to provide an analysis.
>
> On Sat, Nov 20, 2021, 12:37 PM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> Phyllis, List,
>>
>> Rovelli is a brilliant storyteller mixing reflections on quantum science
>> and Eastern thought in both insightful and entertaining ways.
>>
>> As one reviewer put it, the essence of his argument is "that every
>> entity in the universe, from protons to humans, exists only in relation to
>> other objects." I would tend to strongly agree with that, as well as his
>> suggestion that with this knowledge that we should -- as some Buddhist
>> and Daoist teachings would have it -- "go with the flow."
>>
>> Would you comment on how you see his quantum insights as being like the
>> theory of abioticsemiosis?
>>
>> Best,
>>
>> Gary R
>>
>> “Let everything happen to you
>> Beauty and terror
>> Just keep going
>> No feeling is final”
>> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>>
>> *Gary Richmond*
>> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
>> *Communication Studies*
>> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 2:53 PM Phyllis Chiasson <
>> phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote:
>>
>>> Abioticsemiosis seems a lot like what is Happening in quantum physics.
>>> Especially Carlo Rovelli's relational theory as described in Helgoland.
>>>
>>> On Sat, Nov 20, 2021, 11:07 AM Gary Richmond 
>>> wrote:
>>>
 List,

 I recently came upon this quite short article, "A necessary condition
 for proof of abioticsemiosis," by Marc Champagne (Semiotica, issue 197
 (October 2013), pp. 283–287).

  *Abstract:*
 This short essay seeks to identify and prevent a pitfall that attends
 less careful inquiries into “physiosemiosis.” It is emphasized that, in
 order to truly establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living
 world, all the components of a triadic sign – including the interpretant –
 would have to be abiotic (that is,not dependent on a living organism).
 Failure to heed this necessary condition can lead one to hastily confuse a
 natural sign (like smoke coming from fire) for an instance of abiotic
 semiosis. A more rigorous and reserved approach to the topicis called
 for.

 John Deely endorsed, and so in a way (re)introduced, the idea of
 *physiosemiosis* (a term he is credited with coining) to contemporary
 semiotic communities, including the Peircean community.

 *Basics of Semiotics*, laid down the argument that the action of signs
 extends even further than life, and that semiosis as an influence of the
 future played a role in the shaping of the physical universe prior to the
 advent of life, a role for which Deely coined the term *physiosemiosis*.
 Thus the argument whether the manner in which the action of signs permeates
 the universe includes the nonliving as well as the living stands, as it
 were, as determining the "final frontier" of semiotics. Deely's argument,
 which he first expressed at the 1989 Charles Sanders Peirce
 Sesquicentennial International Congress at Harvard University, if
 successful, would render nugatory Peirce's "sop to Cerberus." Deely's 
 *Basics
 of Semiotics*, of which six expanded editions have been published
 across nine languages, deals with semiotics in this expansive sense.

 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely#Contributions_to_semiotics
 In a footnote on Deely's approach to this matter, Champagne remarks:

 Although Deely was prompted to endorse the idea of physiosemiosis by
 his syncretistic study of Charles S. Peirce and John Poinsot (cf. Deely 
 [Basics
 of semiotics, Indiana University Press] 1990: 87–91), his ambitious
 promissory note can also be motivated (perhaps more persuasively) by an
 inference to the best explanation. On this view,a complete absence of
 semiosis outside the living world would turn out to be more 
 surprising/unlikely
 than its presence, however minute or sparse, in the non-living world .
 . .

 Deely's "inference to the best explanation" (that the "absence of
 semiosis outside the living world would turn out to be more
 surprising/unlikely than its presence") has always seemed persuasive enough
 to me. But then the question 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Gary Richmond]

Phyllis, List,

Rovelli is a brilliant storyteller mixing reflections on quantum science
and Eastern thought in both insightful and entertaining ways.

As one reviewer put it, the essence of his argument is "that every entity
in the universe, from protons to humans, exists only in relation to other
objects." I would tend to strongly agree with that, as well as his
suggestion that with this knowledge that we should -- as some Buddhist
and Daoist teachings would have it -- "go with the flow."

