Re: Preferential tax treatment for religious organizations

2007-03-09 Thread Susan Freiman

Volokh, Eugene wrote:

As I read the Texas Monthly plurality, Harlan's Walz concurrence, and 
(probably) the Texas Monthly concurrences, tax exemptions for religious uses 
are generally constitutional to the extent that they also apply to other 
charitable and educational uses.  That, I think, is generally so.
 
	But this decision summarized by Paul Caron at http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2007/03/tax_court_uphol.html  makes me wonder, at least as to certain situations:  The Tax Court yesterday upheld the IRS's denial of § 501(c)(3) tax-exempt status to a California organization dedicated 'to educat[ing] the public as to the alleged slavery and entrapment of Hollywood celebrities by Government officials.'  Families Against Government Slavery v. Commissioner http://www.ustaxcourt.gov/InOpHistoric/Families.TCM.WPD.pdf , T.C. Memo. 2007-49:


	'Language in the documents that Mr. Matthews distributes to the public at the referred-to demonstrations alleges that the Federal Bureau of Investigation kidnaps Hollywood celebrities and that law enforcement personnel and private gangs are joined in a conspiracy to kill, trap, and enslave Hollywood celebrities and minorities to gain more financial support and to engage in activities that petitioner describes as blood sport. Language in petitioner's documents also alleges that Government-sponsored welfare and housing programs force minority women to participate in the above alleged conspiracy. ... 
		

Educational purposes [under § 501(c)(3)] do not include activities 
principally involving the presentation of unsupported opinion. Reg. § 
1.501(c)(3)-1(d)(3)(i). ... The documents that petitioner presents to the public through 
Mr. Matthews are full of unsupported opinions and distorted facts. Petitioner's 
presentations and documents use inflammatory language and emotional and irrelevant 
statements. Because petitioner's activities appear principally to involve the 
presentation to the public of unsupported opinions, petitioner's activities do not 
further educational purposes under the operational test. On the record before us, 
petitioner does not qualify for tax-exempt status under § 501(c)(3) as an educational 
organization.

It sounds like petitioner is a kook, and his project is kooky.  But it does seem pretty clear that 
religious organizations don't lose § 501(c)(3) eligibility because they principally involv[e] the 
presentation of unsupported opinion or distorted facts.  The IRS, I take it, wouldn't apply 
to them its four factors for determining whether an opinion is to be regarded as unsupported:

(1) Whether viewpoints or positions taken are factually unsupported;
(2) Whether facts are distorted;
(3) Whether inflammatory and disparaging material is utilized based 
more on strong emotional feelings than on objective evaluations; and
(4) Whether the organization fails to provide background information that 
would allow the public to understand and to evaluate the material.

If that's so, then does it violate the First Amendment for tax exemptions to be 
granted to all religious entities, with no inquiry into whether they simply distribute 
unsupported opinions, while secular spreaders of opinion are subject to such 
an inquiry?  Or does this different treatment simply reflect the Ballard / Thomas / 
Watson v. Jones principle that the government may not investigate the accuracy of 
religious factual claims, even though it may investigate the accuracy of secular factual 
claims?

Eugene
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(1) Whether viewpoints or positions taken are factually unsupported;
(2) Whether facts are distorted;
(3) Whether inflammatory and disparaging material is utilized based 
more on strong emotional feelings than on objective evaluations; and
(4) Whether the organization fails to provide background information that 
would allow the public to understand and to evaluate the material.


I'm not at all qualified in this area of the law, so can someone tell me 
why these four criteria don't apply to all religions?


Susan

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California Supreme Court Decision in Tax-Exempt Bond Finance Case

2007-03-09 Thread Greg Baylor
Earlier this week, the California Supreme Court issued a decision in
California Statewide Communities Development Authority v. All Persons
Interested.  The opinion is available on the web at
http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/opinions/documents/S124195.PDF

The lower courts had concluded that article XVI, section 5 of the California
Constitution (sometimes called California's Blaine Amendment) forbid the
agency (CSCDA) from issuing tax-exempt bonds for construction projects at
Azusa Pacific University, California Baptist University, and the Oaks
Christian School if such schools were pervasively sectarian.  By a 4-3
vote, the state supreme court held that a school's eligibility for
tax-exempt bond finance does *not* turn on whether it is pervasively
sectarian.  It remanded the case back to the lower courts for further
proceedings.  [The dissenters concluded that the proposed bond issues were
plainly unconstitutional and that remand was unnecessary.]

The supreme court instructed the lower courts to ask two questions in
determining the constitutionality of the proposed bond issues:  (1) whether
the schools offer a broad curriculum in secular subjects; and (2) whether
the schools' secular classes consist of information and coursework that is
neutral with respect to religion.  

In discussing the neutrality requirement, the court invoked Establishment
Clause cases requiring religious neutrality in various settings, including
Epperson v. Arkansas and McCreary County v. ACLU.  At the same time, the
court said that the expression of a religious viewpoint in otherwise
secular classes held in financed buildings would not render the bond issue
unconstitutional.

I am particularly interested in whether other subscribers believe whether a
bond issuing agency would violate the federal constitution if it denied a
religious school access to conduit financing on the ground that its secular
classes are NOT neutral with respect to religion.

Federal and state tax codes exempt from income tax the interest earned on
government-issued bonds.  Government agencies issue bonds for the benefit of
a huge variety of entities, including for-profit industrial enterprises,
housing facilities, airports, hospitals, and schools.  Because the investors
don't pay tax on the interest they earn, they are willing to accept a lower
rate of return.  This benefits the borrowers, who pay a lower interest rate.
Of course, government tax revenues are lower than they otherwise might be.

Given the indirect nature of the government benefit to religious schools, is
California justified in requiring religious neutrality in financed
buildings?  Or is this an unjustifiable viewpoint discriminatory condition
on an otherwise available benefit?

Greg Baylor

Gregory S. Baylor
Director, Center for Law  Religious Freedom
Christian Legal Society
8001 Braddock Road, Suite 300
Springfield, VA 22151
(703) 642-1070 x 3502
(703) 642-1075 fax
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.clsnet.org

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