[peirce-l] Re: What
What??!! From: "Claudio Guerri" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Peirce Discussion Forum" Subject: [peirce-l] Re: WhatDate: Mon, 9 Oct 2006 11:09:51 -0300 List, I could not follow the last discussion on tenacity and related items in all details, since I was in Memphis and now in Pittsburgh and with no much time nor easy access to Internet. But I think (I only think) that Peirce maid his best efforts in the direction of Logic-Semiotic-Philosophy. Even if he was aware of psychological aspects of thought, inquiry and so on, psychology and/or psychoanalysis are not his more developed fields. Even if Peirce is a kind of Leonardo da Vinci of his time we should (I just propose) change from Peirce to Freud and Lacan (and others) to find more specific information on items like 'reasons' or 'modalities' of inquiry that are not just logical or semiotical reasons. I wrote already about a book of Michel Balat (I don't have the title here, but it's from the same editor as the last book of Bernard Morand). The text or research is already some years old but only recently edited (no so carefully edited as Bernard's one). It is on the concrete relation of Lacan's development of the psychoanalytic theory after having participated (apparently also with Louis Althusser) in a seminar by Recanati on Peirce. Perhaps somebody of the List knows a way of making an English translation of that book... all Percians with some interest in psychological aspects will enjoy it very much... I can tell. Best Claudio [EMAIL PROTECTED] - Original Message - From: Clark Goble To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Monday, October 09, 2006 1:58 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: What On Oct 8, 2006, at 7:52 PM, Juffras, Angelo wrote: Tenacity is not a method of inquiry. A person who is tenacious does not doubt and hence has no annoying disturbance that would require him to inquire. He knows.I'm not sure that is true. There are those who doubt in many ways but their tenacity in effect "blocks" the practical effects of this doubt. One could I suppose call this a kind of double-belief. Exactly how Peirce would treat it I'm not sure. But I think we all know examples of this. The classic one I use as an example is a person who knows their spouse is cheating on them but is tenacious in stating and defending the fidelity of their spouse. I honestly don't recall Peirce addressing the problem of competing and contradictory beliefs. Does anyone know off the top of their head anything along those lines? The closest I can think of is the passage of 1908 to Lady Welby where he talks about the three modalities of being. Relative to the first, that of possibility, he talks of Ideas. One might say that the *idea* of infidelity, for example, can be accepted as well as its contradiction. So perhaps that's one way of dealing with it.The question then becomes how inquiry relates to these ideas. I'd suggest, as you do, that it would cut off inquiry, but not because of knowledge. Rather, as Joe said earlier, it is the individual doing what they can to stave off the loss of a threatened belief. I think this is that they don't *want* discussion to leave the world of possibility and move to the realm of facts (the second of the three universes).It is interesting to me how many people do *not* want to move from possibilities (how ever probable) to the realm of facts or events.I think rather that tenaciousness is, as Joe suggested, more closely related to appeals to authority and their weakness. I'd also note in The Fixation of Belief that Peirce suggests that doubt works by irritation. "The irritation of doubt causes a struggle to attain a state of belief. I shall term this struggle *inquiry* though it must be admitted that it is sometimes not a very apt designation." (EP 1:114) To me that suggests something like a small boil or irritation on ones skin or small cut in ones mouth. One can neglect it but eventually it will lead to a change in action. As Peirce notes it may not seem like what we call inquiry. Thus his "sometimes not a very apt designation." But so long as it changes our habits, even if it takes time and is slow, then inquiry is progressing.It might be an error to only call a process of inquiry what we are conscious of as a more directed burden of will. Which I believe was Jim W's point a few days ago. Clark Goble ---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] J. Lurac __ __Correo Yahoo!Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ¡gratis! Reg¨strate ya - http://correo.espanol.yahoo.com/ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce-James question
Are you sure? James died August 26, 1910. J. Lurac _ You wrote: I've been away from the list a while and don't know whether this has been discussed before. Perhaps you can help me. I've been concerned with James lately, particularly his comment about Peirce's essay which he found in "comprehensible," despite Peirce's "vocal elucidations," but which "interested me [James] strangely." Despite Peirce's "crabbed" writing, I think James studied the printed essay later and figured it out. I also think - but want some confirmation - that parts of that "strangely interesting" essay influenced James' with respect to the will to believe and with respect to risk. This is not to say that Peirce would have agreed with what James made of Peirce's essay. The essay which James alluded to, in his letter to Bowditch, seems to have been, "The Grounds of Validity of the Laws of Logic," written in 1969. __Correo Yahoo!Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ¡gratis! Reg¨strate ya - http://correo.espanol.yahoo.com/ --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Alase, List: Yes. I shipped my reply to Claudio with an attachment too extensive for to be distributed, according to the Lyris Administrator. The attachment contained a work that Michel Balat sent me 6 years ago, entitled 'Sur le pragmatisme de Peirce ¨ l'usage des psychistes'. Since Claudio had sent me some Michel's biblography, I wanted to complete it a bit. Anyway, I sent him a copy too. Faithfully yours, J. Lurac ALASE _Asociaci¨n Latinoamericana de Semi¨tica_ <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:Jorge, We haven't understood the purpose of your post to Claudio. Would you be able to clarify it?. VTY, AlaseJorge Lurac [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Claudio, List, Just a small bibliographic collaboration. Cheers, J. LuracClaudio Guerri <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Jorge, List, I think that (even if I don't know too much about the exact way in which Lacan "met" Peirce) there is no discussion anymore that Lacan is LACAN after he included Peirce's proposal in his structuralistic approach to Freud. For the conceptual approach you can see "Des fondements s¨miotiques de la psychanalyse. Peirce apr¨s Freud et Lacan" by Michel Balat.Paris: L'Harmattan,
2000. There are 3 triads that are VERY profitable for applied semiotics, each one in it's one way is specific for different tasks: For 1ness For 2ness For 3ness PeirceAlthusser Lacan Firstness Theoretical Practice Imaginary Secondness Economical Practice Real
Thirdness Political Practice Symbolic Since all signs are very complex signs always, we can not reduce everything only to the peircean-logical-aspects. In my view, there are also 3 logical sequences to begin researching on something: 1. The logical approach: beginning by 1ness,possibility; then 2ness, actualization; and 3ness, law or necessity. 2. The study of a concrete case: beginning by Economical Practice (Which are the concrete existent examples? for concrete things, or Which are the behaviors/performances? for abstract concepts); following Political Practice and finally Theoretical Practice. 3. The psychological approach: ("symbols grow"... also for the psychoanalyst) beginning by the Symbolic aspect through
the significant... I will avoid here more details because it is not my competence... but it works wonderful... I can tell... Applied semiotics is accepting to put our feets in the muddy earth... and get dirty!!! All this is not ment as a peircean review. At the same time a thank Ransdell (specially for the List) and others for their "clean" and very necessary work. Best Claudio - Original Message - From: Jorge Lurac To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 4:00 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...Claudio, list I find at least curious the mention of Lacan as a backing for to discuss the Peirce's triadic conception, Claudio. You should remember he was a Peirce's scholar and some of its more important seminars were presented by F. Recanati. J. Lurac---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] __Correo Yahoo!Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ¡gratis! Reg¨strate ya - http://correo.espanol.yahoo.com/ --- Message from
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[peirce-l] Re: Sinsign, Legisign, Qualisign - help! ...real-reality... truth...
Claudio, 2.457-458 are not paragraphs. See A Sketch of Logical Critics on EP 2, pages 451 to 462. J. LuracClaudio Guerri <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Joe, Ben, Jim, List thanks for all information I could not find 'A Sketch of Logical Critics', EP 2.457-458, 1911 because (I suppose) it is in Vol. 2 of EP and 2 is for vol and not paragraph... etc. etc... But I got this in Vol. 1 of EP: The Essential Peirce Nathan Houser, Christian Kloesel, eds. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1992. Volume I (1867-1893) Chapter 5 Frasers The Work of George Berkeley pages 88-91 [...] Yet it is perfectly possible so to state the matter that no one shall fail to comprehend what the question was, and how there might be two opinions about it. Are universals real? We have only to stop and consider a moment what was meant by the word real, when the whole issue soon becomes apparent. Objects are divided into figments, dreams, etc., on the one hand, and realities on the other. The former are those which exist only inasmuch as you or I or some man imagines them; the latter are those which have an existence independent of your mind or mine or that of any number of persons. The real is that which is not whatever we happen to think it, but is unaffected by what we may think of it. The question, therefore, is whether man, horse, and other names of natural classes, correspond with anything which all men, or all horses, really have in common, independent of our thought, or whether these classes are constituted simply by a likeness in the way in which our minds are affected by individual objects which have in themselves no resemblance or relationship whatsoever. Now that this is a real question which different minds will naturally answer in opposite ways, becomes clear when we think that there are two widely separated points of view, from which reality, as just defined, may be regarded. Where is the real, the thing independent of how we think it, to be found? There must