Re: Christian convert's claim that church broke confidentiality promise and thus exposed him to attack for apostasy in Syria

[Finkelman, Paul]

Seems to me that if the Church publicizes its conversions  then the church 
feels it is getting a benefit from converting people.  Also conversion is an 
important aspect of all evangelical Christian churches.  In a sense they exist 
to "save souls" -- hence their missionary activities at home and around the 
world.  Since that is in part their raison d'etre then that should be 
sufficient "benefit" to the church to create the contract.  And that benefit 
would exist whether it publicizes the event or not.


Furthermore, I wonder if there is a tort here -- intentional infliction of 
emotional distress or some very serious negligence action, since the church 
knew that bragging about this convert exposed him to literally moral danger and 
he relied on the church (and its promise) not to expose him, and then did so.



*
Paul Finkelman

Ariel F. Sallows Visiting Professor of Human Rights Law

College of Law

University of Saskatchewan

15 Campus Drive

Saskatoon, SK  S7N 5A6

Canada

c) 518.605.0296

paul.finkel...@albanylaw.edu

paul.finkel...@yahoo.com

and
Senior Fellow
Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism
University of Pennsylvania
*




From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu  
on behalf of Case, Mary Anne 
Sent: Monday, June 27, 2016 8:45 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: RE: Christian convert's claim that church broke confidentiality 
promise and thus exposed him to attack for apostasy in Syria


Eugene asks, “ Why wouldn’t that be a legally enforceable contract ?” What 
consideration is there for the Church and its agents?  Conversion is a benefit 
to the convert, not the Church.  Consider a secular analogue, plaintiff seeks 
to participate in the rituals of a secular organization, be it the KKK or 
Yale’s Skull and Bones, and extracts a promise that the organization’s leaders 
will keep his participation confidential.  When the organization is offering a 
privilege and the individual is not even becoming a dues paying member, all the 
consideration seems to be flowing to the individual.  It’s a different case 
when, for example, a reporter promises confidentiality to a source, because the 
consideration is the information exchanged. Eugene also says in his WAPO piece, 
“But if the defendants really agreed not to reveal this information, then they 
have waived their free speech rights on this score.”   Does that mean that 
revenge porn is actionable breach of contract if  before sending a compromising 
picture the victim extracted a promise that it will not be more widely 
circulated?



From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Sunday, June 26, 2016 9:14 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Christian convert's claim that church broke confidentiality promise 
and thus exposed him to attack for apostasy in Syria



   Howard Friedman summarizes the decision in the case, but I’m not 
sure it’s right.  Among other things, the Complaint asserts that church 
officials expressly promised that plaintiff’s “baptism and conversion would 
remain private,” and breached that promise.  Why wouldn’t that be a legally 
enforceable contract (see 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/17/convert-to-christianity-sues-church-claiming-it-broke-confidentiality-promise-and-thus-exposed-him-to-attack-for-apostasy-in-syria/)?



   Eugene



Feed: Religion Clause
Posted on: Sunday, June 26, 2016 11:28 AM
Author: Howard Friedman
Subject: Court Says Religious Autonomy Precludes Adjudication of Suit By 
Torture Victim



In a fascinating decision handed down June 17, an Oklahoma trial court held 
that the "religious autonomy doctrine" requires it to dismiss a suit against a 
U.S. church by a convert from Islam to Christianity who was captured and 
tortured in Syria because of his conversion. The facts are set out more fully 
in a complaint (full 
text)
 filed in 2014.  A Tulsa, Oklahoma resident who was born in Syria decided to 
convert, but told First Presbyterian Church leaders that his conversion had to 
remain confidential because he periodically traveled back to Syria and the 
punishment for apostasy under Sharia law was death. Despite assurances of 
confidentiality, the church published an announcement of his baptism in its 
Order of Worship, which was posted on the World Wide Web.  After traveling back 
to Syria, plaintiff was bound, beaten and tortured by radical Muslims who 
threatened to behead him. He eventually escaped.  His suit alleges that the 
church is guilty of negligence, 

