[peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
I'm sorry to get into this discussion late. Please excuse me if I'm recapitulating anything already in the correspondence, but I wonder if any of you have looked for "fundamental psychological laws" in CSP's color perception research, which Max Fisch mentions in the third volume of the chronological edition. -Original Message- From: Joseph Ransdell [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Tue 10/3/2006 6:57 PM To: Peirce Discussion Forum Cc: Subject:[peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? Jeff Kasser says: JK: First, as to the question in the heading of your initial message, it seems to me that Peirce can only be referring to the antecedents of the two conditional statements that motivate the method of tenacity in the first place. These are stated in the first sentence of Section V of "Fixation." "If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of a habit, why should we not attain the desired end, by taking any answer to a question which we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything which might disturb it." In the context of the paper, this would seem to make fairly straightforward sense of the idea that tenacity rests on "two fundamental psychological laws." Peirce sure seems to think that it should be apparent to the reader on which "laws" tenacity rests, and so I don't think we're to wander too far afield from the paper itself in determining which the laws are. REPLY: JR: The more I think about it the less plausible it seems to me that either of these is what he meant by the two "psychological laws". What would the second one be: If x is a belief then x is a habit? That doesn't even sound like a law. And as regards the first, what exactly would it be? If a belief is arrived at then inquiry ends? Or: If inquiry has ended then a belief has been arrived at? But nothing like either of these seems much like something he might want to call a psychological law. Moreover, why would he single out the method of tenacity as based on these when they are equally pertinent to all four methods? He does say earlier that "the FEELING of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions". That is more like a law, in the sense he might have in mind, but that has to do with a correlation between a feeling and an occurrence of a belief establishment and, again, there is no special relationship there to the method of tenacity in particular. I suggest that the place to look is rather at the simple description of the method of tenacity he gives at the very beginning of his discussion of it when he says "… why should we not attain the desired end by taking as answer to a question any we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything that might disturb it?" This involves reiteration of effort with anticipation of it having a result in consequence of it , and thus implicitly makes reference to a possible sequential regularity of a lawlike nature. The two psychological laws might then be idioscopic rather than coenoscopic laws, having to do with the responsiveness of neural tissue to repeated stimulation and the like, which Peirce would know something about. It doesn't make any difference that it is not cenoscopic or properly philosophical since he is referring to it as something the devotee of tenacity exploits, not as something logic is based upon. This means that in referring to the two laws he is NOT referring to the basic principle that inquiry is driven by doubt, construed as constituted by what would be logically described as a formal contradiction. Now, as regards that principle, the idea that inquiry -- thinking in the sense of "I just can't seem to think today" or "he is a competent thinker" -- is driven by doubt in the form of an exerienced contradiction is not a modern idea but has its origins at the very beginning of philosophy in the West in the practice of the dialectical craft of Socrates. Let me quote myself, from a paper I wrote a few years back, on the Socratic tradition in philosophy, which I claim to be the proper logical tradition to which we should be putting Peirce in relation In its origins Socratic dialectic probably developed as a modification of practices of eristic dispute that made use of the reductio techniques of the mathematicians, perhaps as especially modified by the Parmenidean formalists. Socratic dialectic differs importantly from the earlier argumentation, though, in at least two major respects, first, by conceiving of th
[peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
Jeff Kasser says: JK: First, as to the question in the heading of your initial message, it seems to me that Peirce can only be referring to the antecedents of the two conditional statements that motivate the method of tenacity in the first place. These are stated in the first sentence of Section V of "Fixation." "If the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry, and if belief is of the nature of a habit, why should we not attain the desired end, by taking any answer to a question which we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything which might disturb it." In the context of the paper, this would seem to make fairly straightforward sense of the idea that tenacity rests on "two fundamental psychological laws." Peirce sure seems to think that it should be apparent to the reader on which "laws" tenacity rests, and so I don't think we're to wander too far afield from the paper itself in determining which the laws are.REPLY: JR: The more I think about it the less plausible it seems to me that either of these is what he meant by the two "psychological laws". What would the second one