RE: help wanted

[Greg Hamilton]

True, but not in Oregon, New York and California where the standard for 
employer “undue hardship” is “significant cost and difficulty.”

Gregory W. Hamilton, President
Northwest Religious Liberty Association
5709 N. 20th Street
Ridgefield, WA 98642
Office: (360) 857-7040
Website: www.nrla.com<http://www.nrla.com/>

[NRLA2013-final-350px]<http://www.nrla.com/>

Championing Religious Freedom and Human Rights

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
Sent: Monday, February 22, 2016 11:53 AM
To: Law Religion & Law List <religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>
Subject: Re: help wanted

I don’t think Title VII does the work here — the undue hardship standard is so 
de minimis as to be illusory in most cases where it would matter.


On Feb 22, 2016, at 1:51 PM, Greg Hamilton 
<greg.hamil...@nw.npuc.org<mailto:greg.hamil...@nw.npuc.org>> wrote:

From my vantage point in introducing, shepherding and helping to pass Idaho’s 
Free Exercise of Religion Act of 2000, and in failing with both Alaska and 
Oregon state Religious Freedom Restoration Act efforts over an 18-year period 
since 1998 is mostly a political one, albeit a constitutional one. It is 
obvious why, given the problem under the current circumstances—the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s upholding of same-sex marriage as constitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause, which we don’t consider to be an unhappy problem.

We helped defeat Montana’s radical RFRA bill proposal in the 2015 legislative 
session because it had all kinds of Establishment Clause problems, along with 
attempting to provide blank exemptions to small business owners, which we 
believe are best handled by the courts when factoring in motivation and context 
of each situation. A similar state religious freedom restoration act proposal 
was introduced in Washington State, but it didn’t make it out of Committee for 
similar reasons.

Finally, isn’t Title VII anti-discrimination/accommodation law, along with the 
Federal RFRA law, more than already satisfactory to address this matter 
involving state and federal employees?

Gregory W. Hamilton, President
Northwest Religious Liberty Association
5709 N. 20th Street
Ridgefield, WA 98642
Office: (360) 857-7040
Website: www.nrla.com<http://www.nrla.com/>

<http://www.nrla.com/>

Championing Religious Freedom and Human Rights

From: 
religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu> 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
Sent: Monday, February 22, 2016 8:39 AM
To: Law Religion & Law List 
<religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu<mailto:religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu>>
Subject: help wanted

How might Congress draft a federal law that requires states to accommodate 
religious beliefs so that state employees are free to refuse to perform tasks 
that are contrary to their religious beliefs?  We have the Boerne problems of 
making a record and RFRA being held to be too much of a bludgeon.  But assuming 
we could somehow get past that, what would the language be?  Could this work:

"Every state must accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of its 
employees and those persons with which it contracts by exempting them from 
performing tasks that are contrary to their religious beliefs.”

Even assuming the record-requirement part of Boerne could be met, I just can’t 
seem to craft language that I think would be likely to pass constitutional 
muster.

So, help wanted.

Steve



--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar
Howard University School of Law
vox:  202-806-8017
fax:  202-806-8567
http://sdjlaw.org<http://sdjlaw.org/>

“It’s not the note you play that’s the wrong note – it’s the note you play 
afterwards that makes it right or wrong.”

Miles Davis

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--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar
Assoc. Dir. of International Programs
Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice
http://iipsj.org
http://sdjlaw.org

"Politics hates a vacuum.  If it isn't filled with hope, someone will fill it 
with fear."

Naomi Klein




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RE: help wanted

[Greg Hamilton]

From my vantage point in introducing, shepherding and helping to pass Idaho’s 
Free Exercise of Religion Act of 2000, and in failing with both Alaska and 
Oregon state Religious Freedom Restoration Act efforts over an 18-year period 
since 1998 is mostly a political one, albeit a constitutional one. It is 
obvious why, given the problem under the current circumstances—the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s upholding of same-sex marriage as constitutional under the Equal 
Protection Clause, which we don’t consider to be an unhappy problem.

We helped defeat Montana’s radical RFRA bill proposal in the 2015 legislative 
session because it had all kinds of Establishment Clause problems, along with 
attempting to provide blank exemptions to small business owners, which we 
believe are best handled by the courts when factoring in motivation and context 
of each situation. A similar state religious freedom restoration act proposal 
was introduced in Washington State, but it didn’t make it out of Committee for 
similar reasons.

Finally, isn’t Title VII anti-discrimination/accommodation law, along with the 
Federal RFRA law, more than already satisfactory to address this matter 
involving state and federal employees?

