Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
Hi, Michael English: >> Still, this doesn't answer my question of why the setting called >> 'privacy' "helps to reduce blockchain UTXO". I would love to >> understand, if someone is kind enough to explain it to me. > I will try to explain to you what I think Electrum meant by reducing UTXO > bloat. I am > not a good teacher, but I hope that this helps. Thanks *a lot* for taking the time to explain :) > Honestly, reducing UTXO bloat depends on the circumstance. I will explain a > few > circumstances below. The UTXO set is most likely to be reduced by the > "privacy" > setting in a circumstance where one address has received three or more inputs. > There are three cases for transaction inputs and outputs: > 1. Find exact change > 1. This case is very unlikely unless transaction creation is hand >optimized. For example, let's say that I want to donate 0.01 BTC >to Tails ;) and I find that I have a UTXO of 0.012 BTC. I could >decide to spend the extra 0.002 BTC to protect my privacy and >save a small amount on transaction fees. In this case, the UTXO >set is not changed since there is one input and one output. ACK. Of course, this is less unlikely if one considers unspent outputs that are held by *all* addresses in a wallet, but it's still unlikely and that's a detail. > 2. Use Electrum's "priority" coin selection that uses older and >larger value UTXO first > 1. This case is likely to use a single large value UTXO and produce >two outputs since one output has to be the change. The extra >output created by this transaction could be considered "bloat." Sure. And assuming it works exactly like that, on the long term this contributes to ending up with tons of small unspent outputs that will be hard to use without spending substantial fees, unless manually combined with other, older/larger ones (been there, done that, not exactly my cup of tea). I have to say I'm a bit surprised that the algorithm works this way. I find it a bit simplistic, but really I'm not pretending it would be easy, or even doable, to make it better. From my (relatively newbie) perspective, I would have expected that it would balance these two factors with trying to 1. find exact change; 2. add tiny unspent outputs to the transaction to optimize *future* fees and benefit from the small fee required by the other, older/larger ones to avoid increasing the fees for the transaction being constructed too much. If the algorithm worked the way I would have naively expected, then looking at unspent outputs held by *all* addresses would help with reducing fees and UTXO bloat (compared to looking at only one address), not only for the transaction that's being constructed, but more importantly on the long run. > 3. Use Electrum's "privacy" coin selection that prioritizes the >number of UTXO in an address (and also optimizes change which we are >trying to avoid) > 1. This case takes several medium to small value UTXO and combines >them into two outputs. If the number of inputs are three or >more, then this could be considered reducing UTXO bloat. ACK. Thanks again for teaching me and fixing my naive expectations! Cheers, -- intrigeri ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
anonym: > I just spent an hour reading: […] Thanks for diving into it. > First, let me say that I absolutely do not want this feature documented for > end-users. I'm not sure how this could be explained in less a way so a user > could > make an informed decision without using thousands of words (with a thousand > possibilities to misunderstand). So, yeah, either we enable this by default > in Tails, > or we completely ignore it. Fully agreed! > Second, now I understand this feature better, and I feel quite convinced that > it > makes sense for Tails: we can take a selfish stance were we don't care about > the > potential negative effects this can have on the network and blockchain bloat; > then > only other drawback is potential increase of transaction fees, but that seems > like > a negligible effect to me. So, I say: let's do it! Works for me. Cheers! -- intrigeri ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
I just spent an hour reading: * https://medium.com/@lopp/the-challenges-of-optimizing-unspent-output-selection-a3e5d05d13ef#.63vst18ff * https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/issues/1203 First, let me say that I absolutely do not want this feature documented for end-users. I'm not sure how this could be explained in less a way so a user could make an informed decision without using thousands of words (with a thousand possibilities to misunderstand). So, yeah, either we enable this by default in Tails, or we completely ignore it. Second, now I understand this feature better, and I feel quite convinced that it makes sense for Tails: we can take a selfish stance were we don't care about the potential negative effects this can have on the network and blockchain bloat; then only other drawback is potential increase of transaction fees, but that seems like a negligible effect to me. So, I say: let's do it! If you want to speed things up, please create a ticket about this, and assign it to me. Mega bonus points if it contains a patch against config/chroot_local-includes/etc/skel/.electrum/config. :) Cheers! That's great news! I created issue #12177 and I uploaded the replacement config file. ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
