Re: Civil determination of a religious question in Rowan County?
These reports put The Onion to shame. - Original Message - From: "Marty Lederman"To: "Law & Religion issues for Law Academics" Sent: Monday, September 21, 2015 3:19:16 PM Subject: Civil determination of a religious question in Rowan County? A report to the court of another of the Rowan County Deputy Clerks today includes the following: "Mrs. Plank reports that, to the best of her knowledge, all requests for marriage licenses requested by legally qualified couples have been issued. The only denial of a marriage license application that has occurred within the last two weeks was to a gentleman who stated that he wanted a license that would permit him to marry 'Jesus'. When it was explained to the individual that both parties had to be present, he stated, 'Jesus is always present'. After being denied, the gentleman returned later and presented a type of Power of Attorney document issued by his church granting him authority to sign 'Jesus'’ name. Since both parties were not present these requests were denied." Impermissible civil assessment of a fundamentally religious question? (P.S. The passage from the filing today, quoted above, is 100% true. My "legal" question, however, is of course facetious -- although given the Court's recent movement toward almost absolute deference to private religious assessments (cf. Hobby Lobby ), it's not obvious on first glance why the Clerk's Office was permitted to act on the basis that "Jesus was not present.") ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: law suit on behalf of Jesus
Please pardon the intrusion. Apparently the filing is real: http://dockets.justia.com/docket/nebraska/nedce/8:2015cv00158/69317 I hope Judge Gerrard isn't too hard on her when he tosses it. -Leonard A. Zanger - Original Message - From: Paul Finkelman paul.finkel...@albanylaw.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Wednesday, May 6, 2015 12:11:32 AM Subject: law suit on behalf of Jesus Someone just send me this; it seems like it might be real, but does anyone know? Can the plaintiff bring the suit on behalf of Jesus or G-d without a power of attorney signed by one or both? http://www.thenewcivilrightsmovement.com/davidbadash/nebraska_woman_sues_all_homosexuals_in_federal_court_because_jesus_literally * Paul Finkelman Senior Fellow Penn Program on Democracy, Citizenship, and Constitutionalism University of Pennsylvania and Scholar-in-Residence National Constitution Center Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 518-439-7296 (p) 518-605-0296 (c) paul.finkel...@albanylaw.edu www.paulfinkelman.com * ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Satanists want statue beside Ten Commandments monument at Oklahoma Legislature
Isn't there a significant difference between placing a religious monument in a public park vs placing a religious monument in a State capitol building? - Original Message - From: Steven Jamar stevenja...@gmail.com To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Cc: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Sunday, December 8, 2013 9:46:54 PM Subject: Re: Satanists want statue beside Ten Commandments monument at Oklahoma Legislature Sunnum handles this, no? Sent from Steve's iPhone On Dec 8, 2013, at 9:43 PM, hamilto...@aol.com wrote: Inevitable. Marci Marci A. Hamilton Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva University 55 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10003 (212) 790-0215 http://sol-reform.com -Original Message- From: Joel Sogol jlsa...@wwisp.com To: Religionlaw religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Sun, Dec 8, 2013 9:24 pm Subject: Satanists want statue beside Ten Commandments monument at Oklahoma Legislature Satanists want statue beside Ten Commandments monument at Oklahoma Legislature http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/12/08/21820518-satanists-want-statue-beside-ten-commandments-monument-at-oklahoma-legislature?lite Joel L. Sogol Attorney at Law 811 21st Ave. Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401 ph (205) 345-0966 fx (205) 345-0971 email: jlsa...@wwisp.com website: www.joelsogol.com Ben Franklin observed that truth wins a fair fight - which is why we have evidence rules in U.S. courts. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. blockquote ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. /blockquote ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Satanists want statue beside Ten Commandments monument at Oklahoma Legislature
apologies for the previously unsigned post. Leonard A. Zanger Camp Quest of Michigan, Inc. - Original Message - From: Len campquest...@comcast.net To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Monday, December 9, 2013 5:31:33 AM Subject: Re: Satanists want statue beside Ten Commandments monument at Oklahoma Legislature Isn't there a significant difference between placing a religious monument in a public park vs placing a religious monument in a State capitol building? - Original Message - From: Steven Jamar stevenja...@gmail.com To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Cc: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Sunday, December 8, 2013 9:46:54 PM Subject: Re: Satanists want statue beside Ten Commandments monument at Oklahoma Legislature Sunnum handles this, no? Sent from Steve's iPhone On Dec 8, 2013, at 9:43 PM, hamilto...@aol.com wrote: Inevitable. Marci Marci A. Hamilton Paul R. Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law Yeshiva University 55 Fifth Avenue New York, NY 10003 (212) 790-0215 http://sol-reform.com -Original Message- From: Joel Sogol jlsa...@wwisp.com To: Religionlaw religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Sun, Dec 8, 2013 9:24 pm Subject: Satanists want statue beside Ten Commandments monument at Oklahoma Legislature Satanists want statue beside Ten Commandments monument at Oklahoma Legislature http://usnews.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/12/08/21820518-satanists-want-statue-beside-ten-commandments-monument-at-oklahoma-legislature?lite Joel L. Sogol Attorney at Law 811 21st Ave. Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401 ph (205) 345-0966 fx (205) 345-0971 email: jlsa...@wwisp.com website: www.joelsogol.com Ben Franklin observed that truth wins a fair fight - which is why we have evidence rules in U.S. courts. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. blockquote ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. /blockquote ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: 1764 Rhode Island incest law exemption for uncle-niece marriages among Jews
