Re: [tor-bugs] #19145 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor doesn't work for me

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19145: tor doesn't work for me
--+---
 Reporter:  sam666|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * priority:  Immediate => Medium
 * status:  new => needs_information
 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


Comment:

 There needs to be more information to be able to help.

 Let's start with the basic questions.
 * Which version of Tor are you running?
 * Does Tor give any warning or error messages? If so, which ones?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18927 [Obfuscation/meek]: Check meek fingerprint on ESR 45

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18927: Check meek fingerprint on ESR 45
--+
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  dcf
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/meek  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by dcf):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It looks like there's no problem.

 Firefox 45.0.2esr
 [[doc/meek/SampleClientHellos#Firefox45.0.2esronDebianstretchsid2016-05-20]]

 Tor Browser 6.0a5 with meek
 [[doc/meek/SampleClientHellos#TorBrowser6.0a5basedonFirefox45ESRwithmeek-
 clientonDebianstretchsid2016-05-20]]

 diff
 {{{
  Secure Sockets Layer
  TLSv1.2 Record Layer: Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
  Content Type: Handshake (22)
  Version: TLS 1.0 (0x0301)
  Length: 187
  Handshake Protocol: Client Hello
  Handshake Type: Client Hello (1)
  Length: 183
  Version: TLS 1.2 (0x0303)
  Random
 -GMT Unix Time: Feb 20, 2060 19:25:19.0 PST
 -Random Bytes:
 54f218375ad711853b36f8becbd4b085f0e3f53bb48d4149...
 +GMT Unix Time: Mar 10, 2094 14:10:31.0 PST
 +Random Bytes:
 77ef56686f7f9a68867ade6d9c036db5832e2a7ed5aacab2...
  Session ID Length: 0
  Cipher Suites Length: 22
  Cipher Suites (11 suites)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 (0xc02b)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256
 (0xc02f)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
 (0xc00a)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA
 (0xc009)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0xc013)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0xc014)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x0033)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0039)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA (0x002f)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA (0x0035)
  Cipher Suite: TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA (0x000a)
  Compression Methods Length: 1
  Compression Methods (1 method)
  Compression Method: null (0)
  Extensions Length: 120
  Extension: server_name
  Type: server_name (0x)
  Length: 23
  Server Name Indication extension
  Server Name list length: 21
  Server Name Type: host_name (0)
  Server Name length: 18
  Server Name: ajax.aspnetcdn.com
  Extension: renegotiation_info
  Type: renegotiation_info (0xff01)
  Length: 1
  Renegotiation Info extension
  Renegotiation info extension length: 0
  Extension: elliptic_curves
  Type: elliptic_curves (0x000a)
  Length: 8
  Elliptic Curves Length: 6
  Elliptic curves (3 curves)
  Elliptic curve: secp256r1 (0x0017)
  Elliptic curve: secp384r1 (0x0018)
  Elliptic curve: secp521r1 (0x0019)
  Extension: ec_point_formats
  Type: ec_point_formats (0x000b)
  Length: 2
  EC point formats Length: 1
  Elliptic curves point formats (1)
  EC point format: uncompressed (0)
  Extension: SessionTicket TLS
  Type: SessionTicket TLS (0x0023)
  Length: 0
  Data (0 bytes)
  Extension: next_protocol_negotiation
  Type: next_protocol_negotiation (0x3374)
  Length: 0
  Extension: Application Layer Protocol Negotiation
  Type: Application Layer Protocol Negotiation (0x0010)
  Length: 23
  ALPN Extension Length: 21
  ALPN Protocol
  ALPN string length: 2
  ALPN Next Protocol: h2
  ALPN string length: 8
  ALPN Next Protocol: spdy/3.1
  ALPN string length: 8
  ALPN Next Protocol: http/1.1
  Extension: status_request
  Type: status_request (0x0005)
  Length: 5
  Certificate Status Type: OCSP (1)
  Responder ID list Length: 0

Re: [tor-bugs] #18884 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rip Firefox Hello Beta / Loop extension in ESR45 based Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18884: Rip Firefox Hello Beta / Loop extension in ESR45 based Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 Type:  task |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  High | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_review
 Severity:  Major|  Milestone:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, |Version:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605, tbb-6.0-must => ff45-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201605R, tbb-6.0-must


Comment:

