RE: Smith and exemptions
Church Ferry Road Baptist Church v Higgins was a church's challenge to a Montana statute requiring disclosure of certain activities and expenditures in regard to ballot initiatives. Most of the opinion addresses free speech implications of campaign finance law regulation, but the court also addressed and dismissed the churchs claim that it could not be subject to disclosure laws on free exercise grounds. It claimed that since there were some exemptions in the statute (for newspapers and membership organizations) Lukumi required application of compelling interest analysis. The court rejected this submission, on the ground that Lukumi held that a statue was neutral and generally applicable so long as religion was not the only non-exempt category. Is that right? The Third Circuit apparently disagreed in the Newark Police cases. Marc Stern ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Smith and exemptions
That interpretation is not consistent with the Newark Police case or with some other Third Circuit cases, which read considerable bite into the neutral and generally applicable requirement. Outside the Third Circuit, I think it is generally unclear when/if categorical exceptions to a general law take that law outside the Smith rule. In a decision vacated on ripeness grounds, the Ninth Circuit said that a law was neutral and generally applicable so long as the pattern of exceptions did not suggest a desire to suppress religious practice. Thomas v Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'm, 165 F.3d 692, 701-02. I have not seen any decision stating that the rule is that religion must be the ONLY non-exempt category for Lukumi to apply. One might say that the ordinances in Lukumi exempted everything but religious practice, but Kennedy was at some pains to point out that the facts there were well beyond the boundary separating Smith cases and heightened scrutiny free exercise cases. Is the decision in the case you mention available on-line? I was looking for it on Westlaw but was unable to find it? John Taylor WVU Marc Stern [EMAIL PROTECTED] 10/17/2006 9:58:11 AM Church Ferry Road Baptist Church v Higgins was a church's challenge to a Montana statute requiring disclosure of certain activities and expenditures in regard to ballot initiatives. Most of the opinion addresses free speech implications of campaign finance law regulation, but the court also addressed and dismissed the church's claim that it could not be subject to disclosure laws on free exercise grounds. It claimed that since there were some exemptions in the statute (for newspapers and membership organizations) Lukumi required application of compelling interest analysis. The court rejected this submission, on the ground that Lukumi held that a statue was neutral and generally applicable so long as religion was not the only non-exempt category. Is that right? The Third Circuit apparently disagreed in the Newark Police cases. Marc Stern ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Smith and exemptions
I think the more interesting question raised by this case at least based on Marcs description of it is whether courts should provide more rigorous review of regulations burdening religious organizations or individuals when the law at issue regulates speech or voting or ballot access. If a law in any of these areas would be subject to some standard of review less than strict scrutiny when the law is applied to a secular organization or individual, would the same law be subject to strict scrutiny with regard to its application to a religious organization or individual. In light of the Courts often stated conclusion that religion is a viewpoint of speech, does the free exercise clause require that speakers expressing religious viewpoints particularly in the context of political campaigns must receive greater protection for their expressive activities than speakers expressing secular viewpoints. I think the answer to that question has to be that it does not and that the few cases touching this issue support this answer. Alan Brownstein From: [EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marc Stern Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 6:58 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Smith and exemptions Church Ferry Road Baptist Church v Higgins was a church's challenge to a Montana statute requiring disclosure of certain activities and expenditures in regard to ballot initiatives. Most of the opinion addresses free speech implications of campaign finance law regulation, but the court also addressed and dismissed the churchs claim that it could not be subject to disclosure laws on free exercise grounds. It claimed that since there were some exemptions in the statute (for newspapers and membership organizations) Lukumi required application of compelling interest analysis. The court rejected this submission, on the ground that Lukumi held that a statue was neutral and generally applicable so long as religion was not the only non-exempt category. Is that right? The Third Circuit apparently disagreed in the Newark Police cases. Marc Stern ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Smith and exemptions