Gregory W. Hamilton, President
Northwest Religious Liberty Association
5709 N. 20th Street
Ridgefield, WA 98642
Office: (360) 857-7040
Website: www.nrla.com

[NRLA2013-final-350px]

Championing Religious Freedom and Human Rights

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Steven Jamar
Sent: Monday, February 22, 2016 8:39 AM
To: Law Religion & Law List 
Subject: help wanted

How might Congress draft a federal law that requires states to accommodate 
religious beliefs so that state employees are free to refuse to perform tasks 
that are contrary to their religious beliefs?  We have the Boerne problems of 
making a record and RFRA being held to be too much of a bludgeon.  But assuming 
we could somehow get past that, what would the language be?  Could this work:

"Every state must accommodate the religious beliefs and practices of its 
employees and those persons with which it contracts by exempting them from 
performing tasks that are contrary to their religious beliefs.”

Even assuming the record-requirement part of Boerne could be met, I just can’t 
seem to craft language that I think would be likely to pass constitutional 
muster.

So, help wanted.

Steve



--
Prof. Steven D. Jamar
Howard University School of Law
vox:  202-806-8017
fax:  202-806-8567
http://sdjlaw.org

“It’s not the note you play that’s the wrong note – it’s the note you play 
afterwards that makes it right or wrong.”

Miles Davis

___
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Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can 
read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the 
messages to others.

RE: 8th Cir. upholds exclusion of religious schools from playground safety funds

[Greg Hamilton]

Marty, I believe you are right. Justice O'Connor's separate concurring opinion 
in Mitchell v. Helms challenged Justice Thomas's attempt to entirely rid the 
High Court of the doctrine of neutrality, which increasingly seems at risk 
today. Non-monitary material aid versus monitory aid has been, and should 
continue to be the standard, notwithstanding the voucher ruling in Zelman v. 
Simmons-Harris in which, IMHO, O'Connor gets precariously close to nuancing too 
finely her take on government neutrality and the definition of indirect 
funding.

I also find it somewhat amusing that in Locke v. Davey, Chief Justice Rehnquist 
schools Justice Scalia in an endnote about Thomas Jefferson's and James 
Madison's debates with Patrick Henry over government funding assumptions that 
resulted in Jefferson's Virginia Statute of Religious Freedom and the general 
prohibition on such funding. Rehnquist's majority opinion was reassuring in the 
fact that it demonstrated that he had not abandoned the Court’s neutrality 
doctrine entirely, as some of his colleagues were pressing him to do. For me, 
this represented subtle evidence that O'Connor's influence had rubbed off on 
his dear friend and eminent colleague.

My published essay titled Justice O'Connor: Interpretive Determinism and 
Neutrality's Pitfalls addresses at length O'Connor's concurring opinion in 
Mitchell. Along with Dr. Brownstein's essay on Justice Souter's dissent, it was 
published by Roman  Littlefield Publishers, Inc., in Stephen Monsma's edited 
work titled Church-State Relations in Crisis: Debating Neutrality (2002), 
pages 103-126, in which all of the contributing essays specifically focused on 
the Mitchell v. Helms ruling.

I am providing my final draft in Dropbox for your convenience. Please let me if 
it useful and how my assessment of O'Connor's views could be sharpened.

https://www.dropbox.com/s/rw7x8g4pcl0ky22/downloaded_file-29.pdf?dl=0

Gregory W. Hamilton, President
Northwest Religious Liberty Association
5709 N. 20th Street
Ridgefield, WA 98642
Office: (360) 857-7040tel:(360)%20857-7040
Website: www.nrla.comhttp://www.nrla.com

Sent via the Samsung GALAXY S®4, an ATT 4G LTE smartphone
 Original message 
From: Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com
Date: 05/31/2015 5:05 PM (GMT-08:00)
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Re: 8th Cir. upholds exclusion of religious schools from playground 
safety funds

Under Mitchell v. Helms, would it even be constitutionally permissible for the 
state to give direct grant funding to the church?  Recall that SOC, in her 
governing opinion, rested quite heavily on the distinction between monetary and 
nonmonetary aid when it comes to direct aid (as opposed to vouchers):

Justice Souter is correct to note our continued recognition of the special 
dangers associated with direct money grants to religious institutions.  It does 
not follow, however, that we should treat as constitutionally suspect any form 
of secular aid that might conceivably be diverted to a religious use. As the 
cases Justice Souter cites demonstrate, our concern with direct monetary aid is 
based on more than just diversion. In fact, the most important reason for 
according special treatment to direct money grants is that this form of aid 
falls precariously close to the original object of the Establishment Clause’s 
prohibition. See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 
668 (1970) (“[F]or the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First 
Amendment the ‘establishment’ of a religion connoted sponsorship, financial 
support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious activity”). 
Statements concerning the constitutionally suspect status of direct cash aid, 
accordingly, provide no justification for applying an absolute rule against 
divertibility when the aid consists instead of instructional materials and 
equipment.
* * * *
This Court has “recognized special Establishment Clause dangers where the 
government makes direct money payments to sectarian institutions.” Rosenberger, 
515 U.S., at 842, 115 S.Ct. 2510; see also ibid. (collecting cases). If, as the 
plurality contends, a per-capita-aid program is identical in relevant 
constitutional respects to a true private-choice program, then there is no 
reason that, under the plurality's reasoning, the government should be 
precluded from providing direct money payments to religious organizations 
(including churches) based on the number of persons belonging to each 
organization. And, because actual diversion is permissible under the 
plurality's holding, the participating religious organizations (including 
churches) could use that aid to support religious indoctrination. To be sure, 
the plurality does not actually hold that its theory extends to direct money 
payments. See ante, at 2546–2547. That omission, however, is of little comfort. 
In its logic—as well as its specific advisory 