be such a thing, for we find our opinions constrained; there is something, therefore, which influences our thoughts, and is not created by them. We have, it is true, nothing immediately present to us but thoughts. Those thoughts, however, have been caused by sensations, and those sensations are constrained by something out of the mind. This thing out of the mind, which directly influences sensation, and through sensation thought, because it is out of the mind, is independent of how we think it, and is, in short, the real. Here is one view of reality, a very familiar one. And from this point of view it is clear that the nominalistic answer must be given to the question concerning universals. For, while from this standpoint it may be admitted to be true as a rough statement that one man is like another, the exact sense being that the realities external to the mind produce sensations which may be embraced under one conception, yet it can by no means be admitted that the two real men have really anything in common, for to say that they are both men is only to say that the one mental term or thought-sign "man" stands indifferently for either of the sensible objects caused by the two external realities; so that not even the two sensations have in themselves anything in common, and far less is it to be inferred that the external realities have. This conception of reality is so familiar, that it is unnecessary to dwell upon it; but the other, or realist conception, if less familiar, is even more natural and obvious. All human thought and opinion contains an arbitrary, accidental element, dependent on the limitations in circumstances, power, and bent of the individual; an element of error, in short. But human opinion universally tends in the long run to a definite form, which is the truth. Let any human being have enough information and exert enough thought upon any question, and the result will be that he will arrive at a certain definite conclusion, which is the same that any other mind will reach under sufficiently favorable circumstances. Suppose two men, one deaf, the other blind. One hears a man declare he means to kill another, hears the report of the pistol, and hears the victim cry; the other sees the murder done. Their sensations are affected in the highest degree with their individual peculiarities. The first information that their sensations will give them, their first inferences, will be more nearly alike, but still different; the one having, for example, the idea of a man shouting, the other of a man with a threatening aspect; but their final conclusions, the thought the remotest from sense, will be identical and free from the one-sidedness of their idiosyncrasies. There is, then, to every question a true answer, a final conclusion, to which the opinion of every man is constantly gravitating. He may for a time recede from it, but give him more experien
[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Claudio, List, Just a small bibliographic collaboration. Cheers, J. LuracClaudio Guerri <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Jorge, List, I think that (even if I don't know too much about the exact way in which Lacan "met" Peirce) there is no discussion anymore that Lacan is LACAN after he included Peirce's proposal in his structuralistic approach to Freud. For the conceptual approach you can see "Des fondements s¨miotiques de la psychanalyse. Peirce apr¨s Freud et Lacan" by Michel Balat.Paris: L'Harmattan, 2000. There are 3 triads that are VERY profitable for applied semiotics, each one in it's one way is specific for different tasks: For 1ness For 2ness For 3ness PeirceAlthusser Lacan Firstness Theoretical Practice Imaginary Secondness Economical Practice Real Thirdness Political
Practice Symbolic Since all signs are very complex signs always, we can not reduce everything only to the peircean-logical-aspects. In my view, there are also 3 logical sequences to begin researching on something: 1. The logical approach: beginning by 1ness,possibility; then 2ness, actualization; and 3ness, law or necessity. 2. The study of a concrete case: beginning by Economical Practice (Which are the concrete existent examples? for concrete things, or Which are the behaviors/performances? for abstract concepts); following Political Practice and finally Theoretical Practice. 3. The psychological approach: ("symbols grow"... also for the psychoanalyst) beginning by the Symbolic aspect through the significant... I will avoid here more details because it is not my competence...
but it works wonderful... I can tell... Applied semiotics is accepting to put our feets in the muddy earth... and get dirty!!! All this is not ment as a peircean review. At the same time a thank Ransdell (specially for the List) and others for their "clean" and very necessary work. Best Claudio - Original Message - From: Jorge Lurac To: Peirce Discussion Forum Sent: Saturday, June 24, 2006 4:00 AM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...Claudio, list I find at least curious the mention of Lacan as a backing for to discuss the Peirce's triadic conception, Claudio. You should remember he was a Peirce's scholar and some of its more important seminars were presented by F. Recanati. J. Lurac---Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] __Correo Yahoo!Espacio para todos tus mensajes, antivirus y antispam ¡gratis! Reg¨strate ya - http://correo.espanol.yahoo.com/
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[peirce-l] Re: A sign as First or third...
