re: Chinese working class
Steve D., Sorry this is coming late. First, I think you're attributing positions to Bernard and Wong that they don't hold, at least from what I can find of their work on the internet. 'Rethinking the China Campaign' was written when there was a concerted campaign by labor in the US to deny entry into the WTO/PNTR for China. They were worried that the energy of Seattle was getting channeled in a direction that would be destructive for what they call, ' the campaign against corporate sponsored globalization and for fair trade, development and global solidarity.' I don't think they, 'ignore the actual independent labor insurgency underway in China right now' as you say, but stress that the labor movement in the US should reach out to workers and union leaders of the ACFTU, *in addition* to continuing to meet with Chinese political dissidents. (their words) For a similar viewpoint of Wong and Bernard, from someone with much more experience with workers and unions in China, see Anita Chan's recent article 'CHINA AND THE INTERNATIONAL LABOUR MOVEMENT'? http://www.gbcc.org.uk/Chan19.html Also, if organized labor in the US is serious about trying to build solidarity with workers in China, why not go after foreign firms that do contract work in China for the US (mainly from Taiwan, South Korea and Hong Kong)? Most of China's exports to the US are produced in foreign-owned or contracted firms, and the exploitation of workers is worse there than anywhere else in China at present. It would also give activists in the US a way to connect opposition to glomperialism with solidarity efforts with workers in China and make it more difficult for alliances between organized labor and Pat Buchanan, Gary Bauer and their ilk (ilk alert). Second, all accounts point to the fact that the ACFTU is going through serious changes. The Trade Union Law was just amended (see below) giving unions more of a legal basis to engage in collective bargaining, and all sorts of new organizations are developing to 'handle' the new forms of exploitation that are emerging, such as migrant workers' advocacy groups, newspaper 'call-in' centers that expose and serve as advocates of workers. The ACFTU is directly involved in some of these initiatives. To see the ACFTU as part and parcel of the bureaucracy I think is not accurate. Jonathan Lassen Trade union law amended http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2001-11-05/42033.html Efforts made to expand organs at grass roots http://www1.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2001-11-05/42032.html Class struggle continues http://biz.yahoo.com/ifc/cn/news/102901-3.html
Re: semiconductor production
Michael, Most of the stats on the web seem to be proprietary, but I found: http://www.semichips.org/stats/shares.htm and http://www.semichips.org/stats/shares2.htm unless I'm reading the charts wrong (I'm assuming BASE means production base), they show that domestic production/total domestic sales of semiconductors from 1982-1999 in the US was: 198288.7 198385.7 198483.2 198585.7 198682.8 198779.7 198870.5 198967.3 199072.1 199169.9 199270.2 199367.5 199464.6 199561.3 199667.6 199773.8 199875.3 199971.2 Of the four areas listed, Japan's growth has been the slowest in the 90s, while the Asia-Pacific region has been the fastest. But as a spokesperson for Hitachi said in 1994, "You don't have to make all DRAMs in order to sell all DRAMs." I have no idea about the distribution of high-end chip production, but the silicon from the semi-periphery is on par with that from the core. TSMC (a Taiwan 'chip foundry') is expected to put out a higher volume of silicon than any other company in the globe this year, and may even have a technological head start on Intel and other companies. (see http://www.theregister.co.uk/content/archive/13443.html) They beat AMD and Intel in the .13 micron race. But TSMC is as global as its first world counterparts, with manufacturing plants in Singapore, the US and Taiwan. The company was started through a joint venture between the Taiwanese government, Phillips and private investors, and was able to attract scores of Taiwanese engineers educated in the US and working in silicon valley back to Taiwan. The company is now listed in both Taiwan and the US, I think. It's also expected to be shifting production to China in the future, and that's now the direction of a lot of top talent from Taiwan. Jonathan Lassen At 02:45 PM 2001/1/11 -0800, you wrote: Does anybody here know how much of the total semiconductor production comes from abroad and how much is produced domestically? If you know that, then, how much of the high-end chip production comes from abroad? -- Michael Perelman Economics Department California State University Chico, CA 95929 Tel. 530-898-5321 E-Mail [EMAIL PROTECTED]
the fed and the yuan
Hi, What do people make of the nearly unanimous call for China to revalue the yuan and/or go off the dollar peg? Industrialists, US senators and now Alan Greenspan and EU officials have jumped on the bandwagon. Cheers, Jonathan 2003-07-16 Financial Times http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStoryc=StoryFTcid=1057562469743http://news.ft.com/servlet/ContentServer?pagename=FT.com/StoryFT/FullStoryc=StoryFTcid=1057562469743 by Alan Beattie and Christopher Swann Alan Greenspan, chairman of the US Federal Reserve, on Wednesday warned that the Chinese authorities could not continue to peg their currency without endangering their domestic economy. The comments, in front of a congressional committee, add to a chorus of concern among policymakers about China's insistence on fixing the renminbi against the dollar. Mr Greenspan suggested that the renminbi would have to be allowed to float, saying the current campaign of intervention to support it was unsustainable. It has required them to. . . be very heavy purchasers of