Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
Dear Benjamin Udell, Gary Moore: Although John Harvey’s reply was extremely good and very thought provoking, this is the best argued and most informative and just downright practically effective letter I have ever received on a philosophy thread on the internet in twelve years! I appreciate the distinction made in paragraph 2] very much. I did have trouble trying to find any sort of definition for precisely the terminological combination “prime necessity” which, though it combines two well known terms, is not at all self-explicative together as obviously Peirce wants them to be together. You are perfectly right in saying Peirce is just using it as an example. ¶ [Addendum] Gary Moore: To explain my interest I need to show an ongoing conflict with S. J. McGrath over another such combination term with a violent and variegated history: the analogia entis which he says is the primary concept of Thomas Aquinas. He says it is absolutely necessary to all thinking as such as well as to any meaningful theology. He obviously treats it as a form of logical argument. But it is not. It is a literary trope. Now, that does not diminish its importance because literary explication always goes with using language. Literary explication shows that psychology, explicit and implicit, governs all our expression. Yet in logic and philosophy it is only rarely acknowledged, and then only as a minor concern when it fact it is the overwhelming concern of the whole of language. Its formation of language comes long before logic and philosophy. Deely demonstrates that the analogia entis is NOTa logical argument but does show the analysis of the word “God”, which Aquinas definitively says we can never really say anything ‘real’ about, acts as I see it as a black whole around which theology, philosophy, and psychology revolve around and . . . The term analogia entis McGrath is so hot and bothered about does not even occur in Aquinas anywhere. Gary Moore: But your further analysis, as well as the Peirce you quote [3], have been vastly rewarding! You quote “Necessity de omni is that of a predicate which belongs to its whole subject at all times.” I take this to refer to “Firstness”. In turn, I take these to refer to John Deely’s use of Aquinas’ ens ut primum cogitum which is literally the first ‘thing’ you know and gives you the ability to know everything else. This is the key to all of Deely’s thinking. I searched for ens ut primum cogitum at Arisbe and found absolutely nothing which is probably my fault. Is the identification accurate? ¶ [Addendum] Gary Moore: In A Thief of Peirce: The Letters of Kenneth Laine Ketner and Walker Percy, Percy makes the strange statement [page 6] that “To tell the truth, I’ve never seen much use in CSP’s “Firstness”, except to make the system more elegant.”] Gary Moore: At paragraph 8], you say, “ordinary discourse itself can evolve and become less vague and more specialized”. This is true. That this evolution occurs is undeniable. But this indicates the nature of language itself which I am always ‘within’ and yet is the only viewpoint I have of it. This is why I disagree with Deely about his blanket condemnation of solipsism which, like Kant’s categories for the same reason, he is forced to do an about face. FOUR AGES OF UNDERSTANDING, page 588, ““But this is not sufficient for the preclusion of solipsism for the species anthropos, and hence for each individual within it; for whatever may be the mechanism of representative consciousness, that does not change the basic situation admitted on all hands: nothing directly experienced has as such an existence also apart from our experiencing of it. This view is the hallmark of modernity. But the moderns never succeeded in figuring out why they were speculatively driven, over and over again, into a solipsistic corner from which, as Bertrand Russell summarized the modern dilemma in the historical twilight of its dominance in philosophy, there seems no way out. For only the sign in its proper being can effect the needed passage. And ideas as representations are emphatically not signs, but the mere vehicles and foundations through which the action of signs works to achieve, over and above individual subjectivity, the interweave of mind and nature that we call experience.”¶ Gary Moore: And on page 645, Deely grudgingly gives Kant credit for influencing Peirce: “The second great scheme of categories was that of Kant. We passed over Kant’s categories without any discussion of their detail, except to point out that, in the nature of the case, they could provide no more than the essential categories of mind-dependent being insofar as it enters into discourse since, according to Kant, all phenomena are wholly the mind’s own construct. Nonetheless, do not be deceived by this fact into thinking that the Kantian scheme is not worth studying. It is filled with triads, which Peirce found very suggestive in finally
Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
Phyllis Chiasson: Since language only has meaning within contexts, change the context and you are likely to change meaning altogether. Gary Moore: “Change” yes, sometimes even great “change”. However, one should be aware of this, and, for a varied and many times antagonistic audience that both Peirce and Deely dealt with, one should bend over backwards or nobody simply listens. Something I really do not know but suspect is a great problem with Peirce :: How many Europeans pay any attention to Peirce? Dealing with people like Russell and English linguistic analytics, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Derrida – people highly sensitive to the use and misuse of language – from their very different points of view – who have great problems themselves being understood – Peirce’s approach should have attracted great attention in the 1920s, certainly the 1930s. He was more or less available, talked about by American Pragmatists Europeans did pay some attention too – but that is just it! Peirce had things to say of much more interest than William James. They loved his psychology but that seems to be the limit. --- Gary Moore: So when you say “change meaning altogether”, that is exactly how many Europeans may have found in Peirce – in other words, incomprehensible – when in fact he was dealing with exactly their same problems and many times providing answers to their problems which they did not bother with. There still seems to be a pall over Peirce in Europe. And despite Deely’s own obscurity in the matter of “The Ethics of Terminology”, Deely in his own work has abundantly connected Peirce not only with the Latin scholastics, but to Jacques Maritain [whom I had little respect for before reading Deely] and Martin Heidegger [whom he has written one of the best books about in English]. So making one’s meaning known in the vocabularies of other philosophers dealing with the same problems has been a great accomplishment of Deely’s. However, his very off-hand treatment of other European philosophers is so emotionally tainted and stunted as to be incomprehensible and even logically contradictory when he has to change course in mid-stream when forced to admit they had something key to add to his own and Peirce’s arguments, for instance Kant’s approach to the categories. Phyllis Chiasson: Ambiguity and vagueness are the enemies of clarity; Peirce’s concept of terminological ethics is one of his