Re: Re: Re: Re: Re: Moses and monetarism (fwd)
Rorty, an old teacher of mine, views himself as a left liberal. His Achieving Our Country is advertised as a way of rethinking reformist (we might say) politics. He writes for Dissent. He is an anti-Marxist, but that is not enough to make you not on the left. Dewey was an advocate of worker control and extended democracy, and therefore on the left as well. And I am a neopragmatist myself. Of course, there are many who would think that I am not on the left either. --jks In a message dated Wed, 7 Jun 2000 8:09:01 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: Justin, Please see my reply to Tom Walker where I both criticize hermeneutics and empiricism. btw, to my knowledge, Richard Rorty has nothing do with left. He is a new pragmatic following the footsteps of Dewey... thanks, Mine Mine, I am actually a "philosophy person"--used to be a philosophy professor before I was a lawyer. Although I do not necessary share the vehemence of the rejection of (the very different, as you remark) approaches of deconstruction or hermeneutics, I am fairly suspicious of their value when applied in a cookie cutter manner to scientific questions. The Sokal hoax shows what happens when scientifically illiterate postmodernists try to talk about science. I don't know enough about hermeneutics (Gadamer, Otto-Appel, that lot) to say whether scientific illiteracy is a defect of that tendency, although it wouldn't surprise me if it was. (However, I will remark that Heidegger, of all people, an important influence on both decontruction and hermeneutics, wrote some excellent philosophy of science based in obviously solid knowledge of early modern science.) I would refrain from broad brush statements about "empiricism." What do you have in mind when you say that empiricists "support the status quo by distorting the facts in the name of science"? Empiricism in its broadest sense is quintessentially respect for the facts as established by scientific research. This is not an approach that is for or against the status quo. Now, logical empiricism, the philosophy expounded by Carnap, Hempel, Reichenbach, Ayer, and so forth, has been pretty thoroughly discredited in most of its details, and has not had any serious exponents for a quarter century, even among those who consider themselves in some sense empiricists--like me. The closest is perhaps Larry Sklar, although I wonder whether Michael Dummett isn't really a logical empiricist. Still, he doesn't advertise that he is one. G.A. Cohen, a leading (former?) analytical Marxist is pretty close to logical empiricism in his philosophy of science. It was, however, deeply respectful of facts, and, for what it was worth, thought to be consitent with the left social democratic politics of those figures. Ayer, in fact, was a pretty radical left Labourite. One of the key logical empiricists, Otto Neurath, was a Marxist who made substantial contributions to the theory of the planned economy. Contemporary empiricism tends to be of two main types, which are not necesasrily inconsistent. One is neopragmatism of the sort represented by W.V. Quine (a reactionary), Wilfred Sellars (a radical), and the new Hilary Putnam (a former Marxist), as well as by Richard Rorty (a left liberal). The other is scientific realism, represented, e.g., by the old Putnam and his students, Michael Devitt, Richard Boyd, Richard Miller, Peter Railton--Marxists or former Marxists of some stripe all, Quine and Sellars are also scientific realists. I consider myself both a neopragmatist and a scientific realist. Railton was on my dissertation committee. --jks In a message dated Wed, 7 Jun 2000 2:23:56 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: References to hermeneutics and deconstruction don't convince me. I've never been into that kind of lit crit sh*t. I prefer logic, empirical research, and the philosophy of science (methodology). If there would be a philosophy or literature person here, s(he) would *really* be pissed, not only by the unprofessional use of language but also by ignorance. I am not a big fun of hermeneutics and deconstruction either, but I never make the mistake of considering those theorists writing outside the realm of philosopy of science. Science, by its nature, requires *some form* of hermeneutical understanding-- the question of what is that we are studying? why and how? Many people who have written about hermeneutics have also written about the philosophy of social sciences: nature of understanding, nature of inquiry, different methodologies, interpretation (don't we interpret facts in economics. oh!), the status of the relationship between positive and social sciences, etc, etc..okey I have not seen very many critical studies in hermeneutics (mind you that hermeneutics and deconstruction are very different things). I have not seen among *empricists* or pure logicists either. Empricists are well known to be supportive of status
Re: Re: Re: Moses and monetarism (fwd)
References to hermeneutics and deconstruction don't convince me. I've never been into that kind of lit crit sh*t. I prefer logic, empirical research, and the philosophy of science (methodology). If there would be a philosophy or literature person here, s(he) would *really* be pissed, not only by the unprofessional use of language but also by ignorance. I am not a big fun of hermeneutics and deconstruction either, but I never make the mistake of considering those theorists writing outside the realm of philosopy of science. Science, by its nature, requires *some form* of hermeneutical understanding-- the question of what is that we are studying? why and how? Many people who have written about hermeneutics have also written about the philosophy of social sciences: nature of understanding, nature of inquiry, different methodologies, interpretation (don't we interpret facts in economics. oh!), the status of the relationship between positive and social sciences, etc, etc..okey I have not seen very many critical studies in hermeneutics (mind you that hermeneutics and deconstruction are very different things). I have not seen among *empricists* or pure logicists either. Empricists are well known to be supportive of status quo by distorting facts in the name of science. They present ideology as science. I would not be too quick to accept empricist methodology at face value. Regarding *critical* hermeneutics, one should have a look at Paul Ricour's works, not Gadamer's. Paul R. tries to abridge the gap between Marxism and understanding, and the role of marxist methodology in interpretation. Why do economists constantly make the claim that what they are doing are objective science given that it is not-- given that distribution of resources is by definition a political act! Mine Doyran SUNY/Albany
