[peirce-l] Re: Design and Semiotics Revisited (...new thread from "Peircean elements" topic)
France, list > [Frances] My position is to generally agree with Peirce and pragmatism, to > include the trichotomic structure of the phenomenal categories. > One metaphysical thorn for me however is whether all the things in the world > as posited by Peirce are indeed phenomenal, or rather if there is a nomenal > and epiphenomenal aspect of the world that brackets the phenomenal aspect of > the world. If this trident of the menal world were so, then the phenomenal > aspect would be a dyadic dichotomy. > Now, if there were things in the nomenal and epiphenomenal aspects, such as > ephemeral spirits like gods and ghosts and angels or supereal aliens like > unicorns and androids, then the only way they can be sensed and so be real is > analogously as phenomena and then by way of existent objects that act as > representational signs. > Phenomenally, the referred objects of existent signs can be abstract > possibles, or concrete actuals, or discrete necessary agreeables in the > collective sense. This however need not have anything to do with things that > may not be existent or even phenomenal at all. There is another twist here for me in that the dyadic phenomenal world of phanerons and representamens might be held in a Peircean way as synechastically continuent and semiosically existent. > Now, if there are continuent things in the phenomenal world, such as mere > fleeting essences, then the only way these can be sensed and so be real is > analogously as existents and then by way of objects or representamens that > act as signs. > Under such a scheme and to be categorically consistent, phenomenal > continuents would be things as attributed essences, while phenomenal > existents would be objects as manifested synechastic substances and then > objects as exemplified semiotic presences. > This speculative scheme implies to me that there are continuent and existent > representamens that are not signs, and even existent objects that are not > signs. > In the phenomenal world, there are seemingly for Peirce continuent > synechastic representamens that are not signs and there are existent semiosic > representamens that are signs. No. Peirce said that there might be representamens that are not signs, but he was anything but sure of it. Furthermore the representamen would involve semiosis without a mind's involvement. The sign, on the other hand, is considered to be involved in semiosis only in virtue of the involvement of a mind (or quasimind). Thus the nonliving material world is full of things which count as signs in virtue of the fact that minds or quasiminds do or could interpret them, though the nonliving material world does not embody semioses. So those are signs without semiosis except as continued in observant minds (or quasiminds). It is the _representamen_, not the sign, which has semiosis without a mind and it was only a conjecture by Peirce on the basis of which he allowed of a distinction between sign and representamen which he eventually abandoned. > [Frances] The world is thus perfused with representamens,... Not for Peirce under the sign-representamen distinction, under which the world is perfused with signs and only conjecturably has any non-sign representamens at all -- that the world would, furthermore be perfused with non-sign representamens is much farther-reaching conjecture, one which you're certainly allowed to make, but it is not Peirce's. > [Frances] ...but the world for mind is only "virtually and analogously" > perfused with representamens that are signs. Phenomena and representamens > that are not signs cannot be directly sensed or known by mind to be real, but > rather they must first be sensed and represented and interpreted with signs. > What is unsensed and unknown is not noumena or factuality or existence, but > rather is the reality of those entities. > It is not yet fully clear to me if these suggestions are supported by an > interpretation of Peircean philosophy. They don't really seem compatible with Peircean philosophy since, if by "nomena" you mean "noumena," these are ruled out in Peircean phillosophy. Peirce holds that that, which is hidden, often enough doesn't stay hidden and instead "reaches out and touches" us, indeed strikes us, and that pertains to Peircean Secondness. > [Frances] On the term "continuent" as used by me, it is derived from the > ideas continuendo and continuando. Continuents are things that precede > existents as objects in the evolving world of phenomenal phanerents or > phanerons or phanerisms. They may become embedded or embodied within > existents as attributed qualitative essences, but only if evolution takes > them that far. They are a constituent state of phenomena. As an act of > continuity engaged in by a continuum, the contin[u]ent is a global > continuendo that may also be specified as a particular continuando. All > continuents are the result of a disposed habit in law on the pa
[peirce-l] Re: Conceptual Structures Tool Interoperability Workshop
Auke,
Another inter-paragraphical response, then we can both get back to
work towards our deadlines :-)
Auke van Breemen wrote:
<>[GR] But the so-called Welby classification involves the
consideration of the role of the interpretant in semeiotic moving
theoretically somewhat far beyond the 10-adic classification of [year]
Although there are areas in which we are in disagreement, Bernard
Morand and I have agreed on the list that the 10-adic diagram of x is
based on just three of the 10 types discussed in the Welby
classification--that is, the trichotomic exposition in the body of the
letter.