US dollar-denominated assets, Mr Greenspan said. At some point they will no longer be able to do that, because it will create an inability of their monetary system to function well. Asked directly if the authorities should let the renminbi float, Mr Greenspan said: I think that from an economic point of view, it's going to be increasingly evident that that is what is going to have to happen if the existing cost structures around the world remain as they are. And I think the Chinese are sufficiently sophisticated to understand that. Inflows of hot money into China have recently forced the central bank to buy an average of $600m a day to keep the currency steady against the dollar. This pushed China's foreign exchange reserves above $340bn by the end of June from $316bn at the end of March. The surge is viewed by many as evidence of the undervaluation of the currency. Mr Greenspan noted that John Snow, the US Treasury secretary, had already advised the Chinese authorities that they should float their currency. The Fed chairman's words are part of an increased willingness among American policymakers publicly to discuss floating the renminbi. Though they have generally avoided directly pressing China on the issue - believing that it might be counter-productive - US officials have praised moves towards greater flexibility in the Chinese exchange rate. Mr Greenspan on Wednesday questioned whether public pressure on the Chinese would actually help move their private discussion along. The US administration is also under pressure from the US business lobby, particularly manufacturing, which says that Asian currency manipulation is costing American jobs. China's trade surplus with the US grew from $28.2bn in 2001 to $43.3bn in 2002. Commenting on the US economy, Mr Greenspan sought to correct a false impression that he had completely ruled out the use of unusual measures such as buying Treasury bonds outright to combat deflation. Bond yields rose sharply on Tuesday after Mr Greenspan said that such measures were most unlikely to be needed. The Fed chairman said it was not clear whether resurrecting the 30-year Treasury bond, which was discontinued in 2001, was a good idea even in view of the mounting deficits faced by the US.
Re: the fed and the yuan
Ian, They don't believe so: China has the right to decide its exchange rate policy and no international agreement forbids that. from: http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200307/01/eng20030701_119224.shtml But they've agreed in principle to gradually phase out capital controls in the future (as part of the concessions they made for WTO accession), and have signalled they are going to let the rmb float within a wider band. I'm sure one thing the Chinese gov. is worried about is deflation. Lowered demand for China's exports and cheaper imports would make that worse, no? I think I might have to take a look at Brenner (Global Turbulence) again. I just can't figure out why there's suddenly a unanimous call for revaluation. Especially since foreign firms account for such a significant portion of exports from China (more than half I think). Curious, Jonathan At 15:46 2003-7-19, you wrote: - Original Message - From: Jonathan Lassen [EMAIL PROTECTED] Hi, What do people make of the nearly unanimous call for China to revalue the yuan and/or go off the dollar peg? Industrialists, US senators and now Alan Greenspan and EU officials have jumped on the bandwagon. Cheers, Jonathan == Didn't WTO accession give them to 2006 to end the peg? Ian
Re: the fed and the yuan (and yen)
Jim, Thanks for your response. But if it's in the US' interest to devalue the dollar relative to other currencies, then why is the US willing to allow Japan to intervene to prevent the yen from appreciating? (http://www.nytimes.com/2003/07/19/business/19EURO.html - as if China's not going through a 'tough set of things') Is it Japan/US vs. EU/China? The greater current account deficit with China? Also, how does the fact that Japan-China-Hong Kong together have about 800 billion dollars in US denominated reserves fit into the picture? Curious, Jonathan At 11:53 2003-7-20, you wrote: Jonathan writes: I just can't figure out why there's suddenly a unanimous call for revaluation. Especially since foreign firms account for such a significant portion of exports from China (more than half I think). as should be well-known, the falling dollar boosts the US economy at the expense of Europe and other major trading partners with floating rates. But with a fixed yuan/dollar exchange rate, the falling dollar also means that China gains at the expense of Europe and other areas with currencies rising relative to the US dollar. The US -- and other dollar-holders -- don't gain from this, however. all of this encourages fears of deflation. Jim
Re: The Road to Serfdom
Hi all, Here's what James Petras has said about an alternative for China: The renewal of socialist development requires courage, new ideas and recognition of the specificities of the Chinese society and economy. The key is the courage to systematically reject the premises, language and concepts of globalization and neo-liberal ideology. The key to renewal is based on starting from the basic idea that the new strategy must be based on development from below and directed to the domestic economy. This involves a period of transition which must take drastic socialist shock policies to undermine the current elite structure and reverse the regressive allocation of income, investment and ownership. Shocks must include fixed prices on basic commodities, freezing bank accounts and investment of the wealthy classes, appropriation of profits, seizure of the commanding heights of the economy. These policies will likely provoke crises and panic among the elite, investment boycotts and protests form abroad. But they are essential to avoid de-capitalization