[Tails-dev] Mide la productividad de tus empleados mediante la asignación de objetivos.

[Jezreel Ramirez.]

   





 




Buen día,

 

Esperando que se encuentre muy bien le escribimos para realizar una invitación 
para conocer nuestro servicio Smart Performance (sistema en línea para 
asignación, medición y seguimiento a indicadores de desempeño) el cual le 
ayudará en sus procesos de gestión brindándole características como:

 

1.  Asignación, medición y seguimiento a KPI (indicadores de desempeño)
2.  Administración de curículum vitae
3.  Incrementos salariales vinculados a desempeño de colaboradores.
4.  Generación y descarga de reportes de evaluación (por colaborador, 
puestos y/o áreas)

 

Con gusto podemos ampliar cualquier dato que usted requiera o elaborarle una 
cotización de nuestro servicio.
 

Para solicitar mayor información. presione aquí. 

 
 


Solicita tu prueba gratuita. presione aquí. 

 

 


 






   





 




Clic para darse de baja de nuestro boletín 

 


 




 


© 2019 HumanSmart


 



  

 


___
Tails-dev mailing list
Tails-dev@boum.org
https://www.autistici.org/mailman/listinfo/tails-dev
To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to 
tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.

[Tails-dev] 5-10-19

[Timothy Petrone]

Good day,

I have this proposal to share with you and I'm hopeful your experience will be 
helpful in closing. Get back to me for more details if interested.

Regards,
Timothy Petrone.
T: +31 970 050 34732
___
Tails-dev mailing list
Tails-dev@boum.org
https://www.autistici.org/mailman/listinfo/tails-dev
To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to 
tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.

[Tails-dev] Updated release schedule for Tails 3.14

[Cyril Brulebois]

Hi,

Cyril Brulebois  (2019-05-03):
> The 3.14 bugfix release is due on the 14th of May, here's the schedule:
> 
>  * 2019-05-13: build and upload tentative 3.14 ISO image
>  * 2019-05-14: Test and release 3.14

This has now been postponed by a week:

Quarter Soft Freeze Merge Date  Release DateRelease 
ESR
Q2  2019-05-13  2019-05-20  2019-05-21  Firefox 67  
Firefox 60.7 

(excerpt from )

So we'll align and switch our own calendar to:

 * 2019-05-20: build and upload tentative 3.14 ISO image
 * 2019-05-21: Test and release 3.14

> Usual manual testers: please tell me privately whether you're available
> to test the ISO on May 14 by 17:00 (Berlin/Paris time). During the last
> release cycle we've figured out what was taking so much time regarding
> the initial uploads + bittorrent sharing, so hopefully the image will
> indeed be available on the 13th (evening), rather than early the next
> day.
> 
> Changes must have been merged by 10:00 (CEST) on the 13th.

Moving to:

 * merging before 10:00 (CEST) on the 20th
 * testing before 17:00 (CEST) on the 21th

> Please let me know if you have any questions or comments (cc's welcome).

That still holds. :)


Cheers,
-- 
Cyril 'kibi' Brulebois (c...@riseup.net)


signature.asc
Description: PGP signature
___
Tails-dev mailing list
Tails-dev@boum.org
https://www.autistici.org/mailman/listinfo/tails-dev
To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to 
tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.

Re: [Tails-dev] [Tails-news] Tails 3.13.2 is out

[Georg Koppen]

sajolida:
> anonym:
>> Georg Koppen:
>>> Tails - News:
 This release is an emergency release to fix a critical security 
 vulnerability
 in _Tor Browser_.

 It also fixes [other security
 vulnerabilities](https://tails.boum.org/security/Numerous_security_holes_in_3.13.1/).
 You should upgrade as soon as possible.

 # Changes

 ## Fixed _NoScript_ activation in _Tor Browser_

 Starting from Friday May 3, a problem in _Firefox_ and _Tor Browser_ 
 disabled
 all add-ons. This release reactivates all add-ons in _Tor Browser_, 
 especially
 _NoScript_ which is used to:

   * Most importantly, protect against a very strong fingerprinting 
 technique called _HTML5 canvas fingerprinting_ which can break your 
 anonymity.
>>>
>>> Hm. How does it do that? In particular, what does it do in addition to
>>> the defense we baked into Tor Browser and which is not NoScript
>>> dependent? (see the: "Specific Fingerprinting Defenses in the Tor
>>> Browser", subsection 2. HTML5 Canvas Extraction at
>>> https://2019.www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/)
>>
>> There's been a misunderstanding. We were supposed to talk about 
>> fingerprinting enabled by the loss of NoScript's WebGL click-to-play, not 
>> HTML5 canvas fingerprinting.
> 
> Hi Georg!
> 
> So good to see that you keep an eye on our release notes :)

You are welcome :)

> I'm acting here as a mere translator of the technical knowledge that
> intrigeri transmitted to me in
> https://redmine.tails.boum.org/code/issues/16694#note-14 and that I
> could read on https://2019.www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser/design/.
> 
> I understood that HTML5 canvas fingerprint can use a combination of
> "WebGL, font, and named color" and that "WebGL Canvases have
> click-to-play placeholders (provided by NoScript)".
> 
> So, a website could benefit from NoScript being deactivated to use WebGL
> to do HTML5 canvas fingerprinting; even though Tor Browser on its own
> could block other canvas fingerprinting attempts.
> 
> And from a user's point of view, NoScript protects them from (some types
> of) canvas fingerprinting.
> 
> Isn't it?

Well, not really. First of all, the canvas fingerprinting blocker is
effective regardless whether one has WebGL allowed or not. Before
anything is extracted from an HTML  element you get at least a
prompt whether you want to allow to return valid image data or not.
That's regardless whether WebGL is available in that process or not.
Thus, even if NoScript would not be enabled there should be no way that
WebGL could be used for canvas-based fingerprinting without the user
allowing it.

Now, you could argue that *if* users allowed canvas fingerprinting they
would be better off entropy-wise if the potentially available WebGL
parts would be behind a click-to-play option. Maybe. I am not convinced
yet, though, that this would make a big or an actual difference.

Click-to-play placeholders have been there from the beginning as there
were *security* concerns with WebGL which are orthogonal to the
fingerprinting ones. The latter we have patched we think, so
fingerprinting-wise we should be good (or at least not bad). NoScript in
 general in a Tor Browser context is only used for dealing with
potential security/usability trade-offs covered by the security slider.
In that sense it's a bit weird to have NoScript put WebGL behind
click-to-play by default as we claim on the default security mode all
web features work as expected and are enabled.

We have corrected that for 8.5 in that we place WebGL behind
click-to-play as we do for HTML 5 media on higher security levels but
have it enabled otherwise. An important role played here websites that
were subtly non-working with WebGL behind click-to-play or blatantly
broken without any sign of options for fixing that. I suspect there are
more and more libraries in use that check for WebGL capabilities and
just refuse to proceed if non are detected. :(

The medium-term plan is to actually raise the default security level Tor
Browser comes with to "safer", but that's not going to get accomplished
in the next couple of weeks. It's not even clear what trade-offs we need
to make to that mode to make it somewhat acceptable as a default setting.

Georg



signature.asc
Description: OpenPGP digital signature
___
Tails-dev mailing list
Tails-dev@boum.org
https://www.autistici.org/mailman/listinfo/tails-dev
To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to 
tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.