[pfx] Re: Behavior of smtp_tls_security_level = dane

2024-03-16 Thread Viktor Dukhovni via Postfix-users
On Sat, Mar 16, 2024 at 11:04:46PM +0100, Dirk Stöcker via Postfix-users wrote:

> From the server which has the local name server the answer has the
> aa flag, but not the ad flag.

That's expected when the nameserver in question is authoritative for the
requested domain, no DNSSEC validation is performed, since the data is
(presumably) from a trusted source.  It is up to recursive servers to
validate it as needed.

Your configuration where the same server is both authoritative and
recursive is not supported.  The risk with trusting that AA-bit is that
the server might be a secondary server for the zone, with an insecure
channel for zone transfers, in which case the AA bit cannot be trusted.

Postfix only trusts the AD bit from a validating local resolver, and
trusting the AA bit would have be a new configuration option, but
simpler to never mix authoritative and recursive service in the same
nameserver process.

On my machine, the authoriative server (BIND) only listends on the
the ethernet IP interface, while the recursive server (unbound)
listends only on 127.0.0.1.  It validates queries for my own domain,
just like for any other.


> So two tasks for me:
> a) fix the internal DNSSEC issue

Nothing to fix in DNSSEC, rather, split the auth and recursive
resolvers.

-- 
Viktor.
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[pfx] Re: Behavior of smtp_tls_security_level = dane

2024-03-16 Thread Dirk Stöcker via Postfix-users

Hello,


DANE TLSA records are strictly enforced when "well-formed", where
well-formed also requires a plausible TLSA "associated data" field
(expected length for SHA2-256 and SHA2-512 digests and valid DER
encoding of certs or keys for matching type Full(0)).


That's what I did expect. Starting with the fact that what I expect is 
also
what should haven happened I reviewed the whole system. The reason 
somewhere
lies in DNSSEC. The mail sending server is also the domain server for 
the
internal target domain. When I send mail to the target from somehwere 
else DANE works
(with updated TLSA). From the server which has the local name server the 
answer has the

aa flag, but not the ad flag. I have to investigate what's broken here.
Either a configuration change or an update broke something. It was 
hidden as no
negative side effects were visible (I hate it when stuff fails and it's 
invisible,

except in some logs).

So two tasks for me:
a) fix the internal DNSSEC issue
b) monitor internal DANE as well

Lesson learned: Not only external stuff must be monitored thoroughly. 
;-)


P.S. For https://www.postfix.org/TLS_README.html#client_tls_dane maybe 
the third paragraph could have added: "If there are usable, but 
mismatching TLSA entries, no mail is sent."?


For Freedom In Peace
--
http://www.dstoecker.eu/ (PGP key available)
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[pfx] Re: Ignoring postscreen DNSBL disposition by recipient address

2024-03-16 Thread Bill Cole via Postfix-users

On 2024-03-15 at 14:11:03 UTC-0400 (Fri, 15 Mar 2024 13:11:03 -0500)
Matt Saladna via Postfix-users 
is rumored to have said:


Hello,

I'm seeking a workaround for Microsoft's litany of IPs landing on 
DNSBL. They'd like all mail irrespective of DNSBL status to be 
delivered, which requires a skip if the sender IP is blacklisted in 
postscreen. With separation between postscreen and smtpd, postscreen 
rejects the connection before handing off to smtpd so 
smtpd_recipient_restrictions isn't triggered.


Is there an appropriate workaround that allows postscreen to report 
DUNNO after DNSBL checks if the recipient matches in a table?


No, which is because of how postscreen is designed, as a fit to its 
intended purpose. See the man page and supplementary README file for 
details.


If you need to make recipient exceptions to postscreen, you are simply 
using it for the wrong function. It is a *lightweight* tool to dispose 
of pure spam sources without loading and using all the logic of the 
smtpd daemon. By default, postscreen is no longer in control by the time 
the greeting banner is sent.


If you wish to do anything complicated with deciding whether to accept a 
message, you need to do it later in the SMTP transaction.



--
Bill Cole
b...@scconsult.com or billc...@apache.org
(AKA @grumpybozo and many *@billmail.scconsult.com addresses)
Not Currently Available For Hire
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