be: If x is a belief then x is a habit? That doesn't even sound like a law. And as regards the first, what exactly would it be? If a belief is arrived at then inquiry ends? Or: If inquiry has ended then a belief has been arrived at? But nothing like either of these seems much like something he might want to call a psychological law. Moreover, why would he single out the method of tenacity as based on these when they are equally pertinent to all four methods? He does say earlier that "the FEELING of believing is a more or less sure indication of there being established in our nature some habit which will determine our actions". That is more like a law, in the sense he might have in mind, but that has to do with a correlation between a feeling and an occurrence of a belief establishment and, again, there is no special relationship there to the method of tenacity in particular. I suggest that the place to look is rather at the simple description of the method of tenacity he gives at the very beginning of his discussion of it when he says "… why should we not attain the desired end by taking as answer to a question any we may fancy, and constantly reiterating it to ourselves, dwelling on all which may conduce to that belief, and learning to turn with contempt and hatred from anything that might disturb it?" This involves reiteration of effort with anticipation of it having a result in consequence of it , and thus implicitly makes reference to a possible sequential regularity of a lawlike nature. The two psychological laws might then be idioscopic rather than coenoscopic laws, having to do with the responsiveness of neural tissue to repeated stimulation and the like, which Peirce would know something about. It doesn't make any difference that it is not cenoscopic or properly philosophical since he is referring to it as something the devotee of tenacity exploits, not as something logic is based upon. This means that in referring to the two laws he is NOT referring to the basic principle that inquiry is driven by doubt, construed as constituted by what would be logically described as a formal contradiction.Now, as regards that principle, the idea that inquiry -- thinking in the sense of "I just can't seem to think today" or "he is a competent thinker" -- is driven by doubt in the form of an exerienced contradiction is not a modern idea but has its origins at the very beginning of philosophy in the West in the practice of the dialectical craft of Socrates. Let me quote myself, from a paper I wrote a few years back, on the Socratic tradition in philosophy, which I claim to be the proper logical tradition to which we should be putting Peirce in relation In its origins Socratic dialectic probably developed as a modification of practices of eristic dispute that made use of the reductio techniques of the mathematicians, perhaps as especially modified by the Parmenidean formalists. Socratic dialectic differs importantly from the earlier argumentation, though, in at least two major respects, first, by conceiving of the elenchic or refutational aspect of the argumentation not as a basis from which one could then derive a positive conclusion either as the contradictory of the proposition refuted, as in reductio argumentation, or by affirming the alternative because it was the sole alternative available, but rather as inducing an aporia or awareness of an impasse in thought: subjectively, a bewilderment or puzzlement. Second, it differs also by using the conflicting energies held in suspense in the aporia as the motivation of inquiry. (Ransdell, "Peirce and the Socratic Tradition
[peirce-l] Fw: Memorial: Arnold Shepperson
Fprwarded to PEIRCE-L for Keyan Tomaselli: A memorial for Arnold Shepperson- Forwarded Message From: Keyan Tomaselli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: undisclosed-recipientsSent: Tuesday, October 3, 2006 5:06:49 AMSubject: Memorial: Arnold SheppersonA memorial has been organised to pay our last respects to Arnold:Venue: Grobler Room, Afrikaans, Howard College, UKZNDate: Friday 6 OctoberTime: 1.15pmCondolences have been received from all over the world. Many ofArnold's colleagues have inquired about the possibility of donating toa fund for the education of Arnold's adopted young son, Eddie-Lou Please lodge any cash donations (of any amount) with Ms Santie Strong,CCMS Postgraduate Administrator. Alternatively and preferably, pleasedeposit your donation in: Name of account: Arnold SheppersonABSA Flexi Save account no. 917-200-1854Branch Code: 632005Swift code: ABSA ZAJJCards and e-mailed condolences can be sent to Keyan. These will bepassed on to the family. Keyan Tomaselli, Ruth Teer-Tomaselli, Marc Caldwell and graduatestudents, CCMSJohn Collier and Julia Clare (Philosophy)Please find our Email Disclaimer here: http://www.ukzn.ac.za/disclaimer/ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Fw: Obituaries: Arnold Shepperson
