[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge
Clark and list, Thanks for the reference to Timothy Williamson.I do not see any direct connection to Peirce but one could be made in terms of factoringbeliefs or maybe dispositionsinto prime/composite and contents into narrow/broad.I don't know how all of this would work. The unpublished paper ( Can cognition be factorized into internal and external components?) I looked at was attempting to adjust the internal states of the knower to the environment in such a way that one could act on their beliefs. Part of the trick was to get the contents just "broad" enough that action goes through and the theory is workable. Supposing you want to buy a black stove, just how satisfieddo you have to be that this stove is black before you buy it? In any case, where is the principle of justification in the Baldwin quote? Condition #1 is true. Condition #2 is believed. Condition #3 is a character of a "satisfaction." Peirce says, "it would be logically impossible that this character should ever belong to satisfaction in a proposition not true." In other words, in a less than perfect cognition, one is never justified in believing a false proposition. This seems incredibly strong and parallels the ideal theory of truth. In effect, justification can only ever be approached. Jim W -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: peirce-l@lyris.ttu.edu Sent: Wed, 27 Sep 2006 5:18 PM Subject: [peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge On Sep 27, 2006, at 12:19 PM, Joseph Ransdell wrote: This word is used in logic in two senses: (1) as a synonym for Cognition, and (2), and more usefully, to signify a perfect cognition, that is, a cognition fulfilling three conditions: first, that it holds for true a proposition that really is true; second, that it is perfectly self-satisfied and free from the uneasiness of doubt; third, that some character of this satisfaction is such that it would be logically impossible that this character should ever belong to satisfaction in a proposition not true. Thanks for that quote Joe. I'd not seen that one before. It's interesting to compare his (2) with the traditional sense of justified true belief. All three elements are there but the emphasis on perfectCognition makes me wonder whether he's really adopting the traditional sense at all or something more akin to a mental state ala Williamson's recent influential book. (Well, influential in a peculiar sense since no one I've met actually buys Williamson's arguments) Clark Goble --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber [EMAIL PROTECTED] Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge
On Sep 28, 2006, at 10:56 AM, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:Thanks for the reference to Timothy Williamson. I do not see any direct connection to PeirceNote I wasn't pushing for a direct connection. Far from it. More the idea that knowledge is a basic cognitive state. However I think Peirce clearly is an externalist although one can certainly talk about internalism in his discussions. Although I personally tend to see a lot of the externalist/internalist debate largely a semantic one. (i.e. they are debates over what certain terms mean and whether they can in their meaning be divided into external and internal components) I don't find that particular linguistic approach to philosophy helpful myself and like how Chomsky handles things - talking about mental states and then adding a superscript to be just those that are internal. (i.e. avoiding the semantic debate within philosophy entirely)In terms of Peirce I think the issue is less about mind than about the sign and internal and external aspects of the sign. In terms of mind proper I think assigning the issue of internalism to Peirce is difficult since I don't see a huge difference between Peirce's view of mind and say Davidson's anomalous monism. But that means that translating mental states or descriptions into physical ones that would make the internal/external divide meaningful is near impossible.But in terms of knowledge proper I wasn't really pushing to equate Williamson and Peirce. I think Williamson's view ends up being idiosyncratic and hard to accept. --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge
On Sep 26, 2006, at 3:23 PM, Burke Johnson wrote:
Did Peirce ever give his own working definition of the word
knowledge?
I know that Peirce thought that our knowledge is fallible,
truth is
something we only approach in the long run, that scientific knowledge
has a social nature, etc., but, again, would anyone on the list
tell me
more about how you think he would define that concept?
Thanks in advance.
Burke Johnson
Check out the entry on Fallibilism in the Peirce Dictionary:
http://www.helsinki.fi/science/commens/terms/fallibilism.html
There isn't an entry for knowledge but many of the quotes end up
getting at the point.
I'd add that I think knowledge for the individual in Peirce ends up
being that belief which we can't doubt which is thus a habit.
Knowledge in the sense of the community of inquirers is obviously a
bit more.
I'd add that this quote from CP 2.773 might be helpful as well.
Reasoning is a process in which the reasoner is conscious that a
judgment, the conclusion, is determined by other judgment or
judgments, the premisses, according to a general habit of thought,
which he may not be able precisely to formulate, but which he
approves as conducive to true knowledge. By true knowledge he means,
though he is not usually able to analyse his meaning, the ultimate
knowledge in which he hopes that belief may ultimately rest,
undisturbed by doubt, in regard to the particular subject to which
his conclusion relates. Without this logical approval, the process,
although it may be closely analogous to reasoning in other respects,
lacks the essence of reasoning. Every reasoner, therefore, since he
approves certain habits, and consequently methods, of reasoning,
accepts a logical doctrine, called his logica utens. Reasoning does
not begin until a judgment has been formed; for the antecedent
cognitive operations are not subject to logical approval or
disapproval, being subconscious, or not sufficiently near the surface
of consciousness, and therefore uncontrollable. Reasoning, therefore,
begins with premisses which are adopted as representing percepts, or
generalizations of such percepts. ('Dictionary of Philosophy and
Psychology' vol. 2, CP 2.773, 1902)
I'd add this one as well.
But since symbols rest exclusively on habits already definitely
formed but not furnishing any observation even of themselves, and
since knowledge is habit, they do not enable us to add to our
knowledge even so much as a necessary consequent, unless by means of
a definite preformed habit. ('Prolegomena to an Apology for
Pragmaticism', CP 4.531, 1906)
---
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[peirce-l] Re: Peirce and knowledge
Did Peirce ever give his own working definition of the word knowledge? I know that Peirce thought that our knowledge is fallible, truth is something we only approach in the long run, that scientific knowledge has a social nature, etc., but, again, would anyone on the list tell me more about how you think he would define that concept? Thanks in advance. Burke Johnson --- Message from peirce-l forum to subscriber archive@mail-archive.com
