[peirce-l] Syntax and grammar of the signs
http://www.univ-perp.fr/see/rch/lts/marty/lattices/syntax.rtf in addition to http://www.univ-perp.fr/see/rch/lts/marty/lattices/Lattice-CP.rtf Robert Marty http://robert.marty.perso.cegetel.net/ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] First, second, third, etc.
Here is an article that I scanned some time ago, it was written by Andre de Tienne: http://www.medic.chalmers.se/~jmo/semiotic/Peirce_s_semiotic_monism.pdf the first page is missing, but I think than anyone interested in signs and in triadic relations should read it. to summarize: being a 'first', 'second' or 'third' within a genuine triadic relation (like in S, O, I) is a role, a function that the elements have with respect to one another (i.e. being something, being something else, being something that mediate between the other two elements), it is not a property attached to the sign, the object or the interpretant forever. The order of the elements (1, 2, 3) are like ordinal labels: they can change roles, because their function changes depending on how the relation is being analysed. as a consequence the object and the interpretant too can mediate between the other two elements of the relation. here are some excepts: ... The function of a given element can vary, depending on the perspective taken in the analysis of the triad. It can thus happen that an element that was considered as a third from a certain perspective A, will be considered as a second or a first from a different perspective B or C. This is possible because the elements are not considered in their categorial hierarchy, but in their functional identity. I will soon draw extensively on this important feature.In the third place, Peirce makes in his theory of the categories the crucial Peirce's favorite word to characterize thirdness is mediation. A third is a medium between a first and a second. If each of the correlates of a genuine triad is a third, that means that each of them is something that mediates between the other two correlates. This much granted, let us examine in this light the triadic sign. Peirce's general definition of the sign is that which stands for an object to an interpretant. What we have here are the three terms of a purportedly genuine triad: sign, object and interpretant. Each is a third - each can thus be viewed as a mediating term. Please read it, Gary, Ben co maybe it will provide you with some valuable information. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote: Here is an article that I scanned some time ago, it was written by Andre de Tienne: http://www.medic.chalmers.se/~jmo/semiotic/Peirce_s_semiotic_monism.pdf the first page is missing, but I think than anyone interested in signs and in triadic relations should read it. to summarize: being a 'first', 'second' or 'third' within a genuine triadic relation (like in S, O, I) is a role, a function that the elements have with respect to one another (i.e. being something, being something else, being something that mediate between the other two elements), it is not a property attached to the sign, the object or the interpretant forever. The order of the elements (1, 2, 3) are like ordinal labels: they can change roles, because their function changes depending on how the relation is being analysed. Yes I agree. May be the inverse argument makes things clearer: If the functional role of each element is determined by some categorial intrinsic quality of it, then the Categories (qua system) are nothing but an ontology for objects. This is precisely what Peirces' semiotic was struggling against, I think. This is also the aim of my little game. If you take Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) as a compound of elements each of which is capable of an intrinsic categorial determination, we will get: Origin = 1 because it bears the value of Firstness Designation = 2 because it is a Reaction, an agent/patient pattern, between something that is pointed at and its name Protected = 3 because it mediates betwen the designation and the origin. But a relational analysis, that is to say the analysis of the roles of each partial element INTO the whole sign (Let PDO to stand for such a sign), shows: - Designation for PDO remains a Second while: - Protected for PDO is a First - Origin for PDO is a Third Conclusion: The Origin is the interpretant of the Protection system for its object, the Designation : Some place in the South West of France is the interpretant of the AOC for Bordeaux. The demonstration is quite complex because it involves a combination of rules given by CSP in CP 2.235, 2.236, 2.237 and I skip it: - 235. We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate of any triadic relation. The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. 236. The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. 237. The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of middling complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature, as to being either mere possibilities, actual existences, or laws, then the Second Correlate is of that same nature, while if the three are all of different natures, the Second Correlate is an actual existence. -- The linguistic aspect of the game, and the syntactic habit in different languages is worth noticing too. The necessary linear structure of the linguistic chain can't mark easily such a triadic construction. So we have virtually the ambiguity in every language: Protected (Designation of Origin) / (Protected Designation) of Origin. However the syntactic habit (inverse in French and in English) spares the complex calculus of knowing which is S, O or I by constraining their position in the chain. For example English puts the sign Protected at the