I agree with Alan's refinement of the issue -- but wonder about his solution. If one collapses protection of religion into speech, why is religion relevant? Are there not characteristics of religion, such as it associational or communitarian aspects, that are unique to religion? If the religion clauses have any independent, non-speech content, wouldn't that require some consideration of these non-speech factors? David E. Guinn JD, PhDRecent Publications Available from SSRN at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=199608 - Original Message - From: Brownstein, Alan To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 11:15 AM Subject: RE: Smith and exemptions I think the more interesting question raised by this case at least based on Marcs description of it is whether courts should provide more rigorous review of regulations burdening religious organizations or individuals when the law at issue regulates speech or voting or ballot access. If a law in any of these areas would be subject to some standard of review less than strict scrutiny when the law is applied to a secular organization or individual, would the same law be subject to strict scrutiny with regard to its application to a religious organization or individual. In light of the Courts often stated conclusion that religion is a viewpoint of speech, does the free exercise clause require that speakers expressing religious viewpoints particularly in the context of political campaigns must receive greater protection for their expressive activities than speakers expressing secular viewpoints. I think the answer to that question has to be that it does not and that the few cases touching this issue support this answer. Alan Brownstein From: [EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marc SternSent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 6:58 AMTo: Law Religion issues for Law AcademicsSubject: RE: Smith and exemptions Church Ferry Road Baptist Church v Higgins was a church's challenge to a Montana statute requiring disclosure of certain activities and expenditures in regard to ballot initiatives. Most of the opinion addresses free speech implications of campaign finance law regulation, but the court also addressed and dismissed the churchs claim that it could not be subject to disclosure laws on free exercise grounds. It claimed that since there were some exemptions in the statute (for newspapers and membership organizations) Lukumi required application of compelling interest analysis. The court rejected this submission, on the ground that Lukumi held that a statue was neutral and generally applicable so long as religion was not the only non-exempt category. Is that right? The Third Circuit apparently disagreed in the Newark Police cases. Marc Stern ___To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.eduTo subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlawPlease note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Smith and exemptions
John Taylor is trying to post the full opinion, a task well beyond my technical competence. I tend to agree with Alan about speech based claims of this sort not being decided differently because the speaker is religious. In any event, aside from the exemption point, I have trouble seeing a particular burden on religion by campaign finance disclosure laws-or for that matter charitable registration laws. However, the trial judge can hardly be faulted for going through a complaint cause of action by cause of action and dispensing with all the claims seriatim. Alans point reflects a deeply secular point of view-that religion is just another ideology. David is quite right to question whether the constitution accepts that conceptualization of religion. It is ironic, though, that Alans point is underscored by the various cases beginning with Widmar in which religious speakers have urged exactly his position to gain access to public places and to justify public funding of religious enterprises. Marc Stern From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of David E. Guinn Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 12:30 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Smith and exemptions I agree with Alan's refinement of the issue -- but wonder about his solution. If one collapses protection of religion into speech, why is religion relevant? Are there not characteristics of religion, such as it associational or communitarian aspects, that are unique to religion? If the religion clauses have any independent, non-speech content, wouldn't that require some consideration of these non-speech factors? David E. Guinn JD, PhD Recent Publications Available from SSRN at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=199608 - Original Message - From: Brownstein, Alan To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 11:15 AM Subject: RE: Smith and exemptions I think the more interesting question raised by this case at least based on Marcs description of it is whether courts should provide more rigorous review of regulations burdening religious organizations or individuals when the law at issue regulates speech or voting or ballot access. If a law in any of these areas would be subject to some standard of review less than strict scrutiny when the law is applied to a secular organization or individual, would the same law be subject to strict scrutiny with regard to its application to a religious organization or individual. In light of the Courts often stated conclusion that religion is a viewpoint of speech, does the free exercise clause require that speakers expressing religious viewpoints particularly in the context of political campaigns must receive greater protection for their expressive activities than speakers expressing secular viewpoints. I think the answer to that question has to be that it does not and that the few cases touching this issue support this answer. Alan Brownstein From: [EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marc Stern Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 6:58 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Smith and exemptions Church Ferry Road Baptist Church v Higgins was a church's challenge to a Montana statute requiring disclosure of certain activities and expenditures in regard to ballot initiatives. Most of the opinion addresses free speech implications of campaign finance law regulation, but the court also addressed and dismissed the churchs claim that it could not be subject to disclosure laws on free exercise grounds. It claimed that since there were some exemptions in the statute (for newspapers and membership organizations) Lukumi required application of compelling interest analysis. The court rejected this submission, on the ground that Lukumi held that a statue was neutral and generally applicable so long as religion was not the only non-exempt category. Is that right? The Third Circuit apparently disagreed in the Newark Police cases. Marc Stern ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages
RE: Smith and exemptions
I think Davids absolutely right that there are characteristics of religion that justify it receiving special constitutional treatment. And I certainly did not intend to suggest that we should collapse the protection of religion into the protection of speech whenever there is any speech dimension to religious activity. Most of the time the practice of religion should not be viewed as speech but rather as the exercise of religion. But there are situations where religious expressive activities should be treated as speech for the purposes of reviewing regulations that burden or restrict them. Drawing that line may not be that easy to do, but I think it has to be done. Some of the places where I think strong arguments can be offered to treat religious expressive activities as speech involve content neutral speech regulations, and the regulation of elections (regulations relating to voting, ballot access, campaign financing laws etc.) Alan Brownstein From: [EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu] On Behalf Of David E. Guinn Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 9:30 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Smith and exemptions I agree with Alan's refinement of the issue -- but wonder about his solution. If one collapses protection of religion into speech, why is religion relevant? Are there not characteristics of religion, such as it associational or communitarian aspects, that are unique to religion? If the religion clauses have any independent, non-speech content, wouldn't that require some consideration of these non-speech factors? David E. Guinn JD, PhD Recent Publications Available from SSRN at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=199608 - Original Message - From: Brownstein, Alan To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 11:15 AM Subject: RE: Smith and exemptions I think the more interesting question raised by this case at least based on Marcs description of it is whether courts should provide more rigorous review of regulations burdening religious organizations or individuals when the law at issue regulates speech or voting or ballot access. If a law in any of these areas would be subject to some standard of review less than strict scrutiny when the law is applied to a secular organization or individual, would the same law be subject to strict scrutiny with regard to its application to a religious organization or individual. In light of the Courts often stated conclusion that religion is a viewpoint of speech, does the free exercise clause require that speakers expressing religious viewpoints particularly in the context of political campaigns must receive greater protection for their expressive activities than speakers expressing secular viewpoints. I think the answer to that question has to be that it does not and that the few cases touching this issue support this answer. Alan Brownstein From: [EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marc Stern Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 6:58 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Smith and exemptions Church Ferry Road Baptist Church v Higgins was a church's challenge to a Montana statute requiring disclosure of certain activities and expenditures in regard to ballot initiatives. Most of the opinion addresses free speech implications of campaign finance law regulation, but the court also addressed and dismissed the churchs claim that it could not be subject to disclosure laws on free exercise grounds. It claimed that since there were some exemptions in the statute (for newspapers and membership organizations) Lukumi required application of compelling interest analysis. The court rejected this submission, on the ground that Lukumi held that a statue was neutral and generally applicable so long as religion was not the only non-exempt category. Is that right? The Third Circuit apparently disagreed in the Newark Police cases. Marc Stern ___ To post, send message to [EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read
RE: Smith and exemptions
The decision is available at this link, http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/CanyonFerryDecision.pdf. Richard Richard S. Myers Professor of Law Ave Maria School of Law 3475 Plymouth Road Ann Arbor, MI 48105-2550 (734) 827-8094 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Fax (734) 622-0757 ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
RE: Smith and exemptions
The full opinion is available at http://www.telladf.org/UserDocs/CanyonFerryDecision.pdf From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Marc Stern Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 1:21 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Smith and exemptions John Taylor is trying to post the full opinion, a task well beyond my technical competence. I tend to agree with Alan about speech based claims of this sort not being decided differently because the speaker is religious. In any event, aside from the exemption point, I have trouble seeing a particular burden on religion by campaign finance disclosure laws-or for that matter charitable registration laws. However, the trial judge can hardly be faulted for going through a complaint cause of action by cause of action and dispensing with all the claims seriatim. Alans point reflects a deeply secular point of view-that religion is just another ideology. David is quite right to question whether the constitution accepts that conceptualization of religion. It is ironic, though, that Alans point is underscored by the various cases beginning with Widmar in which religious speakers have urged exactly his position to gain access to public places and to justify public funding of religious enterprises. Marc Stern From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of David E. Guinn Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 12:30 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: Smith and exemptions I agree with Alan's refinement of the issue -- but wonder about his solution. If one collapses protection of religion into speech, why is religion relevant? Are there not characteristics of religion, such as it associational or communitarian aspects, that are unique to religion? If the religion clauses have any independent, non-speech content, wouldn't that require some consideration of these non-speech factors? David E. Guinn JD, PhD Recent Publications Available from SSRN at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=199608 - Original Message - From: Brownstein, Alan To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 11:15 AM Subject: RE: Smith and exemptions I think the more interesting question raised by this case at least based on Marcs description of it is whether courts should provide more rigorous review of regulations burdening religious organizations or individuals when the law at issue regulates speech or voting or ballot access. If a law in any of these areas would be subject to some standard of review less than strict scrutiny when the law is applied to a secular organization or individual, would the same law be subject to strict scrutiny with regard to its application to a religious organization or individual. In light of the Courts often stated conclusion that religion is a viewpoint of speech, does the free exercise clause require that speakers expressing religious viewpoints particularly in the context of political campaigns must receive greater protection for their expressive activities than speakers expressing secular viewpoints. I think the answer to that question has to be that it does not and that the few cases touching this issue support this answer. Alan Brownstein From: [EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marc Stern Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 6:58 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: RE: Smith and exemptions Church Ferry Road Baptist Church v Higgins was a church's challenge to a Montana statute requiring disclosure of certain activities and expenditures in regard to ballot initiatives. Most of the opinion addresses free speech implications of campaign finance law regulation, but the court also addressed and dismissed the churchs claim that it could not be subject to disclosure laws on free exercise grounds. It claimed that since there were some exemptions in the statute (for newspapers and membership organizations) Lukumi required application of compelling interest analysis. The court rejected this submission, on the ground that Lukumi held that a statue was neutral and generally applicable so long as religion was not the only non-exempt category. Is that right? The Third Circuit apparently disagreed in the Newark Police cases. Marc Stern ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post,
RE: Smith and exemptions
As my response to David suggests, I dont think my point reflects a deeply secular point of view that religion is just another ideology. The point is whether as a matter of constitutional law, and in light of the several values and goals of our constitutional system, it is sometimes necessary to review regulations of religious expressive activities under free speech, voting rights, and ballot access doctrine rather than free exercise doctrine. I think religion is multi-dimensional and crosses several constitutional boundary lines (speech, equality, liberty). Because it does so, it is necessary to draw doctrinal lines of demarcation at least some of the time. Alan John Taylor is trying to post the full opinion, a task well beyond my technical competence. I tend to agree with Alan about speech based claims of this sort not being decided differently because the speaker is religious. In any event, aside from the exemption point, I have trouble seeing a particular burden on religion by campaign finance disclosure laws-or for that matter charitable registration laws. However, the trial judge can hardly be faulted for going through a complaint cause of action by cause of action and dispensing with all the claims seriatim. Alans point reflects a deeply secular point of view-that religion is just another ideology. David is quite right to question whether the constitution accepts that conceptualization of religion. It is ironic, though, that Alans point is underscored by the various cases beginning with Widmar in which religious speakers have urged exactly his position to gain access to public places and to justify public funding of religious enterprises. Marc Stern ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Smith and exemptions
I'm not sure how far I disagree with Alan as a practical matter, though I was concerned about the description of the case that suggested some "associations" were exempted from the law but not religion. However, I guess the greater concern is that the courts, particularly Scalia,have often used speech as a way to avoid religious issues and the possible criticism that protecting religion violates equal protection requirements. If we automatically default to a free speech analysis we miss the potential bias in the law (as the court missed the Christian bias in"Goldman.") David - Original Message - From: Brownstein, Alan To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 12:17 PM Subject: RE: Smith and exemptions I think Davids absolutely right that there are characteristics of religion that justify it receiving special constitutional treatment. And I certainly did not intend to suggest that we should collapse the protection of religion into the protection of speech whenever there is any speech dimension to religious activity. Most of the time the practice of religion should not be viewed as speech but rather as the exercise of religion. But there are situations where religious expressive activities should be treated as speech for the purposes of reviewing regulations that burden or restrict them. Drawing that line may not be that easy to do, but I think it has to be done. Some of the