Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 23:56 +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 14:48 -0700, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > > It was published on a CD, signed by Philipp Kern , a > > Debian Developer whose identity was verified in person by another DD: > And you believe that Philipp has met officials for all the CAs included > in the Mozilla bundle and verified them? He explicitly states that he has not audited them. > > Mozilla itself just takes them from WebTrust, IIRC,... and we've already > seen recently how securely Mozilla handles this (when they've had a CA > included, from which they didn't even know to whom it belongs). http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/policy/ > Nevertheless I still don't understand what you actually want. The output of the following would be sufficient: $ echo "hello world" | gpg --digest-algo sha256 --clearsign signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 14:48 -0700, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > It was published on a CD, signed by Philipp Kern , a > Debian Developer whose identity was verified in person by another DD: And you believe that Philipp has met officials for all the CAs included in the Mozilla bundle and verified them? Mozilla itself just takes them from WebTrust, IIRC,... and we've already seen recently how securely Mozilla handles this (when they've had a CA included, from which they didn't even know to whom it belongs). Nevertheless I still don't understand what you actually want. If it's just the verification of my name on the key,... then challenge response doesn't help at all,... then you could rather take one of the signatures on my key (e.g. from some DDs, or rather well known "CA"s like DFN, CAcert or heise's crypto campaign). Or via the IGTF hierarchy... I could even sign the key with a StartSSL X.509 cert, which is in your Mozilla... But I thought it's about getting a key that belongs to the owner of the keyserver (mine). Then all the above wouldn't help you at all. The best thing I could do is, putting they credentials directly on the server (on a website or so), thereby making the "official" connection. Or provide them via https and a server certificate e.g. from CAcert. But again,.. they only check the ownership of a server via whois and email,... which is in turn not very secure. Cheers, Chris. ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 16:18 -0500, John Clizbe wrote: > C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > >> Associated with what? With my key? With the keyserver? > > The email address you used when requesting peers. The email address > > which I will associate with the keyserver you claim to operate when you > > confirm for me that you have physical access to the private key > > corresponding to public key 0x5BB9A53D. > > The email and key which you seem to place such great emphasis on, were only > suggested to be added a few months ago solely as a convenience factor for > contacting a keyserver operator. _Nothing_more_. > > You seem to be placing an enormous amount of unwarranted import on them. It seems to be a reasonable practice to request a signature using a key associated with the contact information. Most folks requesting peers do this with their request. I understand now that others do not have this policy. In the future, I will not notify the list when I receive a refusal to comply with it. > > > > c...@pki:~$ grep 5BB9A53D /etc/sks/membership > > #keyserver.pki.scientia.net > > 11370#ChrisMitterer0x5BB9A53D > > > >> Please tell me once you've got that, so that I can delete it. > > Sorry I failed to confirm receipt previously. Please consider my > > initial response an indication of receipt and review of the document. > > > > Please sign a message using the private key associated with 0x5BB9A53D. > > I will then remove the comment character from > > keyserver.colliertech.org's /etc/sks/membership file and re-start the > > server. Something like the following would be more than adequate ;) > > There is no need to restart the server after editing the membership file. Oh? Thanks. I will keep that in mind. > > $ echo " > > I do hereby swear under penalty of perjury that I own and have > > exclusive access to the private key corresponding with the public key ending > > in " | \ > > gpg --digest-algo sha256 --clearsign > > *eyeroll* OYE!!! "Penalty of Perjury"? > > Had you requested such a statement from me at the beginning, I would have most > likely written you off and never bothered helping you iron out your IP config > problems. Aw, man. I didn't *really* request that he sign it that way. I was kidding and trying to lighten the mood, hence the ";)". You would have been right to write me off had I demanded such a thing. A message signed with a key, preferably published in the repository is sufficient. Again, I'm sorry to have put everyone out with my unreasonable peering policy. I will publish my peering policy and reply privately with a link to it in the future to avoid causing list flame. I will not notify the list when I come across what I consider to be questionable practices. I will reduce my reliance on the information provided by potential peers and the keys which they publish. signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 23:33 +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 12:56 -0700, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > > > The necessary root-CAs are available from the International Grid > > > Trust > > > Federation (www.igtf.net) > > > > Thank you. I will review their CPS and make a decision regarding > > trust at a later time. I am more hesitant to add CAs to my trust root > > than I am to trust the ones