head of the chain while French puts it at the tail. Bernard as a consequence the object and the interpretant too can mediate between the other two elements of the relation. here are some excepts: ... The function of a given element can vary, depending on the perspective taken in the analysis of the triad. It can thus happen that an element that was considered as a third from a certain perspective A, will be considered as a second or a first from a different perspective B or C. This is possible because the elements are not considered in their categorial hierarchy, but in their functional identity. I will soon draw extensively on this important feature.In the third place, Peirce makes in his theory of the categories the crucial Peirce's favorite word to characterize thirdness is mediation. A third is a medium between a first and a second. If each of the correlates of a genuine triad is a third, that means that each of them is something that mediates between the other two correlates. This much granted, let us examine in this light the triadic sign. Peirce's general definition of the sign is that which stands for an object to an interpretant. What we have here are the three terms of a purportedly genuine
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
Bernard Morand wrote: Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote: Here is an article that I scanned some time ago, it was written by Andre de Tienne: http://www.medic.chalmers.se/~jmo/semiotic/Peirce_s_semiotic_monism.pdf the first page is missing, but I think than anyone interested in signs and in triadic relations should read it. to summarize: being a 'first', 'second' or 'third' within a genuine triadic relation (like in S, O, I) is a role, a function that the elements have with respect to one another (i.e. being something, being something else, being something that mediate between the other two elements), it is not a property attached to the sign, the object or the interpretant forever. The order of the elements (1, 2, 3) are like ordinal labels: they can change roles, because their function changes depending on how the relation is being analysed. Yes I agree. May be the inverse argument makes things clearer: If the functional role of each element is determined by some categorial intrinsic quality of it, then the Categories (qua system) are nothing but an ontology for objects. This is precisely what Peirces' semiotic was struggling against, I think. This is also the aim of my little game. If you take Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) as a compound of elements each of which is capable of an intrinsic categorial determination, we will get: Origin = 1 because it bears the value of Firstness Designation = 2 because it is a Reaction, an agent/patient pattern, between something that is pointed at and its name Protected = 3 because it mediates betwen the designation and the origin. But a relational analysis, that is to say the analysis of the roles of each partial element INTO the whole sign (Let PDO to stand for such a sign), shows: - Designation for PDO remains a Second while: - Protected for PDO is a First - Origin for PDO is a Third Conclusion: The Origin is the interpretant of the Protection system for its object, the Designation : Some place in the South West of France is the interpretant of the AOC for Bordeaux. The demonstration is quite complex because it involves a combination of rules given by CSP in CP 2.235, 2.236, 2.237 and I skip it: - 235. We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate of any triadic relation. The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of that nature. 236. The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that nature. 237. The Second Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as of middling complexity, so that if any two are of the same nature, as to being either mere possibilities, actual existences, or laws, then the Second Correlate is of that same nature, while if the three are all of different natures, the Second Correlate is an actual existence. -- The linguistic aspect of the game, and the syntactic habit in different languages is worth noticing too. The necessary linear structure of the linguistic chain can't mark easily such a triadic construction. So we have virtually the ambiguity in every language: Protected (Designation of Origin) / (Protected Designation) of Origin. However the syntactic habit (inverse in French and in English) spares the complex calculus of knowing which is S, O or I by constraining their position in the chain. For example English puts the sign Protected at the head of the chain while French puts it at the tail. Bernard exactly, one can note that the expression used by Peirce is the one of the three which is regarded as ... which makes it clear as you say that the categories used in that context have no ontological bearings. They are extremely weak categories, degenerate categories, relations of reason, ... basically take one thing (A), take another thing (B) and you have a first (A) and a second (B), the firstness and the secondness here mean nothing more than A is such as it is and B is other than A, in the context of the relation that is being considered. however when Peirce writes being a mere possibility, actual existences, or laws or of that nature he is referring to the phenomenological nature of the elements in their ontological aspect. I am appalled at the fact that one can confuse these two aspects, it reveals a complete misunderstanding of Peirce's categories. /JM --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: First, second, third, etc.
I am appalled at the fact that one can confuse
these two aspects, it reveals a complete misunderstanding of Peirce's
categories.
