[PEN-L:10255] Re: planning and democracy

[peter donohue]

In his THE RISE AND FALL OF STRATEGIC PLANNING, Henry Mintzberg suggests
that its proponents characterize planning as "a formalized procedure to
produce an articulated result, in the form of an integrated system of
decisions." Formalized planning, in this sense, involves decomposing,
articulating and rationalizing processes by which decisions are made and
integrated in organizations. 

Planning's proponents - corporate, government, academic, & union alike -
assume  rationalizing organizational decision making results in gains of
some sort. But there is little empirical evidence supporting it. Indeed,
there is little evidence that planning's proponents reflect on planning's
role in real organizations. 

Langley instead suggests formalized planning plays important but entirely
different roles "peripheral to the strategy development and implementation
process," i.e.  "public relations, information, group therapy, and direction
and control." In  Sarrazin's studies of French corporate planning too,
planning is "integration after the fact" or "official sanction for actions
already decided upon and hardly subject to review and revision at that point." 

An organization - corporation, Vatican, Labor Party, or household - isn't a
"single decision making center." As Mintzberg observes, the organization
consists of multiple centers of decision making and various "logics of
action," including managers who "make greater use of their own views of
company strategy than they do of 'real strategy' as envisioned by the top
executives." 

Blaming a plan's failure on these "dumbbells down below" misses the point:
multiple centers of decison making and their various "logics of action" are
the only way an intended plan becomes an emergent, then realized strategy. 

Instead of debating whether a "national parliament" or
"democratically-elected planners" might reach "the socially efficient
resolution," wouldn't it be more useful to discuss building organizations of
popular power that might cultivate and learn through multiple centers of
decision making and various "logics of action?" 
Especially, since decision making AFTER the revolution will be determined
largely by those organizations of popular power we build today? Just
asking...   


Peter Donohue
PBI Associates
Portland, Oregon
[EMAIL PROTECTED]

[PEN-L:10254] Re: planning and democracy

[William S. Lear]

On Tue, May 20, 1997 at 14:52:05 (PST) Max B. Sawicky writes:
>Democratically-elected planners can connive to concoct a plan.  A 
>collection of sub-unites of an economy --geographic, industrial, etc. 
>-- cannot contribute pieces of a plan that some overlord fails to 
>reconcile.  If a plan's "locus of scope" is national, its completion
>must be done by a unitary agency, in other words, the one and
>only center.

This is logic of a most curious sort.  If Jim, Max, and I, acting as
"sub-units", agree on a plan to dine at Chez Maynard's there is no
need for some "overlord" to reconcile such a plan.  Suppose we extend
this inductively to cover N diners.  Perhaps at some point, should N
grow sufficiently large, the N diners might reasonably delegate some
responsibilities to a central, mutually agreed upon party who again
need not "reconcile" the plan, but who might take part in "completion"
(execution?), say by taking care of the planning for transportation,
or collecting money at the end of the night to pay the bill.

>If reconciliation takes place in some kind of political 
>setting, such as a national parliament of some type, then it's hard 
>to see how the parties to this deal would not be moved to act on 
>behalf of self-interest, rather than national interest.

I don't think anyone is claiming that self-serving motives would be
rendered obsolete under such a system, parliamentary or otherwise.
Nor is anyone arguing that the presence of self-interest precludes
acting on "national interest", or vice-versa.  Max's argument is, in
short, a Manichean straw-man.  I think the claim for democracy is,
rather, that such motives of self-interest might very well be
minimized, and that other values could come to the fore.  Planning
would need to be done in an environment in which this were recognized,
and naturally democracy is just this sort of system---one which is
predicated, in contrast to modern capitalism, on allowing mutual
sympathies not based on market values to come to the fore.  The very
activity of democracy is, as J. S. Mill noted long ago, something
which is reasonably presumed to be a prerequisite to its full
expression---it is, as he said, "a question of development" which will
take some time, especially given all the work necessary to tear down
dominant systems of subjugation and exploitation which are designed to
stifle such development.

