Re: [TLS] 3rd WGLC: draft-ietf-tls-tls13

2018-01-15 Thread Tim Jackson 
EKR,

If you are going to add this (seems like a reasonable idea to me) please note 
the minor typo of “tailure”, which I presume should be failure.

Tim

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From: "Colm MacCárthaigh" <c...@allcosts.net<mailto:c...@allcosts.net>>
Date: Sunday, January 14, 2018 at 2:42:04 PM
To: "Eric Rescorla" <e...@rtfm.com<mailto:e...@rtfm.com>>
Cc: "" <tls@ietf.org<mailto:tls@ietf.org>>
Subject: Re: [TLS] 3rd WGLC: draft-ietf-tls-tls13


Thanks for the abundant generosity of patience, but I didn't mean that I wanted 
to add a note to the text of the I-D, there's been enough delay and I'm excited 
to see this progress. I just meant "add a note" in my e-mail ;-) Though I do 
like your terse note, it's right to the point.

On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 9:47 PM, Eric Rescorla 
<e...@rtfm.com<mailto:e...@rtfm.com>> wrote:
Hi Colm,

Thanks for your note. This seems straightforward to handle before IETF-LC.

Maybe something like:
"Note: many application layer protocols implicitly assume that replays are 
handled at lower levels. Tailure to observe these precautions may exposes your 
application to serious risks which are difficult to assess without a thorough 
top-to-bottom analysis of the application stack"?

-Ekr


On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 12:15 PM, Colm MacCárthaigh 
<c...@allcosts.net<mailto:c...@allcosts.net>> wrote:

Back during the previous last call, I felt really guilty about bringing up the 
0-RTT stuff so late. Even though it turned out that middle boxes turned out to 
be a bigger problem to deal with anyway, I just want to say that I'm really 
grateful for the 0-RTT related changes in the document and for the time and 
effort that went into all that. I think those changes are sufficient to make a 
TLS1.3 implementation that handles 0-RTT in a forward-secret, secure and safe 
way. The changes represent a good compromise between having a secure state and 
supporting vendors who want to be a bit more loose because their application 
environment can tolerate it and forward secrecy is not as valuable to their 
users. Thanks especially to ekr for inventing the fixes, for stewarding the 
clarifications, and for being awesome about it.

At the same time, I just want to add a small note of caution to vendors; if 
you're going to accept 0-RTT, trying to cut corners by tolerating replays - 
even a little, is really likely to bite you! I've found even more examples of 
application protocols and web protocols that implement transactions. Also, if 
the secrecy of trillions and trillions of users web requests are going to rest 
on how well session ticket encryption keys are managed, protected, rotated and 
revoked, we really owe it to users to come up with some collective guidance for 
vendors on how to do that well.


On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 9:10 PM, Sean Turner 
<s...@sn3rd.com<mailto:s...@sn3rd.com>> wrote:
All,

This is the 3rd working group last call (WGLC) announcement for 
draft-ietf-tls-tls13; it will run through January 26th.  This time the WGLC is 
for version -23 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/).  This 
WGLC is a targeted WGLC because it only address changes introduced since the 
2nd WGLC on version -21, i.e., changes introduced in versions -22 and -23.  
Note that the editor has kindly included a change log in s1.2 and the 
datatracker can also produce diffs 
(https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23).
  In general, we are considering all other material to have WG consensus, so 
only critical issues should be raised about that material at this time.

Cheers,

spt
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Colm

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Re: [TLS] 3rd WGLC: draft-ietf-tls-tls13

2018-01-14 Thread Colm MacCárthaigh 
Thanks for the abundant generosity of patience, but I didn't mean that I
wanted to add a note to the text of the I-D, there's been enough delay and
I'm excited to see this progress. I just meant "add a note" in my e-mail
;-) Though I do like your terse note, it's right to the point.

