Re: [SC-L] Tools: Evaluation Criteria

2007-05-24 Thread Wall, Kevin
James McGovern wrote...

 Maybe folks are still building square windows because we haven't
 realized how software fails and can describe it in terms of a pattern.
 The only pattern-oriented book I have ran across in my travels is the
 Core Security Patterns put out by the folks at Sun. Do you think we
 should stop talking solely about code and start talking about how
 vulnerabilities are repeatedly introduced and describe using patterns
 notation?

You might want to check out securitypatterns.org, and more specifically,
http://www.securitypatterns.org/patterns.html
which mentions a few other books.

I think there are a few other books by Markus Schumacher, one of which
was based on his doctoral dissertation that is not shown there.

As to your question, should we stop talking _SOLEY_ about code? Probably,
yes. But I think the reason we don't is two-fold -- the first is that most
of us view that as the easy-part, the low-hanging fruit so-to-speak. The
second is that the development community for the most part, still doesn't
seem to be applying the securing CODING principles, so many of us think
it would be premature to move on to try to teach them secure design
principles, developing security reqts with abuse cases, etc., threat modeling,
etc. From a personal POV, I think that's something that a small team of
security specialists can handle. (At least it mostly works here. Security
evaluations are mandatory shortly after the design is complete.) But we
can't possibly do manual code inspections with a small security team,
so we try to instruct (alas, w/out too much success) developers secure
coding practices to avoid the problems at that level in the first place.

-kevin
---
Kevin W. Wall   Qwest Information Technology, Inc.
[EMAIL PROTECTED]   Phone: 614.215.4788
The reason you have people breaking into your software all 
over the place is because your software sucks...
 -- Former whitehouse cybersecurity advisor, Richard Clarke,
at eWeek Security Summit


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Re: [SC-L] Tools: Evaluation Criteria

2007-05-24 Thread Peter Amey
 

 -Original Message-
 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
 [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Wall, Kevin
 Sent: 24 May 2007 12:45
 To: McGovern, James F (HTSC, IT)
 Cc: SC-L@securecoding.org
 Subject: Re: [SC-L] Tools: Evaluation Criteria
 
 James McGovern wrote...
 
  Maybe folks are still building square windows because we haven't 
  realized how software fails and can describe it in terms of 
 a pattern.
  The only pattern-oriented book I have ran across in my 
 travels is the 
  Core Security Patterns put out by the folks at Sun. Do you think we 
  should stop talking solely about code and start talking about how 
  vulnerabilities are repeatedly introduced and describe 
 using patterns 
  notation?
 
[snip

I am very happy to accept that we may not understand /all/ or even
/most/ of the ways software fails but we do know an awful lot.  Buffer
overflows, numeric overflows and division by zero have been wee
understood for years.  The first was limited by various versions of
Pascal ages ago.  Yet we are still clinging to techniques that hope we
can spot a buffer overflow pattern after construction (and hopefully
before an exploiter!).

There is a nice symmetry about my aeronautical analogy.  The Comet
disasters occurred just over 50 years after the Wright brothers first
flew; and we are still fiddling around with buffer overflows just over
50 years after Colossus (at the Bletchley Park crypto centre of Enigma
fame) signalled the start of the computer age.

That's all, back to the asylum!


Peter


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