You' are "appalled" at certain scholars' "complete misunderstanding of
Peirce's categories." That is to say, you have closed your mind to
anything but your own decidedly narrow way of looking at things==you
are completely right, anyone who thinks otherwise is completely wrong
("complete misunderstanding"). But at least we who don't see it your
way are in good company. Peirce himself you suggest writes truisms,
so
CP 1.537 Now in genuine Thirdness, the first,
the second, and the third are all three of the nature of thirds, or
thought, while in respect to one another they are first, second, and
third.
JO: this is almost a Lapalissade, what is Peirce saying here?
nothing more than that in a triadic relation, there are three things, a
first thing, a second thing and a third thing. (I'm using
non-capitalized words for ordinals and the capitalized words 'First',
'Second', 'Third' to denote classes of relations or categories)
So either Peirce is a fool or his critic is. Peirce is no fool
You don't seriously inquire but look for confirmation of your own set
in stone viewpoint (the complete opposite of Peirce's procedure which
was endlessly self-critical), and perhaps only an ament--this English
word has several meanings, but I'm using it in the sense of "one with
a short memory"--in this case of many places where your arguments were
proven weak or questionable by certain participants this forum (not
that you ever addressed any of that; how could you? it would
have suggested that you might not be "completely" right), I say only an
ament would act as you have in this recent discussion, forgetting that
inquiry the growth of knowledge is a threaded cable as Peirce
said. I myself have nothing more to say to you here. If I am "appalled"
by anything, it is that chauvinism should again try to pass for
scholarship.
Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:
Bernard
Morand wrote:
Jean-Marc Orliaguet wrote:
Here is an article that I scanned some time ago, it was written by
Andre de Tienne:
http://www.medic.chalmers.se/~jmo/semiotic/Peirce_s_semiotic_monism.pdf
the first page is missing, but I think than anyone interested in signs
and in triadic relations should read it.
to summarize: being a 'first', 'second' or 'third' within a genuine
triadic relation (like in S, O, I) is a role, a function that the
elements have with respect to one another (i.e. being something, being
something else, being something that mediate between the other two
elements), it is not a property attached to the sign, the object or the
interpretant forever. The order of the elements (1, 2, 3) are like
ordinal labels: they can change roles, because their function changes
depending on how the relation is being analysed.
Yes I agree. May be the inverse argument makes things clearer: If the
functional role of each element is determined by some categorial
intrinsic quality of it, then the Categories (qua system) are nothing
but an ontology for objects. This is precisely what Peirces' semiotic
was struggling against, I think.
This is also the aim of my little game. If you take "Protected
Designation of Origin" (PDO) as a compound of elements each of which is
capable of an intrinsic categorial determination, we will get:
Origin = 1 because it bears the value of Firstness
Designation = 2 because it is a Reaction, an agent/patient pattern,
between something that is pointed at and its name
Protected = 3 because it mediates betwen the designation and the
origin.
But a relational analysis, that is to say the analysis of the roles of
each partial element INTO the whole sign (Let PDO to stand for such a
sign), shows:
- Designation for PDO remains a Second
while:
- Protected for PDO is a First
- Origin for PDO is a Third
Conclusion: The Origin is the interpretant of the Protection system for
its object, the Designation : Some place in the South West of France is
the interpretant of the AOC for Bordeaux.
The demonstration is quite complex because it involves a combination of
rules given by CSP in CP 2.235, 2.236, 2.237 and I skip it:
-
235. We must distinguish between the First, Second, and Third Correlate
of any triadic relation.
The First Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as
of the simplest nature, being a mere possibility if any one of the
three is of that nature, and not being a law unless all three are of
that nature.
236. The Third Correlate is that one of the three which is regarded as
of the most complex nature, being a law if any one of the three is a
law, and not being a mere possibility unless all three are of that
nature.
