[SLUG] (was: snooping / detective work.)

2001-05-06 Thread Paul Robinson

Yeah I guess it would be a waste of resources. It would still prove to be a 
worthwhile setup to detect any future attempts though wouldn't it? I seem 
to recall reading on the snort site that the optimum setup is to have 1 
snort running outside the firewall and one inside the firewall.. that way 
you can see who's attempted what and you can also see who got through with 
what.

On a side note I was looking at gateway and dell for potential ready made 
firewalls. They both seem to offer easily configurable purpose built 
machines (eg gateways micros server or dell's power web server). Are there 
any problems with these servers? I am worried that they may not be fully 
configurable and updatable and was wondering if anyone has had any 
experience with these sort of servers. Is it better to just get a regular 
pc and set it all up manually?
We kind of need a quick solution as productivity is suffering due to the 
effect that the compromise has had (DOS effects when the person assumes the 
identity of another machine on our  network)

Again, thanks in advance,
Paul

At 01:32 PM 6/05/2001 +1000, Del wrote:
   What I'd like to be able to do before I set up said firewall is
  set up a sort of packet sniffer box in between the internet and one of the
  servers that this person is using. Hopefully to find out who they are and
  what they are doing.

Right answer, wrong problem.

Who they are is a relayed attack through some other compromised machine
somewhere else, probably in Brazil, Pakistan, Greece, or Saudi Arabia.
That compromised machine is probably relaying data from a third machine
which in turn relays from a fourth ... etc.  You may have to involve
Interpol in a search for the real hacker, or at least CERT.

What are they doing?  Probably going around the internet seeing how
many m4ch1n3s th3y can 0wn3d l1k3 y00r s0rry 4rs3 b3cuz th3y 4r3
1337 d00d!  If you're really lucky they might actually do something
useful with your machine, like D0S M1cr0s0ft!!!

It's not worth your trouble.  Besides, who cares?

Find out how they got in.  My guess:  Because you didn't have a firewall.
End of answer.  Once you have that answer, find out how to keep them out.
I think you can guess the answer to that one.

Believe me, tracking hackers back to home base is just not worth it.
Besides, once your hacker is kicked out of his dial-up account for h4x0ring
your b0x, they'll just use one of the other 500 or so accounts they managed
to get off the phreakers mailing lists.  If it's really important that you
track the guy down because there's some kind of industrial espionage issue
going on and you want to prosecute, then call in the experts to do it.

Del

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[SLUG] Re: Snooping/Detective Work

2001-05-06 Thread Rebecca Richards

Paul,

Paul Robinson [EMAIL PROTECTED] said:

 They also have each individual workstation / server / printer
 given a internet ip address (This is also going to change once said 
 firewall is set up) which was just asking for trouble.

When you reassign your IP addresses, I would suggest that you read RFC 1918
regarding use of private IP addresses, and do NAT at the firewall.  You can
handle internal IP addresses through DHCP, giving your printers and main servers
static leases.  Works quite well, and is far more manageable than administering
bucketloads of static addresses.

 
  What I'd like to be able to do before I set up said firewall is 
 set up a sort of packet sniffer box in between the internet and one of the 
 servers that this person is using. Hopefully to find out who they are and 
 what they are doing. 

That's fine, but you've prolly missed the window of opportunity to gather
evidentiary data which could be used to convict the attacker(s).

The best you'll probably be able to do is determine what exploits they used
etc.  In the meantime, while setting up the sniffer etc, the attacker is using
your system(s) to compromise others, bounce mail off of, steal company IP, etc
etc etc.

Nice exercise to do from an administrative point of view, but not good from a
security/company standpoint.

Also, make sure your IT manager(s) know what you're doing.

 I was currently working on setting up a linux box to 
 install that netsaint package that I asked about a few weeks back. So 
 currently we have a Slackware 4.0 (2.2.6 kernel) box which has the
 default setup + latest apache php 4 and mysql. I can add a second nic 
 and turn off all services and use this box.

I would question the need for a web server plus scripting languages on this sort
of machine.  The last thing you need is for your sniffer logs to be compromised

 
 It will have to fit in seamlessly and both my work colleagues and 
 the intruder must not suspect any change. I was thinking that it would be 
 something like below:

The diagram shows the existing network being split in half.  For one, I don't
see how this can work without one or the other networks being re-addressed or
subnetted (which will impact users).  Also, as soon as you bring up this box,
the attacker will know about it (through ARP broadcasts).  Do you think the
attacker is NOT running a sniffer as well?

I would suggest that you configure this sniffer as such:

Internet+--Server
|
|
|
 Sniffer 

The sniffer machine sits off a hub on the network, with its' network interface
set to promiscuous mode.  Because there is no re-subnetting etc, there is no
impact to existing users, or the attacker.

You should also install a firewall on this box, and turn off everything you
don't need (like web servers, X, databases, portmap, etc).

 I was thinking of using snort for this as I've heard 
 it's pretty rcomprehensive and I've seen the ruleset generation page and

Snort is your friend in this case, along with the original sniffer logs.

When you're finished, burn the logs to CDROM.

Rebecca Richards, CCSA CCSE, Unix/Security Consultant, e-Secure Pty Ltd
Secure in a Networked World Phone:  (02) 9438 4984 Fax: (02) 9438 4986
Suite 201, 2-4 Pacific HighwayMobile: 0412 823 206
St Leonards NSW Australia Email:  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
ACN 068 798 194   http://www.e-secure.com.au

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