Re: [Sks-devel] SKS peering request [sks-server.randala.com]

2014-04-07 Thread Kristian Fiskerstrand
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[Please do not top-post, it makes it difficult to follow the thread]

On 04/07/2014 05:12 AM, Martin Papik wrote:
 
 Dear Phil
 
 First of all thank you for your exhaustive response, it's much 
 appreciated.
 
 I'm running it on real HW, so the Ptree issues are not a problem, 
 although I am curious to know why and how such corruption happens
 on a VM. Is it because of something specific to SKS or DBD? How was
 it fixed in 1.1.4?

It relates to the timing information in the kernel clocksource not
being accurate enough in some VM environments, so one of the
workarounds is to use the tsc clocksource.

 
 Second, with 1.1.3, are ECC signatures lost? Meaning if someone 
 queries my server running 1.1.3 for a key containing an ECC
 signature, will only the one signature be missing or will there be
 problems syncing any further signatures?

For signatures the ECC signature will be gone by default, or an error
will be shown for a primary ECC key. The keys will synchronize and the
full key can be gotten from a 1.1.3 server using clean=off option
that disable the presentation filter. You'll find some details on
number of ECC (primary) keys at [2]

 I.e. will the whole key be lost, the ECC signatures only, or any
 signature after the first ECC signature is added? Another question
 that occurs to me is, how many ECC signatures are actually in the
 wild? Are many users affected? If so, I wonder if the logic that
 selects my server for inclusion in the pool is doing the right
 thing. Mine isn't the only 1.1.3 server included. So I wonder.

ECC safe pool is the subset pool c.f. [0]. The 1.1.3 requirement is
set mainly due to subkey safe searching. This will be bumped to 1.1.5
once released.

 
 I can't do much about OS packaging, it already took extra effort
 to get 1.1.3 on the current stable version (not much, but extra),
 maybe somebody here could undertake the effort needed to backport
 the latest SKS for the stable branch of ubuntu. I've never done
 anything with ocaml so I don't feel qualified to roll out a
 package. Not even for myself to be honest. Or rather, I'm not in
 the best mental shape to be responsible for such a thing.
 
 So the question that sticks out is this, am I degrading the network
 by being included in the pool with a 1.1.3 server? If so, what
 next?

1.1.3 should be reasonably safe (in the meaning I don't have any
immediate plans to discard it form the pool), however do note that
1.1.4 was released in October 2012[1].

 

 Martin
 


...

 
 I believe that Kristian is currently trying to coordinate
 getting some final changes in before a 1.1.5 release which will
 have enough cleanups and improvements in ECC and web security
 areas that it should be considered a really really should
 upgrade release.

It would have its set of improvements, indeed. And you're correct in
that I'm in favor of a new release soon, although I must state the
disclaimer that we haven't decided on this in the team yet.


References:
[0] https://sks-keyservers.net/overview-of-pools.php#pool_subset
[1] http://lists.nongnu.org/archive/html/sks-devel/2012-10/msg00010.html
[2] http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com/2014/01/openpgp-key-statistics/
- -- 
- 
Kristian Fiskerstrand
Blog: http://blog.sumptuouscapital.com
Twitter: @krifisk
- 
Public PGP key 0xE3EDFAE3 at hkp://pool.sks-keyservers.net
fpr:94CB AFDD 3034 5109 5618 35AA 0B7F 8B60 E3ED FAE3
- 
Qui audet vincit
Who dares wins
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Re: [Sks-devel] SKS peering request [sks-server.randala.com]

2014-04-07 Thread Phil Pennock
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On 2014-04-06 at 13:49 +0300, Martin Papik wrote:
 And my impression is that 1.1.3 is okay, a number of the servers
 visible on https://sks-keyservers.net/status/ are 1.1.3, and so far
 the only difference I came across is that 1.1.3 doesn't export server
 contact, which doesn't bother me overly. Is there a better reason to
 upgrade?

If your machine is actually a VM rather than raw metal, then 1.1.4 is
almost essential to avoid database corruption issues (Use unique
timestamps for keydb to reduce occurrances of Ptree corruption).  Some
caching and other fixes.  The main other reason is to support ECC PGP
keys.  If you care about ECC, you'll want 1.1.4 or better.

I believe that Kristian is currently trying to coordinate getting some
final changes in before a 1.1.5 release which will have enough cleanups
and improvements in ECC and web security areas that it should be
considered a really really should upgrade release.

The key aspect here is that OS packaging doesn't tend to draw clean
distinctions between stable dependencies which other software relies
upon and service applications which are the reason this machine
exists.  Often, for the latter group you want to try to stay very close
to the upstream most-recent release.

As a classic example of the trade-offs: I'm involved with Exim.  If you
have a system which just needs to send the occasional email and you want
package installation to handle setting up new role email addresses and
mailing-list integration for you, then you likely don't care about the
most recent version and you want to stick to the configuration layouts
provided by the OS packager.  On the other hand, if you're running a
mail-server, then this is entirely the wrong approach, because the
emphasis shifts to where the whole point of the server is this software
and you'll want the latest improvements and fixes from upstream which
reduce the problems when talking with others, you'll want support for
current trends in email security and you'll want to have a configuration
designed to be evaluated efficiently, for the million+ emails per day
you handle per machine, instead of the 5.

So, figure out why you're running SKS and what your goals are.  Decide
if it's important to you for your server to be included in public pool
definitions run by others, to provide a public service, or if you just
care about local users and being useful enough to the community that
others are prepared to bear the cost of providing you with feeds, so
that you can connect into the mesh.  (There is operational risk for the
stability of your server, for each peer you have, as each peer is able
to DoS your service with resource consumption attacks).

Once you know your answers to those issues, you'll know if you want to
(1) stick with the minimal OS version which can talk to other servers;
(2) run the most recent release, within T time of a new release;
(3) run a local build from Mercurial tip.

Regards,
- -Phil
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Re: [Sks-devel] Peering etiquette reminder

2014-04-07 Thread David Benfell
On Sun, Apr 06, 2014 at 11:37:50AM -0400, Jeremy T. Bouse wrote:
 Having just spent about an hour sifting through my recon.log and
 trying to track down the number of unauthorized gossip attempts I was
 seeing I've stopped. I've already contacted a few that I was able to
 identify and instead just figured I'd blanket the list as it seems to be
 a wider issue.
 
I think there might be more to this than meets the eye. I just paid a
visit to my own peering status page at:

https://sks-keyservers.net/status/info/sks.disunitedstates.com

I see a number of not ok's despite the fact that I have been in
contact with these administrators and they agreed to peer with me. I
have no idea what's going on here. Only one has ever contacted me to
suggest that there was ever a problem--after I'd been aggressive about
purging servers with whom peering didn't seem to be working.

I think a larger conversation might be in order here.

-- 
David Benfell benf...@parts-unknown.org
See https://parts-unknown.org/node/2 if you don't understand the
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