237. The Second Correlate is that one
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Frances to Joe and others... There is a tendency for me to equate immediate or immediacy with all metaphysical quiddities and representamens that are not signs, as well as with all categorical primaries and firstnesses or firsts and qualities that exist to sense, but especially to align them with representamens that are signs within acts of semiosis. My reason for trying to do this semiotically and grammatically at least is to make representamens seem consistent as being immediate representamens along with immediate objects and immediate interpretants. The theoretical use this could have might include differentiating semiosic representamens that are signs from synechastic representamens that are not signs. There might then of course be no need to use immediacy as a label for things before objects or for representamens and phenomena outside semiosis. If for example a diagrammatic table where drawn to illustrate the structure of grammatic signs, it might hence be as follows. -- immediate representamens -- immediate dynamic objects objects -- immediate dynamic final interpretants interpretantsinterpretants -- This basic layout and usage of immediate for representamens seems reasonable to me, but nothing could be found in Peircean writings yet to support the use of the term immediate representamen for some reason, other than as you explained earlier below. The structure of this diagrammatic table however is perhaps rough or vague. It is vertical and even upside down in regard to the usual structure shown of trichotomies, so that there appears to be here three immediate firsts aligned to the left column and margin, yet only one final third aligned to the right column and margin. If the table were flipped the other side up, then the top row would have three horizontal classes as firsts and the right column would have three vertical classes as thirds, which only seems partly consistent with the trichotomic structure of categories. This problem may simply go to the limits of graphic or visual diagrams, which after all are iconic and merely similar in form to their referred objects, and logically senseless in that icons can be neither false nor true. There is an implication here that all semiotic immediates are probably grammatic in stature and somewhat iconic in structure. Perhaps when immediates as say subicons or when icons and their diagrams become dynamic objects or say dynamic object signs, aligned or connected more so to or as designated hyposemic indexes, will they become somewhat logically sensible and thus must be either false or true. In any event, all representamens to me seem inherently and intrinsically immediate, whether they are synechastically not signs or semiosically as signs, therefore labelling representamens as immediate representamens might more clearly assign or reassign them as being semiosic in the field and semiotic in the study. Joe wrote... The passage Jim found runs as follows: It is usually admitted that there are two classes of mental representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and Mediate Representations or Conceptions. In the context in which that occurs, Peirce goes on to say: The former are completely determinate or individual objects of thought; the latter are partially indeterminate or general objects. And he then goes on (in the next paragraph) to say: But according to my theory of logic, since no pure sensations or individual objects exist... . I omit the rest of the long and complex sentence since it adds nothing to the point at issue, which is that he does not himself accept the usually admitted theory, which he contrasts as based on a different metaphysics than his. I cannot myself think of any reason why he would want to use such a term. The word icon is after all his term for a representing entity which presents its object immediately in the sense that no distinction can be drawn between the iconic sign and that of which it is an icon: they are numerically identical... (There is still a formal distinction to be drawn between icon and object, in the sense that there is a difference between representing and being represented, but this does not entail that what represents and what is represented cannot be the same thing. Otherwise there would be no such thing as self-representation. But of course there is.) So of what use would there be for the term immediate representation where that is equivalent to immediate sign or immediate representamen? It would only introduce an awkward expression of no distinctive use in his theoretical work with the negative potentiality of throwing it into confusion. That is why I am questioning your trying to do this. I don't understand what theoretical use it could have. Jim answered... It is usually admitted
[peirce-l] Re: Syntax and grammar of the signs