I don't think anyone expects a harmonious meshing of minds in the
interest of universal humanity, in which self-interest magically
evaporates.  However, self-interest could very reasonably be expected
to be "downgraded" in many cases.  Max seems to be seeing democracy as
just another arena in which game-theoretic maximization would continue
unabated, where I (and, I think Jim Devine), see it as one in which a
flourishing sympathy for others might very well be cultivated and
extended.  None of us can tell whether or not this will come to
be---we've got to struggle and fail a thousand times to finally arrive
at an answer.

>Certainly a plan can delineate areas where market arrangements
>determine outcomes.  In other words, a plan can be restricted:
>it can leave aspects of the economy UNplanned.  This is not
>an argument for the efficiency of planning, democratic or
>otherwise, as much as for its flexibility.

Nobody was making an argument about "efficiency".  It is however, as
Max says, simply noting that democratic planning, in contrast to Max's
explicitly voiced fears of micro-management ("I don't want to have a
national assembly on whether my garbage is contracted out or provided
by public employees."), is not in principle incapable of flexible
delegation of market operations.

>I tried to put JD on the spot by asking how a specific
>relative price would be determined under so-called
>democratic planning.  He then devoted three paragraphs
>on how a plan of democratic but otherwise unknown
>origin would set a production quota for a single good.

I think asking such specific questions is only of use if one expects
to be presented with a shrink-wrapped version of a democratically
planned economy.  I would think that things of this sort must evolve
from a very primitive stage, and that answering such questions (which
strike me as an irrelevant fetish with precision) at this point would
be extraordinarily difficult.  Adam Smith envisioned a system of
capitalism built upon "perfect liberty", which would tend to
conditions of general equality, which he saw in turn as a precondition
for efficient market operation.  Despite his vision, capitalism has
conquered the world with the very opposite of this condition obtaining
nearly everywhere it touches.  Smith did not offer a detailed
blueprint for creating or maintaining this "perfect liberty", but this
does not mean we reject Smith's insights, nor the possibility that
"perfect liberty" might be one of the things that could be maintained
by a democratic plan, under which markets could operate freely in many
spheres.[*]

>I

[PEN-L:10253] The EU: the rhetorical struggle continues

[D Shniad]

Trevor:

[T]he EU has ...contradictary roots. For example, many of the bourgeois 
politicians who were involved in promoting the European Community in 
the 1950s were concerned to ensure that the national divisions which had  
given rise to two world wars should be overcome.

Sid:

I grant that this was the case in the 1950s, Trevor.  But in my eyes, the 
entire thrust of the move to monetary union and the rest of Maastricht 
concretely demonstrates what is happening in Europe today and what the 
goals are of those who are promoting greater centralization at the pan-
European level.  In your comments, you yourself refer to "the lack of 
democratic accountability of EU institutions".

Trevor:

The fact that the right - or at least big capital - have been more successful 
than the left and the working class movement in shaping the EU is no 
reason to abandon the struggle at that level.

[M]embers of the EU have for some time found that there monetary policy 
is effectively determined by what the Bundesbank does. For the 
governments of these countries, a structure which allows them  to share in 
shaping European monetary policy is seen as a step forward.

Sid:

I have to pose the same question to you, Trevor, that I posed to Max -- how 
is it that monetary union will provide the people of Europe more of an 
opportunity to pursue independent, progressive monetary policies than they 
were able to pursue when they enjoyed total [albeit formal] power over 
monetary policy within their own national boundaries?  How will the move 
to monetary unification lessen the reactionary reach of the Bundesbank? 
This makes no sense to me.

Trevor:

I think it is mistaken, and also dangerous, to argue that powers are being 
transferred from national governments to the EU, and that this is reducing 
democratic accountability ...Certainly, it's important to push for greater 
democratic control at the national level, and also for that matter, at a 
regional level within nation states, particularly in the case of the old 
centralised states like Britain and France. But, given the degree of 
integration of the European economy, I think that there are many areas 
where  it is more appropriate to push for democratic control at the level of 
the EU.

Sid:

Specifically HOW can this be done at the EU level, Trevor?