and to provide the key instruments for socialist development. Socialist shock policies should be followed by a worker designed structural adjustment policy (SAP) where property is re-socialized, rural cooperatives are reintroduced, income and credit is redistributed, illicit wealth is confiscated and the State withdraws public guarantees from private sector borrowers. Adjustments in income form above to below, from private to public, from overseas creditors to low income debtors should create the fundamental foundations for the socialization of the economy based on decentralized democratic planning. Planned economy form below requires open debates and the formation of independent social organizations based on the popular classes, including women, ecologists, minorities, as well as peasants, workers, young people and academics. Once the fundamental structures are in place and the regime is consolidated, selective openings of the economy in spheres of competitive advantages should be encouraged. National defense based on internal preparedness and international solidarity linking anti-imperialist, socialist and democratic movements becomes part of the new foreign policy. Future integration via international solidarity with popular movements replaces today's integration via subordination to the imperial dominated world market. from: China in the Context of Globalization http://www.chinastudygroup.org/articleshow.php?id=9 Cheers, Jonathan At 14:41 2003-8-11, you wrote: Maybe I'm not reading carefully enough, but did you answered Doug's question about what your alternative would be? You say what you would not advise them to do, but that's really not an answer. I'm sure they could come up all by themselves lots of reasons why what their approach has serious problems, but if you can't tell them what they might do instead, they aren't any better off. Thanks, Anders
Re: China
I wish I had more time to respond. I will on the weekend. Here are a couple of interesting related links tho: How Bush picked on China to win votes http://www.chinastudygroup.org/newsarchive.php?id=2619 and Politics, Jobs and the Yuan http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/EI18Ad02.html Cheers, Jonathan At 18:36 2003-9-17, you wrote: [would any of the China Study Group members care to comment on the below?] [New York Times] September 16, 2003 China Told Not to Relax Yuan Limits By KEITH BRADSHER HONG KONG, Sept. 15 - Credit-rating agencies strongly warned today that China should not let its currency appreciate soon or relax controls on the movement of large sums of money in and out of the country, as the Bush administration has asked. The Chinese banking system was not ready, the rati
Re: us/chinese real estate bubbles
Speaking of state ownership in China... This is also from the People's Daily, if you can believe it: The last land grab in China People's Daily 2003-09-24 http://fpeng.peopledaily.com.cn/200309/24/eng20030924_124849.shtml The Chinese government has finally realized that simply owning a wealth of business assets does not necessarily mean they are productive. In China, the State used to own almost everything. But as economic reforms have introduced new equity holders into the system, State assets have been gradually withdrawing from centre stage. To shape State-owned enterprises (SOEs) into veritable businesses with strong market orientation, the State has decided to pull even further out of the equity arrangement of China's economic juggernauts. One estimate puts State equities in publicly listed companies alone at 6 trillion yuan (US$725 billion). And who will take over this giant stake? Management, proclaims a chorus of advocates. Of all the companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, only 0.08 per cent of the equities are currently in the hands of management. There seems to be interest as well as room for growth in this area. China's business press touted management buyouts (MBOs) throughout 2002. And they heralded 2003 as the year of the MBO. From 1999, when the first MBO took place in China, to 2002, 16 equity transfers of this nature were sealed. However, in early 2003, the Ministry of Finance issued an edict that temporarily brought MBO activities to a halt, citing legal imperfections as the cause for possible new forms of trading that some insiders can use to obtain improper financial interests. But the buzz surrounding MBOs did not stop there. Rather it morphed from a trumpet blast into a subliminal hum. Management has put on a collective facade of endurance, replacing its erstwhile flamboyance and euphoria. But by all accounts, the MBO show is still going on, just in new formats. Pros and cons The see-sawing arguments tipped mostly towards MBO advocacy last year, while this year they have favoured the opposition. But the arguments remain the same. Hu Ruyin, director of the Shanghai Securities Development Research Centre, pointed out several benefits of MBOs. When management is truly the master of its own universe, efficiency in decision-making is much higher, creating a perfect harmony between the interests of the company and those of management. The management team will work harder, as a result, and be more cohesive. In a word, the MBO combines the best of both worlds - that of the entrepreneur with that of the professional manager. Zhong Wei, professor of finance at Beijing Normal University, is an ardent MBO promoter. MBOs will further clarify China's cloudy corporate equity structure and rid a business of the major investor who does not have the knowledge or inclination to be an active part of the operation, he said. Many of these SOEs are simply a burden. Why do we worry about the erosion of State assets? I worry that nobody will take them. Very few are against privatization per se, but the process of the big sell-off, if not tightly regulated and closely monitored, could