[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Charles, Joe, Gary, Jim, list, Currently, I'm focused on answering Joe's recentest post to me, particularly in regard to the question of how to argue that some very complicated complexus of objects, signs, and interpretants will not amount to a verification. My focus there has as much to do with trying to restrain my prolixity as anything else! Still, I'd like to attempt at least a brief response here. A point which I'll be making in my response to Joe, and which may be pertinent here, is that the "reflexivity" involved in semiosis is not just that of feedback's adjusting of behavior but instead that of learning's effect on the semiotic system's very design -- solidifying it or undermining it or renovating it or augmenting it or redesigning it or etc. Generally, I'd respond that that which Peirce overlooks in connection with verification is -- that verification is an experiential recognition of an interpretant and its sign as truly corresponding to their object, and that verification (in the core sense) involves direct observation of the object in the light (being tested) of the interpretant and the sign. "In the light (being tested)" means that the verification is a recognition formed _as_ collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object. Experience, familiarity, acquaintance with the object are, by Peirce's own account, outside the interpretant, the sign, the system of signs. -- and that, therefore, the recognition is not sign, interpretant, or their object in those relationships in which it is the recognition of them; yet, in being formed as collateral to sign and interpretant in respect of the object, it is logically determined by them and by the object as represented by them; it is further determined by the object separately by observation of the object itself; and by the logical relationships in which object, sign, and interpretant are observed to stand. Dependently on the recognitional outcome, semiosis will go very differently; it logically determines semiosis going forward. So, how will you diagram it? You can't mark it as object itself, nor as sign of the object, nor as interpretant of the sign or of the object. What label, what semiotic role, will you put at the common terminus of the lines of relationship leading to it, all of them logically determinational, from the sign, the object, and the interpretant? If, as verification, it is logically determined by object, sign, and interpretant, and is neither the object itself, or sign or interpretant of the object, then *_what_* is it in its logically determinational relationship to object, sign and interpretant? My answer is that verification is just that, verification, a fourth semiotic element on a part with object, sign, and interpretant. The content of your summary seems at first glance generally correct, except that I would not call it so much a summary as a placement of Peirce's discussion of transuasion into an appropriate further Peircean context. Previously on peirce-l, I think it was over a year ago, I addressed the issue of induction and verification in a general way: http://stderr.org/pipermail/arisbe/2005-January/002066.html [peirce-l] Re: [Arisbe] Re: Critique Of Short -- Section 4 --DiscussionBenjamin Udell Sun Jan 2 23:55:43 CST 2005 66~ > [Joe:] The purpose of the collateral knowledge is not to "confirm the meaning" but to identify the object independently of its identification in the sign.The latter, not the former, was Peirce's purpose, but it amounts to the same thing, & takes on importance since there would be no other way to confirm the meaning. For instance, the experimentation which conveys collateral acquaintance with the object to the experimenter's mind is, by that very stroke, not an interpretant or sign.in the relevant relations. It's an induction which concludes not in an interpretant but in a recognition -- some degree of recognition -- though it certainly will also conclude in an interpretant to the extent that the interpretant goes beyond the recognition & represents the object in respects in which collateral experience has not been furnished. The progression continues. But at some point I will address how this works when the collateral experience is conveyed only weakly & how it is that we are satisfied with that which we call evidence when the evidence is not the object itself freshly observed.~99 (The way in which I eventually addressed the issue was in terms (a) of a general evidentiary power of signs in virtue of their deserving recognition on the basis of experience, and in particular of a kind of sign, classificationally seated alongside index, icon, & symbol, a sign _defined_ in terms of the recognition which it would deserve and which I call the "proxy" and (b) a certain slack and experimentability which the mind has in understanding and practicing the difference between an interpretant and a rec