Robert, list, Robert's "The Syntax of a Class of Signs" (scroll down to see) is interesting. Robert might helpfully clarify a few things. 1. Robert's conclusion is "We can define the syntax of a classe of signs as the part of the lattice of the ten classes of signs situated below this class. Then, the complete lattice appears as the grammar of signs." At least at first glance, given that the foregoing discussion was about the syntaxes of classes of signs, shouldn'tthe conclusion be "... Then the complete lattice appears as the *syntax* of signs" [emphasis added] ? I don't know how Peirce defined "grammar." In looking around the Web, the definitions oftenest mention grammar as involving morphology and syntax. It's not clear to me that the lattice accommodates all such distinctions as those involving kinds of hypoicons (images, diagrams, metaphors), etc. If the lattice doesn't accommodate their distinctions, then Robert might want to call that "morphology" and thus confine the lattice to syntax. I'm improvising here, though, so I don't know what I'll think about it tomorrow. Meanwhile, The Century Dictionary gives for "grammar" http://www.leoyan.com/century-dictionary.com/03/index03.djvu?djvuoptspage=819: 66~~ 1. A systematic account of the usages of a language, as regards especially the parts of speech it distinguishes, the forms and uses of infiected words, and the combinations of words into sentences; hence, also, a similar account of a group of languages, or of all languages or language in general, so far as these admit a common treatment. The formerly current classification of the subjects of grammar as fivefold, namely, _orthography_, _orthoëpy_, _etymology_, _syntax_, and _prosody_, is heterogeneous and obsolescent. The first and last do not belong really to grmnmar, though often for convenience included in the text-books of grammar; _orthoëpy_ is properly phonology or phonetics, an account of the system of sounds used by a language and of their combinations; and _etymology_ is improperly used for an account of the parts of speech mid their inflections. See these words. Abbreviated _gram._ [examples] 2. Grammatical statements viewed as the rules of a language to which speakers or writers must conform; propriety of linguistic usage; accepted or correct mode of speech or writing. [examples] 3. A treatise on grammar. Hence--4. An account of the elements of any branch of knowledge, prepared for teaching or learning; an outline or sketch of the principles of a subject: as, a grammar of geography; a grammar of art.--5. The formal principles of any science; a system of rules to be observed in the putting together of any kind of elements. [examples] Comparative grammar, grammatical treatment of a number of languages, compariug their phenomena in order to derive knowledge of their relations and history or to deduce general principles of language. ~~99 2. The thought that, by Robert's standard, the syntax of arguments is the same thing as "the grammar [or syntax] of signs," got me to thinking about the qualisign at the other extreme. The qualisign would just be by itself. Can that be right? This may be a question of phrasing. The qualisign has, in Robert's sense, minimal syntax proper to it, but the qualisign is involved in the syntax of all other signs. So, one might distinguish between, for instance, the syntax of the involvent dicisign and the syntax of the involute dicisign. 3. Is Robert saying that the lattice contains all the distinct information needed to generate the essentials of a paragraph like the one which he quotes from Peirce? Are all such conceptions as those of the replica adequately implied? Now, I don't know whether he would be going too far with such claims. But I'm wondering whether that's basically what Robert is claiming. Incidentally, I recreated the graphic imagesas monochrome bitmaps, which Marty is free to use without attribution if he wants them. I recreated them because I assumed that the originals were the cause ofhis rtf (rich text file)'s being so large (around 850KB). But then I found that, in fact, his graphic imagesare quite low-KB -- jpgs ranging from 3KB to 11KB. However, the rtf stored them in a way that made the file very large. I guess that's what rtfs do. Replacement with the monochrome bitmaps reduced the rtf filesize from around 850KB to around 72KB. The monochrome bitmaps themselves are 0.842KB, 2.21KB, 3.38KB. Best, Ben Udell THE SYNTAX OF A CLASS OF SIGNS [Robert Marty]. http://www.univ-perp.fr/see/rch/lts/marty/lattices/Lattice-CP.rtf[Marty also directs attention to http://www.univ-perp.fr/see/rch/lts/marty/lattices/Lattice-CP.rtf] On two occasions in the texts on the ten classes of signs 2-254 to 2-263 Peirce talk of the syntax of a class : First in 2-257 concerning the Dicent Sinsign [ 2® 2® 2 ] he write : "Such a Sign must involve an Iconic Sinsign [ 2® 1® 1 ] to embody the
[peirce-l] Re: 1st image of triangle of boxes (MS799.2)
Dear List: in respect for fund raising for the edition of CSP's papers, the Peirce Edition Project at Indianapolis is always in search of funds, Nathan Houser and everybody else there are working a lot for the work on the CSP's papers. more info can be found at their website: http://www.iupui.edu/~peirce/ best cass. 2006/6/25, Frances Kelly [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Frances to Joe and others...There is a tendency for me to equate immediate or immediacy withall metaphysical quiddities and representamens that are not signs, aswell as with all categorical primaries and firstnesses or firsts and qualities that exist to sense, but especially to align them withrepresentamens that are signs within acts of semiosis.My reason for trying to do this semiotically and grammatically atleast is to make representamens seem consistent as being immediate representamens along with immediate objects and immediateinterpretants. The theoretical use this could have might includedifferentiating semiosic representamens that are signs fromsynechastic representamens that are not signs. There might then of course be no need to use immediacy as a label for things beforeobjects or for representamens and phenomena outside semiosis.If for example a diagrammatic table where drawn to illustrate the structure of grammatic signs, it might hence be as follows.