shipped with NSS. It is unlikely that I > > will trust this CA until it is included in the NSS pool. > > > > http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/pending/ > > And how did you get mozilla's CA pool? In a secure way? I really doubt > that... It was published on a CD, signed by Philipp Kern , a Debian Developer whose identity was verified in person by another DD: http://pgp.cs.uu.nl/mk_path.cgi?FROM=ba27a83c&TO=B2CFCDD8&PATHS=trust +paths Cheers, C.J. signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: >> Associated with what? With my key? With the keyserver? > The email address you used when requesting peers. The email address > which I will associate with the keyserver you claim to operate when you > confirm for me that you have physical access to the private key > corresponding to public key 0x5BB9A53D. The email and key which you seem to place such great emphasis on, were only suggested to be added a few months ago solely as a convenience factor for contacting a keyserver operator. _Nothing_more_. You seem to be placing an enormous amount of unwarranted import on them. > > c...@pki:~$ grep 5BB9A53D /etc/sks/membership > #keyserver.pki.scientia.net > 11370#ChrisMitterer0x5BB9A53D > >> Please tell me once you've got that, so that I can delete it. > Sorry I failed to confirm receipt previously. Please consider my > initial response an indication of receipt and review of the document. > > Please sign a message using the private key associated with 0x5BB9A53D. > I will then remove the comment character from > keyserver.colliertech.org's /etc/sks/membership file and re-start the > server. Something like the following would be more than adequate ;) There is no need to restart the server after editing the membership file. > $ echo " > I do hereby swear under penalty of perjury that I own and have > exclusive access to the private key corresponding with the public key ending > in " | \ > gpg --digest-algo sha256 --clearsign *eyeroll* OYE!!! "Penalty of Perjury"? Had you requested such a statement from me at the beginning, I would have most likely written you off and never bothered helping you iron out your IP config problems. -- John P. Clizbe Inet: John (a) Gingerbear DAWT net FSF Assoc #995 / FSFE Fellow #1797 hkp://keyserver.gingerbear.net or mailto:pgp-public-k...@gingerbear.net?subject=help Q:"Just how do the residents of Haiku, Hawai'i hold conversations?" A:"An odd melody / island voices on the winds / surplus of vowels" signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 10:49 -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > Yes. I was using "keyserver" as synonymous for "keyserver operator." > Imprecise language, I grant, but that's English for you. Neverteheless? Why should a keyserver or keyserver operator be a CA or act in such a role? A CA is an entity making a cryptographic assertion on certificates (or keys + UID in the case of OpenPGP). This is also the definition as used with RFC 2828 (more or less). The keyserver is just a distribution point, nothing more, and therefore not a CA. Other wise, my ISP would be a CA to,.. he's the one that delivers me the certificates... Cheers, Chris. ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 12:56 -0700, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > > The necessary root-CAs are available from the International Grid > > Trust > > Federation (www.igtf.net) > > Thank you. I will review their CPS and make a decision regarding > trust at a later time. I am more hesitant to add CAs to my trust root > than I am to trust the ones shipped with NSS. It is unlikely that I > will trust this CA until it is included in the NSS pool. > > http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/pending/ And how did you get mozilla's CA pool? In a secure way? I really doubt that... ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] Seeking peers for keyserver.ftbfs.org
On Sun, Aug 22, 2010 at 07:31:11PM +, Kim Minh Kaplan wrote: > Matt Kraai writes: > > > Thanks for the instructions and URL. I'm able to connect to SKS using > > any address if I use "::", although "netstat -l" only shows it as > > listening for IPv6 connections. > > Although it may appear to work at first sight, you should *not* use bare > "::" for the reconn process: SKS does not understand IPv4-Mapped IPv6 > addresses and thus will reject peers trying to connect using IPv4. You > should explicitly enumerate your addresses. OK, fixed. Thanks. -- Matthttp://ftbfs.org/kraai ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
[Sks-devel] seeking peers for sks.hezmatt.org
Hi all, I am looking for peers for a new SKS keyserver installation. I am running SKS version 1.1.0 on sks.hezmatt.org. It's a private machine, located in Dallas, TX (Linode). I have loaded a keydump from ftp.prato.linux.it, dated 2010-08-18. I see dead peopl^W^W 2856860 keys loaded. For operational issues, please contact me directly. sks.hezmatt.org 11370 # Matt Palmer 0x69351387 - Matt signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