[peirce-l] Re: The "composite photograph" metaphor
Ben, list: Ben, I am struggling to understand exactly what it is you are saying Peirce overlooks in connection with verification. In an effort to get some further clarification of your position, I am including a statement of my understanding of some of what Peirce says on the subject followed by some questions. I. Peirce on Verification TRANSUASION (CP 2.98): A Transuasive Argument, or Induction, is an Argument which sets out from a hypothesis, resulting from a previous Abduction, and from virtual predictions, drawn by Deduction, of the results of possible experiments, and having performed the experiments, concludes that the hypothesis is true in the measure in which those predictions are verified, this conclusion, however, being held subject to probable modification to suit future experiments. Since the significance of the facts stated in the premisses depends upon their predictive character, which they could not have had if the conclusion had not been hypothetically entertained, they satisfy the definition of a Symbol of the fact stated in the conclusion. This argument is Transuasive, also, in respect to its alone affording us a reasonable assurance of an ampliation of our positive knowledge. By the term "virtual prediction," I mean an experiential consequence deduced from the hypothesis, and selected from among possible consequences independently of whether it is known, or believed, to be true, or not; so that at the time it is selected as a test of the hypothesis, we are either ignorant of whether it will support or refute the hypothesis, or, at least, do not select a test which we should not have selected if we had been so ignorant. (END QUOTE) I take the word "verification" as a synonym for the consequences of Peirce's transuasive arguments (distinguishable from abductive and deductive arguments) that set out the conditions under which individuals will be most likely to agree to act as if statements referring to perceptual events and relations between and among perceptual events are true. I say "act as if" because I understand Peirce to say that "belief" necessarily entails both cognitive and behavioral action. Granting that there are semiosical antecedents to one's being able to name and otherwise classify perceptual events like seeing a burning building, any physically and psychologically normal person who sees a burning building will most likely voluntarily or quasi voluntarily agree to report seeing or having seen a burning building as a consequence of their experience's compelling them to act as if they are or were in the actual presence of a burning building. The cognitive assent in agreeing to say there is or was a building burning in which Thirdness is predominant is inseparably connected to a nonvoluntary inability dominated by Secondness to act as if seeing a burning building is or was an hallucination, optical illusion, etc. To refuse to report or to quibble over reporting that a building is or was burning would be an instance of "paper doubt." Say what you will, the consequences of acting as if there is or was no building burning are identical to what we conventionally mean (the import of Peirce's pragmatic maxim) by saying that a building is burning is true. Peirce's transuasive argument does not set out conditions under which all rational individuals ought to agree, but conditions under which, over time, most people will in actual fact agree as a consequence of an inability to act as if what is predicted will not occur. Belief has the character of a wager. Whatever a person's state of mind, relative to present states of information the odds favor acting as if the conclusions of transuasive arguments are true. II. Questions 1. Do you generally agree with my summary of Peirce's transuasive argument? If not, where in your opinion have I gone astray? 2. If you do generally agree with my account of transuasion, what does Peirce's transuasive argument fail to address in connection with verification? --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Announcement - Third Advanced Seminar on Peirce�s Philosophy and Semiotics
