Re: [Servercert-wg] [外部郵件] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 V3: "Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple Network Perspectives"

2024-07-19 Thread 郭宗閔 via Servercert-wg 
Chunghwa Telecom votes YES on Ballot SC-067 V3

Best regards,
Chunghwa Telecom Co., Ltd.,
Tsung-Min Kuo, Ph.D.

From: Servercert-wg  On Behalf Of Chris 
Clements via Servercert-wg
Sent: Monday, July 15, 2024 11:30 PM
To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List 

Subject: [外部郵件][Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-067 V3: 
"Require domain validation and CAA checks to be performed from multiple Network 
Perspectives"


Purpose of Ballot SC-067 V3:


This Ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and 
Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates (i.e., TLS BRs) related 
to “Multi-Perspective Issuance Corroboration” (“MPIC”).



Background:



- MPIC refers to performing domain validation and CAA checks from multiple 
Network Perspectives before certificate issuance, as described within the 
Ballot for the applicable validation methods in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 
3.2.2.5.

- Not all methods described in TLS BR Sections 3.2.2.4 and 3.2.2.5 will require 
using MPIC.

- This work was most recently motivated by research presented at Face-to-Face 
58 [1] by Princeton University, but has been discussed for years prior as well.

- The goal of this proposal is to make it more difficult for adversaries to 
successfully launch equally-specific prefix attacks against the domain 
validation processes described in the TLS BRs.

- Additional background information can be found in an update shared at 
Face-to-Face 60 [2].



Benefits of Adoption:



- Recent publicly-documented attacks have used BGP hijacks to fool domain 
control validation and obtain malicious certificates, which led to the 
impersonation of HTTPS websites [3][4].

- Routing security defenses (e.g., RPKI) can mitigate the risk of global BGP 
attacks, but localized, equally-specific BGP attacks still pose a significant 
threat to the Web PKI [5][6].

- Corroborating domain control validation checks from multiple network 
perspectives (i.e., MPIC) spread across the Internet substantially reduces the 
threat posed by equally-specific BGP attacks, ensuring the integrity of domain 
validation and issuance decisions [5][7][8].

- Existing deployments of MPIC at the scale of millions of certificates a day 
demonstrate the feasibility of this technique at Internet scale [7][9].



Intellectual Property (IP) Disclosure:



- While not a Server Certificate Working Group Member, researchers from 
Princeton University presented at Face-to-Face 58, provided academic expertise, 
and highlighted publicly-available peer-reviewed research to support Members in 
drafting this ballot.

- The Princeton University researchers indicate that they have not filed for 
any patents relating to their MPIC work and do not plan to do so in the future.

- Princeton University has indicated that it is unable to agree to the 
CA/Browser Forum IPR agreement because it could encumber inventions invented by 
researchers not involved in the development of MPIC or with the CA/B Forum.

- Princeton University has instead provided the attached IPR statement. 
Pursuant to the IPR statement, Princeton University has granted a worldwide 
royalty free license to the intellectual property in MPIC developed by the 
researchers and has made representations regarding its lack of knowledge of any 
other Princeton intellectual property needed to implement MPIC.

- The attached IPR statement has not changed since disclosed in Discussion 
Round 1.

- For clarity, Princeton University’s IPR statement is NOT intended to replace 
the Forum’s IPR agreement or allow Princeton to participate in the Forum in any 
capacity.

- Members seeking legal advice regarding this ballot should consult their own 
counsel.



Proposal Revision History:



- Pre-Ballot Release #1 (work team artifacts and broader Validation 
Subcommittee collaboration) [10]

- Pre-Ballot Release #2 [11]



Previous versions of this Ballot:



- Ballot Release #1 [12] (comparing Version 2 to Version 1) [13]. Note, some of 
the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other ballots 
that have since passed (e.g., SC-069).

- Ballot Release #2 [14] (comparing Version 3 to Version 2) [15]. Note, some of 
the changes represented in the comparison are updates made by other ballots 
that have since passed (e.g., SC-072).



References:

[1] 
https://cabforum.org/wp-content/uploads/13-CAB-Forum-face-to-face-multiple-vantage-points.pdf

[2] 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1LTwtAwHXcSaPVSsqKQztNJrV2ozHJ7ZL/view?usp=drive_link

[3] 
https://medium.com/s2wblog/post-mortem-of-klayswap-incident-through-bgp-hijacking-en-3ed7e33de600

[4] https://www.coinbase.com/blog/celer-bridge-incident-analysis

[5] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity23/presentation/cimaszewski

[6] 
https://www.blackhat.com/docs/us-15/materials/us-15-Gavrichenkov-Breaking-HTTPS-With-BGP-Hijacking-wp.pdf

[7] https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity21/presentation/birge-lee

[8] https

Re: [Servercert-wg] [外部郵件] [Voting Begins] Ballot SC-75 v3 - Pre-sign linting

2024-06-25 Thread 郭宗閔 via Servercert-wg 
Chunghwa Telecom votes "yes" to ballot SC-75v3

 

From: Servercert-wg  On Behalf Of
Dimitris Zacharopoulos (HARICA) via Servercert-wg
Sent: Wednesday, June 19, 2024 6:13 PM
To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List

Subject: [外部郵件][Servercert-wg] [Voting Begins] Ballot SC-75 v3 -
Pre-sign linting

 

Voting begins for this ballot.


