Re: Clipboard API: remove dangerous formats from mandatory data types

2015-07-28 Thread Chaals McCathie Nevile
On Tue, 28 Jul 2015 08:24:17 -0400, Hallvord Reiar Michaelsen Steen  
 wrote:



On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 1:08 PM, Chaals McCathie Nevile <
cha...@yandex-team.ru> wrote:


I'm just thinking out loud here, but this problem is similar to one
already faced by email clients, especially those which are web-based...

On Mon, 27 Jul 2015 15:03:40 -0400, Hallvord Reiar Michaelsen Steen <
hst...@mozilla.com> wrote:

 So PNG, JPG et al go in the "support

reading from clipboard" list, and the "support writing" starts out with
text/plain, text/html and text/uri-list - although it would be nice if
CSV was also considered safe enough.



I'm not sure you should directly read image formats from the clipboard,
especially if you don't know how they got there.


What are your concerns exactly? As Wez mentioned we may have to add some
transcoding - but if there's a chunk of binary data labelled as JPEG on  
the clipboard, and the user wants to paste this into her blog editor,

how would we do that if web content "shouldn't" read image formats from
the clipboard?


Essentially only certain things would be delivered from the clipboard - a  
picture in the desired format, and hopefully a certain amount of metadata.  
But we would be pretty explicit that unexpected stuff may well be dropped  
- and probably *should* in various cases like images


(I think we might actually agree in practice, and be looking for words)

cheers


You shouldn't write stuff there that can be dangerous, but you really
shouldn't read it direct. So maybe what happens is that when stuff gets
written, it goes through a process like painting it onto a canvas, and  
then being scraped back off as coloured pixels and "safe" metadata.


Indeed, if that's what it takes.. like the addImageFromCanvas()  
suggestion below. Regarding that suggestion you asked:




Is it more than syntactic sugar?



If we allow adding image data as blobs, the "normal" way with
clipboardData.items.add() it would be just a convenience method. Since
Daniel Cheng has serious concerns and good arguments against allowing  
that, something like addImageFromCanvas() might be a workaround that

would let users put images on the clipboard in a safe way.. If we have
neither, I guess we'll see data:image/jpeg URLs placed on the clipboard
as plain text.
-Hallvord R.



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Re: Clipboard API: remove dangerous formats from mandatory data types

2015-07-28 Thread Hallvord Reiar Michaelsen Steen
On Tue, Jul 28, 2015 at 1:08 PM, Chaals McCathie Nevile <
cha...@yandex-team.ru> wrote:

> I'm just thinking out loud here, but this problem is similar to one
> already faced by email clients, especially those which are web-based...
>
> On Mon, 27 Jul 2015 15:03:40 -0400, Hallvord Reiar Michaelsen Steen <
> hst...@mozilla.com> wrote:
>
>  So PNG, JPG et al go in the "support
>> reading from clipboard" list, and the "support writing" starts out with
>> text/plain, text/html and text/uri-list - although it would be nice if
>> CSV was also considered safe enough.
>>
>
> I'm not sure you should directly read image formats from the clipboard,
> especially if you don't know how they got there.


What are your concerns exactly? As Wez mentioned we may have to add some
transcoding - but if there's a chunk of binary data labelled as JPEG on the
clipboard, and the user wants to paste this into her blog editor, how would
we do that if web content "shouldn't" read image formats from the clipboard?


> You shouldn't write stuff there that can be dangerous, but you really
> shouldn't read it direct. So maybe what happens is that when stuff gets
> written, it goes through a process like painting it onto a canvas, and then
> being scraped back off as coloured pixels and "safe" metadata.
>

Indeed, if that's what it takes.. like the addImageFromCanvas() suggestion
below. Regarding that suggestion you asked:


> Is it more than syntactic sugar?
>
>
If we allow adding image data as blobs, the "normal" way with
clipboardData.items.add() it would be just a convenience method. Since
Daniel Cheng has serious concerns and good arguments against allowing that,
something like addImageFromCanvas() might be a workaround that would let
users put images on the clipboard in a safe way.. If we have neither, I
guess we'll see data:image/jpeg URLs placed on the clipboard as plain text.
-Hallvord R.


