Re: [SC-L] Sad state of affairs

2013-09-20 Thread Jeffrey Walton
On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 7:47 PM, Bobby G. Miller  wrote:
> I was just listening to a podcast interviewing a security executive from a
> prominent vendor.  The response to vulnerabilities was to raise the
> cost/complexity of exploiting bugs rather than actually employing secure
> coding practices.  What saddened me most was that the approach was
> apparently effective enough.
+1. Software security is in a sad state. What I've observed: let the
developers deliver something, then have it pen tested, and finally fix
what the pen testers find. I call it "catch me if you can" security.

I think the underlying problem is the risk analysis equations. Its
still cost effective to do little or nothing. Those risk analysis
equations need to be unbalanced.

And I don't believe this is the solution:
http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/opinion/Congress-should-encourage-bug-fixes-reward-secure-systems.
Too many carrots and too few sticks means it becomes more profitable
to continue business as usual.

Jeff
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Re: [SC-L] Sad state of affairs

2013-09-20 Thread Prasad Shenoy
Well, one of the objectives of employing secure coding practices is just that - 
to raise the cost and complexity of exploiting bugs. 

Cheers,
Prasad

> On Sep 20, 2013, at 7:47 PM, "Bobby G. Miller"  wrote:
> 
> I was just listening to a podcast interviewing a security executive from a 
> prominent vendor.  The response to vulnerabilities was to raise the 
> cost/complexity of exploiting bugs rather than actually employing secure 
> coding practices.  What saddened me most was that the approach was apparently 
> effective enough.
> 
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> List information, subscriptions, etc - http://krvw.com/mailman/listinfo/sc-l
> List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
> SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
> as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
> Follow KRvW Associates on Twitter at: http://twitter.com/KRvW_Associates
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[SC-L] Sad state of affairs

2013-09-20 Thread Bobby G. Miller
I was just listening to a podcast interviewing a security executive from a
prominent vendor.  The response to vulnerabilities was to raise the
cost/complexity of exploiting bugs rather than actually employing secure
coding practices.  What saddened me most was that the approach was
apparently effective enough.
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List charter available at - http://www.securecoding.org/list/charter.php
SC-L is hosted and moderated by KRvW Associates, LLC (http://www.KRvW.com)
as a free, non-commercial service to the software security community.
Follow KRvW Associates on Twitter at: http://twitter.com/KRvW_Associates
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