cause a plethora of problems that might fundamentally undermine any potential benefits. Opponents like Gao Huiqing, director of the planning office for the research department of the State Information Centre, emphasizes fairness. Because the assets are not open to bidding from all parties, but only to management, there is sure to be a lot of insider manoeuvring to make huge profits by simply tossing them onto the public market. And small investors left out of the loop will end up paying for this. It's like asking the down-and-out to subsidize the well-heeled, says Gao. Ba Shusong, deputy director of the strategic development office of the China Securities Association, refutes the oft-repeated argument that because MBOs work in the West, they've got to be good for China. In Western countries, the MBO usually works for the spin-off of a side business or as a deterrent against hostile takeovers, and it takes place in an open, transparent system where there are rules to follow every step of the way. China, Ba says, is different. Here, the whole process is designed for insiders to make a quick buck, or millions of quick bucks, by playing two markets - one for tradable stocks and one for non-tradable ones. Zhong Wei is not convinced. Regulation in China often lags behind practice, he says. We can improve the system by working on it. If we don't go into this dark forest, how do we know what kind of beasts are lurking inside? Hua Sheng, an economist, contends that the modern management model is to separate investors from managers, not the other way round. Investor-managers are more suitable for small and medium-sized firms, he says. Using stock options as a stimulant does not infer that one has to be the sole or majority owner in order to operate a business. Price and payback Several key issues involving MBOs point to the
Re: China's looming energy crisis
Goodman's big bad bureaucracy spin is boring and pretty wrong. I thought it was pretty big news that China was going full-steam ahead with the liberalization and corporatization of the electricity industry in 2002 right after the CA crisis. But as usual, 'market intervention' is to blame. The relationship with northern-produced coal is also very interesting. Not too long ago there were stories about coal shortage being the cause of the electricity shortage. (see http://www.chinastudygroup.org/index.php?type=newsid=3543) This seems to have prompted the government to reopen the hundreds of horrifically unsafe small mines that are the result of the deregulation of the coal industry. (keep your eyes peeled for the film Blind Shaft, which I hear is depicts the mining conditions in small private mines in China pretty well - see review at http://film.guardian.co.uk/filmedinburgh2003/story/0,13776,1022632,00.html) cheers, Jonathan At 09:11 AM 1/5/2004, you wrote: China's Dark Days and Darker Nights Industrial Growth Exceeds Supply of Electrical Power By Peter S. Goodman Washington Post Foreign Service Monday, January 5, 2004; Page A01 HANGZHOU, China -- In a country gaining dominance in the production of electronics, 9-year-old Sheng Minjie sat down one recent evening to do his math homework. First, though, he had to solve a physics equation: How many candles did he need to illuminate his work? Like thousands of other households in this city on China's east coast, Sheng's family was without electricity, his apartment dark and cold. The city had cut the power to his neighborhood as part of a series of rolling blackouts imposed as China struggles to cope with power shortages afflicting much of the country. At one point last month, the city's traffic lights were turned off for two days. A ban on lighted advertising has created the peculiar spectacle of a Chinese metropolis largely devoid of flashing neon. China's relentless industrial development has outstripped its supply of power. The government forecasts shortages of 10 to 15 percent in key manufacturing areas, estimating that China needs about $108 billion worth of new generating capacity to close the gap. Factories are now cutting production, while hotels and restaurants dim lights and switch off heat. Some worry that the scarcity could shackle enterprises that have become critical employers at a time when millions of government-supported jobs are being eliminated by the country's transition from Communism to the free market. These power shortages are extremely serious, said Scott Roberts, an analyst at Cambridge Energy Research Associates in Beijing. In some areas they have been crippling for economic growth. full: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A54689-2004Jan4.html -- The Marxism list: www.marxmail.org
Re: China and socialism
South China Morning Post, Aug. 2 Police shoot villagers in land dispute, report says by: Staff Reporter Dozens of people in Shijiahe village in Zhengzhou, Henan province, were reportedly injured yesterday when police arrested troublemakers who had organised protests over land deals approved by village leaders. Chinesenewsnet.com, an overseas-based Chinese affairs website, carried a message posted by a family member saying about 600 policemen surrounded the village in the early hours yesterday to arrest villagers who were identified as troublemakers. The villagers had complained that village leaders had pocketed the proceeds from the land deals. Armed with tear gas, shotguns, dogs and electric batons, the police confronted unarmed villagers who tried to stop them from taking the troublemakers away, the message said. As a result, more than 30 people suffered gunshot wounds and six were seriously hurt. The message did not say how many villagers or troublemakers had been arrested but said the injured villagers were being treated in a hospital in Zhengzhou. The report said the villagers opposed the land sale, which involved investment of as much as 40 million yuan.