Re: Clipboard API: remove dangerous formats from mandatory data types

2015-07-28 Thread Chaals McCathie Nevile
I'm just thinking out loud here, but this problem is similar to one  
already faced by email clients, especially those which are web-based...


On Mon, 27 Jul 2015 15:03:40 -0400, Hallvord Reiar Michaelsen Steen  
 wrote:



On Tue, Jun 9, 2015 at 8:39 PM, Daniel Cheng  wrote:

Currently, the Clipboard API [1] mandates support for a number of  
formats.
Unfortunately, we do not believe it is possible to safely support  
writing a

number of formats to the clipboard:
- image/png
- image/jpg, image/jpeg
- image/gif



Hi Daniel,
I've been pondering this a bit and I think a first step is to split the
list of "mandatory data types" into two: one list for types you must
support reading from the clipboard, and one (smaller) for types you must
support writing to the clipboard. So PNG, JPG et al go in the "support
reading from clipboard" list, and the "support writing" starts out with
text/plain, text/html and text/uri-list - although it would be nice if  
CSV was also considered safe enough.


I'm not sure you should directly read image formats from the clipboard,  
especially if you don't know how they got there. You shouldn't write stuff  
there that can be dangerous, but you really shouldn't read it direct. So  
maybe what happens is that when stuff gets written, it goes through a  
process like painting it onto a canvas, and then being scraped back off as  
coloured pixels and "safe" metadata.


A use case for the latter is the fabled "embedded accessibility" that  
could have made longdesc obsolete in 1997 - although the more likely use  
case for most people is getting the right geospying in their photo stream,  
and proving to the world that their camera clock flashes like a video  
player from 1987.


So essentially we don't restrict what is in the clipboard, but we do put  
restrictions on what we will take out, and if you want to be well-behaved  
you would follow those restrictions before you put anything there. Can we  
safely implement a clean/dirty flag similar to canvas, to help avoid  
double-sanitizing? Is that worth worrying about?



It would also be good if we could come up with an API for safely writing
images to the clipboard. Just playing:
event.clipboardData.addImageFromCanvas(canvasElm, 'image/png')

Hot or not?


Safely DrawMeA(sheep) is certainly worth pondering. Is it more than  
syntactic sugar?


cheers

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[Bug 28614] Weaken the requirement of the time of running async steps

2015-07-28 Thread nobody
https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=28614
Bug 28614 depends on bug 26440, which changed state.

Bug 26440 Summary: Allow fullscreenchange events to be synchronized with 
animation frames
https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=26440

   What|Removed |Added

 Status|NEW |RESOLVED
 Resolution|--- |MOVED

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[Bug 16502] Define multiple monitor support and per-subdomain

2015-07-28 Thread nobody
https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=16502

Anne  changed:

   What|Removed |Added

 Status|NEW |RESOLVED
 Resolution|--- |MOVED

--- Comment #7 from Anne  ---
Closing this in favor of that. Perhaps once there are primitives for other
monitors we can solve this better, but I don't plan on pioneering that. If you
have the resources and want to solve this, do let me know and I'll help you
out.

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[Bug 27674] requestFullscreen should return a promise

2015-07-28 Thread nobody
https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=27674
Bug 27674 depends on bug 26440, which changed state.

Bug 26440 Summary: Allow fullscreenchange events to be synchronized with 
animation frames
https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=26440

   What|Removed |Added

 Status|NEW |RESOLVED
 Resolution|--- |MOVED

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[Bug 26516] Make resize events etc to be synchronized with animation frames

2015-07-28 Thread nobody
https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=26516
Bug 26516 depends on bug 26440, which changed state.

Bug 26440 Summary: Allow fullscreenchange events to be synchronized with 
animation frames
https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=26440

   What|Removed |Added

 Status|NEW |RESOLVED
 Resolution|--- |MOVED

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[Bug 26440] Allow fullscreenchange events to be synchronized with animation frames

2015-07-28 Thread nobody
https://www.w3.org/Bugs/Public/show_bug.cgi?id=26440

Anne  changed:

   What|Removed |Added

 Status|NEW |RESOLVED
 Resolution|--- |MOVED

--- Comment #29 from Anne  ---
Let's close this in favor of https://github.com/whatwg/fullscreen/issues/16

Any new issues should be filed on GitHub.

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