> Associated with what? With my key? With the keyserver? The email address you used when requesting peers. The email address which I will associate with the keyserver you claim to operate when you confirm for me that you have physical access to the private key corresponding to public key 0x5BB9A53D. c...@pki:~$ grep 5BB9A53D /etc/sks/membership #keyserver.pki.scientia.net 11370#ChrisMitterer0x5BB9A53D > Please tell me once you've got that, so that I can delete it. Sorry I failed to confirm receipt previously. Please consider my initial response an indication of receipt and review of the document. Please sign a message using the private key associated with 0x5BB9A53D. I will then remove the comment character from keyserver.colliertech.org's /etc/sks/membership file and re-start the server. Something like the following would be more than adequate ;) $ echo " I do hereby swear under penalty of perjury that I own and have exclusive access to the private key corresponding with the public key ending in " | \ gpg --digest-algo sha256 --clearsign > The necessary root-CAs are available from the International Grid Trust > Federation (www.igtf.net) Thank you. I will review their CPS and make a decision regarding trust at a later time. I am more hesitant to add CAs to my trust root than I am to trust the ones shipped with NSS. It is unlikely that I will trust this CA until it is included in the NSS pool. http://www.mozilla.org/projects/security/certs/pending/ Cheers, C.J. On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 21:15 +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 08:13 -0700, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > > > If I'm not missing something substantially (and I don't think so) there > > > is really nothing which you'd gain from this anyway. > > > If I send you some encrypted challenge or vice versa, you have neither a > > > proof that I'm actually "Christoph Anton Mitterer" but only that the > > > owner of that key has access to that email address (which an attacker > > > can have easily too, via MiM-attacks). > > > > Yes, it would be a weak indication, but it is more indication than > > just that you own the associated email. > Associated with what? With my key? With the keyserver? > > > > The only thing I intended to suggest with this link is that these are > > the standards by which the state requires me to operate. > As it was already pointed out here, this likely doesn't apply to a > keyserver. > A keyserver is not a certificate authority,... nor a registration > authority. > It's just a service holding any keys. These keys can be valid (in the > sense of "good") or forged (e.g. I could upload a key with "Linus > Torvalds"). > > > > Please accept my sincere apology. I did not mean to offend. I have > > never received a refusal to sign a message indicating ownership of a > > private key and it raised a red flag. > Well it's ok,... but you really should understand, that this is > completely pointless, especially when one wants to make a connection > between a key, and the owner/operator of a keyserver. > > What people (sometimes) do is: making such challenges, after (or in > addition) to personal meetings, where they've exchanged fingerprints, > and identity documents (like passport). > Then it's used as a (very limited) proof, that someone has controll over > an email-address. > > > Cheers, > Chris. > --- Begin Message --- Hi. On Mon, 2010-06-21 at 16:03 -0700, C.J. Adams-Collier wrote: > You should be able to put the following in your /etc/sks/membership > file: > > keyserver.colliertech.org 11370 Done. Please add mine for those severs at: keyserver.pki.scientia.net 11370 Cheers, Chris. --- End Message --- signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] Seeking peers for keyserver.ftbfs.org
Matt Kraai writes: > Thanks for the instructions and URL. I'm able to connect to SKS using > any address if I use "::", although "netstat -l" only shows it as > listening for IPv6 connections. Although it may appear to work at first sight, you should *not* use bare "::" for the reconn process: SKS does not understand IPv4-Mapped IPv6 addresses and thus will reject peers trying to connect using IPv4. You should explicitly enumerate your addresses. -- Kim Minh ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
If your key is in my database prior to you requesting peerage (it was), it indicates to me that it was not generated strictly for the purpose of this communication. If your identity ever comes in to question, I can remove you from the membership list until such time as I can request a trusted third party audit your operations. On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 21:10 +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 07:43 -0700, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > > Generating a signed message is as simple as this: > Yes,... but it gives you _no proof at all_ . > > Even if _I_ would sign this. Anybody in between us two can simply catch > that message (and yours), take another key, and do the same signing. > You'd never notice that. > Therefore, one needs personal meetings in order to do keysigning. > > See wikipedia for man-in-the-middle-attacks. > > > > Cheers, > Chris. > signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 08:13 -0700, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > > If I'm not missing something substantially (and I don't think so) there > > is really nothing which you'd gain from this anyway. > > If I send you some encrypted challenge or vice versa, you have neither a > > proof that I'm actually "Christoph Anton Mitterer" but only that the > > owner of that key has access to that email address (which an attacker > > can have easily too, via MiM-attacks). > > Yes, it would be a weak indication, but it is more indication than > just that you own the associated email. Associated with what? With my key? With the keyserver? > The only thing I intended to suggest with this link is that these are > the standards by which the state requires me to operate. As it was already pointed out here, this likely doesn't apply to a keyserver. A keyserver is not a certificate authority,... nor a registration authority. It's just a service holding any keys. These keys can be valid (in the sense of "good") or forged (e.g. I could upload a key with "Linus Torvalds"). > Please accept my sincere apology. I did not mean to offend. I have > never received a refusal to sign a message indicating ownership of a > private key and it raised a red flag. Well it's ok,... but you really should understand, that this is completely pointless, especially when one wants to make a connection between a key, and the owner/operator of a keyserver. What people (sometimes) do is: making such challenges, after (or in addition) to personal meetings, where they've exchanged fingerprints, and identity documents (like passport). Then it's used as a (very limited) proof, that someone has controll over an email-address. Cheers, Chris. ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 07:43 -0700, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > Generating a signed message is as simple as this: Yes,... but it gives you _no proof at all_ . Even if _I_ would sign this. Anybody in between us two can simply catch that message (and yours), take another key, and do the same signing. You'd never notice that. Therefore, one needs personal meetings in order to do keysigning. See wikipedia for man-in-the-middle-attacks. Cheers, Chris. ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] Seeking peers for keyserver.ftbfs.org
On Sun, Aug 22, 2010 at 08:57:37PM +0200, Kiss Gabor (Bitman) wrote: > > > Note that if you checkout the Mercurial version you can just put > > > your hostname and SKS will use all its addresses. > > > > Thanks for the instructions and URL. I'm able to connect to SKS using > > any address if I use "::", although "netstat -l" only shows it as > > listening for IPv6 connections. > > Are you sure? :-) > $ telnet 94.246.65.214 11371 > Trying 94.246.65.214... > Connected to 94.246.65.214. > Escape character is '^]'. You're right. I was trying to say that, but didn't do so very well. Using "::" allows access via IPv4 or IPv6 connections and via any address, but netstat only shows it as listening for IPv6 connections: tcp6 0 0 [::]:11370 [::]:* LISTEN tcp6 0 0 [::]:hkp[::]:* LISTEN -- Matthttp://ftbfs.org/kraai ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] Seeking peers for keyserver.ftbfs.org
> > Note that if you checkout the Mercurial version you can just put > > your hostname and SKS will use all its addresses. > > Thanks for the instructions and URL. I'm able to connect to SKS using > any address if I use "::", although "netstat -l" only shows it as > listening for IPv6 connections. Are you sure? :-) $ telnet 94.246.65.214 11371 Trying 94.246.65.214... Connected to 94.246.65.214. Escape character is '^]'. Gabor -- Most maszik ki a majom a vizbol. ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] Seeking peers for keyserver.ftbfs.org
On Sun, Aug 22, 2010 at 06:36:15PM +, Kim Minh Kaplan wrote: > Either "0.0.0.0", "::" or "0.0.0.0 ::" could be the way to tell SKS > listen on all addresses depending on your system's settings. This > is a convoluted problem. Phil Pennock has more details: > http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/sks-devel/2009-12/msg2.html > > Note that if you checkout the Mercurial version you can just put > your hostname and SKS will use all its addresses. Thanks for the instructions and URL. I'm able to connect to SKS using any address if I use "::", although "netstat -l" only shows it as listening for IPv6 connections. -- Matthttp://ftbfs.org/kraai ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] Seeking peers for keyserver.ftbfs.org
Matt Kraai writes: Is there a way to listen on all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses without having to explicitly list them all? If I remove the hkp_addresses: and recon_addresses: settings, sks only listens for IPv4 connections. If I set both of these settings to 0.0.0.0 :: sks fails to start. Either "0.0.0.0", "::" or "0.0.0.0 ::" could be the way to tell SKS listen on all addresses depending on your system's settings. This is a convoluted problem. Phil Pennock has more details: http://lists.gnu.org/archive/html/sks-devel/2009-12/msg2.html Note that if you checkout the Mercurial version you can just put your hostname and SKS will use all its addresses. -- Kim Minh ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] Seeking peers for keyserver.ftbfs.org
On Sun, Aug 22, 2010 at 05:23:43PM +, Kim Minh Kaplan wrote: > Matt Kraai: > > > I haven't been able to figure out > > how to make sks listen on both IPv4 and IPv6. > > You need SKS 1.1.1 for IPv6 support. Thanks. After upgrading, I was able to get IPv6 to work. Is there a way to listen on all IPv4 and IPv6 addresses without having to explicitly list them all? If I remove the hkp_addresses: and recon_addresses: settings, sks only listens for IPv4 connections. If I set both of these settings to 0.0.0.0 :: sks fails to start. -- Matthttp://ftbfs.org/kraai ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
[Sks-devel] Re: Seeking peers for keyserver.ftbfs.org
On Sun, Aug 22, 2010 at 09:51:59AM -0700, Matt Kraai wrote: > I'm running SKS version 1.1.0 on keyserver.ftbfs.org. ... >The > machine has IPv6 connectivity, but I haven't been able to figure out > how to make sks listen on both IPv4 and IPv6. If I don't include any > hkp_address: and recon_address: lines in /etc/sks/sksconf, it only > listens for IPv4 connections. If I add > > hkp_address: 94.246.65.214 2001:470:28:43b::1 > recon_address: 94.246.65.214 2001:470:28:43b::1 > > to /etc/sks/sksconf, it exits immediately. It appears that support for listening on multiple addresses wasn't added until SKS version 1.1.1: http://code.google.com/p/sks-keyserver/source/detail?r=ff76ee32f7e3adda7b81d391331b0ab2ee47ef42 I'll upgrade and see if that fixes the problem for me. -- Matthttp://ftbfs.org/kraai ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] Seeking peers for keyserver.ftbfs.org