 Here's a branch with two commits:
 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commits/18884+6
 * 941c9a27bc5dfa5ac8be9cf6d6c4d9d06c41fbbb introduces a build flag,
 --disable-loop to prevent bundling the Loop extension.
 * 3790ded147c3dcf5f12e65f5ae8a4cc7e987f204 adds --disable-loop to Tor
 Browser's mozconfig files.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19115 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make sure Tor Browser 6.0 is not falling back to Bing as its search engine

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19115: Make sure Tor Browser 6.0 is not falling back to Bing as its search 
engine
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Major | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-6.0-must  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * cc: arthuredelstein (added)


Comment:

 Right now if I enter a search term into Disconnects search results, and
 choose DuckDuckGo, and press enter, I see the following message:

 > Just a heads-up, because DuckDuckGo takes user privacy seriously, search
 queries go directly to them, unlike other search engines which are proxied
 through Disconnect

 Then the browser is redirected to the DuckDuckGo site to show the search
 results. So I think Option (3) from this ticket's description doesn't have
 any advantage over Option (2). It looks to me like a choice between (1)
 and (2), at least until Disconnect can get access to Google again.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16608 [Core Tor/Tor]: "time published in the consensus network status" seems to be wrong

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16608: "time published in the consensus network status" seems to be wrong
--+---
 Reporter:  toralf|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.10
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by toralf):

 My hiome-brewed-email solution gave me today:
 {{{
 dry-run of ntpdate :
 20 May 19:58:46 ntpdate[11383]: ntpdate 4.2.8p7@1.3265-o Fri Apr 29
 17:56:26 UTC 2016 (1)
 server 5.9.39.18, stratum 2, offset 0.09, delay 0.02588
 server 5.45.97.127, stratum 3, offset -0.002183, delay 0.02856
 server 212.18.3.18, stratum 2, offset -0.000373, delay 0.03755
 server 192.162.168.12, stratum 3, offset 0.002159, delay 0.02852
 20 May 19:58:53 ntpdate[11383]: adjust time server 5.9.39.18 offset
 0.09 sec
 ...
 May 20 19:58:46.000 [warn] Our clock is 1 minutes, 14 seconds behind the
 time published in the consensus network status document (2016-05-20
 18:00:00 UTC).  Tor needs an accurate clock to work correctly. Please
 check your time and date settings!
 May 20 19:58:46.000 [warn] Please upgrade! This version of Tor (0.2.8.2
 -alpha-dev) is not recommended, according to the directory authorities.
 Recommended versions are:
 
0.2.4.23,0.2.4.24,0.2.4.25,0.2.4.26,0.2.4.27,0.2.5.8-rc,0.2.5.9-rc,0.2.5.10,0.2.5.11,0.2.5.12,0.2.6.5-rc,0.2.6.6,0.2.6.7,0.2.6.8,0.2.6.9,0.2.6.10,0.2.7.1-alpha,0.2.7.2-alpha,0.2.7.3-rc,0.2.7.4-rc,0.2.7.5,0.2.7.6,0.2.8.1-alpha,0.2.8.2-alpha,0.2.8.3-alpha
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19128 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19128: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING
failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  High |  needs_information
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Blocker  |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-alpha|Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201605  |  0.2.8.2-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by toralf):

 fd34049 now gives :

 May 20 21:57:53.000 [notice] Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev (git-684babee8491c3e9)
 opening log file.


  T= 1463774682
 Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev (git-684babee8491c3e9) died: Caught signal 11
 /usr/bin/tor(+0x1435c9)[0x19aad105c9]
 /usr/lib64/libcrypto.so.1.0.0(OPENSSL_cleanse+0x35)[0x36b930375b5]
 /usr/lib64/libcrypto.so.1.0.0(OPENSSL_cleanse+0x35)[0x36b930375b5]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18946 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Investigate fingerprinting potential of enabling H.264 on Linux

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18946: Investigate fingerprinting potential of enabling H.264 on Linux
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  defect   |  team
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:  new
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, tbb-fingerprinting,| Resolution:
  TorBrowserTeam201605   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 One option might be to bundle H.264 support. Tor Browser is not currently
 attempting to hide Linux vs OS X vs Windows.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16858 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-ascii country code in extrainfo descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16858: Non-ascii country code in extrainfo descriptor
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by atagar):

 The new relay is
 [https://atlas.torproject.org/#details/4FF069CA2B2D1A76C7AB451EFB7117F29AEF750A
 4FF069CA2B2D1A76C7AB451EFB7117F29AEF750A]. Corrupt line is the
 following...