This: http://webserver.rilin.state.ri.us/Statutes/title15/15-1/15-1-4.HTM a few citations : page 128 http://books.google.com/books?id=WuKfMAAJprintsec=frontcoversource=gbs_ge_summary_rcad=0#v=onepageqf=false page 447 http://books.google.com/books?id=PQ-tyPMD-rUCpg=PA447lpg=PA447dq=rhode+island+jewish+marriage+consanguinity+1798source=blots=2a2QFqseXhsig=OTNg8yzm5lyMgn645ObVT7Pi_2ohl=ensa=Xei=ubpdUvXlC-bbyQHpj4HABwsqi=2ved=0CDcQ6AEwAg#v=onepageqf=false Len Zanger - Original Message - From: Douglas Laycock dlayc...@virginia.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2013 5:39:11 PM Subject: RE: 1764 Rhode Island incest law exemption for uncle-niece marriages among Jews I once cited it as An Act Regulating Marriage and Divorce § 7 (1798), reprinted in 2 The First Laws of the State of Rhode Island 481, 483 (1798) (John D. Cushing ed., 1983). I don’t know if the law was really 1798, or if an over eager editor took that from the date of the compilation and also put it in as the date of the law. Douglas Laycock Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law University of Virginia Law School 580 Massie Road Charlottesville, VA 22903 434-243-8546 From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2013 5:18 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics (religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu) Subject: 1764 Rhode Island incest law exemption for uncle-niece marriages among Jews I’ve seen articles talking about a 1764 Rhode Island incest law exemption for uncle-niece marriages among Jews, but now that I’m trying to find the actual statute, I’m having a hard time. Does anyone happen to have a good citation for it? Thanks, Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: 1764 Rhode Island incest law exemption for uncle-niece marriages among Jews
This. Evidently the law is still on the books as of 2009. http://www.lawserver.com/law/state/rhode-island/ri-laws/rhode_island_general_laws_15-1-4 Len Zanger - Original Message - From: Douglas Laycock dlayc...@virginia.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2013 5:39:11 PM Subject: RE: 1764 Rhode Island incest law exemption for uncle-niece marriages among Jews I once cited it as An Act Regulating Marriage and Divorce § 7 (1798), reprinted in 2 The First Laws of the State of Rhode Island 481, 483 (1798) (John D. Cushing ed., 1983). I don’t know if the law was really 1798, or if an over eager editor took that from the date of the compilation and also put it in as the date of the law. Douglas Laycock Robert E. Scott Distinguished Professor of Law University of Virginia Law School 580 Massie Road Charlottesville, VA 22903 434-243-8546 From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Volokh, Eugene Sent: Tuesday, October 15, 2013 5:18 PM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics (religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu) Subject: 1764 Rhode Island incest law exemption for uncle-niece marriages among Jews I’ve seen articles talking about a 1764 Rhode Island incest law exemption for uncle-niece marriages among Jews, but now that I’m trying to find the actual statute, I’m having a hard time. Does anyone happen to have a good citation for it? Thanks, Eugene ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression?
You may be pretty sure, but I'm absolutely certain that the photos I purchased from our wedding photographer, as well as all school and graduation photos, are owned by me and not the photographer. I purchased them, and own the rights. That's what I paid for. For the photographer to retain any rights to these photos, I would have had to sign a model waiver, which I did not. Thanks, -Z - Original Message - From: Alan Hurst alan.hu...@aya.yale.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Sunday, August 25, 2013 12:33:30 PM Subject: Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression? I'm pretty sure that Eugene is correct--freelance wedding photographs are generally protected under the category of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, and as such are not eligible to be works for hire. (Photographs submitted to magazines or newspapers are treated differently, as they are contributions to a collective work.) Ownership of the copyright may be assigned, but the author of the work for purposes of copyright law remains the photographer regardless of any prior agreement between the parties. Eugene is also correct that it's hard to see what this has to do with the photographer's Free Speech rights. Regardless of who the author is for purposes of copyright law, the photographer is clearly creating the expression contained in the photographs by selecting the shots, composing and framing them, Photoshopping them, etc. On Sat, Aug 24, 2013 at 2:19 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: (1) A freelancer’s work can be treated as a “work for hire” only if there’s an agreement and the work falls into one of several classes: “a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.” 17 USC 101. A press release would not be a work for hire, for instance. (2) A photographer’s work would generally not qualify for being a work for hire, either. (3) Of course, even if a work isn’t a work for hire, the copyright can be assigned by a signed writing. But I don’t see what that has to do with the compelled-creation-of-expression issue. If I go into freelance press release writing, I think I ought to be free to say to the Church of Scientology, “No, I’m not going to write a press release for you promoting your religious events, because I disapprove of your religion.” And that is true regardless of who would own the copyright in the resulting press release. My objection isn’t to being required to own a copyright. My objection is to having to write things that I think it’s wrong for me to write. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Marci Hamilton Sent: Saturday, August 24, 2013 10:26 AM To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Cc: Law Religion issues for Law Academics Subject: Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression? Point of law-- Most freelancers are subject to work for hire agreements that divest copyright and make the purchaser the owner of the speech for all purposes. Marci A. Hamilton Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School Yeshiva University @Marci_Hamilton On Aug 24, 2013, at 12:37 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: Well, New Mexico law covers “any establishment that provides or offers its services ... to the public, but does not include a[n] ... establishment that is by its nature and use distinctly private.” That does mean that a freelance writer who only writes on behalf of a limited set of clients, rather than offering his services to the public at large, wouldn’t be covered by this particular statute. But a freelance writer who does promote his services to the public would qualify, even if he exercises some selectivity. (Indeed, Huguenin says that there are other photography commissions she won’t take, such as for pornography, horror films, and the like, though chances are that she won’t even be approached for them in the first place. Conversely, my sense is that many freelance writers who offer to hire themselves out to the public will take the great majority of jobs that come their way, even though they too would draw the line somewhere.) So I can’t see how such freelance writers would be immune. But in any event, even if a freelance writer or photographer is unselective, I can’t see how that person’s expression isn’t “her own.” To be sure, the public might not see an unselective
Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression?