Matt Kraai: > I haven't been able to figure out > how to make sks listen on both IPv4 and IPv6. You need SKS 1.1.1 for IPv6 support. -- Kim Minh ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] Seeking peers for keyserver.ftbfs.org
On Sun, Aug 22, 2010 at 09:51:59AM -0700, Matt Kraai wrote: > I'm looking for peers for a new SKS keyserver installation. > > I'm running SKS version 1.1.0 on keyserver.ftbfs.org. This is a > private machine. The server is physically located in Sweden. The > machine has IPv6 connectivity, but I haven't been able to figure out > how to make sks listen on both IPv4 and IPv6. If I don't include any > hkp_address: and recon_address: lines in /etc/sks/sksconf, it only > listens for IPv4 connections. If I add > > hkp_address: 94.246.65.214 2001:470:28:43b::1 > recon_address: 94.246.65.214 2001:470:28:43b::1 > > to /etc/sks/sksconf, it exits immediately. > > I have loaded a keydump from > > http://ftp.prato.linux.it/pub/keyring/dump-latest/ > > dated 2010-08-18. I see 2856860 keys loaded. > > For operational issues, please contact me directly. > > keyserver.ftbfs.org 11370 # Matt Kraai 0x1557BC10 Oops. I forgot to sign that message to prove that I know how to use gpg, so I'll sign this reply instead. -- Matthttp://ftbfs.org/kraai signature.asc Description: Digital signature ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
[Sks-devel] Seeking peers for keyserver.ftbfs.org
Hi, I'm looking for peers for a new SKS keyserver installation. I'm running SKS version 1.1.0 on keyserver.ftbfs.org. This is a private machine. The server is physically located in Sweden. The machine has IPv6 connectivity, but I haven't been able to figure out how to make sks listen on both IPv4 and IPv6. If I don't include any hkp_address: and recon_address: lines in /etc/sks/sksconf, it only listens for IPv4 connections. If I add hkp_address: 94.246.65.214 2001:470:28:43b::1 recon_address: 94.246.65.214 2001:470:28:43b::1 to /etc/sks/sksconf, it exits immediately. I have loaded a keydump from http://ftp.prato.linux.it/pub/keyring/dump-latest/ dated 2010-08-18. I see 2856860 keys loaded. For operational issues, please contact me directly. keyserver.ftbfs.org 11370 # Matt Kraai 0x1557BC10 -- Matthttp://ftbfs.org/kraai ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 11:04 -0400, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > On 8/22/2010 10:54 AM, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > > Because none of the information provided indicates in any way that the > > private key corresponding with the public key provided is under Chris' > > control. > > If Christoph were himself making assurances about certificates, this > would be relevant. As he is not, I don't see how it is. The assurances > are made by the individual signers on the certificates he distributes. > I don't imagine you're going to demand each and every certificate holder > contact you to verify their private keys -- so why do you expect > Christoph to do so? Perhaps there's a good reason for it, but so far > I'm not seeing it. As the administrator of the database, I expect Christoph to ensure that the database: (d) Contains no significant amount of information that is known or likely to be untrue, inaccurate, or not reasonably reliable; I understand that keyserver administrators cannot do much to this end, since they are not issuing the certs themselves. However, I do want to make at least rudimentary identity checks with folks who will be trading messages with my servers on a regular basis. > > (1) The secretary must recognize one or more repositories, after finding > > that a repository to be recognized: > > ... (d) Contains no significant amount of information that is known or > > likely to be untrue, inaccurate, or not reasonably reliable; > > I am not a lawyer, obviously. However, it seems to me that if you > consider Christoph's private certificate to be a significant amount of > information, even though it has absolutely no influence on the public > certificates he distributes, you must also consider the individual > signatures on those certificates to be significant amounts of > information, since those do influence the public certificates. > > (This doesn't even get into the 45 keys on the keyservers marked as > "whitehouse.gov", or the ones in the names of various celebrities, and > so forth. There is a significant amount of information in the > certificate pool which is likely to be untrue, inaccurate, or not > reasonably reliable.) I see. Perhaps I need to re-think things in light of this information. > > All of this is correct. However, the advice is generally applicable to > > signing- and trust-related activities. > > It is generally applicable within your security model. I am skeptical > that your advice is applicable within mine. Good point. Maybe I should take Christoph's advice and think a time or two before I post. signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Aug 22, 2010, at 11:13 AM, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > Please accept my sincere apology. I did not mean to offend. I have never > received a refusal to sign a message indicating ownership of a private key > and it raised a red flag. Since there has been no indication from the list > that this was an appropriate step to take, I will avoid publishing such > issues and attempt instead to resolve them privately. Well as one who was also surprised at your peering policy (although I understood perfectly once you explained), you might try to describe the SKS server peering policy you are obliged to work with up front (and in a accessible web page) just to expedite the explanations. There's nothing whatsoever wrong with your SKS peering policy imho, just it surprised ( at least me) a