Forwarded to PEIRCE-L for Keyan Tomaselli: two obituaries for Arnold Shepperson- Forwarded Message From: Keyan Tomaselli <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]Sent: Tuesday, October 3, 2006 2:27:18 AMSubject: Obituaries: Arnold SheppersonDear JoeArnold spoke of you often, he valued your debate and engagementimensely. He introduced your work to me. His sudden passing is a realshock to all of us. I wondered whether you might be able to post oneor both of the obituaries below on the Peirce List?Many thanks Keyan TomaselliKEYAN TOMASELLIArnold Shepperson passed away on 29 September, 2006.UKZN(University of KwaZulu-Natal) and the communities of scholars his workhas impacted have all lost a great scholar, a committed intellectual,and a wonderful colleague. He died of a heart attack. Arnold servedfor a time as editor of the "Under Fire" section of Critical Arts, andco-wrote with me (and Joe Muller) a number of papers on the impact andhstory of the journal.A CCMS Honours and MA graduate, Arnold was employed by CCMS at varioustimes since he joined us in 1991 as a researcher, project consultant andstudent research advisor. He mentored numerous students in the PublicHealth Promotion via Education Entertainment (EE) Honours module, wasconsulted by students on their MA and PhD dissertations and theses, andhe worked extensively with me on a variety of both University andcontract research projects. Arnold was a key member of CCMS andsignificantly helped to build its research and publication capacity overthe past 16 years. He introduced a strong philosophical component to ourcultural studies work and debates, guiding us in the process towards aunique form of cultural studies globally. During his association with ushe co-authored scores of peer reviewed publications which appeared inboth local and international journals. Arnold was a leading contributorto international debates on CS Peirce, a US philosopher on pragmatismand semiotics, and he served for many years as one of the two SouthAfrican representatives on the Council of the International Associationfor Semiotic Studies. Arnold started his professional career as an industrial electrician onthe mines in the Witwatersrand. He registered at the University ofNatal at the age of 36, completing his undergraduate degree inPhilosophy and English. His goal was very specific: to learn about whyengineering professionals failed to heed warnings about safety issues inmine shafts. He was concerned about how the notion of `safety' wasconstructed by mine management, and he served as an expert witness forthe union with regard to one accident when a number of miners werekilled. Arnold raised funds while a PhD student in the Centre forCultural and Media Studies (CCMS) to conduct a contract research projectfor the Safety in Mines Advisory Committee in which he explored thesemiotics of hazard. His report engaged assumptions about cultures ofsafety and he suggested ways of engaging discourses about safety inrelation to implementation of culturally appropriate diagnosticmechanisms. This was also partly the subject of his PhD, which drewadditionally on his contributions to my Kalahari "from Observation toDevelopment" research project, in which he played a key theoreticalrole. Arnold significantly contributed also to the writing up of theDepartment of Health's Beyond Awareness I media and education strategyin the mid-1990s, developed under the auspices of the Minister'sAdvisory Committee on HIV/AIDS and STDs. The EE module introducedlater gave him an opportunity to thus also apply his talents onempirical projects undertaken by the many students whom he mentored.Arnold was accepted to Honours graduate study in CCMS in 1991 when hewas introduced to CS Peirce's work, a conceptual trajectory in which hewas soon to specialize and in which he became internationally renowned. He published by himself and and co-authored articles in journals on thetopic of semiotics in S - European Journal for Semiotic Studies, SocialSemiotics, Acta Fennica Semiotica, and worked with me also on numerousother articles and book chapters. His contribution to ongoing debatevia the web-based Peirce List was often positively commented on by hisand our peers. Arnold's influence on my own work is well known, and ourclose research and publishing partnership continues to date, with anumber of papers still in press and in preparation. Arnold was probablythe most accomplished Perciean scholar in South Africa.Work done by Arnold in the late 1990s on the National ResearchFoundation sponsored State of the Discipline: Communication Studiesreport, is well known to the South African communication and mediastudies scholars. This work was published in Communicare and EcquidNovi, and two international journals. Arnold's work will via thisproject have impacted nationally on the discipline. Many members of theSA Communication Association (SACOMM) will have interacted with Arnoldat its annual
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce on personality, individualism and science
Gary F.
I don't doubt your sincerity, only your California style dharma. You might
find Dan Leighton's Compassionate Faces more useful than Dogen; I don't know
how you got from Dogen to here. In any case, Leighton precedes you in the
New Age applied bodhisattva conception by noting several recent
inductees/nominees, among them Mother Theresa, Bobby Dylan, Gloria Steinem,
Muhammad Ali, and Thich Nhat Hanh.
Best,
Bill Bailey
Bill Bailey
Bill,
I'm on this list because i read Peirce and take him seriously as a
writer whose concepts have some bearing on the conduct of a life -- any
life -- and my working assumption is that others are here for similar
reasons. Likewise, my interest in the bodhisattva concept arises from my
reading of texts which represent it in a context relevant to the actual
conduct of a life (or a sentient being, to use the Buddhist term). These
texts include the Lotus Sutra and a broad range of Buddhist writers and
translators ancient and modern (especially Dogen) who also take the
concept seriously. I don't profess to be a Buddhist, just as i don't
profess to be a scientist or any kind of specialist, because i don't see
such professions as being relevant: i'm here as a reader, and if i'm
going to discuss any concept drawn from my reading, the discussion will
have to be based on the texts in question. In those terms, i don't see
our exchange here as very relevant either, so pardon me if my responses
are abrupt.