I am absolutely certain because that is what is stated in the purchase agreement. Thanks, -Z - Original Message - From: Steven Jamar stevenja...@gmail.com To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Sunday, August 25, 2013 2:06:55 PM Subject: Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression? We've wandered far from religion -- but that is very wrong, Z. You own the copies -- the specific photos that you purchased. And if you photographer gave you negatives (in the old days) or a CD with electronic versions you can copy or print from (semi-old days) or access to or electronic copies that you can download and distribute and copy and print (more recently) then you have whatever rights your photographer licensed to you -- which might be everything you would want to do with the pictures. But that photographer owns the copyright in the pictures. It is possible that the photographer assigned his or her rights to you, but that is rare. As a model, you would retain rights in your own image -- and the photographer would have limited rights as to what if anything the photographer could do with those photos since the photographer does not own your publicity rights in your own image. So, there are least three different rights involved -- the rights in the physical copies; the copyrights; and the publicity rights. They are not the same thing. So, what you are absolutely certain about is quite wrong. -- Prof. Steven D. Jamar vox: 202-806-8017 Director of International Programs , Institute for Intellectual Property and Social Justice http://iipsj.org Howard University School of Law fax: 202-806-8567 http://iipsj.com/SDJ/ I care not what subject is taught if only it be taught well. Thomas H. Huxley On Aug 25, 2013, at 1:25 PM, Len campquest...@comcast.net wrote: You may be pretty sure, but I'm absolutely certain that the photos I purchased from our wedding photographer, as well as all school and graduation photos, are owned by me and not the photographer. I purchased them, and own the rights. That's what I paid for. For the photographer to retain any rights to these photos, I would have had to sign a model waiver, which I did not. Thanks, -Z - Original Message - From: Alan Hurst alan.hu...@aya.yale.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Sunday, August 25, 2013 12:33:30 PM Subject: Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression? I'm pretty sure that Eugene is correct--freelance wedding photographs are generally protected under the category of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, and as such are not eligible to be works for hire. (Photographs submitted to magazines or newspapers are treated differently, as they are contributions to a collective work.) Ownership of the copyright may be assigned, but the author of the work for purposes of copyright law remains the photographer regardless of any prior agreement between the parties. Eugene is also correct that it's hard to see what this has to do with the photographer's Free Speech rights. Regardless of who the author is for purposes of copyright law, the photographer is clearly creating the expression contained in the photographs by selecting the shots, composing and framing them, Photoshopping them, etc. On Sat, Aug 24, 2013 at 2:19 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: (1) A freelancer’s work can be treated as a “work for hire” only if there’s an agreement and the work falls into one of several classes: “a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a collective work, as a part of a motion picture or other audiovisual work, as a translation, as a supplementary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for hire.” 17 USC 101. A press release would not be a work for hire, for instance. (2) A photographer’s work would generally not qualify for being a work for hire, either. (3) Of course, even if a work isn’t a work for hire, the copyright can be assigned by a signed writing. But I don’t see what that has to do with the compelled-creation-of-expression issue. If I go into freelance press release writing, I think I ought to be free to say to the Church of Scientology, “No, I’m not going to write a press release for you promoting your religious events, because I disapprove of your religion.” And that is true regardless of who would own the copyright in the resulting press release. My objection isn’t to being required to own a copyright. My objection is to having to write things that I think it’s wrong for me to write. Eugene From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu
Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression?
Regardless of the models, I did not pay thousands for my photos. A few hundred for the graduation photos, and a few hundred for the wedding photos 30 years ago. It is my understanding that the studio protects all photos by way of copyright that are posted and accessed via its website services. That condition would make sense, as it protects the clients as well as itself. However, that was a service I wasn't interested in, and purchased one of their more traditional packages. How interesting that my experience was so unusual. So, in your opinion, I retain copyright to the oil-on-canvas portraits I was commissioned to do in the mid 1970's? Interesting. True, there aren't many (seven) and I was paid cash, but I was able to eat and to put gas in my place of lodging. Would I now be able to demand access to these works, photograph them and use them in a portfolio? I apologize to all, but I've had some disappointing experience with intellectual property rights. A firm I worked for many years ago demanded that I sign over rights to a RD project I had worked on for two years, in exchange for wages already paid. I had not been under such an agreement up until that time. The license to that work was then sold to a high-profile client for an amount in the low seven figures. The firm's attorney threatened me with legal action if I did not sign off and accept the token $1. I did, and was terminated three weeks later. My name remains on six of the patents, however. To me they're worth exactly the value of the paper they're printed on. I have been required to sign over intellectual property rights as a condition of hire ever since. The conditions even include any items I might design or invent on my own time that are unrelated to the company's business. Many people I've worked with have also had to sign non-compete clauses, which have kept talented (and well-paid) engineers out of work for years, effectively ending their careers. I therefore don't have a high regard for such laws. More relevant to the topic, I think it is rather sad and pathetic that the work of an artisan who mechanically produces work for hire is considered to be on par with an artist who produces creative work. This lumps in and treats as equals the neighborhood photographer with Annie Leibovitz and Ansel Adams. Producing memorabilia is not art, it is a craft. I'm sure all present know the difference, or should. I understand what the laws say and have read the commentaries with great interest. In my opinion mere competence with a camera is not art. Art, and therefore speech is something else. I'm sure no one here will mind that I don't repeat the obvious Dickensian reference. Thanks for your patience. -Z - Original Message - From: Mark Scarberry mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Sunday, August 25, 2013 6:11:09 PM Subject: Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression? My wife tells me there are now two models. 