bit, necessitating an explanation involving some subtle interpretations of what "trust" means. If you add a policy description of YOUR "trust" needs for SKS peering, its obvious (to me anyways) why you wish a signed message. hth just trying for a positive suggestion 73 de Jeff ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 14:04 +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > Hey... > > Oh my goodness... > > > Now listen: > > On Sat, 2010-08-21 at 18:54 -0700, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > > No. And I advise all others to avoid peering with you until you can > > prove that you own the private key that will be associated with the > > keyserver. > I was already willing to put some effort into giving you strong > indication, that my key belongs to the owner of my keyserver as you > wanted. > > If I'm not missing something substantially (and I don't think so) there > is really nothing which you'd gain from this anyway. > If I send you some encrypted challenge or vice versa, you have neither a > proof that I'm actually "Christoph Anton Mitterer" but only that the > owner of that key has access to that email address (which an attacker > can have easily too, via MiM-attacks). Yes, it would be a weak indication, but it is more indication than just that you own the associated email. > It neither proves you that the owner of that key is really the owner of > that keyserver, also because of easily possible MiM-attacks. > > Obviously you're missing some fundamental parts of how cryptosystems > (and especially the keyserver infrastructure works). > The later is not secured anyway as you can understand from this thread: > http://www.imc.org/ietf-openpgp/mail-archive/msg30930.html > > > > http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=19.34.210 > You might have noticed (e.g. using whois on my IP addresses) that I'm > not living in the state of Washington and not even in the US. > I show's quite some arrogance that you seem to have the impression, that > this law or whatever it is, might have some effect in Europe or Germany. The only thing I intended to suggest with this link is that these are the standards by which the state requires me to operate. > Apart from the fact, that it seems to be about "licensed certificate > authorities". > No keyserver is a CA... > > > So next time before making any "unpolite" public statements, please > think twice,.. (or better three times). Please accept my sincere apology. I did not mean to offend. I have never received a refusal to sign a message indicating ownership of a private key and it raised a red flag. Since there has been no indication from the list that this was an appropriate step to take, I will avoid publishing such issues and attempt instead to resolve them privately. > Cheers, > Chris. Cheers, C.J. > btw: Of course you're still free to decide with which keyserver you want > to peer, which I did now. > signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On 8/22/2010 10:54 AM, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > Because none of the information provided indicates in any way that the > private key corresponding with the public key provided is under Chris' > control. If Christoph were himself making assurances about certificates, this would be relevant. As he is not, I don't see how it is. The assurances are made by the individual signers on the certificates he distributes. I don't imagine you're going to demand each and every certificate holder contact you to verify their private keys -- so why do you expect Christoph to do so? Perhaps there's a good reason for it, but so far I'm not seeing it. > (1) The secretary must recognize one or more repositories, after finding > that a repository to be recognized: > ... (d) Contains no significant amount of information that is known or > likely to be untrue, inaccurate, or not reasonably reliable; I am not a lawyer, obviously. However, it seems to me that if you consider Christoph's private certificate to be a significant amount of information, even though it has absolutely no influence on the public certificates he distributes, you must also consider the individual signatures on those certificates to be significant amounts of information, since those do influence the public certificates. (This doesn't even get into the 45 keys on the keyservers marked as "whitehouse.gov", or the ones in the names of various celebrities, and so forth. There is a significant amount of information in the certificate pool which is likely to be untrue, inaccurate, or not reasonably reliable.) > All of this is correct. However, the advice is generally applicable to > signing- and trust-related activities. It is generally applicable within your security model. I am skeptical that your advice is applicable within mine. ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 14:04 +0200, Arnold wrote: > On 08/22/2010 03:54 AM, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > > On Sat, 2010-08-21 at 22:37 +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > >> On Mon, 2010-08-09 at 12:54 -0400, C.J. Adams-Collier wrote: > >>> Cool. Could you sign something for me so's I have a relatively strong > >>> indication that you own the pub key I will associate with the server? > >>... > >> What I did,... and what should be even a better prove that the key > >> belongs to the owner of the server is: > >> > >> I've added a file at: > >> http://scientia.net/adams-collier.keyinfo > >> which contains the fingerprint + my name. > >> ... > > No. And I advise all others to avoid peering with you until you can > > prove that you own the private key that will be associated with the > > keyserver. > > Why? Because none of the information provided indicates in any