Bill [re the Gita]: It is not a politico telling Arjuna what his social
duty is; it is a god telling a human what his duty is to God. I suppose
gods tend to be a bit totalitarian, but that's just the way they are.
gary: Gods do tend to come across that way in the monotheistic Abrahamic
traditions; whether that transcendent alpha-male quality should be read
into the immanent gods of the Vedic tradition is another question.
(Hmmm, now i seem to be the one making an East/West distinction; isn't
that odd? But maybe you also consider the Abrahamic religions as
"Eastern"; that would be reasonable, since their region of origin is
what we now call the "Middle East", but it's not what i thought you had
in mind.)
Bill: ... you gut the doctrine of all its stringencies, as if they were
yours to explain away, and leave only a pale image of Buddhism.
gary: From here, it looks like you're the one who doesn't take the
bodhisattva vow seriously or recognize the stringencies involved in
living by it.
What i am referring to under that name is simply a person who
has taken the bodhisattva vow and is actually living as if he means
it.
Bill: Why don't you try bouncing this conception off a traditional
Buddhist and see if he or she recognizes it.
gary: My conception is drawn directly (with some rewording) from the
likes of Dogen, Thich Nhat Hanh, etc. I'm sure there are many who call
themselves Buddhists and see the concept differently, but if that's what
you mean by a "traditional Buddhist", i don't see their testimony as
relevant. (Likewise i'd rather read Peirce than consult a "traditional
Peircean".) The point here is not at all to describe what the Buddhist
masses believe.
Bill: What if, for example, Buddhist logic is not rooted in the social
principle? Would that affect your claim? Or is it, as I feel, just the
general similarity that you are interested in.
gary: If Buddhist "logic" were so different from Peircean logic as to be
"not rooted in the social principle", then nobody could understand or
use it at all -- including you and me. And yes, it is the general
similarity that i'm interested in; but as Peirce says, you must
"consider that, according to the principle which we are tracing out, a
connection between ideas is itself a general idea, and that a general
idea is a living feeling" (EP1, 330). Starting with a general
similarity, you can always make distinctions, but doing so doesn't
always advance the inquiry.
gary F.
}Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already
enough names. One must know when to stop. [Tao Te Ching 32
(Feng/English)]{
gnoxic studies }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm
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[peirce-l] Re: What "fundamental psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
Dear Gene, 28.9.2006 kello 07:59, Eugene Halton kirjoitti: If I understand your criticism that the social should not be excluded from the method of tenacity, you are saying that much research today goes on under Darwin-like survival of the fittest rules: research by tenacity in a competitive social milieu, individuals forced by the game to stick to their prior thought which gave them their success. Are you saying that through the competitive social milieu, in pushing individuals into tenacity, the social is thereby ingredient in the method of tenacity? Or that methodically tenacious individuals, in aiming for competitive social success, thereby reveal the social within the method of tenacity? I'm not sure. On the main, yes, but this was not exactly what I had in mind. You wrote in your previous post: A tenaciously held belief is still social, as any habit is. Yet the social is excluded from the method of tenacity. What you believe by tenacity may also be social and learned, or perhaps social and instinctive, but believed in because you simply continue to believe in it, regardless of others' beliefs. It was the way you considered social to be excluded, and tenaciously held belief as something having nothing to do with others' beliefs, which I did not quite agree with. A belief, being a habit, is held as long as it works. And the reason it works - or does not work - may be mainly social, (also including others' beliefs). But it need not be authority. Individuals may not be forced (by authority) to stick to their beliefs, if it just works to do so. Or maybe I should soften what I said in previous post to viewing the social as only indirectly involved in the method of tenacity? Tenacity seems to me to be about imposing one's way on experience. Well, on second thoughts, I think one could say that the social is not essentially involved in the CONCEPT of the method of tenacity, although it is necessarily involved in using the method. But in the concept of the method of authority the social IS essentially involved, because "authority" presupposes two positions, being a dual relation, with one or more believers and at least one believed. This, I assume, is in agreement with your "progressively broadening social conceptions", only taken from a different aspect. The you wrote: I am also familiar with the funding approach you describe, through some encounters with the MacArthur Foundation way back. I spent one evening with Jonas Salk and Rod MacArthur (shortly before he died), who were talking about the five year fellowships the foundation had started, with no