1. Photographer retains copyright, and you buy the photos you want. 2. You pay multi-thousands of dollars up front. Then the photographer takes lots and lots of pictures and sends you the CD (or DVD), and you do what you want with them. This approach would require an assignment of copyright from the owner (the photographer) to you. Mark Scarberry Pepperdine University School of Law Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE Smartphone Original message From: Len campquest...@comcast.net Date: 08/25/2013 10:28 AM (GMT-08:00) To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression? You may be pretty sure, but I'm absolutely certain that the photos I purchased from our wedding photographer, as well as all school and graduation photos, are owned by me and not the photographer. I purchased them, and own the rights. That's what I paid for. For the photographer to retain any rights to these photos, I would have had to sign a model waiver, which I did not. Thanks, -Z - Original Message - From: Alan Hurst alan.hu...@aya.yale.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Sunday, August 25, 2013 12:33:30 PM Subject: Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression? I'm pretty sure that Eugene is correct--freelance wedding photographs are generally protected under the category of pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, and as such are not eligible to be works for hire. (Photographs submitted to magazines or newspapers are treated differently, as they are contributions to a collective work.) Ownership of the copyright may be assigned, but the author of the work for purposes of copyright law remains the photographer regardless of any prior agreement between the parties. Eugene is also correct that it's hard to see what this has to do with the photographer's Free
Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression?
That is not my experience. I retained all copies and negatives of our wedding photos, and more recently we we purchased a CD of our son's graduation photos, from which I can print (or email or whatever) whatever I like. Also, I fail to see how a photographer is participating in a wedding ceremony and reception, any more than the bartender or the limo driver is participating. Rather, it seems to me that a photographer is merely service for hire, and is recording the event. When one hires a plumber or an electrician, it is their knowledge and expertise you're paying for, above the cost of materials. They are not participating in your lifestyle -- whatever that is. Wouldn't a businessperson acting in a professional manner instead be more diplomatic -- and steer a customer he/she didn't like to another professional whose tastes and experience may be better suited to your expectations. My point is that a customer can be redirected in such a way that they feel they are being served with some respect. Instead, the photographer in question appears to have acted otherwise. - Original Message - From: Mark Scarberry mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Saturday, August 24, 2013 2:23:51 PM Subject: Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression? Professional photographers generally retain copyright to graduation photos, wedding photos, etc., so you have to go back to them for additional prints. At least that's my experience. Mark Scarberry Pepperdine University School of Law Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE Smartphone Original message From: Gaubatz, Derek dgaub...@imb.org Date: 08/24/2013 10:57 AM (GMT-08:00) To: 'religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu' religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression? Actually, the creator is the copyright owner of the work unless the purchaser successfully negotiates for a work for hire agreement. From : Marci Hamilton [mailto:hamilto...@aol.com] Sent : Saturday, August 24, 2013 01:26 PM To : Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Cc : Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject : Re: A right not to be compelled to create expression? Point of law-- Most freelancers are subject to work for hire agreements that divest copyright and make the purchaser the owner of the speech for all purposes. Marci A. Hamilton Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School Yeshiva University @Marci_Hamilton On Aug 24, 2013, at 12:37 PM, Volokh, Eugene vol...@law.ucla.edu wrote: Well, New Mexico law covers “any establishment that provides or offers its services ... to the public, but does not include a[n] ... establishment that is by its nature and use distinctly private.” That does mean that a freelance writer who only writes on behalf of a limited set of clients, rather than offering his services to the public at large, wouldn’t be covered by this particular statute. But a freelance writer who does promote his services to the public would qualify, even if he exercises some selectivity. (Indeed, Huguenin says that there are other photography commissions she won’t take, such as for pornography, horror films, and the like, though chances are that she won’t even be approached for them in the first place. Conversely, my sense is that many freelance writers who offer to hire themselves out to the public will take the great majority of jobs that come their way, even though they too would draw the line somewhere.) So I can’t see how such freelance writers would be immune. But in any event, even if a freelance writer or photographer is unselective, I can’t see how that person’s expression isn’t “her own.” To be sure, the public might not see an unselective photographer’s/writer’s speech as equally expressing her own ideology. But the writer or photographer would still be creating the expression herself, using her own artistic and literary creative judgment. The question, then, is: Should people have a right not to be compelled to create expression they think is wrong, just as they have a right not to be compelled to distribute expression they think is wrong? It seems to me that the logic of Wooley should extend equally to both rights. If Maynard can’t be required to carry the motto “Live Free or Die” on his car, then a Maynard who is a generally will-take-most-commissions freelance writer can’t be required to write a press release or organizational newsletter that expresses the view “Scientology is good.” Indeed, the requirement to actually create expression seems much more burdensome than simply the requirement to carry a slogan on one’s car. Finally, note that the New Mexico Supreme Court expressly disclaimed any argument that mere wedding photography is just too banal to be expressive for purposes of this analysis (not that
Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate
Next up, a lawsuit seeking on religious liberty grounds the ability to obtain a health insurance policy from his employer that does not cover vaccinations or other medications, or surgery, but only covers healing prayer. - Original Message - From: Eduardo Penalver penal...@uchicago.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2013 11:06:49 AM Subject: Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate Next up, a lawsuit demanding to be paid in currency that can't be used to buy contraception. Eduardo From: Friedman, Howard M. howard.fried...@utoledo.edu Reply-To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 13:52:52 + To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate In an interesting new lawsuit, a Missouri legislator (suing as an employee of the state) seeks on religious liberty grounds the ability to obtain a health insurance policy from his employer that does not cover contraception, sterilization or abortifacients. He particularly objects to coverage of these in his policy for his 3 daughters, age 12, 18 and 19. More on Religion Clause blog-- http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2013/08/new-contraceptive-coverage-challenge.html Howard Friedman ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate
I assume they were serious and hope they were. Some of both. May I also suggest a compelling interest to provide coverage for late-term theraputic abortion, for the purpose of saving the life of the mother? For example: fetal death at 28 weeks, with no natural expulsion of the fetus, resulting in sepsis and death of the mother when the fetus is not removed surgically. Unfortunately, this is not a hypothetical -- my wife's mother died this way. Thanks - Original Message - From: Marci Hamilton hamilto...@aol.com To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Cc: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu, Len campquest...@comcast.net Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2013 12:33:14 PM Subject: Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate I assume they were serious and hope they were. If you are a woman with unstoppable bleeding as part of your periods, or excruciating cramps, this is medication and treatment that is indeed compelling. If you cannot go to work for 5 days every month because of the severity of your periods, there is a compelling interest for the employer, employee, and the govt to make such treatments available. If your religious beliefs preclude you from having a family you cannot support, or if you carry a gene that could lead to devastating illness and disability in your child, and your religious beliefs counsel against pregnancy, there is also a compelling interest In all 3. Apologies to those who are squeamish about what we are really talking about, but the abstract quality of the legal discourse largely carried on by men needs a reality check. Marci Marci A. Hamilton Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School Yeshiva University @Marci_Hamilton On Aug 15, 2013, at 11:53 AM, Tracey, Timothy ttra...@avemarialaw.edu wrote: I hope that neither you nor Eduardo are serious in your responses. The government's interest in ensuring basic medical care and lifesaving measures is significantly different than whatever interest the government has in forcing religious organizations to supply coverage of contraception, sterilizations, and abortion. The government obviously has a compelling interest in the former but certainly not in the latter. Timothy J. Tracey Associate Professor of Law Ave Maria School of Law On August 15, 2013 at 11:42:29 AM, Len ( campquest...@comcast.net ) wrote: blockquote Next up, a lawsuit seeking on religious liberty grounds the ability to obtain a health insurance policy from his employer that does not cover vaccinations or other medications, or surgery, but only covers healing prayer. - Original Message - From: Eduardo Penalver penal...@uchicago.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2013 11:06:49 AM Subject: Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate Next up, a lawsuit demanding to be paid in currency that can't be used to buy contraception. Eduardo From: Friedman, Howard M. howard.fried...@utoledo.edu Reply-To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 13:52:52 + To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate In an interesting new lawsuit, a Missouri legislator (suing as an employee of the state) seeks on religious liberty grounds the ability to obtain a health insurance policy from his employer that does not cover contraception, sterilization or abortifacients. He particularly objects to coverage of these in his policy for his 3 daughters, age 12, 18 and 19. More on Religion Clause blog-- http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2013/08/new-contraceptive-coverage-challenge.html Howard Friedman ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: This e-mail transmission
Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate
I also suggest that in the interest of compassion consideration might be given to ectopic and anencephalic pregnancies. Thanks. - Original Message - From: Len campquest...@comcast.net To: Marci Hamilton hamilto...@aol.com Cc: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2013 2:03:32 PM Subject: Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate I assume they were serious and hope they were. Some of both. May I also suggest a compelling interest to provide coverage for late-term theraputic abortion, for the purpose of saving the life of the mother? For example: fetal death at 28 weeks, with no natural expulsion of the fetus, resulting in sepsis and death of the mother when the fetus is not removed surgically. Unfortunately, this is not a hypothetical -- my wife's mother died this way. Thanks - Original Message - From: Marci Hamilton hamilto...@aol.com To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Cc: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu, Len campquest...@comcast.net Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2013 12:33:14 PM Subject: Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate I assume they were serious and hope they were. If you are a woman with unstoppable bleeding as part of your periods, or excruciating cramps, this is medication and treatment that is indeed compelling. If you cannot go to work for 5 days every month because of the severity of your periods, there is a compelling interest for the employer, employee, and the govt to make such treatments available. If your religious beliefs preclude you from having a family you cannot support, or if you carry a gene that could lead to devastating illness and disability in your child, and your religious beliefs counsel against pregnancy, there is also a compelling interest In all 3. Apologies to those who are squeamish about what we are really talking about, but the abstract quality of the legal discourse largely carried on by men needs a reality check. Marci Marci A. Hamilton Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School Yeshiva University @Marci_Hamilton On Aug 15, 2013, at 11:53 AM, Tracey, Timothy ttra...@avemarialaw.edu wrote: I hope that neither you nor Eduardo are serious in your responses. The government's interest in ensuring basic medical care and lifesaving measures is significantly different than whatever interest the government has in forcing religious organizations to supply coverage of contraception, sterilizations, and abortion. The government obviously has a compelling interest in the former but certainly not in the latter. Timothy J. Tracey Associate Professor of Law Ave Maria School of Law On August 15, 2013 at 11:42:29 AM, Len ( campquest...