{AvB]
Agreed, I think this is more or less settled. The 'more' being
applicable to the containment of the 3 relations(1902-04) in the 10
(Welby). The 'less' being related to whether or not the 3 do
involve consideration of the role of the interpretant.
I'm not sure what you mean by "the 3" here. However, after presenting
the his fourth (of ten) trichotomy, "the one which I most frequently
use," namely, the icon/index/symbol, Peirce explicitly notes that "All
the remaining six tracheotomies have to do with the Interpretants"
(EP2, 489) [One should perhaps observe in passing that the three
trichotomies used to generate the 10-adic classification are, besides
#4 already mentioned, #1, here called potisign/actisign/famisign or,
alternatively, tinge or tone/token/type (the earlier
qualisign/sinsign/legisign) and #9, "Seme/like a simple sign"
"Pheme/with Antecedent and Consequent" "Delome/with Antecedent/
Consequent and principle of sequence." (this the earlier rheme or
term/proposition/argument trichotomy), at least this is how Bernard and
I saw the correspondence when we discussed it on list.]
[AvB
quoting GR] 1st, again, I say
"sign classes" based on Peirce's remark just quoted: "The three
trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into TEN
CLASSES OF SIGNS." CP .2.254:
I obviously
did not understand you. To be as clear as possible about this point: do
you state:
The 10
classes of signs do represent themselves embodied signs? I was thinking
along different lines. I would say that: "The rhematic symbolic
legisign 'lines' at the end of the last sentence" does represent an
embodied sign. And that the classes of signs represent conditions that
have to be fulfilled if something is going to be classed as an embodied
sign. But I agree that: "if we meet with something that is classifyable
as belonging to one of the 10 sign classes, then we are dealing with an
embodied sign" will do. My response probably was triggered by the use
of 'themselves' and afterwards directed in the wrong direction.
Well certainly a classification schema is just that. My point was
merely that not the 9-adic but only the 10-adic grouping points to
signs which may possibly be embodied, real, that is triadic signs with
a trichotomic relationship to the object/the sign itself/the
interpreter. Of course they need to be actually embodied in
some semiosis to function as signs in any real or virtual world.
<>[AvB]As
I see it we agree on the judgement that it is not right to treat the
sign aspects as signs in themselves.
Again, Sarbo has treated the 9 "sign aspects" (Sarbo's _expression_) "as
signs in themselves" in his fairy tales, Bambi, and other such
analyses. In my opinion, this was a grave error. It is true that your
"Natural Grammar" paper does not attempt such semeiotic analyses and I
applaud this recent restraint. I am glad that Janos--whom, btw, you
know I think is a terrific & delightful fellow & whom I like
personally very much--here refrains from attempting to do semeiotic
with his "sign aspects."
[AvB] I
consciously abstracted from both the nonagons and the proto-sign model.
They belong to a class of attempts and may be both wrong headed without
making the attempt to fruitfully employ the sign aspects in some model
of sign recognition impossible. Especially with regard to cognition
science it might be worthwhile to use the aspects. As for instance when
we have to deal with mental disorders like dyslexia, faceblindness,
non-verbal language disorders. If we assume the development of a full
fledged sign (one of the 10 or 66 classes) to be a process, the
impairements may prove to occur at specific stages in those
processes. It is also feasable that a process account of sign
recognition in semiotic terms gives some direction to brain research.
Emphasizing that activation patterns are more important than brain
regions being activated.