applications or conditions. Salk described it as a way to develop something like intellectual "spore heads" that could have time to pursue their ideas unencumbered, then disseminate. About a year later I also got to play with Salk and some of his "spore heads" at another meeting, which involved a tour of the Art Institute in Chicago. We were in an Andy Warhol exhibit, a room of large silver floating balloons shaped like pillows. Salk and others, including me, laughing and bouncing balloons around, as though in an amusement park. What was this, the method of musement? -A "method," not of fixing belief, but of loosening it! Yes, the method of musement, absolutely! The question is, is it critically adopted, or just indulged in. (In analogy to using unlimited funds reasonably or just sloshing money around). In "Neglegted Argument..." Peirce recommends that about 5-10 % of one's working hours should be spent musing. No doubt this was based on some part of his over 20 000 cards "about the size of a postcard", on which he wrote down e.g. detailed and methodical observations on his own experiences. I, for my part, have found out that about 10 -15% works out best. Anyway, the main point is that Peirce found it reasonable to use both kinds of methods, those of fixing AND those of loosening one's beliefs. With fixing, one should take critical approach in, with loosening, one should take it out. For the reason that one's beliefs get fixed by themselves, uncontrollably, so the question is are they critically fixed or not. All of them never can be at once (i.e. collectively), but some of them can, any time. On the other hand, one can deliberately choose to loosen one's ideas, if one has a method which works. Peirce recommends musement. Best, Kirsti Kirsti Määttänen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
[peirce-l] Re: What
I agree with you, Jim, that Peirce must have thought that the statement about the aim of inquiry must be pretty close, at least, to being a psychological law. I claimed as much in my post. It's nevertheless a somewhat puzzling claim. Precisely because, as you note, the (alleged) fact that doubt is necessary for inquiry does not directly settle the question about the aim of inquiry, it's a bit peculiar that Peirce called his claim about the aim of inquiry a psychological law. Generalizations about what some people desire when they inquire won't get us anywhere near the status of a law. Even a generalization about what all inquirers in fact "desire when they inquire seems to fall far short of nomological status. Peirce seems to be talking about an aim that is internal to inquiry in the way that checkmate is internal to playing chess (though the motivations for chess-playing can be quite various). Nobody would be tempted to say that the aim of chess is a psychological law or fact. But Peirce seems to be claiming, not just in "Fixation" but in many other places, that the aim of the activity of inquiry can be derived from psychological (i.e. psychical) facts. And he also seems to claim that an activity doesn't count as inquiry unless it is done from a certain aim (or maybe even from certain motivations). So these psychical facts about doubt and belief are doing a lot of peculiar and intriguing work for Peirce. Best, Jeff -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Date: Mon, 02 Oct 2006 12:49:49 -0400 Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? J Kasser says, "It's not easy to see how Peirce could have considered "the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry" a psychical or a psychological law. It seems charitable here to see Peirce as writing a bit casually once again and to construe him as meaning that the statement in question is a normative truth more or less forced on us by psychological (i.e. psychical) facts. But, as the following quote from another of your messages indicates, Peirce was pretty quick to close the is/ought gap with respect to this issue: The following axiom requires no comment, beyond the remark that it seems often to be forgotten. Where there is no real doubt or disagreement there is no question and can be no real investigation. So perhaps he really meant that a statement about the aim of iqnuiry could be a (coenscopic) psychological law. " (end) The question is whether "the settlement of opinion is the sole object of inquiry" is a normative truth or a psychological law. The fact that doubt is a necessary condition for inquiry does not settle this question. It merely suggests what is required for any inquiry to begin. Peirce does not say "the settlement of inquiry ought to be the sole object of inquiry." Thus, the statement is a generalization about what all (some?) men desire when they inquire. It is the major premise in a practical syllogism. The conclusion is the normative claim that we ought to pursue the scientific method. Maybe there is an implicit premise that we ought to pursue the best method for settling opinion. This might satisfy those concerned with the "naturalistic fallacy." Peirce overstates his case about his own psychologism. His statement about the "origin of truth" is unfortunate. He should have spoken of either a "desire for truth" originating in the impulse to self-consistency or of "belief." In the latter case, it makes perfectly good sense to talk about psychological concepts such as self-control, satisfaction, conviction, habit etc. The interesting question is whether we can make sense of practical reason and talk of ends and actions without the introduction of psychological concepts. The problem here has less to do with replacing psychologizing tendencies with phenomenological observations than with using the "intentional idom" to assess practical reason. I have always thought of FOB as an "ethics of inquiry." And unless one wants to try and eliminate the concepts involved in moral psychology, they are always there as a conceptual resource for articulating the normative basis of methodology in the sciences. It appears then, that logical methodology is based on ethics. Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Sun, 1 Oct 2006 3:04 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to? Joe and other listers, Thanks, Joe, for your kind words about my paper. I fear that you make the paper sound a bit more interesting than it is, and you certainly do a better job of establishing its importance than I did. It's something of a cut-and paste job from my dissertation, and I'm afraid the prose is sometimes rather "dissertationy," which is almost never a good thing. First, as to the question in the headin
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce on personality, individualism and science
Bill,
I'm on this list because i read Peirce and take him seriously as a
writer whose concepts have some bearing on the conduct of a life -- any
life -- and my working assumption is that others are here for similar
reasons. Likewise, my interest in the bodhisattva concept arises from my
reading of texts which represent it in a context relevant to the actual
conduct of a life (or a sentient being, to use the Buddhist term). These
texts include the Lotus Sutra and a broad range of Buddhist writers and
translators ancient and modern (especially Dogen) who also take the
concept seriously. I don't profess to be a Buddhist, just as i don't
profess to be a scientist or any kind of specialist, because i don't see
such professions as being relevant: i'm here as a reader, and if i'm
going to discuss any concept drawn from my reading, the discussion will
have to be based on the texts in question. In those terms, i don't see
our exchange here as very relevant either, so pardon me if my responses
are abrupt.
Bill [re the Gita]: It is not a politico telling Arjuna what his social
duty is; it is a god telling a human what his duty is to God. I suppose
gods tend to be a bit totalitarian, but that's just the way they are.
gary: Gods do tend to come across that way in the monotheistic Abrahamic
traditions; whether that transcendent alpha-male quality should be read
into the immanent gods of the Vedic tradition is another question.
(Hmmm, now i seem to be the one making an East/West distinction; isn't
that odd? But maybe you also consider the Abrahamic religions as
"Eastern"; that would be reasonable, since their region of origin is
what we now call the "Middle East", but it's not what i thought you had
in mind.)
Bill: ... you gut the doctrine of all its stringencies, as if they were
yours to explain away, and leave only a pale image of Buddhism.
gary: From here, it looks like you're the one who doesn't take the
bodhisattva vow seriously or recognize the stringencies involved in
living by it.
> What i am referring to under that name is simply a person who
> has taken the bodhisattva vow and is actually living as if he means
> it.
Bill: Why don't you try bouncing this conception off a traditional
Buddhist and see if he or she recognizes it.
gary: My conception is drawn directly (with some rewording) from the
likes of Dogen, Thich Nhat Hanh, etc. I'm sure there are many who call
themselves Buddhists and see the concept differently, but if that's what
you mean by a "traditional Buddhist", i don't see their testimony as
relevant. (Likewise i'd rather read Peirce than consult a "traditional
Peircean".) The point here is not at all to describe what the Buddhist
masses believe.
Bill: What if, for example, Buddhist logic is not rooted in the social
principle? Would that affect your claim? Or is it, as I feel, just the
general similarity that you are interested in.
gary: If Buddhist "logic" were so different from Peircean logic as to be
"not rooted in the social principle", then nobody could understand or
use it at all -- including you and me. And yes, it is the general
similarity that i'm interested in; but as Peirce says, you must
"consider that, according to the principle which we are tracing out, a
connection between ideas is itself a general idea, and that a general
idea is a living feeling" (EP1, 330). Starting with a general
similarity, you can always make distinctions, but doing so doesn't
always advance the inquiry.
gary F.
}Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already
enough names. One must know when to stop. [Tao Te Ching 32
(Feng/English)]{
gnoxic studies }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm
---
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[peirce-l] Re: What "fundamenal psychological laws" is Peirce referring to?
Jeff,
I take your point that some circles are much more vicious than others,
and that Peirce was "very concerned about avoiding what he takes to be
vicious circularities in philosophy". And agree that it's not always
easy to sort out the vicious circles from the others.