 {{{
 % curl http://154.35.175.225:80/tor/extra/all > Desktop/dump
 % grep "dirreq-v3-ips us=176,ru=160,de=120" Desktop/dump
 dirreq-v3-ips
 
us=176,ru=160,de=120,??=112,fr=72,gb=72,br=48,es=32,it=32,jp=32,pl=32,ua=32,ca=24,at=16,au=16,be=16,ch=16,cn=16,ie=16,in=16,nl=16,se=16,ae=8,ao=8,ar=8,ax=8,ba=8,bd=8,bg=8,bo=8,bs=8,by=8,cd=8,ci=8,cl=8,co=8,cu=8,cz=8,dk=8,du=8,dz=8,ec=8,ee=8,eg=8,fi=8,gr=8,hk=8,hn=8,hr=8,hu=8,id=8,il=8,i�=8,jm=8,kr=8,kz=8,lb=8,lt=8,lv=8,ma=8,md=8,me=8,mg=8,mk=8,mn=8,mr=8,mx=8,my=8,ng=8,no=8,nz=8,pa=8,pe=8,pg=8,ph=8,pk=8,pr=8,pt=8,py=8,qa=8,ro=8,rs=8,sg=8,si=8,sk=8,sv=8,sy=8,th=8,tj=8,tn=8,tr=8,tt=8,tw
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18967 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Add UUID to families in Onionoo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18967: Add UUID to families in Onionoo
-+-
 Reporter:  seansaito|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  persistence, |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by teor):

 Unless all onionoo instances use exactly the same descriptor archive, you
 will never get matching family identifiers. But you can get close:

 Find the relay in each family that appeared on the network first, by:
 * finding the oldest descriptor you have for each relay, and
 * using something in that descriptor to deduce the age of the relay when
 that descriptor was posted
   * uptime is a clue, but not ideal;
   * relays with older tor releases are likely older;
 or maybe certificates or something else in the descriptor can tell you how
 old the relay is.

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[tor-bugs] #19145 [- Select a component]: tor doesn't work for me

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19145: tor doesn't work for me
--+--
 Reporter:  sam666|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Immediate |  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 tor doesn't work for me

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16858 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-ascii country code in extrainfo descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16858: Non-ascii country code in extrainfo descriptor
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by arma):

 What's the new relay?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19144 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Expensive hardening jobs have no verbose check

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19144: Expensive hardening jobs have no verbose check
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+

Comment (by weasel):

 that's just confusing shell -x output.  The script actually runs
 {{{
 VERBOSE=yes make -k check
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19144 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Expensive hardening jobs have no verbose check

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19144: Expensive hardening jobs have no verbose check
-+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by weasel):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16493 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Consider switching to a single window interface

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16493: Consider switching to a single window interface
+-
 Reporter:  lunar   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by clokep):

 * cc: tor@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #16489 [Applications/Tor Messenger]: Accounts window UX is not so good

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16489: Accounts window UX is not so good
+-
 Reporter:  lunar   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Messenger  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by clokep):

 * cc: tor@… (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19143 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Change the BadContent rules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19143: Change the BadContent rules
--+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by qbi):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 I changed the regex for the phone numbers a bit. So it should fit to the
 spam attempts we saw earlier.

 The `http:` prevents that trac gets eaten by spammers. It catches most of
 the attempts and removing this line would render the site completely
 unusable.

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[tor-bugs] #19144 [Internal Services/Service - jenkins]: Expensive hardening jobs have no verbose check

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19144: Expensive hardening jobs have no verbose check
-+
 Reporter:  cypherpunks  |  Owner:  weasel
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - jenkins  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+
 The expensive hardening jobs do not execute `VERBOSE=yes make check` on
 one line and instead run `VERBOSE=yes` and `make check` separately. This
 prevents `make check` from showing verbose output.