@comcast.net ) wrote: blockquote Next up, a lawsuit seeking on religious liberty grounds the ability to obtain a health insurance policy from his employer that does not cover vaccinations or other medications, or surgery, but only covers healing prayer. - Original Message - From: Eduardo Penalver penal...@uchicago.edu To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2013 11:06:49 AM Subject: Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate Next up, a lawsuit demanding to be paid in currency that can't be used to buy contraception. Eduardo From: Friedman, Howard M. howard.fried...@utoledo.edu Reply-To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Date: Thu, 15 Aug 2013 13:52:52 + To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate In an interesting new lawsuit, a Missouri legislator (suing as an employee of the state) seeks on religious liberty grounds the ability to obtain a health insurance policy from his employer that does not cover contraception, sterilization or abortifacients. He particularly objects to coverage of these in his policy for his 3 daughters, age 12, 18 and 19. More on Religion Clause blog-- http://religionclause.blogspot.com/2013/08/new-contraceptive-coverage-challenge.html Howard Friedman ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu
Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate
As far as I understand the situation, no one legally objects to the health (unrelated to reproduction) use of the pill. If an employer objects to coverage for contraceptives, how is he to tell the difference without prying into his employee's medical condition? Isn't there a potential HIPAA violation in there somewhere? - Original Message - From: Ed Darrell edarr...@sbcglobal.net To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2013 3:16:01 PM Subject: Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate A good, too-often, too-badly needed reality check, Marci. Thanks. I still wonder whether there is any controversy here to adjudicate. Why cannot the plaintiff simply refuse the coverage? Or refuse contraception? I'm partly reminded by my 7th-Day Adventist end of the family, and my Uncle Roland Christian. He was a bit up in the hierarchy of the church, and as some Adventists do, he and his wife abstained from coffee. So, we were surprised at one visit when, at a restaurant, he made a relatively big deal about ordering a therapeutic cup of coffee after dinner. Eventually he explained that both of them had been diagnosed with low blood pressure at Loma Linda Hospital. Their Adventist physician gave them a choice of a pill, at about $1 a day each, or taking a cup of coffee in the morning, and one in the evening. Back then you could still get a decent cup at most restaurants for less than 50 cents. They chose the coffee. He said with a wink that it was not a sin if he didn't enjoy it, too much. There are alternative solutions well short of the legal system for a lot of these issues, it seems to me. Ed Darrell Dallas From: Michael Worley mwor...@byulaw.net To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Thursday, August 15, 2013 11:52 AM Subject: Re: New Twist On Challenge to ACA Contraceptive Mandate As far as I understand the situation, no one legally objects to the health (unrelated to reproduction) use of the pill. As to those whose religion requires contraception, religious adherents cannot force the government to buy for them wine for sacraments, or even bandaids for cuts, even if they are mandated by religion. We do not have laws forbidding reproduction by certain couples if there is a risk of disability-- thus, while we approach the issue from different angles, Marci's compelling interest arguments do not strike me as plausible given present jurisprudence. Unjust from a point of view, sure, but hardly a compelling interest by the government-- certainly a personal compelling interest, but so is three meals a day. We don't have a constitutional right to food (though government programs thankfully assist with this). To state someone's personal compelling interest in purchasing a product translates to the state's compelling interest in providing a product is not supported by case law. Personal interests provide governmental rational basis, of course, but not a governmental compelling interest. Just my 2¢, Michael -- Michael Worley BYU Law School, Class of 2014 On Thu, Aug 15, 2013 at 10:33 AM, Marci Hamilton hamilto...@aol.com wrote: I assume they were serious and hope they were. If you are a woman with unstoppable bleeding as part of your periods, or excruciating cramps, this is medication and treatment that is indeed compelling. If you cannot go to work for 5 days every month because of the severity of your periods, there is a compelling interest for the employer, employee, and the govt to make such treatments available. If your religious beliefs preclude you from having a family you cannot support, or if you carry a gene that could lead to devastating illness and disability in your child, and your religious beliefs counsel against pregnancy, there is also a compelling interest In all 3. Apologies to those who are squeamish about what we are really talking about, but the abstract quality of the legal discourse largely carried on by men needs a reality check. Marci Marci A. Hamilton Verkuil Chair in Public Law Benjamin N. Cardozo Law School Yeshiva University @Marci_Hamilton On Aug 15, 2013, at 11:53 AM, Tracey, Timothy ttra...@avemarialaw.edu wrote: blockquote I hope that neither you nor Eduardo are serious in your responses. The government's interest in ensuring basic medical care and lifesaving measures is significantly different than whatever interest the government has in forcing religious organizations to supply coverage of contraception, sterilizations, and abortion. The government obviously has a compelling interest in the former but certainly not in the latter. Timothy J. Tracey Associate Professor of Law Ave Maria School of Law On August 15, 2013 at 11:42:29 AM, Len ( campquest...@comcast.net ) wrote: blockquote Next up, a lawsuit seeking on religious
Re: Marriage -- the Alito dissent