Cheers,

Sid

[PEN-L:10252] Re: Business as usual

[D Shniad]

Nope.  It's those who strike a neutral stance at a time of fundamental
crisis among conflicting value systems.

> 
> Am still awash in existential nausea brought on by the State Dept's
> appalled discovery, after 32 years of wedded bliss, that Mobutu is 
> one evil dude who should have been hung out to dry in the Sixties.
> In Dante's Inferno, isn't it the hypocrites that rate the hottest spots?
> 
> valis
> Occupied America
> 
>  
>   "Necessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom.
>It is the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves."
>
>-- William Pitt
>   
>  
>
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 

[PEN-L:10251] NAFTA on Steroids

[D Shniad]

Sterling News Service   May 14, 1997

MAI -- NAFTA on steroids

An opinion piece

By Hubert Beyer

VICTORIA -- Few Canadians have heard of the Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI), even though, if adopted, it would strengthen the rights of 
multinational corporations immensely at the expense of the great unwashed, 
namely you and me.

It's been referred to as NAFTA on steroids. Progressive Democratic 
Alliance leader Gordon Wilson says if MAI is implemented, "We will have 
little sovereignty left in Canada." 

Just what is MAI? In a nutshell, the agreement would force participating 
countries to treat foreign investors equal to domestic companies. It would 
remove governments' right to provide subsidies or other forms of financial 
assistance, including tax breaks, to domestic companies as part of job 
protection strategies.

The agreement also would prohibit governments from introducing 
investments restrictions or requirements for domestic ownership, and 
prohibit the kind of "capital flight" legislation that has, to some degree, 
protected Canadian workers from corporate movement to low-wage areas 
such as Mexico. 

But worst of all, Canada is close to signing the agreement, which is still 
being negotiated behind closed doors at the headquarters of the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development in Paris. The 
deadline for ratification of the agreement by the organization's 29 member 
states is scheduled for this fall.

Premier Glen Clark says the agreement would tie the hands of any 
government in several key areas, including job creation, culture, health 
care, the environment and even the constitution. 

"If any semblance of democracy is to be salvaged in Canada, steps must be 
taken to forestall this surrender to corporate tyranny," he says. 

If Canada signs the agreement, one of the first things on the chopping block 
would be the Forest and Jobs Accord which, the NDP hopes, will create 
more than 20,000 forest-related jobs over the next five years. 

The agreement, now close to its final draft stage, also stipulates that the 
"national treatment" and "most favored nation" clauses apply to the 
privatization of state enterprises.

That means foreign investors would be allowed to bid on Crown 
corporations that are being privatized. It is thus quite conceivable that the 
CBC and other Canadian institutions could end up under U.S. or other 
foreign control, should a future Canadian government decide to completely 
privatize them.

The Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, a Vancouver-based think 
tank, describes the purpose of the agreement this way: 

"MAI is designed to establish a new set of global rules for investment that 
will grant trans-national corporations the unrestricted right and freedom to 
buy, sell, and move their operations whenever and wherever they want 
around the world, unfettered by government intervention or regulation." 

Now, whenever I mention the Fraser Institute, I point out that it's a right-
wing outfit. To be fair, I also point out that the Canadian Centre of Policy 
Alternatives is a left-wing outfit. But left or right, there's nothing in the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment that makes me feel comfortable.

The fact that hardly any news leaked out during the talks leading up to 
preparations for final ratification of the agreement is scary in itself. But 
most of all, it is the assault on Canada's sovereignty that is alarming.

With each new international trade agreement, our elected governments lose 
more power. And they lose them to business -- big, multi-national business 
-- which has no conscience other than looking out for the shareholders' 
interests.

There should be a national outcry over the proposed Multilateral Agreement 
on Investment.

(Hubert Beyer is a Victoria-based political analyst. He can be reached at 
Tel: 920-9300; Fax: 385-6783; E-Mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED])

[PEN-L:10250] Re: planning and democracy

[Max B. Sawicky]

> From:  James Devine <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> Subject:   [PEN-L:10217] planning and democracy

Jim dislikes slicing-and-dicing commentary, so I will
stick to the Cuisinart approach, for the most part  . . .