RE: Christian convert's claim that church broke confidentiality promise and thus exposed him to attack for apostasy in Syria

[Volokh, Eugene]

   1.  I’m not an expert on contract law, but I had thought that 
“If you do X, I promise to do Y,” there’s adequate consideration regardless of 
whether X really “benefit[s]” the promisor in any tangible way.  The classic 
“I’ll pay you $1000 when you turn 21, if you don’t smoke before then” is, I 
thought, an example of that (the X there consists in refraining from action, 
but the analysis is the same).  See Restatement (Second) of Torts sec. 71 ill. 
9.

   It may well be that church officials do benefit from the 
conversion – they might see promoting conversion as spiritually beneficial for 
themselves (because it fulfills their religious duty) as well as for the 
convert.  But as I understand it, modern contract law doesn’t require us to 
assess such matters, just as it doesn’t require us to determine whether the 
offeror in the if-you-don’t-smoke illustration is benefiting from the offeree’s 
not smoking.  (The illustration had an uncle offering this to the nephew, and 
the uncle may well derive emotional benefit from knowing the nephew is 
abstaining from vice; but likewise church officials may derive emotional 
benefit from knowing that the convert is achieving salvation through their 
efforts.)

   2.  If V takes a nude photo of herself, sends it to D in 
exchange for D’s promise not to distribute it, and then D breaches that 
promise, I would think that would yield an open-and-shut breach of contract 
case.  Would there even be any controversy about that?

   Eugene

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Case, Mary Anne
Sent: Monday, June 27, 2016 8:46 AM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics 
Subject: RE: Christian convert's claim that church broke confidentiality 
promise and thus exposed him to attack for apostasy in Syria

Eugene asks, “ Why wouldn’t that be a legally enforceable contract ?” What 
consideration is there for the Church and its agents?  Conversion is a benefit 
to the convert, not the Church.  Consider a secular analogue, plaintiff seeks 
to participate in the rituals of a secular organization, be it the KKK or 
Yale’s Skull and Bones, and extracts a promise that the organization’s leaders 
will keep his participation confidential.  When the organization is offering a 
privilege and the individual is not even becoming a dues paying member, all the 
consideration seems to be flowing to the individual.  It’s a different case 
when, for example, a reporter promises confidentiality to a source, because the 
consideration is the information exchanged. Eugene also says in his WAPO piece, 
“But if the defendants really agreed not to reveal this information, then they 
have waived their free speech rights on this score.”   Does that mean that 
revenge porn is actionable breach of contract if  before sending a compromising 
picture the victim extracted a promise that it will not be more widely 
circulated?

From: 
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Sunday, June 26, 2016 9:14 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Christian convert's claim that church broke confidentiality promise 
and thus exposed him to attack for apostasy in Syria

   Howard Friedman summarizes the decision in the case, but I’m not 
sure it’s right.  Among other things, the Complaint asserts that church 
officials expressly promised that plaintiff’s “baptism and conversion would 
remain private,” and breached that promise.  Why wouldn’t that be a legally 
enforceable contract (see 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/17/convert-to-christianity-sues-church-claiming-it-broke-confidentiality-promise-and-thus-exposed-him-to-attack-for-apostasy-in-syria/)?