 For example: [https://jenkins.torproject.org/job/tor-ci-linux-master-
 expensive-hardening/56/ARCHITECTURE=amd64,SUITE=stretch/consoleText]
 (search for `VERBOSE`).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18904 [Obfuscation/meek]: Mac OS: meek-http-helper profile not updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18904: Mac OS: meek-http-helper profile not updated
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605,  | Resolution:
  tbb-6.0-must   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by dcf):

 Replying to [comment:9 gk]:
 > The tor-browser-bundle one looks good to me and is applied to master
 (495885feb51d7f1faf6d4c0dc3dd8f47e9f1caa7). dcf could you review the meek
 part and create a new tag we can use?

 Here is a tag [https://gitweb.torproject.org/pluggable-
 transports/meek.git/tag/?id=0.22-18371-3 0.22-18371-3].

 I suppose after the next stable release, we can merge the bug18371 branch
 into master, because the old behavior will no longer be needed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19121 [Applications/Tor Browser]: reinstate the update.xml hash check

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19121: reinstate the update.xml hash check
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |Version:
 Severity:  Major| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, |  Actual Points:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Points:
Parent ID:   |Sponsor:
 Reviewer:   |
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good, thanks. This is commit
 c179270e049f085ec8ae1ad443dd1b1fe1084728 on tor-browser-45.1.0esr-6.0-1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16858 [Core Tor/Tor]: Non-ascii country code in extrainfo descriptor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16858: Non-ascii country code in extrainfo descriptor
--+--
 Reporter:  atagar|  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by atagar):

 * status:  needs_information => new
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 What kind of information is this pending? Iirc the relay operator replied
 but we didn't have time for followup so setting this back to 'new'.

 A relay with these lines is has been back in the consensus for a day.
 There's two issues: tor publishing these lines and the dirauths accepting
 them. While the former is tricky we can take action on the later.

 I'll probably change Stem to stop considering these lines malformed since
 this has been an ongoing issue for the better part of a year. I wouldn't
 be surprised if these lines make metrics-lib and zoossh unhappy too.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15055 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implement ed25519 link handshake

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15055: Implement ed25519 link handshake
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 Priority:  High |  assigned
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  tor-relay, prop-220, |Version:  Tor:
  027-triaged-1-in, 028-triaged, |  0.2.7
  201511-deferred, 201512-deferred, tor-crypto-  | Resolution:
  identity, tor-ed25519-proto,   |  Actual Points:
  TorCoreTeam201605  | Points:  6
Parent ID:  #15054   |Sponsor:
 Reviewer:   |  SponsorU-must
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay, going to try to wrap all this up next week. That will be a
 challenge.  Here are the pieces of it, to break it down into little edible
 bites:
   * Fix #19020.
   * Servers connecting to servers send all correct authentication
 information when protocol permits.
   * Servers receiving connections send all certificates (when protocol
 permits?)
   * Servers receiving connections from servers check authentication
 information, make correct decisions.
   * Anyone connecting to a server checks all certs (if provided)
   * Add an ed25519_id_key item to or_connection_t / channel_t.
   * Index those by ed25519 id.
   * (non)profit.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16873 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add javadoc to metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16873: add javadoc to metrics-lib
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18746   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 fast again :-)
 DescripTor API and the real copyright logo look good!

 A few things I noticed immediately:

 * the references to constants in !DescriptorSourceFactory are lacking the
 `#`, e.g., `{@link #COLLECTOR_DEFAULT}`.
 * package-info is now fine except `org.torproject.descriptor.impl` should
 not be referenced as link, b/c it's excluded from javadoc, but this only
 avoids a warning when running javadoc
 * same with {{{ExitList.java:83: warning - Tag @link: missing '#':
 "getEntries()"}}}

 still need to read the text ;-)

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[tor-bugs] #19143 [Internal Services/Service - trac]: Change the BadContent rules

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19143: Change the BadContent rules
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - trac  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The BadContent page contains the `http:` line. I'm suspecting this rule
 being the cause of CAPTCHAs being shown whenever submissions to the wiki
 or the bug tracker contain links.

 Also the phone number lines trigger submissions that contain ticket
 numbers.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18811 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Our first-party isolation patch incorrectly rejects blobs retrieved in workers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18811: Our first-party isolation patch incorrectly rejects blobs retrieved in
workers
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_information
 Severity:  Normal   |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, |Version:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:8 gk]:
 > Could you elaborate whey we don't care about CSP just for blob: URLs?

 blob: URLs result in pure JavaScript data that don't result in further
 content being loaded from the network. So I don't think CSP is needed at
 this in the blob loading process. I also looked downstream of the function
 I am patching here, and there is apparently no access to CSP settings.