Michael English: > Anonym, > >> Of course, mine too (and intrigeri's, I'm sure :)). Sorry for >> frustrating you like this about something that is obvious for you, >> but it indeed gets hard for us when we need to consider things we >> have little or no clue about. And I'm sure you understand we cannot >> just blindly trust and implement any suggestion we get. > > Yes, I understand. I think that it is unlikely that other Tails users > will give their opinion, so could we at least put this setting in the > documentation? Otherwise, I guess that we will have to abandon it. I just spent an hour reading: * https://medium.com/@lopp/the-challenges-of-optimizing-unspent-output-selection-a3e5d05d13ef#.63vst18ff * https://github.com/spesmilo/electrum/issues/1203 First, let me say that I absolutely do not want this feature documented for end-users. I'm not sure how this could be explained in less a way so a user could make an informed decision without using thousands of words (with a thousand possibilities to misunderstand). So, yeah, either we enable this by default in Tails, or we completely ignore it. Second, now I understand this feature better, and I feel quite convinced that it makes sense for Tails: we can take a selfish stance were we don't care about the potential negative effects this can have on the network and blockchain bloat; then only other drawback is potential increase of transaction fees, but that seems like a negligible effect to me. So, I say: let's do it! If you want to speed things up, please create a ticket about this, and assign it to me. Mega bonus points if it contains a patch against config/chroot_local-includes/etc/skel/.electrum/config. :) Cheers! ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
Anonym, Of course, mine too (and intrigeri's, I'm sure :)). Sorry for frustrating you like this about something that is obvious for you, but it indeed gets hard for us when we need to consider things we have little or no clue about. And I'm sure you understand we cannot just blindly trust and implement any suggestion we get. Yes, I understand. I think that it is unlikely that other Tails users will give their opinion, so could we at least put this setting in the documentation? Otherwise, I guess that we will have to abandon it. Cheers, Michael English ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
Michael English:
> Anonym,
>
> Please Cc me with any replies. For some reason, I am unable to subscribe to
> the list.
Got it!
> Anonym:
>> Note that I haven't chimed in with my opinion yet. :) I think intrigeri
>> is just careful: privacy features are routinely exaggerated in their
>> efficacy and can easily have many unexpected effects; for instance,
>> playing with such parameters often introduces fingerprintability
>> ("this user seems to have enabled the non-default feature X, which
>> Tails enables, so +1 indication that this is a Tails user"). It's
>> hard to weigh weigh such advantages and disadvantages against each
>> other, especially when the domain (blockchain) is not well-known,
>> which at least is the case for me (intrigeri has read up in the past
>> weeks for other reasons, so he's definitely in a better position to
>> evaluate).
>
> Increased fingerprintability is not at all relevant here. Consider
> adding uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser as an example of increasing
> the fingerprint left by Tails users. Websites could check whether a
> client using Tor is blocking ads to narrow down that the user is a
> Tails user. The coin selection that I recommend changing happens
> entirely offline. No remote servers are involved in the creation of a
> new transaction. Once the transaction is broadcast to the Bitcoin
> network, the fingerprintability actually goes down as the transaction
> looks more generic. Remember that all transactions will have inputs
> and outputs that appear the same to the network. The change here is
> selecting inputs that reveal less about the user’s total bitcoin
> balance.
Note that "fingerprintability" was an example said in the spirit of "deviating
from the default options often makes observers able to partition users" [0].
I'm happy to hear this feature in fact will defend against that somewhat. FWIW,
with my extremely limited understanding of the blockchain, what you say sounds
pretty convincing. :)
[0] "4. Case study: against options",
https://www.freehaven.net/anonbib/cache/usability:weis2006.pdf
>> So, if the decision comes down to me, I'd delegate to our community.
>> That's also hard. Now we have two voices in favour, none against,
>> and some probably good arguments for those that know how the
>> blockchain works. If we can get some argument why enabling this
>> feature won't have nasty consequences (e.g. increased
>> fingerprintability) and get some more people to join in support for
>> this change, I'd do it. I am afraid this is the best I can do.
>
> Is anyone else in favor or against this change?
I wouldn't count my vote, due to my blockchain ignorance. :)
> My attempt is to make privacy a default option in Tails.
Of course, mine too (and intrigeri's, I'm sure :)). Sorry for frustrating you
like this about something that is obvious for you, but it indeed gets hard for
us when we need to consider things we have little or no clue about. And I'm
sure you understand we cannot just blindly trust and implement any suggestion
we get.
Cheers!
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Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
Anonym,
Please Cc me with any replies. For some reason, I am unable to subscribe
to the list.