main contributions to philosophy and the extension (and purpose) of his semeiotic. Torkild Thellefsen discusses meaning from a Peircean perspective in his new book. He points out that the word, X-ray, has a much deeper and more complete meaning to a physician than it does to nonprofessionals, who in their fundamental ignorance may nevertheless think they well know what X-rays mean and do. E. David Ford also explains the need for effective definitions in his book, Scientific Method for Ecological Research. Those who do not engage in so-called “ethical terminology” risk being misunderstood—or worse. Gary Moore: This is true but, in reality, physicians are forced to explain the abilities and limits of x rays to patients and their families. This had been made so because many physicians made it seem as if the patient and their families are too stupid to understand such highly intellectual concepts. This had two wonderful results. They could literally get away with murder. They could take as many x rays as they could get away changing for. And that sort of behavior is now, after so many years of terrible abuse, coming to a stop – but at the expense of everyone in general. Now, when someone comes into the emergency room, an x-ray is taken simply to say, based on some extremely remote possibility, it has been done instead of dealing with the immediate problem immediately. The extravagant rise in the price of healthcare, therefore, is raised directly linked, and abundantly documented, to just such behavior. To supposedly avoid an anticipated problem of explanation, you eliminate the problem by an action that has a physical, expensive, but irrelevant result. So bombastic obscurity is the opposite of being good and noble and is rather nasty and devious and downright treacherous. Gary Moore: You yourself do not make a direct and factual statement of what Peirce “main contributions to philosophy and the extension (and purpose) of his semeiotic” clearly is at all, but just shuffle off explanation by saying it is important and that “ambiguity and vagueness” are bad things. But just saying that or Thellefsen’s saying that or Ford’s saying that does not at all clarify what Peirce actually said that was distinctively, on his own, important – or it is just hum-bug obscurity? He means to say something important, and he has said important things in the past, but on “The Ethics of Terminology” has he really said anything substantially different from what anyone else has
Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS
Dear John Harvey, Gary Moore: Absolutely excellent! Before a more precise term can be used by more than one person, someone has to define and explain it in the less precise (i.e. more ambiguous) vocabulary that is already understood by others. The limited communication which ambiguity provides is a hermeneutic path toward more understanding. In other words, ambiguity is a tool for achieving greater precision. This is perfect! Ambiguity, established within a locating context, is therefore necessary for communication per se. Establish the context precisely and you sizably decrease, but never eliminate, the ambiguity. If what you say is important enough, at some time you must enunciate your thoughts to a wider, broader community. Peirce uses the term “prime necessity” as if it were a very precise scholastic logical term. And yet an explanation for “prime necessity” is not to be found anywhere in the Peirce sites nor in any major philosophy resource like the Stanford University Encyclopedia of Philosophy. If, on the other hand as I advocated, we had the literal Latin phrase he was referring to, I would have no problem locating at least a context in which it is used as “prime necessity”. Peirce praises it by saying, “He could not have sought out a more technical phrase” as it “strictly means”. And yet it is impossible to find except in this paragraph in “The Ethics of Terminology” (EP volume 2, page266). So it is hardly a model of intelligibility considering its lack of context and its near total lack of use.¶ Gary Moore: I. A. Richards I am mainly familiar with as a literary critic, obviously with a command of philosophy and logic. However one communicates in English, one uses literary or, better, rhetorical tropes that, while not necessarily being precisely logical (but not hindering it either), none the less state the existential fact a human being who is in a certain situation is making a statement. If done well, all parties, with their appropriate usage of ambiguity, can more or less correctly understand each other. Abuse the ambiguity as Peirce can do in a purely arbitrary fashion, people think, because he has said something extremely obscure, that it is extremely brilliant because either no one understands it or everyone is afraid of saying “The emperor has no clothes on,” that the great ‘truths’ are merely very ordinary pedestrian sideswipes.¶ - Gary Moore: “The x-ray example is a good illustration of a situation in which ambiguity and precision both have economic, health, ethical and semeiotic costs and benefits.” The doctor is now being legally forced to explain why an x-ray is necessary and what it can and cannot do in common, though un-precise, terms. Instead of what? Instead of just doing the x-ray to legally say he did an x-ray to cover himself from legal suits without necessarily being of any use to the patient even from the most outlandish of possibilities, while at the same time economically harming the patient with a needless very expensive charge. As Churchill said of politics, “America and England are divided by a common language.” Well, he had to break down and learn American context if he was going to get American money and weapons, did he not? No one was going to give those things to him simply because he wanted them.¶ --- Gary Moore: Herein perfectly fits the following, “The question isn't, Is there perfect precision? Some of the questions are, Is there enough precision for the situation or context? and when necessary, How does further inquiry increase the precision and clarity of our understanding? “Further inquiry”, though, can only proceed from ambiguity as what is at hand to any possible precision.¶ -- Gary Moore: “In a concluding section, Professor Berthoff turns to the idea of a fall into language by way of a discussion of Kleist's essays on marionette theatre and the shaping of thought at the point of utterance. It has been a while since I have dealt with Kleist’s essays on marionettes and Immanuel Kant. Has a better format and treatment of his essays occurred I do not know about? Regards, Gary Moore From: John Harvey johnhar...@earthlink.net To: Peirce-L peirce-l@listserv.iupui.edu Sent: Saturday, May 12, 2012 10:28 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] ORDINARY DISCOURSE AS THE FINAL CAUSE OF ALL INTELLECTUAL ENDEAVORS Gary, Phyllis, list, The use of ambiguity and precision or clarity as antonyms is what I. A. Richards might have called a killer dichotomy[1] which doesn't recognize they are all on the continuum of discourse academic as well as ordinary. Before a more precise term can be used by more than one person, someone has to define and explain it in the less precise (i.e. more ambiguous) vocabulary that is already understood by others. The limited communication which ambiguity provides is a hermeneutic path toward more understanding. In other
Re: [peirce-l] Benjamin Peirce on universal will.