Claudio, list I find at least curious the mention of Lacan as a backing for to discuss the Peirce's triadic conception, Claudio. You should remember he was a Peirce's scholar and some of its more important seminars were presented by F. Recanati. J. LuracClaudio Guerri <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> escribi¨: Jim, List, I would like to try a comment on the relation between this two quotes: 1. "A _Sign_, or _Representamen_, is a First which stands in such genuine triadic relation to a Second, called its _Object_, as to be capable of determining a Third, called its _Interpretant..." (CP 2.274) and 2. "A sign is a third mediating between the mind addressed and the object represented". (Trichotomic, p. 281 Bref, [ A Sign is a First ] and [ A sign is a third ] as an apparent contradiction. I have to give up trying to understand the subtle differences in English between capital "First" and little "third"... but even so, something sounds also meaningfull there (even for an Italian leaving head upside-down in Argentina)... Since EVERYTHING is a sign, or everything can only be considered as a sing by humans, and since all discussions can proceed only through signs, etc. etc... (see CP 1.540, 5.283, 5.308, 5.309 and others...), signs can not be a 'definitive-something', or all Peirce's effort could get lost in his most ineresting aspect: the emphasys on relations instead of on taxonomies. On the other side, every sign can be considered in it's 3 aspects (or better 9, or 27, or 81, since, only 3 is mostly a very rough cut into 'reality'... that resists symbolization -Lacan-). In quote 2 we have the sign in context. The sign is considered a little third, 'only' it's thirdness, which is it's most outstanding aspect to fulfill the task of mediation. Only the symbolic aspect is considered here, by using the verbal language (which is lineal and sequential -de Sassure-). Auke's diagrams (or other diagramms too...) could show the same statement without 'erasing' the other two aspects of the different signs involved, just by enphasysing with color the outstanding parts involved in this statement. Here we have a graphic example (forgive me Ben, the outcome could not be uglyer): In quote 1 the sign is considered in it's most complex-difficult aspect, the capital First, which envolves the pure POSSIBILITY, the quali-quantitative-elemental-abstract-knowledge that "opens" the logical 'power' of that sign. The most valuable value of any sign is to know and to be aware (by the 'interpretant') of it's 'firstness'. In that 'possible FIRST' we have the clue of what comes logically 'after'. Signs "grow" (historically) from thirdness to firstness, in opposition of the logical order. Jim Piat says: "...all signs (which are thirds) are also firsts because they have qualities. Likewise all signs are seconds because they exist and have effects. But signs are neither mere Firsts nor mere Seconds". (bold is mine) Each coherent statement, in verbal language, should be constructed logically like quote 2 by relating 1ness, 2ness and 3ness (not necessarily in this order) of three different signs. This parts have not to be explicit in the verbal text. The signs are not mere Firsts nor mere Seconds nor mere Thirds, but the verbal language can give or construct this (terrible) impression. (like in the traditional bad example: the weathervane IS an index...) Jim Piat says: "...I do think Peirce meant for his three trichotomies of signs* to highlight to certain aspects of signs which to me are clearly related to his theory of catergories which I take to be the foundation of his theory of signs. In particular I think his first trichotomy forgrounds the quality of signs themselves as either hypotheticals, singulars or generals; the second trichotomy addresses the ways in which signs can refer to their objects by means of qualitative similarity, existential correlation, or convention; and the the third trichotomy addresses the fact that a sign can represent either a mere quality, an object or another sign. For me this suggest a three by three matrix of sign aspects based on Peirce's categories." (bold is mine) There is already some research done in this direction, for applied semiotics. The outcome is what I called the "Semiotic Nonagon". It is a diagrammatic-icon, an operative model that can be used with great advantage in qualitative research, but it is NOT an explanation of Peirce's logic-phylosophical proposal. Peirce would probably die again if he sees it as a diagram of his ideas. In fact he drew the 'triangle' of the 10 classes but never the 9adic matrix. Peirce's proposal could be probably schetched in hiperspace with the help of computer sciences... but probably, it would not be easy to 'use' for applied semiotics... As fare as I know Max Bense (he probably was the first) already draw this 3x3 matrix in the 60's, some other scholars used it too, just to show all 9 aspects in so
[peirce-l] Test
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