Anonym:
> Note that I haven't chimed in with my opinion yet. :) I think intrigeri
> is just careful: privacy features are routinely exaggerated in their
> efficacy and can easily have many unexpected effects; for instance,
> playing with such parameters often introduces fingerprintability
> ("this user seems to have enabled the non-default feature X, which
> Tails enables, so +1 indication that this is a Tails user"). It's
> hard to weigh weigh such advantages and disadvantages against each
> other, especially when the domain (blockchain) is not well-known,
> which at least is the case for me (intrigeri has read up in the past
> weeks for other reasons, so he's definitely in a better position to
> evaluate).
Increased fingerprintability is not at all relevant here. Consider
adding uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser as an example of increasing the
fingerprint left by Tails users. Websites could check whether a client
using Tor is blocking ads to narrow down that the user is a Tails user.
The coin selection that I recommend changing happens entirely offline.
No remote servers are involved in the creation of a new transaction.
Once the transaction is broadcast to the Bitcoin network, the
fingerprintability actually goes down as the transaction looks more
generic. Remember that all transactions will have inputs and outputs
that appear the same to the network. The change here is selecting inputs
that reveal less about the user’s total bitcoin balance.
> So, if the decision comes down to me, I'd delegate to our community.
> That's also hard. Now we have two voices in favour, none against,
> and some probably good arguments for those that know how the
> blockchain works. If we can get some argument why enabling this
> feature won't have nasty consequences (e.g. increased
> fingerprintability) and get some more people to join in support for
> this change, I'd do it. I am afraid this is the best I can do.
Is anyone else in favor or against this change? My attempt is to make
privacy a default option in Tails.
Cheers,
Michael English
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Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
Michael English:
>> Anyway: I personally don't feel responsible for maintaining the
>> Electrum integration in Tails, would rather not to become more
>> involved into it, and will therefore let its maintainer (i.e. anonym)
>> make the call. But I'm genuinely curious about the unspent outputs
>> optimization claim; I bet my intuition is wrong, and I'll learn
>> something along the way :)
>>
>> Cheers,
>
> Anonym, I did not expect this to be a controversial change. If you
> also think that it is controversial, then maybe we should keep it
> disabled and let the user decide.
Note that I haven't chimed in with my opinion yet. :) I think intrigeri is just
careful: privacy features are routinely exaggerated in their efficacy and can
easily have many unexpected effects; for instance, playing with such parameters
often introduces fingerprintability ("this user seems to have enabled the
non-default feature X, which Tails enables, so +1 indication that this is a
Tails user"). It's hard to weigh weigh such advantages and disadvantages
against each other, especially when the domain (blockchain) is not well-known,
which at least is the case for me (intrigeri has read up in the past weeks for
other reasons, so he's definitely in a better position to evaluate).
So, if the decision comes down to me, I'd delegate to our community. That's
also hard. Now we have two voices in favour, none against, and some probably
good arguments for those that know how the blockchain works. If we can get some
argument why enabling this feature won't have nasty consequences (e.g.
increased fingerprintability) and get some more people to join in support for
this change, I'd do it. I am afraid this is the best I can do.
Cheers!
___
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Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
Intrigeri, Hi, s7r: intrigeri wrote: The text was copied from Electrum man page. Thank you! UTXO's are basically the coins you can spend. The spendable coins are in UTXO's, not in addresses. Addresses are just a smart crypto way to let the world know in advance who has the right to spend a given UTXO. Existing unspent outputs cannot be reused, they are burned and re-crated entirely every time. So you cannot spend part of a UTXO, you spend it all (practice does not recommend re-using addresses - it's true nothing keeps you from receiving the change in the same initial address that you spent from, but you'll have a different UTXO). Yes, I had to learn all that last week already, but thanks anyway :) Still, this doesn't answer my question of why the setting called 'privacy' "helps to reduce blockchain UTXO". I would love to understand, if someone is kind enough to explain it to me. I will try to explain to you what I think Electrum meant by reducing UTXO bloat. I am not a good teacher, but I hope that this helps. Honestly, reducing UTXO bloat depends on the circumstance. I will explain a few circumstances below. The UTXO set is most likely to be reduced by the "privacy" setting in a circumstance where one address has received three or more inputs. There are three cases for transaction inputs and outputs: 1. Find exact change 1. This case is very unlikely unless transaction creation is hand optimized. For example, let's say that I want to donate 0.01 BTC to Tails ;) and I find that I have a UTXO of 0.012 BTC. I could decide to spend the extra 0.002 BTC to protect my privacy and save a small amount on transaction fees. In this case, the UTXO set is not changed since there is one input and one output. 