How so, Bob? Please explain why the state may interfere in our decision whether to have children or not, or HOW, and why procreation should be a prescribed goal of marriage? Marriage is a contract between two consenting individuals. The terms of that marriage are up to the parties involved, presumably so long as no laws are broken. I think a good argument may be made that population growth is unsustainable, but I don't recall that its ever been asserted by government that whether one has children or not is a state interest. Except in China, and we see it's working well for them. - Original Message - From: b...@jmcenter.org To: Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Wednesday, July 10, 2013 11:26:02 PM Subject: Re: Marriage -- the Alito dissent Len, Given the extreme overpopulation of the U.S. and the world, the state does indeed have a substantial interest -- at least in the number of children parents produce. (The current population footprint is not environmentally sustainable.) Bob Ritter On July 3, 2013 at 10:17 PM Len campquest...@comcast.net wrote: This is going to sound awfully libertarian of me, but it's none of the state's business whether a couple has children or not, regardless of age. Rather it is my understanding that the care and treatment of children resulting from a given union (by whatever means) are appropriate state interests. (Not only was Abraham not a model parent, but also reads as an extortionist and pimp.) From: Sanford V Levinson slevin...@law.utexas.edu To: Mark Scarberry mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu, Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Wednesday, July 3, 2013 9:49:40 PM Subject: RE: Marriage -- the Alito dissent I realize that my following question gets into another hot-button area, but is Mark suggesting that there is a strong constitutional interest in procreation at any age? Why can’t the state come to the altogether rational conclusion that it is really unwise for, say, a 55-year-old couple to have children unless the couple has enough resources to cover the costs of taking care of children even after their retirement (not to mention covering the costs of likely medical care)? I agree that is probably not a compelling state interest, at least in a quasi-libertarian society, but I certainly think it is at least a rational, say, as the defenses being asserted for DOMA. Of course it may be that medical advances in the future will make Sarah and Abraham models to emulate, though I tend to be skeptical. In any event, Abraham was a dreadful father who proved willing to kill his child because of a totally arbitrary command to do so. (It is irrelevant that, at least according to the Bible, God sent the innocent lamb to be sacrificed instead There are Midrash, incidentally, that suggest that no lamb appeared, which explains why only Abraham climbed down the mountain and Isaac was not heard from again for three years, by which time Sarah was dead. One can only imagine the conversation that ensued when Abraham came back to the tent without Isaac and had to explain why he was alone. He’s lucky that she didn’t kill him then and there. But I digress….) sandy From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2013 8:12 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: Marriage -- the Alito dissent The biological issues with regard to different sex couples mostly can be answered fairly easily, I think, including with these points: With regard to medical or similar issues that prevent procreation, a state inquiry would intrude substantially on privacy, which would justify the state in not inquiring. (Also, some couples who have given up on conceiving, later are surprised to find that they have.) With regard to age, no bright line can be set that accurately distinguishes those who can from those who cannot procreate. Any line based on experience as to an age after which procreation cannot occur would either be impossible to set - men can procreate to a very old age - or would have to discriminate against women, who lose the ability to become pregnant by a particular upper bound (absent miracles as with Sarah and Abraham) that is much younger than any age that could possibly be set for men. Thus there are good reasons not to set an age limit. Mark Scarberry Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE Smartphone ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives
Re: Marriage -- the Alito dissent
I am going to step out of lurking mode for a change. Some of this conversation is fascinating. Someone please answer me this: Why cannot both the conjugal and consent definitions also apply to SSM's rather than only the latter? Obviously the conjugal view requires a third party at a certain crucial point, but some gay couples do happen to commit for the purpose of raising families, whether blended or new (via adoption, surrogate or in vitro), so long as intrinsically ordered is not a sneaky euphemism for biologically. The way I see it (and have seen it), either view applies regardless of the orientation of the couple. For that matter, being biologically ordered also doesn't work for some straight couples, who are biologically incapable of conceiving, sometimes for purely natural reasons. I'm sure many on this list know of a few examples. Thanks, Len Zanger Camp Quest - Original Message - From: Stuart Buck stuartb...@msn.com To: Religion Law religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Wednesday, July 3, 2013 5:24:24 PM Subject: RE: Marriage -- the Alito dissent Marty-- Why do you say that footnote is extraordinary? Best, Stuart From: lederman.ma...@gmail.com Date: Sat, 29 Jun 2013 10:55:27 -0400 Subject: Marriage -- the Alito dissent To: conlawp...@lists.ucla.edu; religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu I'm surprised there hasn't been more attention paid to the quite remarkable dissent that Justice Alito filed in Windsor. In it, he contrasts two competing views of marriage: what he calls the conjugal view, in which marriage is the solemnizing of a comprehensive, exclusive, permanent union that is intrinsically ordered to producing new life, even if it does not always do so (citing Robby George); and the “consent-based” concept of marriage, a vision that primarily defines marriage as the solemnization of mutual commitment—marked by strong emotional attachment and sexual attraction—between two persons. As Alito notes, At least as it applies to heterosexual couples, this [consent-based] view of marriage now plays a very prominent role in the popular understanding of the institution. Indeed, our popular culture is infused with this understanding of marriage. [Just as an aside: What is the purpose and implication of his adding At least as it applies to heterosexual couples?] Altio's view is that the judiciary can't possibly give preference to one or the other of these two views: Windsor and the United States implicitly ask us to endorse the consent-based view of marriage and to reject the traditional view, thereby arrogating to ourselves the power to decide a question that philosophers, historians, social scientists, and theologians are better qualified to explore. [FN7 -- on which more below] Because our constitutional order assigns the resolution of questions of this nature to the people, I would not presume to enshrine either vision of marriage in our constitutional jurisprudence. Legislatures, on the other hand, apparently can do so: Legislatures, however, have little choice but to decide between the two views . We have long made clear that neither the political branches of the Federal Government nor state governments are required to be neutral between competing visions of the good, provided that the vision of the good that they adopt is not countermanded by the Constitution. Accordingly, both Congress and the States are entitled to enact laws recognizing either of the two understandings of marriage. I'd be curious what others think of this reasoning. For now, just some short, initial observations about Alito's view of the legislative function, before turning to his extraordinary footnote 7: First, Alito does not