places where I think strong arguments can be offered to treat religious expressive activities as speech involve content neutral speech regulations, and the regulation of elections (regulations relating to voting, ballot access, campaign financing laws etc.) Alan Brownstein From: [EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu] On Behalf Of David E. GuinnSent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 9:30 AMTo: Law Religion issues for Law AcademicsSubject: Re: Smith and exemptions I agree with Alan's refinement of the issue -- but wonder about his solution. If one collapses protection of religion into speech, why is religion relevant? Are there not characteristics of religion, such as it associational or communitarian aspects, that are unique to religion? If the religion clauses have any independent, non-speech content, wouldn't that require some consideration of these non-speech factors? David E. Guinn JD, PhDRecent Publications Available from SSRN at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/cf_dev/AbsByAuth.cfm?per_id=199608 - Original Message - From: Brownstein, Alan To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Sent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 11:15 AM Subject: RE: Smith and exemptions I think the more interesting question raised by this case at least based on Marcs description of it is whether courts should provide more rigorous review of regulations burdening religious organizations or individuals when the law at issue regulates speech or voting or ballot access. If a law in any of these areas would be subject to some standard of review less than strict scrutiny when the law is applied to a secular organization or individual, would the same law be subject to strict scrutiny with regard to its application to a religious organization or individual. In light of the Courts often stated conclusion that religion is a viewpoint of speech, does the free exercise clause require that speakers expressing religious viewpoints particularly in the context of political campaigns must receive greater protection for their expressive activities than speakers expressing secular viewpoints. I think the answer to that question has to be that it does not and that the few cases touching this issue support this answer. Alan Brownstein From: [EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED].ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marc SternSent: Tuesday, October 17, 2006 6:58 AMTo: Law Religion issues for Law AcademicsSubject: RE: Smith and exemptions Church Ferry Road Baptist Church v Higgins was a church's challenge to a Montana statute requiring disclosure of certain activities and expenditures in regard to ballot initiatives. Most of the opinion addresses free speech implications of campaign finance law regulation, but the court also addressed and dismissed the churchs claim that it could not be subject to disclosure laws on free exercise grounds. It claimed that since there were some exemptions in the statute (for newspapers and membership organizations) Lukumi required application of compelling interest analysis. The court rejected
Is anyone here interested in the certiorari in the Holm case
Here is the beginning. I can send the rest if anyone is interested. Stan Shepp No. _ In The Supreme Court of the United States - - RODNEY HANS HOLM, Petitioner, v. STATE OF UTAH, Respondent. - - On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari To The Supreme Court Of The State Of Utah - - PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI - - RODNEY R. PARKER* FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS SNOW, CHRISTENSEN MARTINEAU 10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor Post Office Box 45000 Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 Telephone: (801) 521-9000 RAYMOND SCOTT BERRY Post Office Box 58027 Salt Lake City, Utah 84158 Telephone: (801) 359-6160 October 13, 2006 *Counsel of Record COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO. (800) 225-6964 OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831 i QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Does Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879), preclude extension of modern liberty rights to religious polygamists who do not seek legal recognition of their relationships? 2. Does state criminalization of private polygamous relationships between consenting adults violate the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? 3. Does Utahs bigamy law target religion, in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, by making participation in a private religious ceremony an element of the crime? 4. Were Petitioners constitutional rights of due process and confrontation violated when the State failed to prove the jurisdictional elements of the crime, and when the trial court sustained the States objection to Petitioners effort to prove that the alleged acts took place outside the State of Utah? Let me know if you want the entire file posted here. Thanks! Stan Shepp Somewhere in the West Center of the Universe [EMAIL PROTECTED] ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Podcasts from ACLU Membership Conference in Wash DC this week
I thought many of the topics discussed at this week's ACLU Membership Conference might be of interest to list members. I caught some of the ACLU Membership Conference on C-SPAN (still rerunning one program on C-SPAN2 tonight) and I also found a lot of content available as streaming video or downloadable audio at: http://action.aclu.org/conference/webcasts.html Unfortunately, I missed the debate between Antonin Scalia and Nadine Strossen and I've heard it wont be webcast. I did order it from C-SPAN on DVD, though, for $30 plus shipping at: http://tinyurl.com/ynflv5 Hope this info is of general interest, Allen Asch Check out the new AOL. Most comprehensive set of free safety and security tools, free access to millions of high-quality videos from across the web, free AOL Mail and more. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