Would you comment on how you see his quantum insights as being like the
theory of abioticsemiosis?

Best,

Gary R

“Let everything happen to you
Beauty and terror
Just keep going
No feeling is final”
― Rainer Maria Rilke

*Gary Richmond*
*Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
*Communication Studies*
*LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*







On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 2:53 PM Phyllis Chiasson <
phyllis.marie.chias...@gmail.com> wrote:

> Abioticsemiosis seems a lot like what is Happening in quantum physics.
> Especially Carlo Rovelli's relational theory as described in Helgoland.
>
> On Sat, Nov 20, 2021, 11:07 AM Gary Richmond 
> wrote:
>
>> List,
>>
>> I recently came upon this quite short article, "A necessary condition for
>> proof of abioticsemiosis," by Marc Champagne (Semiotica, issue 197
>> (October 2013), pp. 283–287).
>>
>>  *Abstract:*
>> This short essay seeks to identify and prevent a pitfall that attends
>> less careful inquiries into “physiosemiosis.” It is emphasized that, in
>> order to truly establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living
>> world, all the components of a triadic sign – including the interpretant –
>> would have to be abiotic (that is,not dependent on a living organism).
>> Failure to heed this necessary condition can lead one to hastily confuse a
>> natural sign (like smoke coming from fire) for an instance of abiotic
>> semiosis. A more rigorous and reserved approach to the topicis called
>> for.
>>
>> John Deely endorsed, and so in a way (re)introduced, the idea of
>> *physiosemiosis* (a term he is credited with coining) to contemporary
>> semiotic communities, including the Peircean community.
>>
>> *Basics of Semiotics*, laid down the argument that the action of signs
>> extends even further than life, and that semiosis as an influence of the
>> future played a role in the shaping of the physical universe prior to the
>> advent of life, a role for which Deely coined the term *physiosemiosis*.
>> Thus the argument whether the manner in which the action of signs permeates
>> the universe includes the nonliving as well as the living stands, as it
>> were, as determining the "final frontier" of semiotics. Deely's argument,
>> which he first expressed at the 1989 Charles Sanders Peirce
>> Sesquicentennial International Congress at Harvard University, if
>> successful, would render nugatory Peirce's "sop to Cerberus." Deely's *Basics
>> of Semiotics*, of which six expanded editions have been published across
>> nine languages, deals with semiotics in this expansive sense.
>>
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely#Contributions_to_semiotics
>> In a footnote on Deely's approach to this matter, Champagne remarks:
>>
>> Although Deely was prompted to endorse the idea of physiosemiosis by his
>> syncretistic study of Charles S. Peirce and John Poinsot (cf. Deely [Basics
>> of semiotics, Indiana University Press] 1990: 87–91), his ambitious
>> promissory note can also be motivated (perhaps more persuasively) by an
>> inference to the best explanation. On this view,a complete absence of
>> semiosis outside the living world would turn out to be more 
>> surprising/unlikely
>> than its presence, however minute or sparse, in the non-living world . .
>> .
>>
>> Deely's "inference to the best explanation" (that the "absence of
>> semiosis outside the living world would turn out to be more
>> surprising/unlikely than its presence") has always seemed persuasive enough
>> to me. But then the question immediately arises: whence comes this
>> "semiosis outside the living world"?
>>
>> Again, Champagne argument is that "in order to truly establish the
>> presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all the components of a
>> triadic sign – *including the interpretant* – would have to be abiotic"
>> (emphasis added).
>>
>> But is this necessarily so? Or rather, is there a way of viewing one of
>> the "components of a triadic sign" as *not* abiotic ("signs grow" CSP)?
>>
>> A theist might argue that this aboriginal semiosis is *not *strictly 'a
>> *bio*tic', that it comes from the 'action' (so to speak) of a "*living*
>> God." But then I was immediately reminded of Terrence Deacon's arguments in
>> his "stunningly original, stunningly synoptic book" (Stuart Kauffman), 
>> *Incomplete
>> Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter* (2012), which I have always
>> thought would be more accurately subtitled, "How mind emerged from 
>> *constraints
>> on* matter." But does that approach 

Re: [PEIRCE-L] "A necessary condition for proof of abioticsemiosis"

[Phyllis Chiasson]

Abioticsemiosis seems a lot like what is Happening in quantum physics.
Especially Carlo Rovelli's relational theory as described in Helgoland.