Re: China and socialism
Thanks LP for posting the review of Hart-Landsberg and Burkett's long MR piece. I just picked up a copy yesterday, and have been looking it over. I've got my own little quibbles with it (not enough emphasis on rural China, which I think is desperately important right now, they lump pre-1976 China together as 'Maoist' China, etc.), but personally I think it's a very welcome and timely piece. I hope it continues to spark debate and interest. Many of the (reposted) digs against Hart-Landsberg and Burkett seem wildly off the mark. The duo are mainly concerned about people using China as a progressive model of development. Few in the US do, but I think there is a growing sense in other parts of the world that China offers a viable alternative to neoliberalism. Particularly when China works together with Brazil and other countries in the Group of 77. Stiglitz seems to be in this category, and you'll find lots of this in UN orgs and other wonky progressive orgs. To counter this, Hart-Landsberg and Burkett try to show how bad things are in China for the working class. It's not the whole story, but it's hard to deny, and it's only going to get worse. I think we should be getting ready for this debate. When these kind of news stories - see below - appear (and we're only hearing about this one because one of the villagers was able to get to the internet), perhaps we should pause and look a bit closer at what's going on. The way that these contradictions are either displaced, resolved, or sublated will have, IMO, a wide-reaching influence on how the 21st Century plays out, just as they did last century. Jonathan - Villagers vow to fight on in face of police assault Joint owners want to overturn the sale of 150 hectares worth 40 million yuan SCMP | 3 aug Villagers in Henan province vowed to continue their fight for justice after police intervened at the weekend to quell their protest over land sales, leaving several people injured and four detained. What we ask for is simple: return our land and punish the corrupt village officials, said a villager surnamed Liu, whose mother was injured in the raid and was being treated yesterday for gunshot wounds. Mr Liu, 22, said the district government had sent about 400 officials to Shijiahe village in Zhengzhou city to try to stop the villagers from petitioning. About 600 police armed with tear gas, shotguns, dogs and electric batons raided the village last Saturday looking for the organisers of protests against land sales approved by village head Liu Guo-zhao. At least 30 people were injured and four detained in the incident, Mr Liu said. Most of the injured cannot even afford to go to hospital. Villagers strongly opposed the land deal, which involved 150 hectares of farmland worth up to 40 million yuan and owned by more than 6,000 of them, Mr Liu said. They had protested since June and sent their petitions to the city and provincial governments but had not received any response. A district government team went to the village about three weeks ago after villagers threatened to hold a protest in Beijing. The incident police raid happened on the same day the team had promised to release an investigation result, Mr Liu said. The team disappeared from the village before the police arrived. He said local government representatives had visited his mother, one of the four still in hospital. It was merely a show. They did not even bother to visit the other victims who were in other wards, he said. They tried to give my mother 1,000 yuan for medical care, but we refused to accept it because we knew their real intention was to stop us from petitioning any further. My mother said, 'We don't need your money now. Let us wait until the problem is resolved'. Mr Liu, who works in Zhengzhou, posted a report of the incident and his mobile phone number on an overseas Chinese website on Sunday. He said yesterday that internet police had phoned him and he dared not return home for fear of further police harassment. An official from the Huiji district government publicity department confirmed that a group of officials had been sent to Shijiahe village to deal with the dispute. Most of our staff from the relevant departments are in the village now, he said. They have been working on the dispute ever since it started. The incident is still under investigation ... and things are going in the right direction. The official denied a report that the village head had been placed in shuanggui, a disciplinary measure outside the regular legal system under which party members are detained and interrogated. A Zhengzhou city government spokeswoman said the fact that no local media had covered the story proved the sensitivity of the case. We cannot give any comment, not because it is a secret; we need time to clarify the facts, she said.