2. Use Electrum's "priority" coin selection that uses older and larger value UTXO first 1. This case is likely to use a single large value UTXO and produce two outputs since one output has to be the change. The extra output created by this transaction could be considered "bloat." 3. Use Electrum's "privacy" coin selection that prioritizes the number of UTXO in an address (and also optimizes change which we are trying to avoid) 1. This case takes several medium to small value UTXO and combines them into two outputs. If the number of inputs are three or more, then this could be considered reducing UTXO bloat. Routing transaction relay through Tor is only part of the solution. The blockchain is a public ledger that can be analyzed anytime after the initial transaction broadcast. Private coin selection impedes correlation of transaction inputs and outputs that could link back to an identity. Sure. I hope our doc clearly states that it's very hard to use Bitcoin in a privacy-preserving way, for some various value of "privacy". Agreed, but the setting indicated by Michael could be shipped as a default imho. It makes sense in a context like Tails/Tor threat model. Sorry if I was unclear: I'm not arguing this point. I didn't look into it in details, so I am really not in a position to have opinion about it yet. It's clear to me that there's no way to optimize coin selection for all possible desired outcomes (e.g. optimizing the blockchain itself, optimizing usage of unspent outputs i.e. not wasting money via fees on the long term, optimizing some kind of privacy on the short term), but it's not obvious to me which way Tails should lean towards: at this point I have no idea if the (limited) privacy benefits brought by this feature outweigh the drawbacks it brings in other areas. I think that the privacy benefits are more substantial than you think and transaction fees should be about the same. Consider the fact that the current method spends across multiple addresses in a single transaction confirming in that transaction and future transactions that a single identity owns all of those addresses. Anyway: I personally don't feel responsible for maintaining the Electrum integration in Tails, would rather not to become more involved into it, and will therefore let its maintainer (i.e. anonym) make the call. But I'm genuinely curious about the unspent outputs optimization claim; I bet my intuition is wrong, and I'll learn something along the way :) Cheers, Anonym, I did not expect this to be a controversial change. If you also think that it is controversial, then maybe we should keep it disabled and let the user decide. Cheers, Michael English ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
Hi, s7r: > intrigeri wrote: > The text was copied from Electrum man page. Thank you! > UTXO's are basically the coins you can spend. The spendable coins are in > UTXO's, not in addresses. Addresses are just a smart crypto way to let > the world know in advance who has the right to spend a given UTXO. > Existing unspent outputs cannot be reused, they are burned and re-crated > entirely every time. So you cannot spend part of a UTXO, you spend it > all (practice does not recommend re-using addresses - it's true nothing > keeps you from receiving the change in the same initial address that you > spent from, but you'll have a different UTXO). Yes, I had to learn all that last week already, but thanks anyway :) Still, this doesn't answer my question of why the setting called 'privacy' "helps to reduce blockchain UTXO". I would love to understand, if someone is kind enough to explain it to me. >>> Routing transaction relay through Tor is only part of the solution. The >>> blockchain is >>> a public ledger that can be analyzed anytime after the initial transaction >>> broadcast. >>> Private coin selection impedes correlation of transaction inputs and >>> outputs that >>> could link back to an identity. >> >> Sure. I hope our doc clearly states that it's very hard to use Bitcoin >> in a privacy-preserving way, for some various value of "privacy". > Agreed, but the setting indicated by Michael could be shipped as a > default imho. It makes sense in a context like Tails/Tor threat model. Sorry if I was unclear: I'm not arguing this point. I didn't look into it in details, so I am really not in a position to have opinion about it yet. It's clear to me that there's no way to optimize coin selection for all possible desired outcomes (e.g. optimizing the blockchain itself, optimizing usage of unspent outputs i.e. not wasting money via fees on the long term, optimizing some kind of privacy on the short term), but it's not obvious to me which way Tails should lean towards: at this point I have no idea if the (limited) privacy benefits brought by this feature outweigh the drawbacks it brings in other areas. Anyway: I personally don't feel responsible for maintaining the Electrum integration in Tails, would rather not to become more involved into it, and will therefore let its maintainer (i.e. anonym) make the call. But I'm genuinely curious about the unspent outputs optimization claim; I bet my intuition is wrong, and I'll learn something along the way :) Cheers, -- intrigeri ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