appear to distinguish at all between the meaning of marriage in religious and philosophical traditions, and the meaning of state-conferred marriage licenses . Windsor and Perry, of course, only involve the latter -- that is to say, they are merely about state action , and the meaning and effect of a state-conferred status , not the institution of marriage through the ages. Second, in light of how states in this nation actually implement that governmental function -- most obviously, by affording marital status to many heterosexual couples who cannot or will not procreate -- is it really fair to say that those states' marriage laws are designed to solemnize a comprehensive, exclusive, permanent union that is intrinsically ordered to producing new life, even if it does not always do so? That is to say, haven't the states chosen the consent-based view of marriage . . . and, if so, shouldn't the exclusion of same-sex couples be considered on that basis? (As Alito acknowledges, the consent-based view now plays a very prominent role in the popular understanding of the institution. Indeed, our popular culture is infused with this understanding of marriage. Wouldn't we therefore expect that state marriage laws reflect
Re: Marriage -- the Alito dissent
I think the assumption is, that opposite-sex couples are expected to have children in the normal way, while same-sex couples cannot. This is a poor assumption. My point is that with increasing frequency straight couples cannot, which puts them (us) in the same predicament as same-sex couples. With increasing frequency, same-sex couples choose to raise a family -- by whatever means, and I think that our reasonable observer realizes this, and it will soon become a normal expectation if it hasn't already. Just like straight folks. I think that the conjugal view is actually elastic enough to incorporate this. In any case I do not see exclusionary language in the definition. Thanks again. -Z - Original Message - From: Mark Scarberry mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Wednesday, July 3, 2013 9:12:14 PM Subject: Re: Marriage -- the Alito dissent The biological issues with regard to different sex couples mostly can be answered fairly easily, I think, including with these points: With regard to medical or similar issues that prevent procreation, a state inquiry would intrude substantially on privacy, which would justify the state in not inquiring. (Also, some couples who have given up on conceiving, later are surprised to find that they have.) With regard to age, no bright line can be set that accurately distinguishes those who can from those who cannot procreate. Any line based on experience as to an age after which procreation cannot occur would either be impossible to set - men can procreate to a very old age - or would have to discriminate against women, who lose the ability to become pregnant by a particular upper bound (absent miracles as with Sarah and Abraham) that is much younger than any age that could possibly be set for men. Thus there are good reasons not to set an age limit. Mark Scarberry Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE Smartphone ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others. ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.
Re: Marriage -- the Alito dissent
This is going to sound awfully libertarian of me, but it's none of the state's business whether a couple has children or not, regardless of age. Rather it is my understanding that the care and treatment of children resulting from a given union (by whatever means) are appropriate state interests. (Not only was Abraham not a model parent, but also reads as an extortionist and pimp.) - Original Message - From: Sanford V Levinson slevin...@law.utexas.edu To: Mark Scarberry mark.scarbe...@pepperdine.edu, Law Religion issues for Law Academics religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Sent: Wednesday, July 3, 2013 9:49:40 PM Subject: RE: Marriage -- the Alito dissent I realize that my following question gets into another hot-button area, but is Mark suggesting that there is a strong constitutional interest in procreation at any age? Why can’t the state come to the altogether rational conclusion that it is really unwise for, say, a 55-year-old couple to have children unless the couple has enough resources to cover the costs of taking care of children even after their retirement (not to mention covering the costs of likely medical care)? I agree that is probably not a compelling state interest, at least in a quasi-libertarian society, but I certainly think it is at least a rational, say, as the defenses being asserted for DOMA. Of course it may be that medical advances in the future will make Sarah and Abraham models to emulate, though I tend to be skeptical. In any event, Abraham was a dreadful father who proved willing to kill his child because of a totally arbitrary command to do so. (It is irrelevant that, at least according to the Bible, God sent the innocent lamb to be sacrificed instead There are Midrash, incidentally, that suggest that no lamb appeared, which explains why only Abraham climbed down the mountain and Isaac was not heard from again for three years, by which time Sarah was dead. One can only imagine the conversation that ensued when Abraham came back to the tent without Isaac and had to explain why he was alone. He’s lucky that she didn’t kill him then and there. But I digress….) sandy From: religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu [mailto:religionlaw-boun...@lists.ucla.edu] On Behalf Of Scarberry, Mark Sent: Wednesday, July 03, 2013 8:12 PM To: religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu Subject: Re: Marriage -- the Alito dissent The biological issues with regard to different sex couples mostly can be answered fairly easily, I think, including with these points: With regard to medical or similar issues that prevent procreation, a state inquiry would intrude substantially on privacy, which would justify the state in not inquiring. (Also, some couples who have given up on conceiving, later are surprised to find that they have.) With regard to age, no bright line can be set that accurately distinguishes those who can from those who cannot procreate. Any line based on experience as to an age after which procreation cannot occur would either be impossible to set - men can procreate to a very old age - or would have to discriminate against women, who lose the ability to become pregnant by a particular upper bound (absent miracles as with Sarah and Abraham) that is much younger than any age that could possibly be set for men. Thus there are good reasons not to set an age limit. Mark Scarberry Sent from my Verizon Wireless 4G LTE Smartphone ___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.___ To post, send message to Religionlaw@lists.ucla.edu To subscribe, unsubscribe, change options, or get password, see http://lists.ucla.edu/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/religionlaw Please note that messages sent to this large list cannot be viewed as private. Anyone can subscribe to the list and read messages that are posted; people can read the Web archives; and list members can (rightly or wrongly) forward the messages to others.