Re: China Study Group
Hi Kenneth Campbell, Who funds Monthly Review? I have no idea. I do know a bit about China Study Group, since I work with them. The annual budget is about 100 dollars, which is what the website costs. All the labor is volunteer. My guess is -- and this is prejudicial against me, not you -- that these people are academics or dilettantes without any roots in the cultures they write about. (Only a guess.) Some are academics, most are not. Most of the members are from China. None are dilettantes. Cheers, Jonathan wrote: Jonathan Lassen writes: Thanks LP for posting the review of Hart-Landsberg and Burkett's long MR piece. I just picked up a copy yesterday, and have been looking it over. I've got my own little quibbles with it (not enough emphasis on rural China, which I think is desperately important right now, they lump pre-1976 China together as 'Maoist' China, etc.), but personally I think it's a very welcome and timely piece. I hope it continues to spark debate and interest. I do not like to diminish the MR. Just... put it in perspective. Who funds it? Have you met the people who do? (I have met some of them.) Likewise, with groups using .orgs. So, here, to save reader's time, is from the Web site of China Group: China Study Group is a New York based non-profit organization formed in 1995 to facilitate networking of scholars/activists, and promote dissemination of info and research works, Another New York intelligentsia leftist group. Without roots, perhaps, based on the self-description: Members of the CSG support the broad goals of the Chinese revolution that triumphed in 1949, and seek to stimulate knowledge and debate regarding its achievements and limitations, as well as to offer a critical perspective of the radical changes that have occurred in China over the past 25 years and an ongoing analysis of its role in the world today. No mention of the money, though. Are these rich people in the CSG support? My guess is -- and this is prejudicial against me, not you -- that these people are academics or dilettantes without any roots in the cultures they write about. (Only a guess.) Nonetheless, China exists without the CSG, so, please, do not interpret my skeptical view of information from the CSG as a refutation of China. I think China might possibly be there for a long time -- even without me. Ken. -- I am the passenger And I ride and I ride I ride through the city's backside I see the stars come out of the sky Yeah, they're bright in a hollow sky You know it looks so good tonight -- The Passenger Iggy Pop, 1977
Re: China and socialism
Joel Wendland wrote: Is this particular story emblematic of the restoration of capitalism, though? Isn't it true that this kind of event took place in pre-reform China -- and not necessarily to benefit the working and toiling classes? We expect to see it in capitalist countries, of course. The pre-reform, post-revolutionary state in China did not resort to organized violence in order secure land for industrial purposes. They had sufficient legitimacy and power so that violence was not necessary. The violence associated with land grabs is very much a recent problem, developing since the late 90s as far as I know. In a socialist country, however, where the working class is the dominant social strata, one might expect it not to happen. China's working class may be the majority in urban China, but I don't think anyone would consider them dominant. My question is, to what extent is political repression in China the result of a one-party system that had/s(?) the tendency to disallow dissenting opinions and/or the insistence on a single path to socialism (if that kind of rhetoric is allowable), or a political culture (not meant in the anthropological sense) generated by a cultural-revolution-type atmosphere rather than a restoration of capitalism? I don't think you can separate the current development/restoration of capitalism and repression in China. People living in non-capitalist social relations have to be drawn kicking and screaming into the loving embrace of the 'market.' Chinese farmers don't want to be locked cages and thrown back into the 19th century. The corrupt bureaucratic class of China's countryside is the underground pump for the sea of factories that produce an increasingly large chunk of social materiality on this planet. This can only be accomplished under the most ruthless of dictatorships, regardless of the appearence of the political system. The current 'political culture' in China has been generated by the Cultural Revolution only in a negative way. Dengism was the conscious rejection of everything Maoist, particularly the Cultural Revolution. It emerged as the victorious ideology only after Mao's death, and the failure of the Cultural Revolution. Cheers, Jonathan
Re: China Study Group
Kenneth Campbell wrote: As I hope you understood, I meant no offence. China needs no help from us. I'm not sure why China provokes such strong feelings of separateness/alienation. Let's all just stay in our hermetically sealed container-states, it's much safer. JL
Re: What is the total wealth ?
Sorry if this has already been quoted. ...when the limited bourgeois form is stripped away, what is wealth other than the universality of individual needs, capacities, pleasures, productive forces, etc., created through universal exchange? ... The absolute working-out of his creative potentialities, with no presupposition other than the previous historic development, which makes this totality of development, i.e., the development of all human powers as such the end in itself, not as measured on a predetermined yardstick... Grundisse 488 Jonathan
China's migrant refuseniks