Dear Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith , Both of them knew German did they not? “Schopenhauer's most influential work, The World as Will and Representation, claimed that the world is fundamentally what humans recognize in themselves as their will. His analysis of will led him to the conclusion that emotional, physical, and sexual desires can never be fully satisfied. The corollary of this is an ultimately painful human condition. Consequently, he considered that a lifestyle of negating desires, similar to the ascetic teachings of Vedanta, Buddhism and the Church Fathers of early Christianity, was the only way to attain liberation.[2]” – “In 1814, Schopenhauer began his seminal work The World as Will and Representation (Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung). He finished it in 1818 and published it the following year.” This is from the Wikipedia®. The article seemed gossipy with personal information, and though it hit Schopenhauer’s main points, it missed the whole point here because they made presuppositions from other people’s writing about Schopenhauer instead of studying Schopenhauer himself – which unfortunately includes me. ¶ BUT I do follow Nietzsche word by word, so I object when the article says, “A key focus of Schopenhauer was his investigation of individual motivation. Before Schopenhauer, Hegel had popularized the concept of Zeitgeist, the idea that society consisted of a collective consciousnesswhich moved in a distinct direction, dictating the actions of its members. Schopenhauer, a reader of both Kant and Hegel, criticized their logical optimism and the belief that individual morality could be determined by society and reason. Schopenhauer believed that humans were motivated by only their own basic desires, or Wille zum Leben (Will to Live), which directed all of mankind.[17] For Schopenhauer, human desire was futile, illogical, directionless, and, by extension, so was all human action in the world. To Schopenhauer, the Will is a metaphysical existence which controls not only the actions of individual, intelligent agents, but ultimately all observable phenomena. Will, for Schopenhauer, is what Kant called the thing-in-itself. Nietzschewas probably one of the biggest supporter of this idea of Will and embedded it in his philosophy.” ¶ Kshatriya This ‘newspaper’ view of Nietzsche and Schopenhauer bluntly hits the main points but misses the message. Now, in Germany, there were many translations of oriental, especially Hindu, literature early in the century following up on an English scholars discovery around 1788 [I cannot find the name right now] that Sanskrit had close ties to most European languages. The Germans were much more enthusiastic about this discovery [for many good and bad reasons including political] than the English [who were ambivalent for political reasons], and so made greater and faster advances in the study of Sanskrit. German translations were quite commonly the basis of the English translations in the Peirces day, but some were available in English which, if the Peirces knew German well, and I think they did, they could read the abundant German translations as well as the most prominent Western adaptation of Sanskrit philosophy in Schopenhauer.¶ Now, Nietzsche mainly in his published works used Schopenhauer as a poetic metaphor or otherwise a straw man for undermining, in his ambiguous way, current scholarly ideals. But in his 1867 notebooks he both castigates Schopenhauer thoroughly and, on the other hand, gets him viewed more correctly than Wikipedia® does. The world’s ‘will’ is completely mindless. It may or may not be an animate force [with Nietzsche, not], but it has no intelligence and no plan. I have talked to a Kshatriya caste Hindu scholar who says exactly the same about Brahma, the supposed chief overlord of the Hindu gods [whom nonetheless was beheaded by Shiva] . To him, Brahma is just a synonym for the universe. To him, Shiva is the only important god – which I know many other Hindus would disagree with very much – but never violently. ¶ On the other hand, I have read Shankara’s Bhramasutrabasya complete and from cover to cover which leaves one very ambivalent, as a Westerner, about what is ‘important’ other than “Jivanmukta”. So what you say at the end, at least in a Westerner’s mind, can either be theistic or non-theistic as one simply pleases. Would you agree to this approach with Eastern philosophers? This ambivalence may reflect Charles Sanders Pierce’s obscurity about which Buddhist texts he referred to as, ultimately, it would make no difference. And it would support your premise that in both of the Peirces there is “a broad non-theism (anti-personification, non-anthropomorphic) into Benjamin Peirce's view cited here and in his presentation in Ideality and the physical sciences consistent with the Neglected Argument but in many ways more sophisticated, and certainly made with more passion and
Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION, now Nietzsche
Dear Stephen Rose, The many books of both John Deely and Jacques Derrida [JD] actually, if one gets involved with them, offers opportunities of cross reference and clearer expression of certain ideas than any one summary volume. Having the books, despite the expense, offers great opportunities for verification and counter-verification when one has time to read the full context – usually for my slow wittedness two or three times – brings great revelations sometimes to what one author may have footnoted in a marginal manner. When S. J. McGrath referred to Jacques Derrida’s THE GIFT OF DEATH I gained a great new perspective on Heidegger’s view of death as a realistic limit situation in language and experience as well as introducing me to deeper aspects of Kierkegaard. Jacques Derrida’s original ideas I find 'marginal' [joke, irony] but they usually bring with them great insights into other philosophers.¶ John Deely, on the other hand, may very well express one of his ideas in a new book much better in an old book or simply make it easier to find a reference. --- Pace Nietzsche, learning the wholly different ways one needs to read each philosopher, though it is frustrating, is always in the end well worth while. Nietzsche is both the hardest – because he is very easy and enjoyable to read as entertaining literature – but shows each of us how we are irreducibly FIXED in our personal/contextual/historical linguistic context – which to find out about is really what philosophy is all about just as in Socrates’ dialogic method of usually just asking questions [when most serious] or making speeches when he is wanting to enthrall others with his command of rhetoric. Enthralment obviously works at least just as well as logical conviction. Abinavagupta once said the the ecstasy of literature is far superior to even the religious ecstasy of the yogi. Nietzsche would have loved to have heard that, but the enthusiasm for Abhinavagupta [various spellings] is a late twentieth century thing. --- Regards, Gary From: Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com To: Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 11:32 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION, now Nietzsche The French including JD could have been spared a few books by this input. I have always credited ER as synonymous with what N means by amor fati which isn't exactly stoic. I see these things as a basis for achieving transcendence in the