Dear Joe and list, The programm of the third advanced Seminar on Peirce¨s philosophy and semiotics has just been released. As Joe said, it will certainly be worth while participating to anyone interested in Peircean matters: 9ª Jornada do Centro de Estudos Peirceanos Third Advanced Seminar on Peirce¨s Philosophy and Semiotics Datas: 24 e 25 de agosto de 2006 Horário: 8h30 ¨s 18h00 Local: Campus Consola¨¨o (Marqu¨s)Audit¨rio AnexoRua Caio Prado 102, t¨rreoS¨o Paulo - SP ADVANCED SEMINAR - Manh¨ de 24/08: 8h30-8h45: Recep¨¨o dos participantes 8h45-9h00: Abertura do Evento (Fátima Regina Machado) 9h00-9h45 palestra Nathan Houser (The form of experience)9h45-10h00 comentadora Lucia Santaella10h00-10h20 resposta do palestrante e discuss¨es (iniciadas por perguntas de Cassiano Terra) 10h20-10h30 s¨ntese avaliativa (Fátima Regina Machado) 10h30-10h45 Intervalo 10h45-11h30 palestra Vincent Colapietro (PeirceÂs Rhetorical Turn) 11h30-11h45 comentador Vin¨cius Romanini11h45-12h05 resposta do palestrante e discuss¨es 12h05-12h15 s¨ntese avaliativa JORNADA - Tarde de 24/08: 14h00-14h40: Leituras Avan¨adas (Maria de Lourdes Bacha) 14h40-14h50: Quest¨es dos participantes do evento 14h50-15h30: Inicia¨¨o ¨ Leitura de Peirce (Roberto Chiachiri) 15h30-15h40: Quest¨es dos participantes do evento 15h40-16h00: Intervalo 16h00-16h40: Inter Psi (Wellington Zangari) 16h40-16h50: Quest¨es dos participantes do evento 16h50-17h30: Panorama dos estudos semi¨ticos no Brasil (Lucia Santaella) 17h30-17h45: Quest¨es dos participantes do evento 17h45: Encerramento do primeiro dia ADVANCED SEMINAR - Manh¨ de 25/08: 8h30-8h45: Recep¨¨o dos participantes 8h45-9h00: Revis¨o dos assuntos discutidos no dia anterior (Fátima Regina Machado) 9h00-9h45 palestra Thomas Short (PeirceÂs Relation to Contemporary Philosophy of Mind) 9h45-10h00 comentador Ivo Ibri 10h00-10h20 resposta do palestrante e discuss¨es (iniciadas por perguntas de Vin¨cius Romanini) 10h20-10h30 s¨ntese avaliativa (Maria de Lourdes Bacha)10h30-10h45 Intervalo 10h45-11h30 palestra Winfried Nöth11h30-11h45 comentador Lauro da Silveira 11h45-12h05 resposta do palestrante e discuss¨es 12h05-12h15 s¨ntese avaliativa JORNADA - Tarde de 25/08: 14h00-14h40: Estudos Intersemi¨ticos da Moda (Maria Luiza Feitosa de Souza) 14h40-14h50: Quest¨es dos participantes do evento 14h50-15h30:Teoria Semi¨tica da Moda (Solange Silva Moreira) 15h30-15h40: Quest¨es dos participantes do evento 15h40-16h00: Intervalo 16h00-16h40: CS:Games (Mirna Feitoza) 16h40-16h50: Quest¨es dos participantes do evento 16h50-17h30: Propostas para a cria¨¨o de novos grupos de estudo do CENEP em Goi¨nia e Salvador (Mar¨lia Laboissieri e Licia Soares de Souza) 17h30-18h00: Avalia¨¨o do evento e projetos futuros (Lucia Santaella) 18h00: Encerramento Joseph Ransdell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Dear Vinicius: Good to hear that your dissertation is being completed in time for you to take advantage of the conference which is occurring a few days before that so that Nathan and Tom could be present for your defense. For personal reasons, I had to decline Lucia's invitation to appear at the conference, as one of the invited speakers, along with Nathan, Tom, and Vincent as well, an occasion which I deeply regret missing out on for several reasons, and to learn of the further missed opportunity of attending the discussion at your defense makes it all the more regretful. But I'll be looking forward to reading your dissertation myself as soon as you can make it generally available. (I won't trouble you for further information on what conclusions you arrived at until after the defense, but the topic has been under discussion recently on the list and I am sure there are a number of people who will want to raise some questions with you about what you came up with when you have the time free to be responsive to that.) But as I say this it occurs to me that no announcement of that conference was ever made on the list, and I should perhaps provide some context for this. The conference referred to was described by Lucia Santaella, who arranged it, as "an International Conference on Consciousness, Mind, and Thought in Peirce to be held in August 24-25, 2006, during which the Center of Peirce Studies at Sao Paulo Catholic University will be transformed into an International Center." Lucia is the creator of the Center, which originates as a program at that university which has been developed under her leadership for many years now and is largely (though by no means exclusively) responsible for a remarkably vital and continually growing and burgeoning tradition of Peirce-related research and scholarship whose equal is difficult to find anywhere in the world. The occasion is thus a celebrational one, and anyone interested in matters Peircean who is in position to be in attendance in Sao Pau