Drought of Migrant Labor Beijing Review | 5 aug by Fan Ren http://www.bjreview.com.cn/200431/Nation-200431(A).htm This year has seen the flood of migrant laborers, who traditionally travel to thriving coastal provinces in search of work, reduced to a trickle. As a result, many private companies have been adversely affected by this shortfall in labor, with some even having to downsize production or temporarily close their plants. What are the reasons behind this phenomenon? Shishi, a coastal city in Fujian Province, nicknamed City of Casual Clothing, has a population of 300,000, including 200,000 migrant workers. Its 5,000 companies employ migrant workers as their predominant source of labor. This year, however, the city has been hit by a severe shortage of laborers. Scarcely one year ago it was a totally different picture. It was common to see several migrant workers compete for one job opportunity. Now to recruit enough workers, the personnel department of many companies have promised to pay a bounty of 100 yuan ($12.1, or around 12 percent of a laborers monthly wage) to anyone who can poach staff for them. According to a report in Xinhua News Agency, since February, many small and medium-sized enterprises in Fujian Provinces coastal cities, like Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Putian and Jinjiang, have been facing a similar shortage of workers. Both skilled and ordinary workers are in great demand, with a combined shortage of 200,000 for the region. A survey conducted by the enterprise research agency affiliated to the Fujian Provincial Bureau of Statistics reveals that since the 2004 Spring Festival (Chinese New Year), the shortage of workers, especially skilled ones, has adversely affected the normal operation of enterprises based in Jinjiang. Only 80 to 85 percent of industrial enterprises and less than 50 percent of ceramic factories have been operating due to the labor shortage. Fujian Provinces coastal cities, a gold mine for the private economy, used to absorb over 1 million migrant workers every year, 80 percent of whom were from inland provinces. Since the 2004 Spring Festival, Zhejiang, another coastal province famous for its thriving private economy, has also been hit by a shortage of migrant workers. Data shows that this year the number of migrant workers in the province has experienced a year-on-year decrease of 10 to 20 percent. Demand of migrant laborers in Zhejiang has for the first time exceeded supply in the last 20 years. Whats more, the Pearl River Delta, which in the past was inundated with migrant workers, is also experiencing a severe shortage. According to a survey, there is a shortfall of 2 million workers in the central cities on the Pearl River Delta, such as Guangzhou, Shenzhen and Dongguan. Recruiting new workers has now become the top priority of many local enterprises. The prosperity of the private economy in Chinas eastern and southern coastal cities is for most part attributed to the cheap migrant labor, and the expansion of the manufacturing-based economy has provided more job opportunities for millions of surplus rural laborers. Currently, over one-third of Chinas rural laborers are working in non-agriculture industries. According to a survey conducted by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, the countrys total number of migrant workers had reached 99 million by the end of 2003. Undoubtedly, rural laborers have become the main body of manufacturing workers. Since the early 1990s, every Spring Festival has seen the seasonal flow of migrant workers between their working cities and their hometowns, which is described as the tide of migrant workers. Why a Shortage of Workers? Since migrant workers have become an indispensable part of Chinese cities, what has caused the current shortage of migrant workers in coastal cities? First, as major exporters of migrant workers, two central provincesAnhui and Jiangxiused to export over 90 percent of their rural laborers during the peak of the migrant worker tide. But the importance the Chinese Government now attaches to issues concerning the countryside, agriculture and farmers, plus the rise in the price of agricultural products from September 2003 have made farmers think twice before they go to work in cities. As a result, a large number of rural laborers have changed their plans, with many taking back their contracted land (in China, every farmer receives a piece of contracted land to farm. When farmers do not want to farm their land, they usually transfer the land to other farmers), or swapping their single crop rice for double crop rice. This is a major reason behind the dwindling of migrant workers moving to cities after the 2004 Spring Festival. Second, an unfavorable ratio between salary and expense is another reason for the drop in migrant workers. With economic development, the cost of living in coastal cities has kept going up, but migrant workers continue to earn relatively low wages. According to rough estimation, the monthly expense
Re: Fidel Castro horrified by China
From my standpoint the conversation concerning China gets loud because of the lack of concrete economic and political data. Then ideology parades as insight. Quite. If China's non agricultural workforce is between 350 and 400 million . . . with roughly 100 million in the NON STATE SECTOR . . . then the question becomes what is the economic meaning of state sector and non state sector in China? The self-described meaning of the state sector is here: http://www.sasac.gov.cn/eng/eng_qygg/eng_qygg_0001.htm This is its number 1 responsibility: 1) ... to guide and push the reform and restructuring of the state-owned enterprises. Supervise the maintenance and appreciation of state assets value for those state-invested enterprises, reinforce the management of the state-owned assets, promote the establishment of modern enterprise system of the SOEs and improve enterprises Corporate governance, drive the strategic adjustment of the state-owned economic structure and layout. Also, your employment numbers are fantastically off. Here's a report (2002) from China's State Council: The employees of state and collective enterprises and institutions accounted for 37.3 percent of the total urban employees in 2001, down from 99.8 percent in 1978. Meanwhile, the number of employees of private, individually owned and foreign-invested enterprises has increased drastically. In the countryside, the household is still the dominant unit of agricultural employment. However, with the implementation of the urbanization strategy and the development of non-agricultural industries, non-agricultural employment and the transfer of rural labor have increased rapidly. By the end of 2000, the number of employees of township enterprises had reached 128.195 million, of which 38.328 million were employed by township collective enterprises, 32.525 million by township private enterprises and 57.342 million by individually owned township enterprises. Since the 1990s, the labor force transferred from rural to