RE: Subject: Re: Kansas/Arizona statutes protecting for-profit businesses

[Greg Hamilton]

...and Alan has been championing this bill on the spot at the Arizona capitol. 
Sigh. I have fought him over it when he tried to push me into supporting the 
Idaho bill which was just as egregious as the Arizona bill, but perhaps more 
targeted.

Gregory W. Hamilton, President
Northwest Religious Liberty Association
5709 N. 20th Street
Ridgefield, WA 98642
Office: (360) 857-7040
Website: www.nrla.comhttp://www.nrla.com/

[NRLA2013-final-350px]http://www.nrla.com/

Championing Religious Freedom and Human Rights for All People of Faith

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Michael Peabody
Sent: Tuesday, February 25, 2014 1:38 PM
To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Subject: Subject: Re: Kansas/Arizona statutes protecting for-profit businesses

After reading the legislation, it's amazing how broadly it is drafted. It would 
seem to not only include permitting discrimination on the basis of sexual 
orientation or marital status, but also on the basis of religion.  It would 
make it very easy for any business with a religious inkling to refuse to 
accommodate the religious exercise of employees, or even terminate them on the 
basis of religious differences.

The Hobby Lobby case may go a long way in showing what rights employers have, 
and it seems to be part of a general strike against the application of the Bill 
of Rights to the states (14th Amendment).

Any time the principle argument in favor of a potentially dangerous law is, 
What's the worse that can happen? I think there's reason to get really 
nervous.

There is probably an answer for those who don't want to violate their religious 
conscience by accommodating those members of protected classes that disagree 
with them, but this legislation is not it.

Michael D. Peabody, Esq.
Editor
ReligiousLiberty.TV
http://www.religiousliberty.tv



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RE: Point of Information -- not quite on topic

[Greg Hamilton]

Then that would settle the matter.

 

Gregory W. Hamilton, President

Northwest Religious Liberty Association

5709 N. 20th Street

Ridgefield, WA 98642

Office: (360) 857-7040

Website: www.nrla.com http://www.nrla.com/ 

 

  http://www.nrla.com/ 

 

A non-partisan government relations and workplace mediation

services program that champions religious freedom and human

rights for all people and institutions of faith in the legislative, civic,

judicial, academic, interfaith, evangelical and corporate workplace

arenas in the states of Alaska, Idaho, Montana, Oregon  Washington.

 

“God did not give us a spirit of timidity, but a spirit of power, of

love and of self-discipline.” 2 Timothy 1:7

 

From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu 
[mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marci Hamilton
Sent: Tuesday, March 06, 2012 2:23 PM
To: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics
Cc: Law  Religion issues for Law Academics
Subject: Re: Point of Information -- not quite on topic

 

Marty--Are nonJews, non Israelis included?   That would be a surprise to me.  I 
know kids recruited and only Jews were 

 

We were talking about leagues, not individual players.   The Catholic leagues 
are not open to my knowledge to non Catholic schools.   

 

Marci

 



On Mar 6, 2012, at 12:42 PM, Marty Lederman lederman.ma...@gmail.com wrote:

 the Maccabiah Games feature only Jewish athletes.

 

Nope.  See http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-332,00.html

 

It's open to all Israeli citizens without regard to religion, and to 
Jews who are not citizens (presumably because they have an automatic right of 
citizenship, although I don't know that for a fact).

 

I'd also be very, very surprised if many Catholic Leagues exclude 
participants based on religion; perhaps they're confined to certain church 
teams, or students from Catholic schools, etc. -- but an actual personal 
religious test for individuals?  

 

On Mon, Mar 5, 2012 at 10:06 AM, Marci Hamilton hamilto...@aol.com 
wrote:

There is significant precedent for one-religion sporting events, which 
I assume everyone agrees is fine.Catholic Leagues exist in numerous cities  
 And  the Maccabiah Games feature only Jewish athletes.  

 

TAPPs' first mistake appears to have been opening itself up to 
religious organizations with different religious needs and demands.  

 

Marci

 

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