It is clear that the attack in Khobar is part of a new pattern. These
are not mainly excitatory terrorist activity (although dragging the
dead Brit's body through the streets for a couple of miles before
putting it on display, is clearly for political purposes). It is
economic warfare.
The authorities will not be giving publicity to the rational strategy
of the insurgents: it is to attack oil installations owned by foreign,
especially US companies.
The Saudi regime has said the investment of foreign capital is
essential. It has had to send in helicopters with elite troops, but it
is likely there will be substantial deaths of hostages as well as of
the insurgents. It has captured one of the leaders and can torture
him, and the Yanbu attack last month ended arguably in victory for the
regime. But this is now a war on Saudi territory which the insurgents
may not lose in the longer term. The lack of democratic consensus and
the unemployment in Saudi Arabia are not good omens for the Saui Royal
family. The truce with radical islamist within the country has broken
down, which allowed them to organise for 9/11. The war is now at home.
Although the islamic insurgents are almost certainly motivated by
ideas of martyrdom and are willing to attack civilians with
terroristic methods, the intention is more than to be politically
excitatory. It is therefore arguable they should be called insurgents
rather than terrorists, and we should consider that a guerrilla war
has now broken out of insurgents within Saudi Arabia itself, one that
will not be easily stamped out. Its vulnerable targets are economic.
US and UK governments may well have to instruct all their civilian
citizens to leave the country.
This is a war for control of Saudi Arabian oil supplies.
Judging from the response of the UK government to the bombing of the
crucial capitalist institution of the Baltic Exchange by the IRA in
the 1990's, the Saudi Arabian regime will have to compromise.
US capital may lose direct ownership of Saudi Oil.
That has enormous global strategic significance for the hegemony of US
imperialism over the world capitalist economy. Especially since the
Islamic insurgents can probably deny Iraqi oil to the west for several
years to come.
The insurgents are backed by substantial capital resources and
infrastructure. This is a war of global dimensions of a new form
between rival capitalisms. In terms of its footsoldiers it is a war
between the haves and the Islamic have nots. The latter are more
determined, and more likely to win, at least some concessions. Their
leadership are shrewd enough clearly to be thinking strategically as
well as tactically in terms of organisation.
This is perhaps the third world war, of a form very different from the
first and second.
I suggest...
Chris Burford
London
