Re: [Tails-dev] new features coming in to be aware of
On 2023-06-22 08:51:01, anonym wrote: > On 20/06/2023 19.19, richard wrote: >> Hi Tails devs, >> >> So the legacy tor daemon recently got two new features in alpha you >> should be aware of, proof-of-work and conflux circuits: > > Thanks for the heads-up! This is very valuable! [snip] > Am I correct to assume that as long as we have a tor and Tor Browser > that supports this, and our Tor Browser's SocksPort has ExtendedErrors > enabled, then we are good to go for this feature, or is something more > needed? Rather than answer your questions here, probably the best thing to do here is to invite you to a small presentation that we are planning with one of the implements of these features, so these questions can be asked directly. Would you, and possibly other Tails folks, be able to make something on July 6th? -- micah ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://www.autistici.org/mailman/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] non-anonymous ephemeral onion services with stem
Oops, sorry, disregard! I meant to email this to tor-dev, not tails-dev. On 12/28/2016 08:53 AM, Micah Lee wrote: > The stem documentation for create_ephemeral_hidden_service [1] says: > "Changed in version 1.5.0: Added support for non-anonymous services." > > But I can't figure out to actually use this feature. There doesn't seem > to be a new argument to say if you want your onion service to be > non-anonymous. > > It also says, "Changed in version 1.5.0: Added the basic_auth argument." > But there's a new basic_auth argument you can pass into the function to > use that. > > [1] > https://stem.torproject.org/api/control.html#stem.control.Controller.create_ephemeral_hidden_service > ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] non-anonymous ephemeral onion services with stem
The stem documentation for create_ephemeral_hidden_service [1] says: "Changed in version 1.5.0: Added support for non-anonymous services." But I can't figure out to actually use this feature. There doesn't seem to be a new argument to say if you want your onion service to be non-anonymous. It also says, "Changed in version 1.5.0: Added the basic_auth argument." But there's a new basic_auth argument you can pass into the function to use that. [1] https://stem.torproject.org/api/control.html#stem.control.Controller.create_ephemeral_hidden_service ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Redmine maintainence Oct. 28, 9:30am EST - Oct. 30
sajolida <sajol...@pimienta.org> writes: > BitingBird: >> micah: >>> >>> Hello! >>> [...] >>> We came up with Oct. 28th (wednesday) at 9:30am eastern US time for >>> starting the upgrade process. This was the best time for us to come >>> together and work on this. We are expecting the work to not last very >>> long, but with redmine we have found it best to expect the unexpected, >>> so we want to schedule the outage for two days, through the 30th, to get >>> everything worked out before we are done. >>> >>> micah >>> >> Noted... and thanks very, very much to you and all the others riseup >> birds for your amazing work! > > Yeap, thanks for the notice and for all the work! > > What's the preferred communication channel if we want to have updates on > the process either to lurk or to give a hand? #riseup on > irc.indymedia.org? or maybe you don't do that kind of stuff... Usually when we have a work party, we will form a temporary channel where we can spam each other, without disrupting the main #riseup channel. But come there if you are interested, and we can hook you into the right place! micah ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Redmine maintainence Oct. 28, 9:30am EST - Oct. 30
Hello! Over here at riseup we have been sad about the state of redmine, partly because we know that you fine tails people are also sad about some bugs in the current implementation. We have been trying to keep with the Debian provided package of redmine for ease of maintenance, but the current package doesn't solve the parenting problems that you are having (among other problems), there isn't an easy way to bring the fixes in From upstream, and there doesn't look like there will be a new version in debian any time soon (even if we helped with that process). So, with heavy hearts, we have decided to migrate from the debian packaged redmine to the upstream release... and to do that, we need to schedule some downtime. We came up with Oct. 28th (wednesday) at 9:30am eastern US time for starting the upgrade process. This was the best time for us to come together and work on this. We are expecting the work to not last very long, but with redmine we have found it best to expect the unexpected, so we want to schedule the outage for two days, through the 30th, to get everything worked out before we are done. micah signature.asc Description: PGP signature ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Newer version of Tor in Tails
On 09/09/2015 10:23 AM, Micah Lee wrote: > I'm updating OnionShare to add support for ephemeral hidden services, > which is available in Tor 0.2.7.1-alpha and newer and I'd like to test > it in Tails to confirm that it works. > > What's the easiest way for me to get a version of Tails that includes > Tor 0.2.7.1+? Should I boot to Tails 1.5.1 and try to compile and > install a newer version of Tor? Or is there an alpha version of Tails I > could use instead? Actually, nevermind. I realized I can just install the .deb from Tor's experimental repo, and it seems to work. -- Micah Lee signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] Newer version of Tor in Tails