Re: Re: Re: Re: Moses and monetarism (fwd)
I'm not sure what that has to do with literary criticism (which is basically supposed to help us understand the fiction we read). It is true that the meaning of a theory varies with context, but that says we have to be very clear by what _we_ mean by the theory. The sociology or psychology of its writing and interpretation is interesting, but doesn't say much if anything about a theory's validity. WHY? In what sense does sociology differ in saying about "theory's validity" from let's say economics? How do you judge theory's validity? According to which criteria? The best works in business cycles, economic crises, world systemicy trends are done by *sociologists* like Wallerstein, Arrighi, Frank etc.. Are you gonna say that their works are fiction, or not scientific enough? okey, I will send a post about how Wallerstein views the methodology of social sciences. wait! Mine Doyran SUNY/Albany
Re: Re: Re: Re: Moses and monetarism (fwd)
Mine, I am actually a "philosophy person"--used to be a philosophy professor before I was a lawyer. Although I do not necessary share the vehemence of the rejection of (the very different, as you remark) approaches of deconstruction or hermeneutics, I am fairly suspicious of their value when applied in a cookie cutter manner to scientific questions. The Sokal hoax shows what happens when scientifically illiterate postmodernists try to talk about science. I don't know enough about hermeneutics (Gadamer, Otto-Appel, that lot) to say whether scientific illiteracy is a defect of that tendency, although it wouldn't surprise me if it was. (However, I will remark that Heidegger, of all people, an important influence on both decontruction and hermeneutics, wrote some excellent philosophy of science based in obviously solid knowledge of early modern science.) I would refrain from broad brush statements about "empiricism." What do you have in mind when you say that empiricists "support the status quo by distorting the facts in the name of science"? Empiricism in its broadest sense is quintessentially respect for the facts as established by scientific research. This is not an approach that is for or against the status quo. Now, logical empiricism, the philosophy expounded by Carnap, Hempel, Reichenbach, Ayer, and so forth, has been pretty thoroughly discredited in most of its details, and has not had any serious exponents for a quarter century, even among those who consider themselves in some sense empiricists--like me. The closest is perhaps Larry Sklar, although I wonder whether Michael Dummett isn't really a logical empiricist. Still, he doesn't advertise that he is one. G.A. Cohen, a leading (former?) analytical Marxist is pretty close to logical empiricism in his philosophy of science. It was, however, deeply respectful of facts, and, for what it was worth, thought to be consitent with the left social democratic politics of those figures. Ayer, in fact, was a pretty radical left Labourite. One of the key logical empiricists, Otto Neurath, was a Marxist who made substantial contributions to the theory of the planned economy. Contemporary empiricism tends to be of two main types, which are not necesasrily inconsistent. One is neopragmatism of the sort represented by W.V. Quine (a reactionary), Wilfred Sellars (a radical), and the new Hilary Putnam (a former Marxist), as well as by Richard Rorty (a left liberal). The other is scientific realism, represented, e.g., by the old Putnam and his students, Michael Devitt, Richard Boyd, Richard Miller, Peter Railton--Marxists or former Marxists of some stripe all, Quine and Sellars are also scientific realists. I consider myself both a neopragmatist and a scientific realist. Railton was on my dissertation committee. --jks In a message dated Wed, 7 Jun 2000 2:23:56 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: References to hermeneutics and deconstruction don't convince me. I've never been into that kind of lit crit sh*t. I prefer logic, empirical research, and the philosophy of science (methodology). If there would be a philosophy or literature person here, s(he) would *really* be pissed, not only by the unprofessional use of language but also by ignorance. I am not a big fun of hermeneutics and deconstruction either, but I never make the mistake of considering those theorists writing outside the realm of philosopy of science. Science, by its nature, requires *some form* of hermeneutical understanding-- the question of what is that we are studying? why and how? Many people who have written about hermeneutics have also written about the philosophy of social sciences: nature of understanding, nature of inquiry, different methodologies, interpretation (don't we interpret facts in economics. oh!), the status of the relationship between positive and social sciences, etc, etc..okey I have not seen very many critical studies in hermeneutics (mind you that hermeneutics and deconstruction are very different things). I have not seen among *empricists* or pure logicists either. Empricists are well known to be supportive of status quo by distorting facts in the name of science. They present ideology as science. I would not be too quick to accept empricist methodology at face value. Regarding *critical* hermeneutics, one should have a look at Paul Ricour's works, not Gadamer's. Paul R. tries to abridge the gap between Marxism and understanding, and the role of marxist methodology in interpretation. Why do economists constantly make the claim that what they are doing are objective science given that it is not-- given that distribution of resources is by definition a political act! Mine Doyran SUNY/Albany