way that the private key corresponding with the public key provided is under Chris' control. > Keys and certificates identify persons, not ownership of a server. Whether > or not you trust the signers of the key or certificate is up to you. > > For the server, all he can do is prove he has sufficient access rights > (which he offered and is also inherent to modifying the membership file). Or > you can contact the domain owner offline (using WHOIS information). > > But then, why won't you peer with an anonymously operated server? In some > countries that might be necessary. After all, each public key a key server > provides, should initially be regarded as 'untrusted'. http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=19.34&full=true#19.34.400 (1) The secretary must recognize one or more repositories, after finding that a repository to be recognized: ... (d) Contains no significant amount of information that is known or likely to be untrue, inaccurate, or not reasonably reliable; I interpret this to mean that I need to perform some amount of identity verification of the operator of each keyserver with which I peer. > The only thing I'm interested in is if the server is operated by a > sufficiently skilled administrator. Something certificates won't tell. > > > > http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=19.34.210 > > This is a national law / ruling applicable to just one country. It is > useless in the rest of the world (ref. art. 3a, for example) and not > applicable to PGP-keys, as they are not depending on a certification > authority to be valid for the user. All of this is correct. However, the advice is generally applicable to signing- and trust-related activities. > Arnold Cheers, C.J. signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On 8/22/2010 10:47 AM, David Shaw wrote: > Robert, are you really saying what you seem to be saying? The action > of the owners doesn't make a keyserver a CA. That makes the person > running the keyserver a CA. Yes. I was using "keyserver" as synonymous for "keyserver operator." Imprecise language, I grant, but that's English for you. smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On Aug 22, 2010, at 9:27 AM, Robert J. Hansen wrote: > While I concur with you, Christoph, there's one minor error that should > probably be corrected: > >> No keyserver is a CA... > > Most keyservers are CAs, in that the people who run the keyservers have > signed other people's keys. Robert, are you really saying what you seem to be saying? The action of the owners doesn't make a keyserver a CA. That makes the person running the keyserver a CA. If I signed a bunch of keys and put them up on my web server, it wouldn't make my web server a CA. Similarly, if I signed someone's key and gave it to him on a USB stick, it wouldn't make the USB stick a CA. Most keyservers are a database plus a web server plus a key distribution protocol. It's a storage place for keys. The CA is the person/entity issuing signatures. The method they use to distribute these signatures (be it keyserver, sneakernet, or morse code) does not change that. The PGP "Global Directory" keyserver, by comparison, is a CA. It issues the signatures, and isn't just storage. David ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
No offense intended. However, this is actually slightly more than zero indication that the key belongs to you. The only indication you have given is that you have control over the email address listed in the pubkey. My friends very often have their email accounts hacked and I receive mail from spammers pretending to be them. The fact that you refuse to prove that you own the private key is a strong indication that you do not own it. Generating a signed message is as simple as this: $ echo "I really do own the key" | gpg --clearsign You need a passphrase to unlock the secret key for user: "C.J. Adams-Collier " 1024-bit DSA key, ID 176BE946, created 2008-03-02 (main key ID BA27A83C) -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 I really do own the key -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.4.10 (GNU/Linux) iEYEAREIAAYFAkxxNs4ACgkQXKBS0hdr6UYcfwCcCpcwrtsIzJh979D+ELsmHqPc J5oAnA6faHMKoI8OyR+EEO1cHblZNVtr =muZK -END PGP SIGNATURE- Tada :) On Sun, 2010-08-22 at 14:04 +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: > Hey... > > Oh my goodness... > > > Now listen: > > On Sat, 2010-08-21 at 18:54 -0700, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > > No. And I advise all others to avoid peering with you until you can > > prove that you own the private key that will be associated with the > > keyserver. > I was already willing to put some effort into giving you strong > indication, that my key belongs to the owner of my keyserver as you > wanted. > > If I'm not missing something substantially (and I don't think so) there > is really nothing which you'd gain from this anyway. > If I send you some encrypted challenge or vice versa, you have neither a > proof that I'm actually "Christoph Anton Mitterer" but only that the > owner of that key has access to that email address (which an attacker > can have easily too, via MiM-attacks). > > It neither proves you that the owner of that key is really the owner of > that keyserver, also because of easily possible MiM-attacks. > > Obviously you're missing some fundamental parts of how cryptosystems > (and especially the keyserver infrastructure works). > The later is not secured anyway as you can understand from this thread: > http://www.imc.org/ietf-openpgp/mail-archive/msg30930.html > > > > http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=19.34.210 > You might have noticed (e.g. using whois on my IP addresses) that I'm > not living in the state of Washington and not even in the US. > I show's quite some arrogance that you seem to have the impression, that > this law or whatever it is, might have some effect in Europe or Germany. > > Apart from the fact, that it seems to be about "licensed certificate > authorities". > No keyserver is a CA... > > > So next time before making any "unpolite" public statements, please > think twice,.. (or better three times). > > > Cheers, > Chris. > > btw: Of course you're still free to decide with which keyserver you want > to peer, which I did now. > signature.asc Description: This is a digitally signed message part ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
