Tsk, tsk. This is all really simple. Academic males won't be able to "get it up" to "perform" (as agents) unless they cite Judith Butler in their publications, :-). Barkley Rosser On Mon, 25 Jan 1999 11:48:32 -0500 Doug Henwood <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > [Bill Lear posted this to PEN-L, but it seems relevant to the stumbling > Judy seminar.] > > From: "William S. Lear" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > MIME-Version: 1.0 > Date: Sun, 24 Jan 1999 23:10:02 -0600 (CST) > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: [PEN-L:2542] Re: Butler and bad writing > Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > On Sun, January 24, 1999 at 15:30:53 (-0800) [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > >... > >Initially articulated as a critique of compulsory heterosexuality > >within feminism (Osborne, 1996: 110), the notion of performativity is > >best understood as an attempt to avoid two forms of reductionism: on > >the one hand, a metaphysical voluntarism that makes agency an > >unexplained attribute of the sovereign subject, and on the other, a > >fatalistic determinism that sees the subject as completely determined > >by social context. While acknowledging the social construction of > >gender, Butler is also concerned about the politically disabling > >consequences of theories of social determination. Her aim is > >therefore both to recognize that the subject is socially constructed > >and, at the same time, to argue that this does not mean the erasure of > >agency. Butler seeks to open up a space for agency through the notion > >of the performative. > > Good. We need to explain agency not as "an unexplained attribute" of > a subject nor as "a fatalistic determinism" (a tendency found in > Marxism, perhaps?). Butler plies between this Scylla and Charybdis by > granting that although "the subject is socially constructed", "this > does not mean the erasure of agency". Ok, at least I can begin to see > the fog lifting. Now, some tentative reformulations so I can try to > get a better handle on this. > > By "social construction" of something, say gender, I assume what is > meant is something other than innate development. That is, the human > liver and its function are not something that is socially constructed > (though they are in part "environmentally constructed"). To be > "socially constructed" means to be defined, e.g., behaviorally, by > social convention. > > The risk of seeing subjects (can't we just use the word "people", > aren't we all subjects in one way or another? Well, I won't > quibble...) as solely formed by social convention has dangers, so > while Butler wants to retain this, she also wants to add another > piece, aimed at one particular shortcoming of viewing subjects as > solely constructed by social convention, namely, that this view erases > agency of the subject (I assume "agency" is akin to Free Will?). Her > addition which is aimed at allowing for agency is called "the > performative". She locates the "act", or ongoing "activity", of > "performativity" in "discourse", which I assume means some form of > social encounter among humans. This performative act brings into being > the thing it "names" or refers to. I'm curious to know why, if Butler > is trying to propose something other than social construction, she > constructs a theory ("performativity") which is based on human social > interaction. Is not then performativity itself social construction? > This seems to me to be the case, especially since Butler says that > "The 'performative' dimension of construction is precisely the forced > reiteration of norms", and where else can these norms be reproduced, > but in culture. > > I'm also curious: What does it mean to "bring[] into being" a subject? > > Butler thinks that agency lives in the interstices of reiteration. > Somehow the repeated acts are not smooth, are discontinuous, and > therefore agency sneaks in. > > She equates performativity with "citationality", or citing things > repeatedly. This repeated citation demands a certain linguistic > continuity ("it must draw upon and recite a set of linguistic > conventions"), but aside from that, there is some form of (unnamed) > element in subsequent reformulations which is to some extent "skewed" > from earlier ones, thus providing the cracks in the subject formation > in which agency can appear. I could easily see how skewed > reformulation actually provided better "cover" for pernicious ideas. > Even if ideas were entirely "orthogonal", they have some persistence > (the slave-owner tells the black that they are lazy and worthless > today, tomorrow he says they are stupid and dirty the next --- just > how does a lack of overlap provide for *more* agency rather than > less?). > > So, what I get from this is that because of some form of discrepancy > in succeeding formulations of norms ("multiple logics"?), subjects are > able to somehow detect this inconsistency and to thereby "act" as > agents (do they commit an act of agency in detecting this?). > > So culture ("cultural practices") reinforces heterosexual norms > through marriage and the division of labor. Then, "reproduction" > (intercourse, pregnancy, childbirth?) is "overdetermined" by things > that "are not reducible to ... citation", i.e., marriage and division > of labor. By "overdetermined", I assume she means there are multiple > factors pushing in the same (similar, given the lack of precise > overlap?) direction (some of) which are individually capable of > producing the observed effect of subject formation. > > I'm sorry to be dense, but just how is any of this novel? Don't we > know that despite vicious and repeated attacks on people, they can > retain dignity, hope, sense of self, agency? And don't we know that > this same repetition is sometimes extremely difficult to overcome? > And why does Butler assume that it is *further* efforts to undermine a > person's sense of self, their agency, that produce the effect of > agency? What role would activism and scholarship aimed at undermining > power and its institutions have? It is not a form of resignification, > but it does often have the effect of freeing people from the labels > they have come to internalize. And how does what she describes fall > outside of "social context", whatever that might encompass? She tries > to say subject formation is not "completely determined by social > context", but if she is to do so, she needs to show how *her* account > is not a part of "social context". > > Also, why doesn't she travel more the route of Chomsky in his > description of language development, according to which the innate > capacities interact and grow within a certain environment, much like > the formation of the ocular apparatus. Can't agency and subjectivity > be looked at similarly? Could not the capacity for agency (and > subjectivity) be innate capacities which are formed in interaction > with the (social) environment? Wouldn't we then be interested in > social practice which enhanced the former and diminished the latter? > Haven't we seen this before? > > I am not getting it. > > > Bill > -- Rosser Jr, John Barkley [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[PEN-L:2568] Re: Butler and bad writing
Rosser Jr, John Barkley Mon, 25 Jan 1999 14:15:07 -0500 (Eastern Standard Time)