Having read most (all?) of Sarbo's papers on this of the past 5 or so
years, I cannot say that I have seen substantial progress in moving
forward with the "sign aspects" even and especially in relation to
cognitive science. Perhaps your involvement in the project will
catalyze it towards accomplishing something in that direction. As for
the matter of its having implications for the consideration of "mental
disorders like dyslexia" etc., I personally think these ar
[peirce-l] Re: Conceptual Structures Tool Interoperability Workshop
Title: Message Gary, Since apparently the both of us are facing deadlines, I will keep it as short as possible . GR: But first allow to apologize for not acknowledging your co-authorship of "Natural Grammar.". -- Given your estimation of the work it might also have been a gesture of courtesy ;-) No offense experienced.. AvB: I expect that we will end upwith something at least of the order of the Welby classification. Then 9aspects will not be sufficient. But the so-called Welby classification involves the consideration of the role of the interpretant in semeiotic moving theoretically somewhat far beyond the 10-adic classification of [year] Although there are areas in which we are in disagreement, Bernard Morand and I have agreed on the list that the 10-adic diagram of x is based on just three of the 10 types discussed in the Welby classification--that is, the trichotomic exposition in the body of the letter. Agreed, I think this is more or less settled. The 'more' being applicable to the containment of the 3 relations(1902-04) in the 10 (Welby). The 'less' being related to whether or not the 3 do involve consideration of the role of the interpretant. A different, but naturally related question concerns the diagram Peirce drew on the verso of a page of the Welby letter ( it is here that Morand and I disagree, but this is an entirely distinct issue from the one we're presently considering). In any event, it is the discussion of these, shall we say, "Welby aspects" of the matter which I imagine will be--and surely ought be--on-going. This is truly new territory, and I applaud Bernard for his efforts in this regard even as I disagree with some of his conclusions. The point here, however, is that it seems no longer a question to, for example, Bernard and I (and this is also clearly the position of Liszka, Kent and Parker as well) that the trichotomies relating to the sign/object/interpretant do indeed "result together in dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS" as Peirce explicitly states in CP .2.254 which prefaces his diagram of the 10-adic classification just mentioned. So what I am going to defend is the use of triadically derived sign aspects for other purposes then typecasting. It is not a defense of the sufficiency of the 9 aspects. GR wrote: . . . In a word, the nine sign "parametric" choices do not themselves represent embodied signs, whereas the ten classes do.[GR, Outline of trikonic, p 6] -- I would prefer 'signs' instead of 'sign classes' but if you accept that we are in agreement here (and I think that Claudio, Sarbo and Farkas would also agree). 1st, again, I say "sign classes" based on Peirce's remark just quoted: "The three trichotomies of Signs result together in dividing Signs into TEN CLASSES OF SIGNS." CP .2.254: I obviously did not understand you. To be as clear as possible about this point: do you state: The 10 classes of signs do represent themselves embodied signs? I was thinking along different lines. I would say that: "The rhematic symbolic legisign 'lines' at the end of the last sentence" does represent an embodied sign. And that the classes of signs represent conditions that have to be fulfilled if something is going to be classed as an embodied sign. But I agree that: "if we meet with something that is classifyable as belonging to one of the 10 sign classes, then we are dealing with an embodied sign" will do. My response probably was triggered by the use of 'themselves' and afterwards directed in the wrong direction. 2nd, I'm not sure whether indeed we truly all are in fact in agreement here, or perhaps on what we are in agreement? Would you please clarify what exactly you are suggesting that Guerri, Sarbo, Farkas, you and I are in agreement about? I think that would be very helpful for the progress of the discussion. As I see it we agree on the judgement that it is not right to treat the sign aspects as signs in themselves. But obviously there is disagreement regarding the question whether everybody is acting according that judgement, see your criticism of Sarbo below. <>The point where we differ, as I see it, is whether we deem it possibleto analyze sign processes in more detail with the help of sign aspects.I think it is worth a try, while you argue that it will prove to be adead end. Not so much a "dead end" as theoretically incorrect (the nonagon may prove to be anything but a "dead end" while "proto-signs" seem to me to be exactly this).. Anyhow, when one continues to use the language of really embodied signs to refer to that which is not one (as Sarbo does) one confuses matters. It is quite one thing to suggest informally that something is "iconic" and quite another that it is an "icon" as Peirce defines this in relation to his classification within logic as semeiotic, that is, for