Democratically-elected planners can connive to concoct a plan.  A 
collection of sub-unites of an economy --geographic, industrial, etc. 
-- cannot contribute pieces of a plan that some overlord fails to 
reconcile.  If a plan's "locus of scope" is national, its completion
must be done by a unitary agency, in other words, the one and
only center.

If reconciliation takes place in some kind of political 
setting, such as a national parliament of some type, then it's hard 
to see how the parties to this deal would not be moved to act on 
behalf of self-interest, rather than national interest.  Does that
mean we should't have democracy?  Not at all.  The question is
whether planning is practical in a democratic context, or even
whether it is facilitated by democratic participation.

Certainly a plan can delineate areas where market arrangements
determine outcomes.  In other words, a plan can be restricted:
it can leave aspects of the economy UNplanned.  This is not
an argument for the efficiency of planning, democratic or
otherwise, as much as for its flexibility.

I tried to put JD on the spot by asking how a specific
relative price would be determined under so-called
democratic planning.  He then devoted three paragraphs
on how a plan of democratic but otherwise unknown
origin would set a production quota for a single good.

Now I have to quote him:

> Consumers would decide which co-op to buy from, rejecting the X that
> is of low quality. Those co-ops who produced products of
> sufficiently high quality would be able to sell them and redeem the
> ration coupons for money (or other kinds of ration coupons) from the

HOW MUCH money, who decides, and how?  

> planning authority, thus covering costs.  . . .

Who says what costs are?

> have to clean up their acts. (Alternatively, they could give the
> consumer a larger quantity of X in return for a single coupon.) BTW,
> the value of the coupons to the co-op would be set by the planners,
> to reflect the internal and external costs of the production of the
> product. 

Uh huh.  As with Chinese food, I've eaten a lot but I
still seem to be hungry.

JD goes on to note he ignores the issue of price, which
was my question, and says:

> question). If quality could be quantified (which of course it
> cannot), one might think of the ratio of number of coupons to
> quality of X as a "price." In the example, consumers play a big role
> in determining this "ratio" in a quasi-demand and supply scenario.
> Individual co-ops would have limited effect on this ratio. 

Quality has nothing to do with the basic problem.
"Planning" comes down to using markets to
ration preset allotments of consumer goods.
What is the basis for the allotments?  "Democracy."
If nobody owns capital, why not permit consumer
sovereignty and use taxes and subsidies to adjust
prices to social costs?  Democratically of course.

In either case, we're still left with the problem of
planning the production of intermediate goods, and
the aforementioned production quotas of consumer
goods, and the inevitability that the interests of workers, 
consumers, communities, and industries will conflict
and, as I've claimed, democracy will not facilitate the socially 
efficient resolution of this so much as the politicization of
planning, socialist-style.

On something of a tangent, the national movement of united
autonomous local groups  (which calls to mind John Sayles'
hilarious but unrelated short story, the Anarchist Convention),
JD hopes that in a socialist parliamentary setting, groups 
with disparate interests will learn to work together and
eschew the corruptions of capitalist politics, such as vote-
trading.  Whatever for?  Incidentally, I don't see such tactics
as pernicious; they are simply intrinsic to a democratic process.
To me they underline the conflicting natures of democracy and 
planning.  To think that workers without capital ownership would
fail to pursue self-interest because of some utterly new cultural
context is to assume away that aspect of human behavior that
makes planning difficult.

Cheers,

MBS


===
Max B. SawickyEconomic Policy Institute
[EMAIL PROTECTED]  1660 L Street, NW
202-775-8810 (voice)  Ste. 1200
202-775-0819 (fax)Washington, DC  20036

Opinions above do not necessarily reflect the views
of anyone associated with the Economic Policy
Institute.
===

[PEN-L:10249] Re: War and Primitive Accumulation

[Max B. Sawicky]

> Reply-to:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> From:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> Subject:   [PEN-L:10219] War and Primitive Accumulation

> In his section on primitive accumulation in volume one of Capital,
> Marx writes: "The public debt becomes one of the most powerful levers of pof
> primitive accumulation 
> 
> Somewhere, I have the recollection, that Marx linked the growth
> of public debt with wars (there is a passing reference in the above
> quoted section to "maritime trade and commercial wars" but nothing
> very substantive.) Does anyone recall if, and where, Marx links
> war with debt, with taxes transfering wealth from the workers and
> the middle-class to capital - i.e. as part of the process of
> primitive accumulation?

