[peirce-l] Re: What's going on here?
Frances to Gary... It does seem that Peirce did not, in his available writings to us, use the term intermediate in any formal or categorical manner. To use the term intermediate informally or casually as a thirdness as he often did, in regard to say continuity and synechism as you noted, would however perhaps defeat the term mediate as an alternate for thirdness; but so be it. In regard to the term direct it does seem to be say an iconic firstness, at least when used in seeking the initial proof of connectivity among premisses and conclusions in logical arguments, but not as a thirdness in the way intermediate might be, because the term indirect is used by Peirce as say a symbolic thirdness. The direct and the indirect are seemingly formal terms for him, while intermediate is not. The formal contrast at least in proof therefore is perhaps not so much between direct and intermediate as you suggested, but rather might be between direct and indirect as he often stated. It would be tidy for me in my statements about Peirce to align these terms as immediate and intermediate and mediate and as direct and redirect and direct but only if they properly expressed and conveyed his ideas, even as synonyms; yet he seemingly did not so align them, and there you have it. As you further mused in offering us an additional Peircean passage, the proof Peirce refers to in arguments may qualify him eventually as an authority on authority but only if he initially arrived at his conclusions through empirical means. If the authorship and ownership or messenger of a stated conclusion are important at all, given its necessary empirical foundation of course, they would then be perhaps extra logical rather than being merely illogical. In regard to the inner state of desire among semioticians or logicians, in their wishing or willing or wanting to seek truth in the first place, it might be held as an innate inclined trait; and thus aligned as habitual tendency, along with obstinate stubborn tenacity, and ruling authority. These methods of arriving at proof and truth, aside from any desire to attain them, are however not empirical; yet some senseless and illogical desire for them seems ever present. This desire for humans to be rational and reasonable is certainly a drive in the intellectual and scientific process, probably the outcome of evolution, but it seemingly cannot be accounted for by logic on its own solely alone. It would seem that objective logic must hence allow and admit some degree of psychologistic subjectivism after all. This may go to explaining why abduction is best located as an immediate or initial kind of inferred judgement, before empirical induction and eventual deduction. The desire might of course also be neatly aligned with direct monstration in finding logical proof. Gary wrote... Frances writes My access to digital versions of Peircean writings is limited, but it would be interesting to seek and find out how many occasions the term intermediate appears in his texts, if indeed it has not already been done and posted to the list archive. A search for intermediate in the Collected Papers gives 46 hits. He seems to use the word mostly in connection with continuity (as per his doctrine of synechism) and thus with Thirdness. For instance: A fork in a road is a third, it supposes three ways; a straight road, considered merely as a connection between two places is second, but so far as it implies passing through intermediate places it is third Continuity represents Thirdness almost to perfection (CP 3.337). In CP 4.75 (Thomas's selection) i don't see a clear distinction between the immediate and the direct, but i do see an implied contrast between intermediate and direct. By the way, i came across another paragraph in Peirce that strikes me as very similar in tone and content to CP.475, though it is differently framed: [[[ Some persons fancy that bias and counter-bias are favorable to the extraction of truth--that hot and partisan debate is the way to investigate. This is the theory of our atrocious legal procedure. But Logic puts its heel upon this suggestion. It irrefragably demonstrates that knowledge can only be furthered by the real desire for it, and that the methods of obstinacy, of authority, and every mode of trying to reach a foregone conclusion, are absolutely of no value. These things are proved. The reader is at liberty to think so or not as long as the proof is not set forth, or as long as he refrains from examining it. Just so, he can preserve, if he likes, his freedom of opinion in regard to the propositions of geometry; only, in that case, if he takes a fancy to read Euclid, he will do well to skip whatever he finds with A, B, C, etc., for, if he reads attentively that disagreeable matter, the freedom of his opinion about geometry may unhappily be lost forever. ]]] -- CP 2.635, EP1 193 I wonder, would the proof Peirce refers to here qualify him as an authority on authority? ---
[peirce-l] Re: What's going on here?
