CVS commit: [netbsd-9] src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand
Module Name:src
Committed By: martin
Date: Thu Apr 30 16:17:04 UTC 2020
Modified Files:
src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand [netbsd-9]:
rand_unix.c
Log Message:
Pull up following revision(s) (requested by nia in ticket #878):
crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c: revision 1.16
Fix the detection of KERN_ARND by OpenSSL.
Firstly, include the correct headers. Then, make sure that requests
never exceed 256 bytes.
Disable a hack for old FreeBSD versions, just in case it actually gets
used.
This should mean that OpenSSL doesn't ever fall back to reading from
/dev/urandom.
XXX pullup, XXX upstream.
To generate a diff of this commit:
cvs rdiff -u -r1.12.2.3 -r1.12.2.4 \
src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the
copyright notices on the relevant files.
Modified files:
Index: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
diff -u src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c:1.12.2.3 src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c:1.12.2.4
--- src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c:1.12.2.3 Mon Apr 27 14:47:26 2020
+++ src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c Thu Apr 30 16:17:04 2020
@@ -26,12 +26,12 @@
# include
# endif
#endif
-#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
+#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
# include
# include
# include
#endif
-#if defined(__OpenBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)
+#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
# include
#endif
@@ -247,10 +247,12 @@ static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf,
* when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a
* multiple of longs, which should never be the case.
*/
+#if defined(__FreeBSD__)
if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
+#endif
/*
* On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only
@@ -268,7 +270,8 @@ static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf,
mib[1] = KERN_ARND;
do {
-len = buflen;
+/* On NetBSD, KERN_ARND fails if more than 256 bytes are requested */
+len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen;
if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, , NULL, 0) == -1)
return done > 0 ? done : -1;
done += len;
CVS commit: [netbsd-9] src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand
Module Name:src Committed By: martin Date: Thu Apr 30 16:17:04 UTC 2020 Modified Files: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand [netbsd-9]: rand_unix.c Log Message: Pull up following revision(s) (requested by nia in ticket #878): crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c: revision 1.16 Fix the detection of KERN_ARND by OpenSSL. Firstly, include the correct headers. Then, make sure that requests never exceed 256 bytes. Disable a hack for old FreeBSD versions, just in case it actually gets used. This should mean that OpenSSL doesn't ever fall back to reading from /dev/urandom. XXX pullup, XXX upstream. To generate a diff of this commit: cvs rdiff -u -r1.12.2.3 -r1.12.2.4 \ src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the copyright notices on the relevant files.
CVS commit: [netbsd-9] src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand
Module Name:src Committed By: martin Date: Thu Feb 20 14:48:19 UTC 2020 Modified Files: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand [netbsd-9]: rand_unix.c Log Message: Pull up following revision(s) (requested by riastradh in ticket #714): crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c: revision 1.14 Open /dev/urandom with O_CLOEXEC. Let's avoid bleeding file descriptors into our clients' children, shall we? XXX pullup To generate a diff of this commit: cvs rdiff -u -r1.12.2.1 -r1.12.2.2 \ src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the copyright notices on the relevant files.
CVS commit: [netbsd-9] src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand
Module Name:src Committed By: martin Date: Thu Feb 20 14:48:19 UTC 2020 Modified Files: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand [netbsd-9]: rand_unix.c Log Message: Pull up following revision(s) (requested by riastradh in ticket #714): crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c: revision 1.14 Open /dev/urandom with O_CLOEXEC. Let's avoid bleeding file descriptors into our clients' children, shall we? XXX pullup To generate a diff of this commit: cvs rdiff -u -r1.12.2.1 -r1.12.2.2 \ src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c Please note that diffs are not public domain; they are subject to the copyright notices on the relevant files. Modified files: Index: src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c diff -u src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c:1.12.2.1 src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c:1.12.2.2 --- src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c:1.12.2.1 Mon Jan 27 07:21:42 2020 +++ src/crypto/external/bsd/openssl/dist/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c Thu Feb 20 14:48:19 2020 @@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ static int get_random_device(size_t n) return rd->fd; /* open the random device ... */ -if ((rd->fd = open(random_device_paths[n], O_RDONLY)) == -1) +if ((rd->fd = open(random_device_paths[n], O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC)) == -1) return rd->fd; /* ... and cache its relevant stat(2) data */