I can't supply the Marx cite, but you might be interested to
know, if you don't already, of a similar view in Wicksell that
saw the size of government and its debt as a tyrannical
drain on worker incomes.  This view apparently had some
influence on James Buchanan with the results we have
come to know.

Now, in furtherance of my crusade on behalf of public
borrowing . . .

If "primitive accumulation" refers exclusively to the
relationship between imperialist nations and their
captives, then the rest of this post should be disregarded.
If the issue is the more general shift in income distribution
from middle to upper class, then it is salient, if possibly
wrong.

On a more practical level, public debt in the U.S. is not
financing wars and defense, by and large.  You could say
it financed the US defense build-up, but that ended in 1986.
The defense budget has fallen relative to GDP since then.
Post-Vietnam US military actions have been cheap dates.
The prospective budget deal cuts defense in real absolute
terms over the next five years by about $70 billion.  Post-
1986, US borrowing is financing tax revenue erosion and
increases in health care (Medicare and Medicaid).  For other
industrial countries with much smaller military establishments,
the irrelevance of public debt for wars is all the greater.
Presently, public borrowing in the U.S. and to an important
extent other industrial countries is making possible an
intergenerational redistribution (e.g., borrowing finances
health and nursing home care for the elderly now, future
taxes service the resulting debt).  Much more is made of
this than is justified (see Dean Baker's report on generational
accounting from EPI), but it doesn't seem very well tuned to
the negative vibrations in Marx.

MBS

===
Max B. SawickyEconomic Policy Institute
[EMAIL PROTECTED]  1660 L Street, NW
202-775-8810 (voice)  Ste. 1200
202-775-0819 (fax)Washington, DC  20036

Opinions above do not necessarily reflect the views
of anyone associated with the Economic Policy
Institute.
===

[PEN-L:10248] Re: that says it all

[Wojtek Sokolowski]

At 08:26 PM 5/19/97 -0700, Mark Weisbrot wrote:
>
>
> "The point is that we and our friends control the keys to the clubs and the 
>treasuries that Kabila will need to tap if he is going to rebuild the 
>country -- the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, our development 
>funds, and those of the Europeans."
> 
> -- Chester Crocker, former Assistant Secretary of State for Africa from 
>1981 to 1989 and now a professor at Georgetown University, explaining why 
>the US would still have "a tremendous amount of influence" over the new 
>government in Zaire, despite having installed and helped to maintain one of 
>the most corrupt dictatorships on earth in that country for the last 32 
>years.  (NYT, Saturday, May 17,1997, p.A6)
>

Well, what else is new? Did you seriously think of the US as a law-abiding
international citizen whose policies are guided by the principles of mutual
respect?

Dont't take me wrong, it is nothing personal.  I am just venting my
frustrations with the mainstream thinking.  Just yesterday I heard a bunch
of NPR neo-liberals complaining on All Things Considered that after the AA
had been abolished in CA and TX, minority enrollment in colleges and
universities is dropping, and citing a recent study showing discriminatory
effects of standardized testing on minority students.  When did those folks
get of the boat?  It is like complaining that Nazi concentration camps
"discriminated against" Jews and Gypsies.  After years of sabotage by
bleeding heart liberals in fedral gov't and courts, the US educational
institutions finally work the way they were designed to -- reproducing the
caste system  by maintaining seggregated schools.

wojtek sokolowski 
institute for policy studies
johns hopkins university
baltimore, md 21218
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
voice: (410) 516-4056
fax:   (410) 516-8233

[PEN-L:10247] on the mismeasurement of unemployment

[Michael Perelman]

I like to think of what might be called the measure of effective
unemployment.  If workers get placed in positions below their level of
competence they may be said to be partially unemployed.  For example, if
a Ph.D. mathemetician ends up at McDonalds, she might be 95% unemployed.