   Eugene

Feed: Religion Clause
Posted on: Sunday, June 26, 2016 11:28 AM
Author: Howard Friedman
Subject: Court Says Religious Autonomy Precludes Adjudication of Suit By 
Torture Victim

In a fascinating decision handed down June 17, an Oklahoma trial court held 
that the "religious autonomy doctrine" requires it to dismiss a suit against a 
U.S. church by a convert from Islam to Christianity who was captured and 
tortured in Syria because of his conversion. The facts are set out more fully 
in a complaint (full 
text)
 filed in 2014.  A Tulsa, Oklahoma resident who was born in Syria decided to 
convert, but told First Presbyterian Church leaders that his conversion had to 
remain confidential because he periodically traveled back to Syria and the 
punishment for apostasy under Sharia law was death. Despite assurances of 
confidentiality, the church published an announcement of his 

RE: Christian convert's claim that church broke confidentiality promise and thus exposed him to attack for apostasy in Syria

[Case, Mary Anne]

Eugene asks, “ Why wouldn’t that be a legally enforceable contract ?” What 
consideration is there for the Church and its agents?  Conversion is a benefit 
to the convert, not the Church.  Consider a secular analogue, plaintiff seeks 
to participate in the rituals of a secular organization, be it the KKK or 
Yale’s Skull and Bones, and extracts a promise that the organization’s leaders 
will keep his participation confidential.  When the organization is offering a 
privilege and the individual is not even becoming a dues paying member, all the 
consideration seems to be flowing to the individual.  It’s a different case 
when, for example, a reporter promises confidentiality to a source, because the 
consideration is the information exchanged. Eugene also says in his WAPO piece, 
“But if the defendants really agreed not to reveal this information, then they 
have waived their free speech rights on this score.”   Does that mean that 
revenge porn is actionable breach of contract if  before sending a compromising 
picture the victim extracted a promise that it will not be more widely 
circulated?

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene
Sent: Sunday, June 26, 2016 9:14 PM
To: Law & Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Christian convert's claim that church broke confidentiality promise 
and thus exposed him to attack for apostasy in Syria

   Howard Friedman summarizes the decision in the case, but I’m not 
sure it’s right.  Among other things, the Complaint asserts that church 
officials expressly promised that plaintiff’s “baptism and conversion would 
remain private,” and breached that promise.  Why wouldn’t that be a legally 
enforceable contract (see 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/06/17/convert-to-christianity-sues-church-claiming-it-broke-confidentiality-promise-and-thus-exposed-him-to-attack-for-apostasy-in-syria/)?

   Eugene

Feed: Religion Clause
Posted on: Sunday, June 26, 2016 11:28 AM
Author: Howard Friedman
Subject: Court Says Religious Autonomy Precludes Adjudication of Suit By 
Torture Victim

In a fascinating decision handed down June 17, an Oklahoma trial court held 
that the "religious autonomy doctrine" requires it to dismiss a suit against a 
U.S. church by a convert from Islam to Christianity who was captured and 
tortured in Syria because of his conversion. The facts are set out more fully 
in a complaint (full 
text)
 filed in 2014.  A Tulsa, Oklahoma resident who was born in Syria decided to 
convert, but told First Presbyterian Church leaders that his conversion had to 
remain confidential because he periodically traveled back to Syria and the 
punishment for apostasy under Sharia law was death. Despite assurances of 
confidentiality, the church published an announcement of his baptism in its 
Order of Worship, which was posted on the World Wide Web.  After traveling back 
to Syria, plaintiff was bound, beaten and tortured by radical Muslims who 
threatened to behead him. He eventually escaped.  His suit alleges that the 
church is guilty of negligence, breach of contract and outrageous conduct 
leading to extreme emotional distress.

In Doe v. First Presbyterian Church USA of Tulsa, 
Oklahoma,
 (OK Dist. Ct., June 17, 2016), the court held that the public dissemination of 
the names of those who have been baptized "is a key part of how the Church 
requires a conversion and baptism to be 'visible" to the world." The court went 
on to say:
the simple dispositive issue is whether the public dissemination of Plaintiff's 
name as a baptized person is "rooted in religious belief"
[A] secular Court like this one must not consider claims ... that arise out of 
a sacrament because a sacrament is part of the most sacred beliefs of that 
religious institution Defendants' deeply held religious belief about the 
visible, public nature of baptism must not be disturbed by this Court. 
[emphasis in original]
Tulsa 
World
 reports on the decision, with additional background.


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