On Sat, Nov 20, 2021, 11:07 AM Gary Richmond 
wrote:

> List,
>
> I recently came upon this quite short article, "A necessary condition for
> proof of abioticsemiosis," by Marc Champagne (Semiotica, issue 197
> (October 2013), pp. 283–287).
>
>  *Abstract:*
> This short essay seeks to identify and prevent a pitfall that attends less
> careful inquiries into “physiosemiosis.” It is emphasized that, in order to
> truly establish the presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all
> the components of a triadic sign – including the interpretant – would have
> to be abiotic (that is,not dependent on a living organism). Failure to heed
> this necessary condition can lead one to hastily confuse a natural sign
> (like smoke coming from fire) for an instance of abiotic semiosis. A more
> rigorous and reserved approach to the topicis called for.
>
> John Deely endorsed, and so in a way (re)introduced, the idea of
> *physiosemiosis* (a term he is credited with coining) to contemporary
> semiotic communities, including the Peircean community.
>
> *Basics of Semiotics*, laid down the argument that the action of signs
> extends even further than life, and that semiosis as an influence of the
> future played a role in the shaping of the physical universe prior to the
> advent of life, a role for which Deely coined the term *physiosemiosis*.
> Thus the argument whether the manner in which the action of signs permeates
> the universe includes the nonliving as well as the living stands, as it
> were, as determining the "final frontier" of semiotics. Deely's argument,
> which he first expressed at the 1989 Charles Sanders Peirce
> Sesquicentennial International Congress at Harvard University, if
> successful, would render nugatory Peirce's "sop to Cerberus." Deely's *Basics
> of Semiotics*, of which six expanded editions have been published across
> nine languages, deals with semiotics in this expansive sense.
>
> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Deely#Contributions_to_semiotics
> In a footnote on Deely's approach to this matter, Champagne remarks:
>
> Although Deely was prompted to endorse the idea of physiosemiosis by his
> syncretistic study of Charles S. Peirce and John Poinsot (cf. Deely [Basics
> of semiotics, Indiana University Press] 1990: 87–91), his ambitious
> promissory note can also be motivated (perhaps more persuasively) by an
> inference to the best explanation. On this view,a complete absence of
> semiosis outside the living world would turn out to be more 
> surprising/unlikely
> than its presence, however minute or sparse, in the non-living world . . .
>
> Deely's "inference to the best explanation" (that the "absence of semiosis
> outside the living world would turn out to be more surprising/unlikely than
> its presence") has always seemed persuasive enough to me. But then the
> question immediately arises: whence comes this "semiosis outside the
> living world"?
>
> Again, Champagne argument is that "in order to truly establish the
> presence of sign-action in the non-living world, all the components of a
> triadic sign – *including the interpretant* – would have to be abiotic"
> (emphasis added).
>
> But is this necessarily so? Or rather, is there a way of viewing one of
> the "components of a triadic sign" as *not* abiotic ("signs grow" CSP)?
>
> A theist might argue that this aboriginal semiosis is *not *strictly 'a
> *bio*tic', that it comes from the 'action' (so to speak) of a "*living*
> God." But then I was immediately reminded of Terrence Deacon's arguments in
> his "stunningly original, stunningly synoptic book" (Stuart Kauffman), 
> *Incomplete
> Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter* (2012), which I have always thought
> would be more accurately subtitled, "How mind emerged from *constraints
> on* matter." But does that approach in a way beg the question? Whence
> those 'constraints'?
>
> Best,
>
> Gary R
>
> “Let everything happen to you
> Beauty and terror
> Just keep going
> No feeling is final”
> ― Rainer Maria Rilke
>
> *Gary Richmond*
> *Philosophy and Critical Thinking*
> *Communication Studies*
> *LaGuardia College of the City University of New York*
>
>
>
>
>
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