urban areas has topped the 80-million mark. from: http://www.china.org.cn/e-white/20020429/1.I.htm Furthermore, since 2000, nearly *all* of the township and village enterprises have been formally privatized (usually sold to the managers), so the 38+ million listed above in the 'collective' economy can now be moved to the 'private' column. Add it all up: 65 million employed in the state sector, 800+ million outside of it. Also, the ratio of employees working in the state sector continues to decline, as does its share of GDP/assets, etc. And furthermore, many of the SOEs are now no longer fully 'owned' by the State. The state merely has a controlling stake of the enterprises' shares, while management has been contracted out to From the perspective of living labor, what is the difference between state and non-state management if their common goal is the ruthless expansion of value? Let's forget about the 800 million in agriculture . . . who under the best conditions of industrial socialism ... can only alienate their products on the basis of exchange . . . no matter what the form of property in land. There aren't 800 million in agriculture. There are somewhere around 800 million people registered in rural areas, but a little less than half of China's working age population is engaged in agriculture, around 450 million. Jonathan
Re: Fidel Castro horrified by China
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: My resistance is to an ideological curve in our history that bounces from crying crocodile tears over the alleged famine killing perhaps as many as 40 million people and all kinds of vilification of the revolution in China and the on going revolutionary process. Which I haven't heard anyone do here, please correct me if I'm wrong. But speaking of revolution, here's the (very) rough draft of a piece by Li Changping, former county head in China, who came to fame in China by writing a letter to then Premier Zhu Rongji about corruption and the desperate conditions in Hubei Province. Prevent Rural Problems From Becoming Revolutionary The main manifestation of rural problems 1. In central and western China, most rural households find it difficult to even maintain simple reproduction after paying taxes and fees on their agricultural income. Furthermore, the majority of migrant workers find it difficult to reproduce their labor power on their wages. In 70% of the villages in central and western China, each family has about 8 mu of land. In average years, each mu of land produces about 1,500 jin of grain, and at .5 yuan/jin, this is about 750 yuan in gross revenue per mu. After subtracting about 200 yuan per mu in production and transaction costs, and 100 yuan in all sorts of visible and invisible taxes and fees, this leaves 450 yuan/mu in income, or about 3,600 yuan in income per family, and usually not more than 5,000 if you include income from sidelines. This figure is an approximation of farm income in currency, while only about 3,000 yuan of a family's income comes in the form of cash. Because education, medical, and the production costs of farmers are all high, it is thus difficult for farming households to break even. According to a survey undertaken by students from Nanjin University in their hometowns, 66% of central-western rural households find it difficult to maintain simple reproduction, and 64% of households are operating in debt. Migrant workers in cities currently earn about 6,000 yuan a year, but they have on average 900 yuan in medical expenses, 1,500 yuan in rent, 2,000 in food and incidental expenses, 200 yuan in clothing expenses, etc. This leaves them with about 600 yuan/year to take home. It is not possible for a young man to accumulate enough money to build a house, get married, and prepare for children and old age on 600 yuan a year. 2. Central-western China's infrastructure has been crumbling. Health, education and other public goods exist only in name. Rural markets are depressed, and financial resources have dried up. Production and life in general are difficult in rural areas, and the romantic image of farming in China is now nothing more than a historical memory. In recent years, the state has spent a great deal on managing large river systems, with impressive results. However, because the level of organization and mobilization in villages has fallen from the past, many of the infrastructure projects built under the communes are not being maintained, lowering villages' abilities to fight natural disasters. The number of school buildings has increased in the last few years, but the public education system that existed before the 80s no longer exists. Schooling is now farming households' biggest expense (36% of their income). A survey by the Ministry of Health revealed that rural households pay on average 500 yuan/year in medical expenses. Falling ill and going to the hospital have become a luxuries for farmers, and also one of their greatest fears. In the 80s, middle schools, roads, electricity, communication, pumps, etc., were all part of the state's responsibility, but now they are all the people's responsibility. How will farmers, who have a difficult time with simple reproduction, be able to shoulder what should be the state's burden to provide public goods? Farmers' disposable cash income is falling, as is their purchasing power. Rural markets are shrinking, and TVEs (town and village enterprises) are having a rough time as rural markets shrink. The four major state banks have retreated from rural areas, and the inability of farmers to secure loans has become one of the bottlenecks for rural development. The new generation of farmers no longer feel a connection with the land, signaling that the age of chaotic urban growth is set to begin. 3. Agricultural investment continues to drop, the natural environment in rural areas is getting worse, farmers produce more and earn less, and many villages are being pressured to return to self-sufficiency. The central government increased its agricultural investment, but provincial, city, county and township governments, heavily in debt (rural townships alone owe 230 billion yuan in debt) and under pressure to issue wages to their millions of bloated staff, prevented this money from reaching the countryside. Since the 1990s, hundreds of millions of hours of labor were mobilized each year to undertake infrastructure