immanent frame, at least a bit. PS Web tip for those with fairly common names. Including middle initials works wonders for effective searches. ShortFormContent at Blogger On Mon, Apr 30, 2012 at 12:10 PM, Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com wrote: Dear sir, Nietzsche rejected the 'eternal return' as irrational in his earliest notebooks attributing his source of the idea from Pythagoras which was a surprise to me. I researched the Stoics as best I could, supposedly the real generators of the idea, but it does not amount to anything important in their surviving fragments – except, taking my clue from Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, the way things are, regardless of anything else whatsoever, is the most perfect way things can be. If there is change, it is merely a return to the same thing. The world you have is the only prize. ¶Nietzsche, though, made it a poetic metaphor, not a real philosophical idea, in that one could say what has happened in your life you cannot change, and therefore can use this myth to say, again no matter what, that it was the best possible of your lives, that what you have lived cannot change therefore accept it enthusiastically as it is your most precious life no matter what it was! Marcus Aurelius essentially says the same thing even to the point of saying that even evil men can have a rightful place in Nature’s plan in which we all are just blades of grass anyway. ¶ I would say Nietzsche never debunked science per se but rather the self-importance and mystique of the Scientist's 'science'. He always finds a way to attack the person behind the science who puts too much self-importance into his accomplishment. -- Regards, Gary From: Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com To: Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com Cc: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 6:59 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION, now Nietzsche I have read the Heidegger though again I claim no expertise. On the matter of eternal return in my Neitzsche gloss Abba's Way in he section on Enigma and Myth I explicitly reject eternal return on grounds that turn out to be Peircean I think. Continuity for example. Progress. I think it would be interesting to see the linkages we have discussed examined in context of integrating an understanding of Peirce that contains his ethical and theological thought. Didn't he himself debunk science sufficiently
Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION, now Nietzsche
Dear sir, Nietzsche rejected the 'eternal return' as irrational in his earliest notebooks attributing his source of the idea from Pythagoras which was a surprise to me. I researched the Stoics as best I could, supposedly the real generators of the idea, but it does not amount to anything important in their surviving fragments – except, taking my clue from Marcus Aurelius and Epictetus, the way things are, regardless of anything else whatsoever, is the most perfect way things can be. If there is change, it is merely a return to the same thing. The world you have is the only prize. ¶Nietzsche, though, made it a poetic metaphor, not a real philosophical idea, in that one could say what has happened in your life you cannot change, and therefore can use this myth to say, again no matter what, that it was the best possible of your lives, that what you have lived cannot change therefore accept it enthusiastically as it is your most precious life no matter what it was! Marcus Aurelius essentially says the same thing even to the point of saying that even evil men can have a rightful place in Nature’s plan in which we all are just blades of grass anyway. ¶ I would say Nietzsche never debunked science per se but rather the self-importance and mystique of the Scientist's 'science'. He always finds a way to attack the person behind the science who puts too much self-importance into his accomplishment. -- Regards, Gary From: Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com To: Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com Cc: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu Sent: Monday, April 30, 2012 6:59 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION, now Nietzsche I have read the Heidegger though again I claim no expertise. On the matter of eternal return in my Neitzsche gloss Abba's Way in he section on Enigma and Myth I explicitly reject eternal return on grounds that turn out to be Peircean I think. Continuity for example. Progress. I think it would be interesting to see the linkages we have discussed examined in context of integrating an understanding of Peirce that contains his ethical and theological thought. Didn't he himself debunk science sufficiently to suggest that he had a wider view? ShortFormContent at Blogger On Mon, Apr 30, 2012 at 3:08 AM, Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com wrote: Dear Sir, MOORE: Now there is a fascinating topic! Nietzsche went mad because of the fundamental incompleteness of ethics per se . . . This goes enormously well with a number of possible semiotic investigations [since all investigations are semiotic investigations by necessity]. But beyond John Poinsot and Nietzsche’s exact contemporary Charles Sanders Pierce, Nietzsche is the first to get behind the workings of language itself, and making understanding him much more difficult, Nietzsche’s very process of the investigation of language employs his insights into the workings of language which then makes his writings in a way very much like James Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake which explicitly employs the philosophy of Giambatista Vico, and undoubtedly Aquinas, in Joyce’s bête noir in A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man. Joyce writes in the dream consciousness of a drunken character utilizing the ‘real’ chaos of the dream state which everyone from Cro magnon to Sigmund Freud thought hide a secret order behind it [people need to read Freud directly for themselves because the literal Freud is a real scientist and his observations have rational fundaments even if one finally rejects some in a fair trial]. It is also a way to connect Peirce through Freud, as well as Lacan who never thought he superseded Freud, directly to Nietzsche’s literal thought process. It is precisely because Nietzsche lays out his thought as exactly as he literally thought it or as he saw himself thinking it which is necessarily linguistic, that makes him so difficult:: Nietzsche is demonstrating language’s sober and natural, not dream or drunken, secrets. What Poinsot and Peirce try to do logically and scientifically, Nietzsche shows as he lives it self-consciously. If you start chronologically from the earliest Nietzsche in the philological articles and notebooks and go through to the ‘mad’ letters to Overbeck and Burckhardt among others, you see an unbroken whole of an internal investigation of language as people actually use it. You get to see the trinitarian process of internal discussion I wrote about going on in what Nietzsche put on paper. Nothing is sacred. - MOORE: Yes, there were a number of irresolvable [incompleatable] ethical problems in his life that had to have irrupted, and not necessarily unconsciously, into his writings. Some of these were irresolvable, “What do you do when such is the case that nothing can change at all?” This unchangeability of one’s personal situation is the explicit meaning and Nietzsche’s intentional employment
Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION
Dear Sir, Your comments below are not only perfectly reasonable and specifically valid, but the conclusion, if I understand it, is that fundamentally not only are there ‘loose ends’ in general, but that Peirce and you both believe this is the ontological nature of things and will never chance. Not only do I agree, but what comes to my mind immediately about this fundamental inconclusiveness is the very strange nature of time which per se leaves everything at a loose end. Nothing can change nor determine time in how it works although, scientifically space and the logic being and nothingness can be defined and dealt with to a small degree as objective matters. The objective determination of time as far as it goes can produce obvious observations that none the less, when applied to matters that are supposed to stay the same at least ideally, when we factor in the ‘solipsism’ of the personal moment, this now that is the changing movement that is me, disqualifies anything as objectively stable or that the only stability or identity is change which disables every definition. It is as if, once we have grasped the fact that though every person’s perspective is different we grasp at least we have ‘differences inherent in perception’ at least as a solid and workable common conception. But time immediately destroys even the sameness in each individual as different from each other so you even have different perspectives within yourself of your self that is never ever at all in any way the same in any fashion which at least we could identify the commonality of the difference of perceptive views. The world does not hold together because it never ever held together before or conceivably in the future which, as future, has no existence. Even the past has a little more than that but not much more. “Man is a futile passion.” The man falls apart but the passion goes on. Regards, Gary Moore From: Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU Sent: Sunday, April 29, 2012 7:42 AM Subject: RE: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION Gary M., Your reflections are very rich indeed but i only have time for a few comments today ... Yes, the Commens Dictionary is a wonderful online resource. [[ Peirce says, “by the phaneron I mean the collective total of all that is in any way or in any sense present to the mind, quite regardless of whether it corresponds to any real thing or not. If you ask present when, and to whose mind, I reply that I leave these questions unanswered...” (Adirondack Lectures, CP 1.284, 1905) ... However Peirce’s concluding statement id disturbing for exactitude – “never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds”. ]] This baffled me at first ... my comment on it is in my online study of Peirce’s phaneroscopy, at http://www.gnusystems.ca/PeircePhenom.htm#phaner ... compatible with yours, i think. [[ MOORE: Would not a phaneron immediately cease to be a phaneron when we attempt to analyze it? Would that not immediately put it in the structure of language? ]] Well, analysis introduces a new element into the phaneron (using the word “element” more loosely than Peirce would), but it too is present to the mind. We can’t assume that language is coterminous with thought. Peirce always objected to the practice of drawing conclusions about logic or semiosis from the structure of language. [[ The phaneron makes no distinction in itself or an other. It is simply “all that is in any way or in any sense present to the [unspecified] mind” – would that be correct and in accord with Peirce’s ““never having entertained a doubt that those features of the phaneron that I have found in my mind are present at all times and to all minds”? “I have found” is very fortuitous as if one just stumbled across it by accident. ]] I don’t see that implication in it. In Peirce at least, one usually finds by searching, or inquiry. But of course it’s what you were not looking for, the surprises, that are always most interesting in what you find. As Leonard Cohen sang, “There is a crack in everything – that’s how the light gets in.” But all of the normative sciences (as Peirce called them), including logic, are driven by the need for self-control. [[ We never in any path of knowing truly have the complete picture ... ]] Indeed! But if we are scientific inquirers in the full Peircean sense of those terms, we never cease trying to make it more complete ... to contribute what little an individual can to the “growth of concrete reasonableness.” [[ Where is the perfection at all to be found if “it cannot be at all minute”? Someone draws a right angle which every reasonable person says is perfect. Wittgenstein, let us say, being the typical unreasonable ‘reasonable’ person brings in a powerful microscope and puts the right angle under view
[peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION
Dear Doctor Rose,
Thank you for your reply!
--
The quote from John Deely had an important original context because it
potentiallyreferred to metaphysical concerns with “positive internal characters
of the subject”.
---
Now, in my incredibly small experience with Peirce, I have noticed there are
times when he pays strict logical attention and times when he is more
‘colloquial’. Sometimes the ‘colloquial’ is not just ‘ordinary discourse itself
– which I have argued elsewhere in relation to Umberto Eco ALWAYS triumphs over
philosophical discourse [which is always a mere interruption to ‘ordinary
discourse’ that always goes on to render philosophy insignificant] – but rather
refers to old style ‘metaphysics’ as he does here.
Deely has several special [to himself] issues that would put the Peirce quote
into a completely different light possibly. One such issue is the theological
‘soul’. Another relates to his very good book on and continuing high regard for
Martin Heidegger. I would think neither Peirce nor Heidegger would accept
literally the metaphysical connotation of “positive internal characters of the
subject”. Heidegger, in whom Deely most properly and almost uniquely recognizes
the semiotic aspect of Heidegger [something I was lucky enough to see in
Heidegger’s 1916 doctoral thesis on the categories of John Duns Scotus whom
Peirce admired].
Heidegger would unreservedly reject any literal reference to “internal” and to
“subject” in his “Dasein” or Being-there since it is a field of experience
presented to the human being which, as far as it is ‘known’ is completely
‘external’ and open to be delimited by language. It would seem to me Peirce
would do the same since it seems to me that for him experience is an
undelimited whole or totality. But I could very well be wrong on this for
Peirce.
Heidegger does recognize obscurely an unknown aspect of Dasein. But since such
a ‘thing’ is not experienced directly and is not related to language as either
‘ordinary’ nor ‘philosophical’ discourse, it can only be approached obliquely
or asymptotically. The Heideggerian scholar William J. Richardson SJ does this
with Lacanian psychoanalysis which, it seems anyway, Deely disapproves of. The
point is, it seems with both Heidegger and Peirce, the popular phrase “What you
see is what you get” is taken in a strict and radical sense. I think also both
consider the ‘unconscious’ as a matter of historicity being logically being
teased out of the long dream of language which completely overwhelms any one
individual.