I suspect that this sort of effective unemployment is increasing,
despite the hoopla about more flexible labor markets.
--
Michael Perelman
Economics Department
California State University
Chico, CA 95929

Tel. 916-898-5321
E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]

[PEN-L:10245] Re: locality --> loyalty?

[Wojtek Sokolowski]

Before I reply to Bill's missive, apologies for numerous typos in my
postings, resulting from both my lack of typing skills and my Eudora's lack
of a spell-checker (which, ironically, demonstrates that 'institutions'
after all matter).

I am glad to hear that we agree in principles (which I suspected from the
beginning of this discussion), including the position that capitalism, while
giving a lip service to 'choice', actually robs 'ordinary' people of it by
skillful use of incentives and propaganda; and the position that
participatory democracy and self-management are fundamental principles of a
just social order, but so is rational planning.  The attempts to reconcile
central planning and participatory democracy started this discussion (see
parallel postings by Max S. and Jim D.) which, I reckon, may pose a certain
difficulty.  In my missives I argued that this difficulty results from the
fact that different people perceive and use social institutions differently
which seldom corresponds to the legal or ostensible purpose those
instituions are supposed to serve.

Because of that subjective element neither of the conventional solutions to
a just social order seems to be realistic.  One such solution, the
'invisible hand of the market', ironically is a "bottom-up" approach -- a
fairy tale of how things will be just fine if everyone is free to pursue
his/her own interests.  The other solution,  the 'visible hand of the
central planners'  (or Leviathan), is a "top-down" approach -- a false hope
created by the replacement of individual rationality with supposedly
superior rationality of a bureaucracy aka formal-rational institutions.

Ironically, both solution share the same behavioural model which, I believe,
is responsible for their failures to accomplish the professed goal of
creating a just and rational social order.  Both, free market and central
planning take an 'aprioristic' approach to human behaviour assuming that
people will generally react similarly to a particular set of stimuli,
therefore, by arranaging different set of stimuli into a system of 'rewards'
and 'punishments,' or institutions reducing or increasing the cost of
particular types of behaviour, we can predict and control human behaviour. 

In my missives I tried to argue (not always in a clear fashion) that this
behavioural model is plain wrong.  It is wrong because it ingnores the
cognitive processes of the subjects by assuming that the stimuls receivers
will interpret the stimuli or signals in exact the same way as the stimulus
senders (policy makers, central planners, or economists).  That is, the
reactions to both, Fed's monetary policies (or, for that matter, 'signals'
sent by the 'markets') as well as subjective reactions to the directives and
goals sent by the central planning boards, are to varying degrees mediated
through local and subjective factors that include local cultures, local
networks, local power struggles, as well as individual interpretations.

To give a simple illustration:  The Fed's decision to increase interest
rates, or the central planning board's decision to reduce labour cost,
clearly depends on its uniform interpretation by all interested parties.
That uniform, assumed by the Fed or the central planning board,
interpretation may or may not be the case, however.  A local businessperson
or a plant manager may decide that her long-term interests will be better
served by developing good relations with local workers than by obeing the
signals sent by the central auhtority.  She will either ignore the signal
althogether, or will try to circumvent its effects on the workers.  

In the same vein, even if we implemented a hypothetical set of
formal-rational instiutions that offer a perfect opportunity for everyone to
participate in the decision making process, a perfect decsion making process
for balancing everyone's needs and interests, and a perfect way of
implementing those decisions as planned, there will always be some
entrepreneurial characters who, paraphrasing George Orwell, will try to be
more equal than others, that is, to accumulute more equity for themselves or
their cronies.  Discounting that fact altogether, or calling it an
'inevitable outcome of the human nature' are equally wrong because both
ignore the fact people sometimes do and sometimes do not follow the
formal-rational scripts, as well as they sometimes do and sometimes do not
behave like selfish pigs in the Orwell's tale.