On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 9:47 PM, Eric Rescorla  wrote:

> Hi Colm,
>
> Thanks for your note. This seems straightforward to handle before IETF-LC.
>
> Maybe something like:
> "Note: many application layer protocols implicitly assume that replays are
> handled at lower levels. Tailure to observe these precautions may exposes
> your application to serious risks which are difficult to assess without a
> thorough top-to-bottom analysis of the application stack"?
>
> -Ekr
>
>
> On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 12:15 PM, Colm MacCárthaigh 
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Back during the previous last call, I felt really guilty about bringing
>> up the 0-RTT stuff so late. Even though it turned out that middle boxes
>> turned out to be a bigger problem to deal with anyway, I just want to say
>> that I'm really grateful for the 0-RTT related changes in the document and
>> for the time and effort that went into all that. I think those changes are
>> sufficient to make a TLS1.3 implementation that handles 0-RTT in a
>> forward-secret, secure and safe way. The changes represent a good
>> compromise between having a secure state and supporting vendors who want to
>> be a bit more loose because their application environment can tolerate it
>> and forward secrecy is not as valuable to their users. Thanks especially to
>> ekr for inventing the fixes, for stewarding the clarifications, and for
>> being awesome about it.
>>
>> At the same time, I just want to add a small note of caution to vendors;
>> if you're going to accept 0-RTT, trying to cut corners by tolerating
>> replays - even a little, is really likely to bite you! I've found even more
>> examples of application protocols and web protocols that implement
>> transactions. Also, if the secrecy of trillions and trillions of users web
>> requests are going to rest on how well session ticket encryption keys are
>> managed, protected, rotated and revoked, we really owe it to users to come
>> up with some collective guidance for vendors on how to do that well.
>>
>>
>> On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 9:10 PM, Sean Turner  wrote:
>>
>>> All,
>>>
>>> This is the 3rd working group last call (WGLC) announcement for
>>> draft-ietf-tls-tls13; it will run through January 26th.  This time the WGLC
>>> is for version -23 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/
>>> doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/).  This WGLC is a targeted WGLC because it
>>> only address changes introduced since the 2nd WGLC on version -21, i.e.,
>>> changes introduced in versions -22 and -23.  Note that the editor has
>>> kindly included a change log in s1.2 and the datatracker can also produce
>>> diffs (https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21
>>> rl2=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23).  In general, we are considering all other
>>> material to have WG consensus, so only critical issues should be raised
>>> about that material at this time.
>>>
>>> Cheers,
>>>
>>> spt
>>> ___
>>> TLS mailing list
>>> TLS@ietf.org
>>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>>
>>
>>
>>
>> --
>> Colm
>>
>> ___
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>>
>


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Re: [TLS] 3rd WGLC: draft-ietf-tls-tls13

2018-01-14 Thread Eric Rescorla 
Hi Colm,

Thanks for your note. This seems straightforward to handle before IETF-LC.

Maybe something like:
"Note: many application layer protocols implicitly assume that replays are
handled at lower levels. Tailure to observe these precautions may exposes
your application to serious risks which are difficult to assess without a
thorough top-to-bottom analysis of the application stack"?

-Ekr


On Sun, Jan 14, 2018 at 12:15 PM, Colm MacCárthaigh 
wrote:

>
> Back during the previous last call, I felt really guilty about bringing up
> the 0-RTT stuff so late. Even though it turned out that middle boxes turned
> out to be a bigger problem to deal with anyway, I just want to say that I'm
> really grateful for the 0-RTT related changes in the document and for the
> time and effort that went into all that. I think those changes are
> sufficient to make a TLS1.3 implementation that handles 0-RTT in a
> forward-secret, secure and safe way. The changes represent a good
> compromise between having a secure state and supporting vendors who want to
> be a bit more loose because their application environment can tolerate it
> and forward secrecy is not as valuable to their users. Thanks especially to
> ekr for inventing the fixes, for stewarding the clarifications, and for
> being awesome about it.
>
> At the same time, I just want to add a small note of caution to vendors;
> if you're going to accept 0-RTT, trying to cut corners by tolerating
> replays - even a little, is really likely to bite you! I've found even more
> examples of application protocols and web protocols that implement
> transactions. Also, if the secrecy of trillions and trillions of users web
> requests are going to rest on how well session ticket encryption keys are
> managed, protected, rotated and revoked, we really owe it to users to come
> up with some collective guidance for vendors on how to do that well.
>
>
> On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 9:10 PM, Sean Turner  wrote:
>
>> All,
>>
>> This is the 3rd working group last call (WGLC) announcement for
>> draft-ietf-tls-tls13; it will run through January 26th.  This time the WGLC
>> is for version -23 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/
>> doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/).  This WGLC is a targeted WGLC because it
>> only address changes introduced since the 2nd WGLC on version -21, i.e.,
>> changes introduced in versions -22 and -23.  Note that the editor has
>> kindly included a change log in s1.2 and the datatracker can also produce
>> diffs (https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21
>> rl2=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23).  In general, we are considering all other
>> material to have WG consensus, so only critical issues should be raised
>> about that material at this time.
>>
>> Cheers,
>>
>> spt
>> ___
>> TLS mailing list
>> TLS@ietf.org
>> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>>
>
>
>
> --
> Colm
>
> ___
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>
>
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Re: [TLS] 3rd WGLC: draft-ietf-tls-tls13

2018-01-14 Thread Colm MacCárthaigh 
Back during the previous last call, I felt really guilty about bringing up
the 0-RTT stuff so late. Even though it turned out that middle boxes turned
out to be a bigger problem to deal with anyway, I just want to say that I'm
really grateful for the 0-RTT related changes in the document and for the
time and effort that went into all that. I think those changes are
sufficient to make a TLS1.3 implementation that handles 0-RTT in a
forward-secret, secure and safe way. The changes represent a good
compromise between having a secure state and supporting vendors who want to
be a bit more loose because their application environment can tolerate it
and forward secrecy is not as valuable to their users. Thanks especially to
ekr for inventing the fixes, for stewarding the clarifications, and for
being awesome about it.

At the same time, I just want to add a small note of caution to vendors; if
you're going to accept 0-RTT, trying to cut corners by tolerating replays -
even a little, is really likely to bite you! I've found even more examples
of application protocols and web protocols that implement transactions.
Also, if the secrecy of trillions and trillions of users web requests are
going to rest on how well session ticket encryption keys are managed,
protected, rotated and revoked, we really owe it to users to come up with
some collective guidance for vendors on how to do that well.


On Fri, Jan 12, 2018 at 9:10 PM, Sean Turner  wrote:

> All,
>
> This is the 3rd working group last call (WGLC) announcement for
> draft-ietf-tls-tls13; it will run through January 26th.  This time the WGLC
> is for version -23 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/).
> This WGLC is a targeted WGLC because it only address changes introduced
> since the 2nd WGLC on version -21, i.e., changes introduced in versions -22
> and -23.  Note that the editor has kindly included a change log in s1.2 and
> the datatracker can also produce diffs (https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?
> url1=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23).  In general,
> we are considering all other material to have WG consensus, so only
> critical issues should be raised about that material at this time.
>
> Cheers,
>
> spt
> ___
> TLS mailing list
> TLS@ietf.org
> https://www.ietf.org/mailman/listinfo/tls
>



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Re: [TLS] 3rd WGLC: draft-ietf-tls-tls13

2018-01-14 Thread Tony Arcieri 
Ship it

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[TLS] 3rd WGLC: draft-ietf-tls-tls13

2018-01-12 Thread Sean Turner 
All,

This is the 3rd working group last call (WGLC) announcement for 
draft-ietf-tls-tls13; it will run through January 26th.  This time the WGLC is 
for version -23 (https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-tls-tls13/).  This 
WGLC is a targeted WGLC because it only address changes introduced since the 
2nd WGLC on version -21, i.e., changes introduced in versions -22 and -23.  
Note that the editor has kindly included a change log in s1.2 and the 
datatracker can also produce diffs 
(https://www.ietf.org/rfcdiff?url1=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-21=draft-ietf-tls-tls13-23).
  In general, we are considering all other material to have WG consensus, so 
only critical issues should be raised about that material at this time.

Cheers,

spt
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