-
Another issue with Deely and Heidegger related to this is Deely’s seemingly
strict separation between human consciousness, which dreams the dream of
language, and the ‘animal’ which largely does not do so. Heidegger also
separates the two but simply as an observation and method of trying to delimit
language within manageable bounds, and not because of a religious agenda since
he explicitly holds for an “atheistic methodology”. In other words, if he had
found another animal than human being he could converse with, he would have no
ideological or theological problem, being more attuned to Nietzsche in this
matter.
Therefore I raise another question: “Does Peirce raise a distinct separation
between the human being as the only linguistic animal, and if so, where, and if
not, where?”
-
Gary C. Moore
- Forwarded Message -
From: Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com
To: Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com
Cc: PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 6:36 AM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION
The wonders of Google,
Commens Peirce Dictionary: Thirdness, Third [as a category]:
Thirdness, Third [as a category]
(see also Firstness, Secondness, Categories)
Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of indecomposable
concepts correspond three classes of characters or predicates. Firstly come
firstnesses, or positive internal characters of the subject in itself;
secondly come secondnesses, or brute actions of one subject or substance on
another, regardless of law or of any third subject; thirdly comes
thirdnesses, or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one subject on
another relatively to a third. ('Pragmatism', CP 5.469, 1907)
'via Blog this'
I didn't realize that Steven was quoting this in his most interesting post.
Cheers. S
ShortFormContent at Blogger
On Wed, Apr 25, 2012 at 3:17 AM, Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com wrote:
- Forwarded Message -
From: Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com
To: Steven Ericsson-Zenith stevenzen...@gmail.com
Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 2:14 AM
Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION
Thank you! I was expecting more. But it just seems to be passing phraseology.
GCM
From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith
Re: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION
Dear Stephen Rose, MD --- Thank you again for the reply! Your introduction of dolphins leads to two problems in this regard that befuddle me profoundly - which is very easy to do. Both dolphins and sperm whales have enormously larger cerebrums than humans do. This would seem to completely undermine any possible ground to ‘progressive’ evolution making physical adaptation merely the chance happening of time and place, Darwin’s “niche”, with purely accidental inheritances which you as an MD know more times than not are far more malignant in the short or long run than benevolent if they are truly ever so. There is no point to physical existence except the lottery of abilities you have at the singular moment of selection. And whatever is selected as survivor traits at that moment may kill the species off in the moment after that. So there is never any accumulation of benefits, just different levels of liabilities hopefully on the whole neutral or of indifferent ‘quality’. --- Also, these sea creatures with enormous brains and what seems to us ‘primitive linguistic’ abilities [reading Melville’s MOBY DICK from its literal mass of quotes on cetology to Job-type messenger end, “I alone have survived to tell thee” is a real help] brings up the Heideggerian distinction between present-to-hand with ready-to-hand. Our whole intellectual milieu is purely oriented to tool usage and being busy with work for one’s daily bread, whereas cetaceans romp and play all day. Everything – largely – is a game to them. If tragedy strikes it is but for a moment then either disregarded as irrelevant or simply forgotten. With human beings we drag it with us to the grave. Which, then, is the ‘superior’ being? - Therapy dogs: this follows therefrom. If there is no care, there is no unhappiness. Heidegger founded the whole of what might be loosely called ‘consciousness’ or ‘attention’, or better ‘circumspection’ from Peirce’s original mentor, Kant, in being-there upon “care” largely derived from Augustine. This hardly seems a benefit in and of itself unless one really counts the accomplishments of human kind as a whole as beneficial. But it is hard for me to see that in the actual case of the facts of the matter. --- Regards, Gary C. Moore From: Stephen C. Rose stever...@gmail.com To: Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com Cc: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU PEIRCE-L@listserv.iupui.edu Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2012 5:26 AM Subject: Re: Fw: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION Thanks for elevating me to the realm of the academically enabled . No doctor I. A mere lapsed MDiv. As to your concluding question, my answer is why not? At least in the realm of dreams and musement. It seems to me that Peirce has a sense of benignity that when tied to his sense of continuity and fallibility excludes no possibility that can be proved out. Bring on the dolphins and therapy dogs. Cheers, S ShortFormContent at Blogger On Thu, Apr 26, 2012 at 2:38 AM, Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com wrote: Dear Doctor Rose, Thank you for your reply! -- The quote from John Deely had an important original context because it potentiallyreferred to metaphysical concerns with “positive internal characters of the subject”. --- Now, in my incredibly small experience with Peirce, I have noticed there are times when he pays strict logical attention and times when he is more ‘colloquial’. Sometimes the ‘colloquial’ is not just ‘ordinary discourse itself – which I have argued elsewhere in relation to Umberto Eco ALWAYS triumphs over philosophical discourse [which is always a mere interruption to ‘ordinary discourse’ that always goes on to render philosophy insignificant] – but rather refers to old style ‘metaphysics’ as he does here. Deely has several special [to himself] issues that would put the Peirce quote into a completely different light possibly. One such issue is the theological ‘soul’. Another relates to his very good book on and continuing high regard for Martin Heidegger. I would think neither Peirce nor Heidegger would accept literally the metaphysical connotation of “positive internal characters of the subject”. Heidegger, in whom Deely most properly and almost uniquely recognizes the semiotic aspect of Heidegger [something I was lucky enough to see in Heidegger’s 1916 doctoral thesis on the categories of John Duns Scotus whom Peirce admired]. Heidegger would unreservedly reject any literal reference to “internal” and to “subject” in his “Dasein” or Being-there since it is a field of experience presented to the human being which, as far as it is ‘known’ is completely ‘external’ and open to be delimited by language. It would seem to me Peirce would do the same since it seems to me that for him experience is an undelimited whole or totality. But I could very well be wrong on this for Peirce. Heidegger
[peirce-l] WITTGENSTEIN i FORGOT
Dear Doctor Fuhrman,
I forgot to notice your Wittgenstein quotation [someone whom in his Quixotic
way Deely does not like but I do].