[[ Peirce was very concerned about building claims that couldn't be
established by the coenscopic sciences into the goals and methods of
inquiry, because he feared that they would then be placed beyond the
possibility of falsification through inquiry. ]]
Actually i found myself taking a line like that a couple of months ago,
in a review of a book on animal and human cognition. Some of the
contributors argue for a discontinuity between human consciousness and
that of other primates, and claim that this thesis is testable (i.e.
falsifiable). That there's an enormous *difference* is beyond question,
i think, but i'm enough of a "synechist" to have doubts about a
discontinuity. Anyway, in my review (online at
http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/MissingLink.htm ), i pointed to what i see
as a circularity in their method of testing.
I don't know whether Peirce would see my own logic there as valid, but i
think the question may be relevant here in that that part of Peirce's
concern about "psychologism" was that it made reasoning too "human"
(i.e. made its range of application was too specialized) -- as when he
refers to "the psychological or accidental human element" (CP1.537), or
says that "A subtle and almost ineradicable narrowness in the conception
of Normative Science runs through almost all modern philosophy in making
it relate exclusively to the human mind" (CP 5.128). But i'm not sure
that i'm reading Peirce right in this respect.
gary F.
}Once the whole is divided, the parts need names. There are already
enough names. One must know when to stop. [Tao Te Ching 32
(Feng/English)]{
gnoxic studies }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm
---
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[peirce-l] [Fwd: Memorial: Arnold Shepperson]
List, I am forwarding information regarding a memorial for Arnold Shepperson. In addition, I have just heard from Keyan Tomaselli that rights to publish the Safundi article he co-authored with Arnold have been granted so that it may be placed on Arisbe. Links to other articles may also be provided. Gary A memorial has been organised to pay our last respects to Arnold: Venue: Grobler Room, Afrikaans, Howard College, UKZN Date: Friday 6 October Time: 1.15pm Condolences have been received from all over the world. Many of Arnold's colleagues have inquired about the possibility of donating to a fund for the education of Arnold's adopted young son, Eddie-Lou Please lodge any cash donations (of any amount) with Ms Santie Strong, CCMS Postgraduate Administrator. Alternatively and preferably, please deposit your donation in: Name of account: Arnold Shepperson ABSA Flexi Save account no. 917-200-1854 Branch Code: 632005 Swift code: ABSA ZAJJ Cards and e-mailed condolences can be sent to Keyan. These will be passed on to the family. Keyan Tomaselli, Ruth Teer-Tomaselli, Marc Caldwell and graduate students, CCMS John Collier and Julia Clare (Philosophy) Please find our Email Disclaimer here: http://www.ukzn.ac.za/disclaimer/ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: [peirce-l] Arisbe archives availability
Jamie, Joe, Is there a possibility of setting up a dedicated server for Arisbe at your university, at the Peirce Edition Project offices in Indy, or some similar venue such as the Peirce Project at U Montreal or some other university? If I can figure out the technicalities of how we might incorporate it into the Peirce Publishing web site at http://www.peircepublishing.com, I'd be willing to give it free space as a public service to our community. Irving Irving Anellis [EMAIL PROTECTED] or [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.peircepublishing.com On Tue Oct 3 4:44 , Jaime Nubiola <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> sent: Dear colleagues, While Arisbe is down, it is possible the get access to how was Arisbe in March 2005 and earlier, through the Internet Archive WayBackMachine (http://www.archive.org/index.php). Best, Jaime Denis and list: The ARISBE website is temporarily down, with a possibility that it might be permanently down at its present location and have to be reopened elsewhere. The Door -- the IPS that has been hosting it gratis -- was apparently taken over by a national networking company and it may not be possible -- or desirable if it is possible -- to keep it going there. I am waiting to hear back from somebody at The Door on this, and will let everybody know on this as soon as I find out something. Two things important to understand: first, I have several complete up-to-date copies of the website stored on several different media and restoration is just a matter of pushing a few buttons once suitable arrangements are made, which I will do as quickly as possible if it is necessary to move it in order to restore it. I don't want to make more than one such move, though, because of the complications and possible confusions implicit in such a move. Second, the PEIRCE-L forum is not systemically connected with the ARISBE website and whatever happens there has no effect on the workings of the listserver which provides the physical basis of this forum. Joe Ransdell -- manager of PEIRCE-L and of the website ARISBE [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce on personality, individualism and science
Gary, thanks for this quote, which i'm pretty sure i haven't seen
before -- i wouldn't have thought Peirce would talk about a
"Buddhisto-christian religion"!
