Re: [Rpm-maint] [rpm-software-management/rpm] RPMv6 proposal: Detached signatures (#1482)

2021-01-17 Thread Kevin Fenzi
> @mlschroe Sadly, Fedora doesn’t sign its metadata.

We don't need to as we use metalinks. In the metalink is the checksum(s) for 
the valid repomd.xml file. If someone tampers with the repodata it will not 
match and the client will go on to the next one. But thats likely offtopic for 
this issue... so I will stop there.

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Re: [Rpm-maint] [rpm-software-management/rpm] RPMv6 proposal: Detached signatures (#1482)

2021-01-14 Thread Florian Festi
There is a middle way how to deal with signatures: Append at the end of the 
package. RPM should probably dictate a way how they should be separated. Then 
one could just read the last few kB of the package and check for signatures 
there without understanding the rpm format at all. You could also put 
signatures there that are completely unknown to rpm.
One could encode them with base64 or something similar to be 100% sure nothing 
can go wrong.

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Re: [Rpm-maint] [rpm-software-management/rpm] RPMv6 proposal: Detached signatures (#1482)

2021-01-11 Thread Demi Marie Obenour
@Conan-Kudo That is fantastic news!

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Re: [Rpm-maint] [rpm-software-management/rpm] RPMv6 proposal: Detached signatures (#1482)

2021-01-11 Thread ニール・ゴンパ
@DemiMarie The first steps towards making it possible to do that are being done 
now: https://pagure.io/koji/pull-request/2637

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Re: [Rpm-maint] [rpm-software-management/rpm] RPMv6 proposal: Detached signatures (#1482)

2021-01-11 Thread Demi Marie Obenour
@mlschroe tell that to the Fedora infrastructure maintainers.  They don’t sign 
their metadata.

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Re: [Rpm-maint] [rpm-software-management/rpm] RPMv6 proposal: Detached signatures (#1482)

2021-01-11 Thread Panu Matilainen
Rpm will have to support the embedded signatures for just about forever more, 
but there's no reason rpm couldn't support detached signatures as an 
alternative, it's just a piece of OpenPGP data that could come from anywhere if 
there was an API for it. But detached signatures aren't any magic solution to 
all signature problems, it's just a different set of compromises from the 
embedded ones.

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Re: [Rpm-maint] [rpm-software-management/rpm] RPMv6 proposal: Detached signatures (#1482)

2021-01-10 Thread Demi Marie Obenour
Fast and has a massive security margin.  I believe the best known attacks are 
on 3 rounds vs 12, and libsodium has a hyper-optimized SIMD implementation it 
uses for Argon2.

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Re: [Rpm-maint] [rpm-software-management/rpm] RPMv6 proposal: Detached signatures (#1482)

2021-01-10 Thread ニール・ゴンパ
Why Blake2b?

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Re: [Rpm-maint] [rpm-software-management/rpm] RPMv6 proposal: Detached signatures (#1482)

2021-01-10 Thread Demi Marie Obenour
Some of the advantages of this approach:

- The initial hash covers the entire package, and does not need to be updated 
when signatures are added or removed.
- Multiple signatures are automatically supported.
- Signatures are timestamped and can expire.
- Key fingerprints include the algorithm as part of the hash, so if there are 
no trusted keys that use a certain algorithm, that algorithm cannot be used.

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Re: [Rpm-maint] [rpm-software-management/rpm] RPMv6 proposal: Detached signatures (#1482)

2021-01-10 Thread Demi Marie Obenour
That’s understandable.  Ideally, this blob would be as simple as possible; the 
current signature blob is more complicated than necessary.  What about a 
Blake2b hash of the lead+header+payload, followed by a list of (length, 
timestamp, expiration, Blake2b hash of (algorithm ID||public key), raw binary 
signature blob) tuples?  The signature would be over the Blake2b hash of all 
data between the package hash (inclusive) and the signature blob (exclusive).  
This would include the signature’s own length, timestamp, expiration date, and 
(algorithm ID||public key) hash.

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