Since both, strict following and mitigating the formal-rational directions
by individuals are possible forms of behaviour,  it is wrong to simply
assume that the businessperson/manager will always do what the formal,
institutional arrangement stipulate.  If she does, that in itself
interesting enough to warrant an investigation (it is truly fascinating why
people follow orders that are clearly detrimental to their own well being or
to their set of values).  

It further seems to me that the design of a formal-rational arran

[PEN-L:10244] Query: readings on the (mis?) measurement of unemployment (U.S.)

[Barnet Wagman]

I'd like to get up to speed on the measurement of unemployment
in the U.S.  In particular, I'm curious about whether we could be
seeing a longish-run increase in the undermeasurement of unemployment.

Obviously, the unemployment rate understates the problem on unemploy-
ment, by not adjusting for underemployment and 'discouraged' workers.
The question is whether this mis-mearsurement is getting worse.

Any suggestions on what to read?

Thanks,

Barnet Wagman

[PEN-L:10243] clip'n'save headline...

[Thad Williamson]

On p. 3 of today's NY Times:

"Capitalism Poses a Moral Problem"

(It's an article about Poland.)


cheers,
Thad
Thad Williamson
National Center for Economic and Security Alternatives (Washington)/
Union Theological Seminary (New York)
212-531-1935
http://www.northcarolina.com/thad

[PEN-L:10242] Re: The EU: against wishful thinking

[Doug Henwood]

[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

>In a message dated 97-05-15 17:49:44 EDT, you [i.e. me] write:
>
>>If I get any more self-conscious, I might end up some sort of Hegelian
>>pretzel.
>Can we get pictures? :-) :-)

As soon as I get them I'll put them up on my web site.

>Personally, I think
>women are just as stubborn and just as theoretical in their debates, it's
>just that the frame work on which they hang their arguments are so different
>that men (hide bound cretures that they tend, I SAID TEND, to be) don't
>recognize the theories in a different frame work.  The other problem is that
>so few men are really versed in the feminist debates that they don't
>recognize a theoretical disagreement when they see it.

Well, I'm in the midst of trying to do just that. What do you, Maggie, or
anyone else for that matter, think of this observation from Teresa Ebert's
preface to Ludic Feminism: "This mode [of canonic feminist theory] has
become a more and more restricted, ahistorical, and localist genre of
descriptive and immanent writing. According to the codes of this mode of
writing, feminist theory, first of all, has to be written in a 'feminine'
language. In other words, it has to avoid abstract concepts (if it does
deploy them, they must be quickly deconstructed into an indeterminate
series of open-ended stories) and instead rely on anecdotes, memoirs,
confessions, little narratives, and other forms of intimate self-writing.
The debilitating assumption behind this injunction is that concepts are in
and of themselves panhistorically masculinist. The unsaid of such an
understanding is, of course, that women are essentially aconceptual. I
write against this assumption."

Doug

--

Doug Henwood
Left Business Observer
250 W 85 St
New York NY 10024-3217 USA
+1-212-874-4020 voice  +1-212-874-3137 fax
email: 
web: 

[PEN-L:10241] Memorible Economics Teachers

[jtreacy]

Last evening while scanning Walter Cronkite's, "A Reporters Life," p.42 I
noted he reported that Bob Montgomery was one of his few turn on Profs. 
at the University of Texas in the 30's. His remarks that Andrew Mellon was
the greatest Sec. of Treasury since Judas made an impression along with
the fact that he "looked like" a bomb thrower. 

Montgomery was investigated by the Texas Legislature for harboring 
dangerous views. When asked if he had ever met a pay roll he confessed 
that he had not but added, "I have never laid an egg but know more about 
genetics than the average hen."
[EMAIL PROTECTED] copyrighted
 

[PEN-L:10240] Business as usual

[[EMAIL PROTECTED]]

Am still awash in existential nausea brought on by the State Dept's
appalled discovery, after 32 years of wedded bliss, that Mobutu is 
one evil dude who should have been hung out to dry in the Sixties.
In Dante's Inferno, isn't it the hypocrites that rate the hottest spots?

valis
Occupied America

 
  "Necessity is the plea for every infringement of human freedom.
   It is the argument of tyrants; it is the creed of slaves."
   
   -- William Pitt