While I concur with you, Christoph, there's one minor error that should probably be corrected: > No keyserver is a CA... Most keyservers are CAs, in that the people who run the keyservers have signed other people's keys. The Web of Trust is really a buffet table of CAs, where you get to choose which CAs you trust and which you don't, and your network of keys emerges from your CA trust decisions. If what you meant to say was that keyserving is a totally separate function from being a CA, though, then I agree with you. ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On 8/22/2010 8:04 AM, Arnold wrote: > This is a national law / ruling applicable to just one country. Even less than that. It's a state law applicable to just one state -- neither one of our largest nor most populous. (It is beautiful and I've found the people there to generally be quite pleasant, but that's beside the point.) I do not understand what Adams-Collier is on about, either. When I posted a couple of weeks ago to ask for peers, I received an email from him simply reading "ping?" I asked if there was something he needed, and got no response back. I don't know what to make of either my interaction with him, or of his interaction with Christoph. ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
On 08/22/2010 03:54 AM, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > On Sat, 2010-08-21 at 22:37 +0200, Christoph Anton Mitterer wrote: >> On Mon, 2010-08-09 at 12:54 -0400, C.J. Adams-Collier wrote: >>> Cool. Could you sign something for me so's I have a relatively strong >>> indication that you own the pub key I will associate with the server? >>... >> What I did,... and what should be even a better prove that the key >> belongs to the owner of the server is: >> >> I've added a file at: >> http://scientia.net/adams-collier.keyinfo >> which contains the fingerprint + my name. >> ... > No. And I advise all others to avoid peering with you until you can > prove that you own the private key that will be associated with the > keyserver. Why? Keys and certificates identify persons, not ownership of a server. Whether or not you trust the signers of the key or certificate is up to you. For the server, all he can do is prove he has sufficient access rights (which he offered and is also inherent to modifying the membership file). Or you can contact the domain owner offline (using WHOIS information). But then, why won't you peer with an anonymously operated server? In some countries that might be necessary. After all, each public key a key server provides, should initially be regarded as 'untrusted'. The only thing I'm interested in is if the server is operated by a sufficiently skilled administrator. Something certificates won't tell. > http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=19.34.210 This is a national law / ruling applicable to just one country. It is useless in the rest of the world (ref. art. 3a, for example) and not applicable to PGP-keys, as they are not depending on a certification authority to be valid for the user. Arnold signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
Re: [Sks-devel] new keyserver online
Hey... Oh my goodness... Now listen: On Sat, 2010-08-21 at 18:54 -0700, C.J. Adams-Collier KF7BMP wrote: > No. And I advise all others to avoid peering with you until you can > prove that you own the private key that will be associated with the > keyserver. I was already willing to put some effort into giving you strong indication, that my key belongs to the owner of my keyserver as you wanted. If I'm not missing something substantially (and I don't think so) there is really nothing which you'd gain from this anyway. If I send you some encrypted challenge or vice versa, you have neither a proof that I'm actually "Christoph Anton Mitterer" but only that the owner of that key has access to that email address (which an attacker can have easily too, via MiM-attacks). It neither proves you that the owner of that key is really the owner of that keyserver, also because of easily possible MiM-attacks. Obviously you're missing some fundamental parts of how cryptosystems (and especially the keyserver infrastructure works). The later is not secured anyway as you can understand from this thread: http://www.imc.org/ietf-openpgp/mail-archive/msg30930.html > http://apps.leg.wa.gov/rcw/default.aspx?cite=19.34.210 You might have noticed (e.g. using whois on my IP addresses) that I'm not living in the state of Washington and not even in the US. I show's quite some arrogance that you seem to have the impression, that this law or whatever it is, might have some effect in Europe or Germany. Apart from the fact, that it seems to be about "licensed certificate authorities". No keyserver is a CA... So next time before making any "unpolite" public statements, please think twice,.. (or better three times). Cheers, Chris. btw: Of course you're still free to decide with which keyserver you want to peer, which I did now. ___ Sks-devel mailing list Sks-devel@nongnu.org http://lists.nongnu.org/mailman/listinfo/sks-devel