Re: Re: Re: Re: Moses and monetarism (fwd)
If there would be a philosophy or literature person here, s(he) would *really* be pissed, not only by the unprofessional use of language but also by ignorance. I am not a big fun of hermeneutics and deconstruction either, but I never make the mistake of considering those theorists writing outside the realm of philosopy of science. As something of a litcritter myself, I find denunciations of "lit crit sh*t" kinda banal. Like, okay, it's *just* literature (or fiction)---whatever. The basic point of such "sh*t" is that knowledges, like other things, are historical. There are no hidden meanings in texts--there are meanings generated in one way or another, by readers, schools, listservs, etc. (There are, btw, plenty of reasons to regard decon and other stuff as "sh*t": the things mentioned in this discussion are not among them.) As for PC, Jim said its empirical data waiting for a theory. Certainly. But it's not treated as such, generally--least of all by people like Greenspan and Co., who treat it as a full blown theory that needs to be disproved. There could be other uses, but I don't see them manifest very widely--though maybe I'm not looking hard enough. Christian
Re: Re: Re: Re: Moses and monetarism (fwd)
Justin, Please see my reply to Tom Walker where I both criticize hermeneutics and empiricism. btw, to my knowledge, Richard Rorty has nothing do with left. He is a new pragmatic following the footsteps of Dewey... thanks, Mine Mine, I am actually a "philosophy person"--used to be a philosophy professor before I was a lawyer. Although I do not necessary share the vehemence of the rejection of (the very different, as you remark) approaches of deconstruction or hermeneutics, I am fairly suspicious of their value when applied in a cookie cutter manner to scientific questions. The Sokal hoax shows what happens when scientifically illiterate postmodernists try to talk about science. I don't know enough about hermeneutics (Gadamer, Otto-Appel, that lot) to say whether scientific illiteracy is a defect of that tendency, although it wouldn't surprise me if it was. (However, I will remark that Heidegger, of all people, an important influence on both decontruction and hermeneutics, wrote some excellent philosophy of science based in obviously solid knowledge of early modern science.) I would refrain from broad brush statements about "empiricism." What do you have in mind when you say that empiricists "support the status quo by distorting the facts in the name of science"? Empiricism in its broadest sense is quintessentially respect for the facts as established by scientific research. This is not an approach that is for or against the status quo. Now, logical empiricism, the philosophy expounded by Carnap, Hempel, Reichenbach, Ayer, and so forth, has been pretty thoroughly discredited in most of its details, and has not had any serious exponents for a quarter century, even among those who consider themselves in some sense empiricists--like me. The closest is perhaps Larry Sklar, although I wonder whether Michael Dummett isn't really a logical empiricist. Still, he doesn't advertise that he is one. G.A. Cohen, a leading (former?) analytical Marxist is pretty close to logical empiricism in his philosophy of science. It was, however, deeply respectful of facts, and, for what it was worth, thought to be consitent with the left social democratic politics of those figures. Ayer, in fact, was a pretty radical left Labourite. One of the key logical empiricists, Otto Neurath, was a Marxist who made substantial contributions to the theory of the planned economy. Contemporary empiricism tends to be of two main types, which are not necesasrily inconsistent. One is neopragmatism of the sort represented by W.V. Quine (a reactionary), Wilfred Sellars (a radical), and the new Hilary Putnam (a former Marxist), as well as by Richard Rorty (a left liberal). The other is scientific realism, represented, e.g., by the old Putnam and his students, Michael Devitt, Richard Boyd, Richard Miller, Peter Railton--Marxists or former Marxists of some stripe all, Quine and Sellars are also scientific realists. I consider myself both a neopragmatist and a scientific realist. Railton was on my dissertation committee. --jks In a message dated Wed, 7 Jun 2000 2:23:56 PM Eastern Daylight Time, [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: References to hermeneutics and deconstruction don't convince me. I've never been into that kind of lit crit sh*t. I prefer logic, empirical research, and the philosophy of science (methodology). If there would be a philosophy or literature person here, s(he) would *really* be pissed, not only by the unprofessional use of language but also by ignorance. I am not a big fun of hermeneutics and deconstruction either, but I never make the mistake of considering those theorists writing outside the realm of philosopy of science. Science, by its nature, requires *some form* of hermeneutical understanding-- the question of what is that we are studying? why and how? Many people who have written about hermeneutics have also written about the philosophy of social sciences: nature of understanding, nature of inquiry, different methodologies, interpretation (don't we interpret facts in economics. oh!), the status of the relationship between positive and social sciences, etc, etc..okey I have not seen very many critical studies in hermeneutics (mind you that hermeneutics and deconstruction are very different things). I have not seen among *empricists* or pure logicists either. Empricists are well known to be supportive of status quo by distorting facts in the name of science. They present ideology as science. I would not be too quick to accept empricist methodology at face value. Regarding *critical* hermeneutics, one should have a look at Paul Ricour's works, not Gadamer's. Paul R. tries to abridge the gap between Marxism and understanding, and the role of marxist methodology in interpretation. Why do economists constantly make the claim that what they are doing are objective science given that it is not-- given that distribution of resources is by definition a political act! Mine Doyran