I'm updating OnionShare to add support for ephemeral hidden services, which is available in Tor 0.2.7.1-alpha and newer and I'd like to test it in Tails to confirm that it works. What's the easiest way for me to get a version of Tails that includes Tor 0.2.7.1+? Should I boot to Tails 1.5.1 and try to compile and install a newer version of Tor? Or is there an alpha version of Tails I could use instead? -- Micah Lee signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] OnionShare bug in Tails
On 05/15/2015 11:21 AM, intrigeri wrote: Hi Micah, Micah Lee wrote (15 May 2015 00:11:53 GMT) : OnionShare recently stopped working in Tails Can you please be more specific wrt. what version of Tails worked for you, and what version stopped working? I just tested a bunch of old versions of Tails in VMs and confirmed that it last worked in 1.2.3 and stopped working in 1.3. Specifically, OnionShare is able to connect to the Tor control port, but when it tries to create a hidden service it now causes the entire tor process to crash, and it looks like this is related to Tor sandbox warnings. You can look at the issue on github to see the full tor logs, but basically there are a handful of sandbox_intern_string(): Bug: No interned sandbox parameter found for /var/lib/tor/tmpBuBZmk errors (/var/lib/tor/tmpBuBZmk being the hidden service dir), ending with a crash: (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall open). Looks like a bug in Tor sandbox rather than anything Tails-specific to me. Agreed, but I haven't run into it anywhere except in Tails. Maybe this is because all other platforms use the tor service from Tor Browser rather than a system Tor, and that doesn't have sandboxing enabled or something? So I can find very little information about what's causing this or how to fix it. Anyone here know? 0. Make sure there are no AppArmor-related messages for Tor in `sudo dmesg`. If there are, please report them to us. There are no AppArmor errors. 1. Try without Tor sandboxing (configuring a bridge as documented via Tails Greeter + Tor Launcher should be enough, since we disable the sandbox when special Tor config is requested). When I enable a bridge it doesn't cause the tor crash. So I think this is a Tor sandbox issue. However, onionshare fails for some other reason when a bridge is enabled. I think this is an entirely separate issue, but I'm looking into it. 2. If #1 confirmed that the only problem is caused by Tor sandboxing, report a bug on the Tor bug tracker: we don't maintain the Tor sandbox in Tails :) Apparently tor immediately crashes in Tor Browser if you edit its torrc and set Sandbox 1. So now I'm testing using a system Tor in Debian, not Tails, and I can confirm that starting a hidden service causes a crash. I'll try to make a simpler piece of code that reproduces it and open a tor bug. -- Micah Lee OpenPGP: 0B1491929806596254700155FD720AD9EBA34B1C ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
[Tails-dev] OnionShare bug in Tails
OnionShare recently stopped working in Tails and I'm trying to fix it. Here is the issue: https://github.com/micahflee/onionshare/issues/179 Specifically, OnionShare is able to connect to the Tor control port, but when it tries to create a hidden service it now causes the entire tor process to crash, and it looks like this is related to Tor sandbox warnings. You can look at the issue on github to see the full tor logs, but basically there are a handful of sandbox_intern_string(): Bug: No interned sandbox parameter found for /var/lib/tor/tmpBuBZmk errors (/var/lib/tor/tmpBuBZmk being the hidden service dir), ending with a crash: (Sandbox) Caught a bad syscall attempt (syscall open). While searching for how to solve this I've only found a small handful of closed tor bugs that were all resolved with patches to tor itself, like: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12041 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12035 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/12064 So I can find very little information about what's causing this or how to fix it. Anyone here know? -- Micah Lee OpenPGP: 0B1491929806596254700155FD720AD9EBA34B1C ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Shared screen locking solution for live distributions in Debian
On 01/12/2015 03:58 PM, Klaus Knopper wrote: Also, screen locking makes only sense if there is the apparent possibility that someone else has physical access to the computer while the user is not paying attention. Why would I lock the screen if I'm the only one using the computer in a safe environment, and shut it down and remove the live medium when I'm done with my work. I outlined some reasons for it here [1], but TL;DR is so you can step out of your office for a minute to refill your cup of coffee without having to close all your work, tell everyone you're chatting with that you'll brb, shut down your computer, and then boot it up again to get back to work. [1] https://labs.riseup.net/code/issues/5684#note-11 -- Micah Lee ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