S7r, Hello intrigeri, Michael, intrigeri wrote: Hi Michael, Michael English: It also helps to reduce blockchain UTXO (unspent transaction outputs) bloat, This makes me curious. How does this help with that property, exactly? My intuition tells me that by restricting the set of coins that can be spent to one single address, on the contrary, the software has fewer possibilities to optimize towards 1. reusing existing unspent outputs; and thus 2. avoiding to create more. Also: where was this text quoted from? The text was copied from Electrum man page. The privacy coin chooser will not offer 100% anonymity, because that's technically not possible in a system using a public blockchain, but it will obfuscate information about sender's total BTC holdings so it's a plus. Yes, I was relating this to routing the SPV validation through Tor which also obscures the addresses that a particular person owns. Without Tor, the bloom filters that SPV wallets like Electrum use are not very private at all. UTXO's are basically the coins you can spend. The spendable coins are in UTXO's, not in addresses. Addresses are just a smart crypto way to let the world know in advance who has the right to spend a given UTXO. Good explanation. Existing unspent outputs cannot be reused, they are burned and re-crated entirely every time. So you cannot spend part of a UTXO, you spend it all (practice does not recommend re-using addresses - it's true nothing keeps you from receiving the change in the same initial address that you spent from, but you'll have a different UTXO). Yes, when a transaction is created, all of the inputs must be spent in their entirety. Whatever coins do not need to be sent to another person are sent back to a "change address" which is a new address under the control of the spender. If there are still coins left after the destination address(es) and the change address(es), then it is interpreted as a transaction fee for the miners to collect. Routing transaction relay through Tor is only part of the solution. The blockchain is a public ledger that can be analyzed anytime after the initial transaction broadcast. Private coin selection impedes correlation of transaction inputs and outputs that could link back to an identity. Sure. I hope our doc clearly states that it's very hard to use Bitcoin in a privacy-preserving way, for some various value of "privacy". Agreed, but the setting indicated by Michael could be shipped as a default imho. It makes sense in a context like Tails/Tor threat model. Yes, that is exactly my rational. Private coin selection is perfectly suited to the context of Tails. I like to think of it as similar to browser fingerprints in the Tor Browser. Onion routing and private coin selection reduces the "bitcoin fingerprint" left by Tails users. Cheers, Michael English ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
Hello intrigeri, Michael, intrigeri wrote: > Hi Michael, > > Michael English: >> It also helps to reduce blockchain UTXO (unspent transaction >> outputs) bloat, > > This makes me curious. How does this help with that property, exactly? > My intuition tells me that by restricting the set of coins that can be > spent to one single address, on the contrary, the software has fewer > possibilities to optimize towards 1. reusing existing unspent outputs; > and thus 2. avoiding to create more. > > Also: where was this text quoted from? > The text was copied from Electrum man page. The privacy coin chooser will not offer 100% anonymity, because that's technically not possible in a system using a public blockchain, but it will obfuscate information about sender's total BTC holdings so it's a plus. UTXO's are basically the coins you can spend. The spendable coins are in UTXO's, not in addresses. Addresses are just a smart crypto way to let the world know in advance who has the right to spend a given UTXO. Existing unspent outputs cannot be reused, they are burned and re-crated entirely every time. So you cannot spend part of a UTXO, you spend it all (practice does not recommend re-using addresses - it's true nothing keeps you from receiving the change in the same initial address that you spent from, but you'll have a different UTXO). >> Routing transaction relay through Tor is only part of the solution. The >> blockchain is >> a public ledger that can be analyzed anytime after the initial transaction >> broadcast. >> Private coin selection impedes correlation of transaction inputs and outputs >> that >> could link back to an identity. > > Sure. I hope our doc clearly states that it's very hard to use Bitcoin > in a privacy-preserving way, for some various value of "privacy". > Agreed, but the setting indicated by Michael could be shipped as a default imho. It makes sense in a context like Tails/Tor threat model. signature.asc Description: OpenPGP digital signature ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
Re: [Tails-dev] Set coin selection to "privacy" by default in Electrum
Hi Michael, Michael English: > It also helps to reduce blockchain UTXO (unspent transaction > outputs) bloat, This makes me curious. How does this help with that property, exactly? My intuition tells me that by restricting the set of coins that can be spent to one single address, on the contrary, the software has fewer possibilities to optimize towards 1. reusing existing unspent outputs; and thus 2. avoiding to create more. Also: where was this text quoted from? > Routing transaction relay through Tor is only part of the solution. The > blockchain is > a public ledger that can be analyzed anytime after the initial transaction > broadcast. > Private coin selection impedes correlation of transaction inputs and outputs > that > could link back to an identity. Sure. I hope our doc clearly states that it's very hard to use Bitcoin in a privacy-preserving way, for some various value of "privacy". Cheers, -- intrigeri ___ Tails-dev mailing list Tails-dev@boum.org https://mailman.boum.org/listinfo/tails-dev To unsubscribe from this list, send an empty email to tails-dev-unsubscr...@boum.org.