> CP 1.673. . .. the supreme commandment of the Buddhisto-christian
> religion is, to generalize, to complete the whole system even until
> continuity results and the distinct individuals weld together. Thus it
> is, that while reasoning and the science of reasoning strenuously
> proclaim the subordination of reasoning to sentiment, the very supreme
> commandment of sentiment is that man should generalize, or what the
> logic of relatives shows to be the same thing, should become welded
> into the universal continuum, which is what true reasoning consists
> in. But this does not reinstate reasoning, for this generalization
> should come about, not merely in man's cognitions, which are but the
> superficial film of his being, but objectively in the deepest
> emotional springs of his life. In fulfilling this command, man
> prepares himself for transmutation into a new form of life, the joyful
> Nirvana in which the discontinuities of his will shall have all but
> disappeared.
It does accord pretty closely with what i was thinking; and so does
everything in your later post (below), including the other Peirce
passages you found:
- Original Message -
...
I would suggest that the ideal of the scientific method requires a
authentic scientific personality as Peirce conceived it, the kind of
person who, like Peirce, was willing to offer his life to the pursuit of
truth in those areas in which he was most likely to significantly
contribute. But this tendency ought to be alive not only in scientists
but in all of us to some extent--this desire to help make the world a
more reasonable place where "it is 'up to us' to do so".
> CP 1.615 The one thing whose admirableness is not due to an ulterior
> reason is Reason itself comprehended in all its fullness, so far as we
> can comprehend it. Under this conception, the ideal of conduct will be
> to execute our little function in the operation of the creation by
> giving a hand toward rendering the world more reasonable whenever, as
> the slang is, it is "up to us" to do so. In logic, it will be observed
> that knowledge is reasonableness; and the ideal of reasoning will be
> to follow such methods as must develope knowledge the most speedily. .
> . .
But Peirce suggests that in the true scientist that this represents a
kind of religious commitment involving a strong sense of duty,
sacrifice, faith in the reality of God (as this is presented in the N.A.
and elsewhere), and so forth. While you are no doubt correct that Peirce
emphasized the communal nature of science, there is yet an individual
contribution to be made beyond this veritable sacrifice of all other
concerns to this compelling scientific pursuit. Commenting on the extent
to which Peirce emphasized the communal you wrote:
>GF: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .Peirce did not, to my knowledge,
>put as much emphasis on that last point as he did on the collective,
>public, social, communal nature of true science (as opposed to the more
>mundane enterprise which *he* sometimes called "art" or "practice" --
>obviously my sense of "practice" is different.) His emphasis was
>appropriate for the cultural milieu in which he wrote. For my own part,
>i'd say that the key principle here is the creative tension between
>individual and community: the individual who merely conforms to
>communal
>habits does not contribute to its development.
>
I would suggest that the "creative tension between individual and
community" was always there in Peirce, and even in the scientific method
as he conceived it. After all, abduction tends to be--if it is not
exclusively--a personal matter (even when several scientists abduce the
same hypothesis at more or less the same time).
---
Yes, exactly -- thank you!
gary F.
}No wise fish would go anywhere without a porpoise. [the Mock Turtle]{
gnoxic studies }{ http://users.vianet.ca/gnox/gnoxic.htm
---
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[peirce-l] Arisbe archives availability
Title: Arisbe archives availability Dear colleagues, While Arisbe is down, it is possible the get access to how was Arisbe in March 2005 and earlier, through the Internet Archive WayBackMachine (http://www.archive.org/index.php). Best, Jaime Denis and list: The ARISBE website is temporarily down, with a possibility that it might be permanently down at its present location and have to be reopened elsewhere. The Door -- the IPS that has been hosting it gratis -- was apparently taken over by a national networking company and it may not be possible -- or desirable if it is possible -- to keep it going there. I am waiting to hear back from somebody at The Door on this, and will let everybody know on this as soon as I find out something. Two things important to understand: first, I have several complete up-to-date copies of the website stored on several different media and restoration is just a matter of pushing a few buttons once suitable arrangements are made, which I will do as quickly as possible if it is necessary to move it in order to restore it. I don't want to make more than one such move, though, because of the complications and possible confusions implicit in such a move. Second, the PEIRCE-L forum is not systemically connected with the ARISBE website and whatever happens there has no effect on the workings of the listserver which provides the physical basis of this forum. Joe Ransdell -- manager of PEIRCE-L and of the website ARISBE [EMAIL PROTECTED] --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