SC-75 v3 Pre-sign linting


Summary


There have been numerous compliance incidents publicly disclosed by CAs in
which they failed to comply with the technical requirements described in
standards associated with the issuance and management of publicly-trusted
TLS Certificates. However, the industry has developed open-source tools,
linters, that are free to use and can help CAs avoid certificate
misissuance. Using such linters before issuing a precertificate from a
Publicly-Trusted CA (pre-issuance linting) can prevent the mis-issuance in a
wide variety of cases.

The following motion has been proposed by Dimitris Zacharopoulos of HARICA
and endorsed by Corey Bonnell of Digicert and Ben Wilson of Mozilla.

You can view the GitHub pull request representing this ballot here
 . 


Motion Begins


MODIFY the "Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of
Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates" based on Version 2.0.5 as
specified in the following redline:

*   https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/20af1b271f2b689344ae3
53d3e78dc6b772199db...d809c41bc063109e15d46bfe1b5ad6403d823381
  


Motion Ends


This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
approval of this ballot is as follows:


Discussion (at least 7 days)


*   Start time: 2024-06-12 06:30:00 UTC
*   End time: on or after 2024-06-19 06:30:00 UTC


Vote for approval (7 days)


*   Start time: 2024-06-19 10:00:00 UTC
*   End time: 2024-06-26 10:00:00 UTC

 



 



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Re: [Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-073: Compromised and Weak Keys

2024-05-02 Thread 郭宗閔 via Servercert-wg 
Chunghwa Telecom votes ‘no’ on Ballot SC-073. 

 

Tsung-Min Kuo 

 

From: Servercert-wg mailto:servercert-wg-boun...@cabforum.org> > On Behalf Of Wayne Thayer via
Servercert-wg
Sent: Friday, April 26, 2024 2:00 AM
To: CA/B Forum Server Certificate WG Public Discussion List
mailto:servercert-wg@cabforum.org> >
Subject: [Servercert-wg] Voting Period Begins - Ballot SC-073: Compromised
and Weak Keys

 

Purpose of Ballot SC-073

This ballot proposes updates to the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance
and Management of Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates related to weak
and compromised private keys. These changes lie primarily in Section 6.1.1.3
 :

*   6.1.1.3(4) clarifies that, for the purpose of this requirement, CAs
shall be made aware of compromised keys using their existing notification
mechanism(s).
*   6.1.1.3(5) improves guidance for CAs around the detection of weak
keys. Should this ballot pass, these changes become effective on November
15, 2024.

Notes:

*   This ballot builds on the extensive work done by SSL.com in creating
ballot SC-59v2 Weak Key Guidance. SSL.com’s contributions are appreciated.
*   Thanks to Rob Stradling of Sectigo for the generation and
publication of the set of Debian weak keys referenced in this ballot.
*   The Debian weak keys requirements have been discussed extensively,
including in the following threads:

https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-March/004291.html
and

https://lists.cabforum.org/pipermail/servercert-wg/2024-April/004422.html 
*   This ballot does not appear to conflict with any other ballots that
are currently under discussion.

 

The following motion has been proposed by Wayne Thayer of Fastly, and
endorsed by Brittany Randall of GoDaddy and Bruce Morton of Entrust.

— Motion Begins —

This ballot modifies the “Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and
Management of Publicly-Trusted Certificates” (“Baseline Requirements”),
based on Version 2.0.3.

MODIFY the Baseline Requirements for the Issuance and Management of
Publicly-Trusted TLS Server Certificates as specified in the following
Redline:

Here is a link to the immutable GitHub redline:

https://github.com/cabforum/servercert/compare/a65402cff89affe1fc0a1f0e49807
c7e42e1608a...bee10c8e4a56815bffd59fab12cbd4044baa7cc0 

— Motion Ends —

This ballot proposes a Final Maintenance Guideline. The procedure for
approval of this ballot is as follows:

Discussion (7+ days)

*   Start time: 2024-04-18 00:00:00 UTC
*   End time: 2024-04-26 00:00:00 UTC

Vote for approval (7 days)

*   Start time: 2024-04-26 00:00:00 UTC
*   End time: 2024-05-03 00:00:00 UTC



 



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