Frances to listers... This curiosity of mine is about the term intermediate as used by Peirce in the passage quoted below. It is a thread however that seems related to the topic. The use of the term intermediate by Peirce may of course have been merely a casual one, rather than strictly a categorical one. It is tempting however to align it categorically and thus tridentially as mediate and intermediate and mediate, where the intermediate might embrace the dynamic and energetic and clearly the indexic. Nevertheless, the intent by Peirce might have been to broadly include both indexes and symbols under the raw intermediate umbrella. There is also a clear distinction here in the passage between the immediate and the direct, which presumably are not to be identified as similar, because the term immediate is not used. My access to digital versions of Peircean writings is limited, but it would be interesting to seek and find out how many occasions the term intermediate appears in his texts, if indeed it has not already been done and posted to the list archive. The necessity for a sign directly monstrative of the connection of premiss and conclusion is susceptible of proof. The proof is as follows. When we contemplate the premiss, we mentally perceive that that being true the conclusion is true. I say we perceive it, because clear knowledge follows contemplation without any intermediate process. Since the conclusion becomes certain, there is some state at which it becomes directly certain. Now this no symbol can show; for a symbol is an indirect sign depending on the association of ideas. Hence, a sign directly exhibiting the mode of relation is required. This promised proof presents this difficulty: namely, it requires the reader actually to think in order to see the force of it. That is to say, he must represent the state of things considered in a direct imaginative way. (Charles Peirce, Collected Papers, CP 4.75) --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Panopedia
Steven... Aside from the issues of objective intent and textual authorship, the promise of an open and free internet with its unpoliced websites and networks that are responsible and reasonable is regrettably as yet unfulfilled. Even the serious lists continue to be filled with trivial atopical nonsense. Expert thinkers furthermore still covet their sound ideas, and in my experience are hesitant to post and store them in such an unpredictable environment. Striking a balance for the serious lists on the internet between being opened and closed or free and fee is obviously being worked and tooled by specialists in the field, and is cause for some optimism. This very site is perhaps a good example of it, for which the manager or owner in his kind wisdom should be applauded. (Forgive this injection, but by any logical or semiotic stretch, the message with its intent or effect is not the messenger, any more than the interpretant sign is the interpreter. Logically, it is pointless and meaningless and useless to say attack the messenger or the interpreter of a sign who merely expedites it. Any alternative in logic wrongly resorts to some form of psychologistic subjectivism or linguistic nominalism. The exception might be in finding the motive of desire for signers in seeking the logical truth of a sign initially in their efforts. This is a preliminary state of thought that logic seemingly cannot account for solely on its own alone. This may very well be the reason why abductive inference is available to mind, but then this too is an objective kind of logic. The solution to this problem of course is objective relativism, where the signer is held to be brought into a relation with the message they sense, rather than with their inner sense of the message, because it is after all the message that is said to be say nice or valid or sound or true.) Steven partly wrote... I am most firmly convinced that there is no message without a messenger; i.e. any message without a clearly identifiable messenger is simply meaningless. By which I mean literally without intent; absent the embodiment of meaning in a message creator. We are deceived if we believe that there is intent in any message in which the messenger cannot be clearly identified or identified by proxy through a transparent identity. We would do as well to consider astrology. Hence, from this point of view, almost everything that is in the Wikipedia is meaningless. Despite your criticism of elitism, you advocate aristocracy. I am not an aristocrat. Each idea I give out freely provides me with bills to pay. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Panopedia
Steven... This message may be an aside, but the principle of evolutionary love as it is understood by me might be well applied to the act of science. It states that objects and here thinkers should give of themselves and thus their ideas freely, for its own intrinsic sake, with no ulterior motive, and expect nothing in return for the effort. This ideal implies to me that it is the message that is important, and not the messenger. It also neatly disposes of personal ego and material profit. This principle of course was posited by Peirce well before the promising internet and its open websites existed, if indeed this fact makes any difference. The need for identifying the messenger is in my opinion overstated and overrated. It too often smacks of celebrity elitism, and lionizes the messenger to the detriment of the message. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