--
This is directly relevant to Heidegger's culture of tooling inherent naturally
in language, in ready-to-hand as opposed to presence-at-hand that Deely says
human beings have lost touch with in their purely pragmatic concerns. Language
without a doubt is a tool, but obviously a strange tool.
---
Wittgenstein's endowment from his father’s inheritance to George Trakl and
Rainer Maria Rilke, poets Heidegger has written several essays on, they
certainly would side with Deely on presence-at-hand over the working engine of
language which, considering the ending of the TRACTATUS, I find one of the
Quixotic aspects of Wittgenstein. Poetry has no place in a language of running
engines doing work.
Regards,
Gary C. Moore
From: Gary Fuhrman g...@gnusystems.ca
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Sent: Thursday, April 26, 2012 8:39 AM
Subject: RE: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM
JOHN DEELY LOCATION
Gary M.,
The passage in Deely to which you refer defines Peirce’s concept of Firstness
by collecting several quotations from Peirce that refer to it. I’m not sure why
you have singled out one of those quotations in connection with “metaphysical
concerns”, but i think a better acquaintance with Peirce’s phaneroscopic
(phenomenological) categories would serve you better in the task of
interpreting both Peirce’s text and Deely’s. Both of them are referring
primarily to logic, i.e. semiotic, and while it is true that just about any
principle of logic “potentially refers to metaphysical concerns”, those
concerns are secondary and derivative. Comparisons with Heidegger’s terminology
are even more remote, in this context. I think you’d be better advised to
peruse Selection 28 in EP2; the passage from Peirce that Deely quotes from CP
5.469 is a variant reading from that same MS (318), the MS in which he
introduces the term “semiosis”.
Gary F.
} The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine idling,
not when it is doing work. [Wittgenstein] {
www.gnusystems.ca/Peirce.htm }{ gnoxic studies: Peirce
From:C S Peirce discussion list [mailto:PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU] On Behalf
Of Gary Moore
Sent: April-26-12 2:38 AM
To: PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
Subject: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN
DEELY LOCATION
Dear Doctor Rose,
Thank you for your reply!
--
The quote from John Deely had an important original context because it
potentiallyreferred to metaphysical concerns with “positive internal characters
of the subject”.
---
Now, in my incredibly small experience with Peirce, I have noticed there are
times when he pays strict logical attention and times when he is more
‘colloquial’. Sometimes the ‘colloquial’ is not just ‘ordinary discourse itself
– which I have argued elsewhere in relation to Umberto Eco ALWAYS triumphs over
philosophical discourse [which is always a mere interruption to ‘ordinary
discourse’ that always goes on to render philosophy insignificant] – but rather
refers to old style ‘metaphysics’ as he does here.
Deely has several special [to himself] issues that would put the Peirce quote
into a completely different light possibly. One such issue is the theological
‘soul’. Another relates to his very good book on and continuing high regard for
Martin Heidegger. I would think neither Peirce nor Heidegger would accept
literally the metaphysical connotation of “positive internal characters of the
subject”. Heidegger, in whom Deely most properly and almost uniquely recognizes
the semiotic aspect of Heidegger [something I was lucky enough to see in
Heidegger’s 1916 doctoral thesis on the categories of John Duns Scotus whom
Peirce admired].
Heidegger would unreservedly reject any literal reference to “internal” and to
“subject” in his “Dasein” or Being-there since it is a field of experience
presented to the human being which, as far as it is ‘known’ is completely
‘external’ and open to be delimited by language. It would seem to me Peirce
would do the same since it seems to me that for him experience is an
undelimited whole or totality. But I could very well be wrong on this for
Peirce.
Heidegger does recognize obscurely an unknown aspect of Dasein. But since such
a ‘thing’ is not experienced directly and is not related to language as either
‘ordinary’ nor ‘philosophical’ discourse, it can only be approached obliquely
or asymptotically. The Heideggerian scholar William J. Richardson SJ does this
with Lacanian psychoanalysis which, it seems anyway, Deely disapproves of. The
point is, it seems with both Heidegger and Peirce, the popular phrase “What you
see is what you get” is taken in a strict and radical sense. I think also both
consider the ‘unconscious’ as a matter
Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION
Dear Doctor Ericsson-Zenith, Thank you for the reply! However, unless my brain is far too fuzy, I do not find John Deely's quotation the positive internal characters of the subject in itself. Did Doctor Deely misquote? Did the quote come from elsewhere? - It is an intriguing statement possibly subtantualizing both internal and subject which, in Deely and Poinsot's terminology would mean they are foundational terminals in a Peircean Triad would it not? - Does anyone have suggestions, referrences, or information? Thank you for your consideration, Gary C. Moore P. S. If I have done anything improper please tell me. I am new to the group. From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith stevenzen...@gmail.com To: Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 1:12 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION FYI CP 5.469 This illustration has much more pertinence to pragmatism than appears at first sight; since my researches into the logic of relatives have shown beyond all sane doubt that in one respect combinations of concepts exhibit a remarkable analogy with chemical combinations; every concept having a strict valency. (This must be taken to mean that of several forms of expression that are logically equivalent, that one or ones whose analytical accuracy is least open to question, owing to the introduction of the relation of joint identity, follows the law of valency.) Thus, the predicate is blue is univalent, the predicate kills is bivalent (for the direct and indirect objects are, grammar aside, as much subjects as is the subject nominative); the predicate gives is trivalent, since A gives B to C, etc. Just as the valency of chemistry is an atomic character, so indecomposable concepts may be bivalent or trivalent. Indeed, definitions being scrupulously observed, it will be seen to be a truism to assert that no compound of univalent and bivalent concepts alone can be trivalent, although a compound of any concept with a trivalent concept can have at pleasure, a valency higher or lower by one than that of the former concept. Less obvious, yet demonstrable, is the fact that no indecomposable concept has a higher valency. Among my papers are actual analyses of a number greater than I care to state. They are mostly more complex than would be supposed. Thus, the relation between the four bonds of an unsymmetrical carbon atom consists of twenty-four triadic relations. Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or predicates. Firstly come firstnesses, or positive internal characters of the subject in itself; secondly come secondnesses, or brute actions of one subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third subject; thirdly comes thirdnesses, or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one subject on another relatively to a third. Since the demonstration of this proposition is too stiff for the infantile logic of our time (which is rapidly awakening, however), I have preferred to state it problematically, as a surmise to be verified by observation. The little that I have contributed to pragmatism (or, for that matter, to any other department of philosophy), has been entirely the fruit of this outgrowth from formal logic, and is worth much more than the small sum total of the rest of my work, as time will show. Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Apr 24, 2012, at 10:40 PM, Gary Moore wrote: To whom it may concern, In John Deely's FOUR AGES OF UNDERSTANDING page 647 he quotes Peirce as saying the positive internal characters of the subject in itself [footnote 109 Peirce c. 1906: CP 5.469]. - I only have the two volumes of THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE and cannot locate it. Gary C Moore P O Box 5081 Midland, Texas 79704 gottlos752...@yahoo.com - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
[peirce-l] Fw: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION
- Forwarded Message - From: Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com To: Steven Ericsson-Zenith stevenzen...@gmail.com Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 2:14 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION Thank you! I was expecting more. But it just seems to be passing phraseology. GCM From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith stevenzen...@gmail.com To: Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 2:09 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION It's there, second sentence of the second paragraph. Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Apr 24, 2012, at 11:30 PM, Gary Moore wrote: Dear Doctor Ericsson-Zenith, Thank you for the reply! However, unless my brain is far too fuzy, I do not find John Deely's quotation the positive internal characters of the subject in itself. Did Doctor Deely misquote? Did the quote come from elsewhere? - It is an intriguing statement possibly subtantualizing both internal and subject which, in Deely and Poinsot's terminology would mean they are foundational terminals in a Peircean Triad would it not? - Does anyone have suggestions, referrences, or information? Thank you for your consideration, Gary C. Moore P. S. If I have done anything improper please tell me. I am new to the group. From: Steven Ericsson-Zenith stevenzen...@gmail.com To: Gary Moore gottlos752...@yahoo.com Sent: Wednesday, April 25, 2012 1:12 AM Subject: Re: [peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION FYI CP 5.469 This illustration has much more pertinence to pragmatism than appears at first sight; since my researches into the logic of relatives have shown beyond all sane doubt that in one respect combinations of concepts exhibit a remarkable analogy with chemical combinations; every concept having a strict valency. (This must be taken to mean that of several forms of expression that are logically equivalent, that one or ones whose analytical accuracy is least open to question, owing to the introduction of the relation of joint identity, follows the law of valency.) Thus, the predicate is blue is univalent, the predicate kills is bivalent (for the direct and indirect objects are, grammar aside, as much subjects as is the subject nominative); the predicate gives is trivalent, since A gives B to C, etc. Just as the valency of chemistry is an atomic character, so indecomposable concepts may be bivalent or trivalent. Indeed, definitions being scrupulously observed, it will be seen to be a truism to assert that no compound of univalent and bivalent concepts alone can be trivalent, although a compound of any concept with a trivalent concept can have at pleasure, a valency higher or lower by one than that of the former concept. Less obvious, yet demonstrable, is the fact that no indecomposable concept has a higher valency. Among my papers are actual analyses of a number greater than I care to state. They are mostly more complex than would be supposed. Thus, the relation between the four bonds of an unsymmetrical carbon atom consists of twenty-four triadic relations. Careful analysis shows that to the three grades of valency of indecomposable concepts correspond three classes of characters or predicates. Firstly come firstnesses, or positive internal characters of the subject in itself; secondly come secondnesses, or brute actions of one subject or substance on another, regardless of law or of any third subject; thirdly comes thirdnesses, or the mental or quasi-mental influence of one subject on another relatively to a third. Since the demonstration of this proposition is too stiff for the infantile logic of our time (which is rapidly awakening, however), I have preferred to state it problematically, as a surmise to be verified by observation. The little that I have contributed to pragmatism (or, for that matter, to any other department of philosophy), has been entirely the fruit of this outgrowth from formal logic, and is worth much more than the small sum total of the rest of my work, as time will show. Steven -- Dr. Steven Ericsson-Zenith Institute for Advanced Science Engineering http://iase.info On Apr 24, 2012, at 10:40 PM, Gary Moore wrote: To whom it may concern, In John Deely's FOUR AGES OF UNDERSTANDING page 647 he quotes Peirce as saying the positive internal characters of the subject in itself [footnote 109 Peirce c. 1906: CP 5.469]. - I only have the two volumes of THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE and cannot locate it. Gary C Moore P O Box 5081 Midland, Texas 79704 gottlos752...@yahoo.com - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from
[peirce-l] PEIRCE QUOTATION FROM JOHN DEELY LOCATION
To whom it may concern, In John Deely's FOUR AGES OF UNDERSTANDING page 647 he quotes Peirce as saying the positive internal characters of the subject in itself [footnote 109 Peirce c. 1906: CP 5.469]. - I only have the two volumes of THE ESSENTIAL PEIRCE and cannot locate it. Gary C Moore P O Box 5081 Midland, Texas 79704 gottlos752...@yahoo.com - You are receiving this message because you are subscribed to the PEIRCE-L listserv. To remove yourself from this list, send a message to lists...@listserv.iupui.edu with the line SIGNOFF PEIRCE-L in the body of the message. To post a message to the list, send it to PEIRCE-L@LISTSERV.IUPUI.EDU