--immediaterepresentamens--immediate dynamic objects objects--immediate dynamicfinalinterpretants interpretantsinterpretants-- This basic layout and usage of immediate for representamens seemsreasonable to me, but nothing could be found in Peircean writings yetto support the use of the term immediate representamen for some reason, other than as you explained earlier below.The structure of this diagrammatic table however is perhaps rough orvague. It is vertical and even upside down in regard to the usualstructure shown of trichotomies, so that there appears to be here three immediate firsts aligned to the left column and margin, yetonly one final third aligned to the right column and margin.If the table were flipped the other side up, then the top row would have three horizontal classes as firsts and the right column wouldhave three vertical classes as thirds, which only seems partlyconsistent with the trichotomic structure of categories. This problemmay simply go to the limits of graphic or visual diagrams, which after all are iconic and merely similar in form to their referred objects,and logically senseless in that icons can be neither false nor true.There is an implication here that all semiotic immediates are probably grammatic in stature and somewhat iconic in structure. Perhaps whenimmediates as say subicons or when icons and their diagrams becomedynamic objects or say dynamic object signs, aligned or connected moreso to or as designated hyposemic indexes, will they become somewhat logically sensible and thus must be either false or true.In any event, all representamens to me seem inherently andintrinsically immediate, whether they are synechastically not signs orsemiosically as signs, therefore labelling representamens as immediate representamens might more clearly assign or reassign themas being semiosic in the field and semiotic in the study.Joe wrote...The passage Jim found runs as follows:It is usually admitted that there are two classes of mental representation, Immediate Representations or Sensations and MediateRepresentations or Conceptions.In the context in which that occurs, Peirce goes on to say:The former are completely determinate or individual objects of thought; the latter are partially indeterminate or general objects.And he then goes on (in the next paragraph) to say:But according to my theory of logic, since no pure sensations orindividual objects exist... . I omit the rest of the long and complex sentence since it adds nothingto the point at issue, which is that he does not himself accept theusually admitted theory, which he contrasts as based on a different metaphysics than his. I cannot myself think of any reason why he wouldwant to use such a term. The word icon is after all his term for arepresenting entity which presents its object immediately in the sense that no distinction can be drawn between the iconic sign and that ofwhich it is an icon: they are numerically identical... (There is stilla formal distinction to be drawn between icon and object, in the sense that there is a difference between representing and being represented,but this does not entail that what represents and what is representedcannot be the same thing. Otherwise there would be no such thing asself-representation. But of course there is.) So of what use would there be for the term immediate representation where that isequivalent to immediate sign or immediate representamen?It would only introduce an awkward
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Claudio, List,Justa small bibliographic collaboration.Cheers,J. LuracClaudio Guerri [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Jorge, List,I think that (even if I don't know too much about the exact way in which Lacan "met" Peirce) there is no discussion anymore that Lacan is LACAN after he included Peirce's proposal in his structuralistic approach to Freud. For the conceptual approach you can see "Des fondements s¨miotiques de la psychanalyse. Peirce apr¨s Freud et Lacan" by Michel Balat.Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000.There are 3 triads that are VERY profitable for applied semiotics, each one in it's one way is specific for different tasks:For 1nessFor 2ness For 3ness PeirceAlthusser Lacan FirstnessTheoretical Practice Imaginary SecondnessEconomical Practice Real ThirdnessPolitical
Practice Symbolic Since all signs are very complex signs always, we can not reduce everything only to the peircean-logical-aspects.In my view, there are also 3 logical sequences to begin researching on something:1. The logical approach: beginning by 1ness,possibility; then 2ness, actualization; and 3ness, law or necessity. 2. The study of a concrete case: beginning by Economical Practice(Which are theconcrete existent examples? for concrete things, or Which are thebehaviors/performances?for abstract concepts); following Political Practice and finally Theoretical Practice. 3. The psychological approach: ("symbols grow"... also for the psychoanalyst) beginning by the Symbolic aspect through the significant... I will avoid here more details because it is not my competence...
but it works wonderful... I can tell...Applied semiotics is accepting to put our feets in the muddy earth... and get dirty!!! All this is not ment as a peircean review. At the same time a thank Ransdell (specially for the List) and others for their "clean" and very necessary work.Best Claudio- Original Message - From: Jorge Lurac To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 4:00 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...Claudio, listI find at least curious the mention of Lacan as a backing for to discuss the Peirce's triadic conception, Claudio. You should remember he was a Peirce's scholar and some of its more important seminars were presented by F. Recanati.J. Lurac---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] __Correo Yahoo!Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ¡gratis! Reg¨strate ya - http://correo.espanol.yahoo.com/
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