We has many discussions of SNI encryption on this list recently, and that was enough motivation to write a draft about it. I am pretty sure that this will be met with wide approval and no discussion at all :-).
-- Christian Huitema -------- Forwarded Message -------- Subject: New Version Notification for draft-huitema-tls-sni-encryption-00.txt Date: Wed, 21 Jun 2017 21:17:26 -0700 From: internet-dra...@ietf.org To: Christian Huitema <huit...@huitema.net>, Eric Rescorla <e...@rtfm.com> A new version of I-D, draft-huitema-tls-sni-encryption-00.txt has been successfully submitted by Christian Huitema and posted to the IETF repository. Name: draft-huitema-tls-sni-encryption Revision: 00 Title: SNI Encryption in TLS Through Tunneling Document date: 2017-06-20 Group: Individual Submission Pages: 19 URL: https://www.ietf.org/internet-drafts/draft-huitema-tls-sni-encryption-00.txt Status: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-huitema-tls-sni-encryption/ Htmlized: https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-huitema-tls-sni-encryption-00 Htmlized: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-huitema-tls-sni-encryption-00 Abstract: This draft describes the general problem of encryption of the Server Name Identification (SNI) parameter. The proposed solutions hide a Hidden Service behind a Fronting Service, only disclosing the SNI of the Fronting Service to external observers. The draft starts by listing known attacks against SNI encryption, and then presents two potential solutions that might mitigate these attacks. The first solution is based on TLS in TLS "quasi tunneling", and the second solution is based on "combined tickets". These solutions only require minimal extensions to the TLS protocol. Please note that it may take a couple of minutes from the time of submission until the htmlized version and diff are available at tools.ietf.org. The IETF Secretariat
_______________________________________________ TLS mailing list TLS@ietf.org https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