 But it's possible I am missing something here. Is there any reason why a
 blob would need an associated CSP?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19139 [Core Tor/Tor]: Let Autoconf handle enabling C and POSIX extensions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19139: Let Autoconf handle enabling C and POSIX extensions
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The removal of the `environ` configure check is now tracked in #19142.

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[tor-bugs] #19142 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove the environ configure check

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19142: Remove the environ configure check
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Trivial   |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 See ticket:19139#comment:1 on why the `environ` variable configure check
 can probably be removed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #7478 [Core Tor/Tor]: Allow routersets to include/exclude nodes by IPv6 address

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#7478: Allow routersets to include/exclude nodes by IPv6 address
-+-
 Reporter:  nickm|  Owner:  teor
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 Priority:  High |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  tor-client, ipv6,|Version:
  TorCoreTeam201605, TorCoreTeam-| Resolution:
  postponed-201604, review-group-1   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  1
 Reviewer:  mikeperry|Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by mikeperry):

 Sorry for the delay, and thank you for your patience, fergus.

 This may be an improvement, but I am still wondering about the "reject
 *:*" exitpolicy case. In that case, both the port and the IP would be 0.
 But I think that 0:0 address is never used as arguments to this function,
 but is just in the set itself. If that is true, then I think we're all
 good here.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19139 [Core Tor/Tor]: Let Autoconf handle enabling C and POSIX extensions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19139: Let Autoconf handle enabling C and POSIX extensions
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor | Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 FWIW the removal of the existing macros in the patch was done by grepping
 for `#define _` and removing  instances manually according to the list in
 the [https://www.gnu.org/software/autoconf/manual/autoconf.html#Posix-
 Variants Autoconf manual].

 And now for the `environ` variable. Research into the
 [http://pubs.opengroup.org/onlinepubs/9699919799/functions/exec.html POSIX
 standard] and the manpages of [https://manpages.debian.org/cgi-
 bin/man.cgi?query=environ Debian], [http://man.openbsd.org/?query=environ
 OpenBSD] and
 
[https://developer.apple.com/legacy/library/documentation/Darwin/Reference/ManPages/man7/environ.7.html
 Mac OS X] shows that the external `environ` variable is declared in
 `unistd.h`. To be on the safe side the declaration in compat.c can be kept
 but it does not need to be conditionally because external variables can be
 declared multiple times (as long as their declaration is the same).
 Therefore the `environ` configure check can be removed. As this change is
 unrelated to the ticket description, I'll open a new ticket and refer back
 to this comment.

 One remaining question: does the initial patch need a changes file? If so,
 I'm happy to write one.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16873 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add javadoc to metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16873: add javadoc to metrics-lib
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18746   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by karsten):

 Great feedback!  I made the changes you suggest above and pushed a few
 more commits to the same branch.  Please keep sending more feedback!

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[tor-bugs] #19141 [Internal Services/Service - lists]: Please create tor-meeting@ mailing list

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19141: Please create tor-meeting@ mailing list
---+-
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:  qbi
 Type:  task   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - lists  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 This will be the one true list name to end all list names.

 Previous list names were valencia2016, berlin2015, etc etc. Now there will
 be just one. We'll prune its membership between meetings if we want to.

 See discussion on #16719 for previous history.

 The next event will be
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/org/meetings/2016SummerMeeting

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #13968, #15940, #15941, #18637, #18641, #18644, #13966, #8018, #10218, #13802, #13953, #14921, #16706, #17066, #17272, #17640, #15059, #8185, #4581, #

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #13968, #15940, #15941, #18637, #18641, #18644, #13966, 
#8018, #10218, #13802, #13953, #14921, #16706, #17066, #17272, #17640, #15059, 
#8185, #4581, #13339, #9664, #17028, #17788, #15942, #16805, #17901, #2668, 
#3259, #5462, #11101, #16795, #17627, #17806, #17849, #17911, #18082, #18320, 
#18456, #18828, #17765 by isabela:
points to 3

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16599 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Onionoo feature: family ID

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16599: Onionoo feature: family ID
-+--
 Reporter:  virgilgriffith   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  user disappeared
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by virgil):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => user disappeared
 * severity:   => Normal


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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #14683, #17289, #17292, #18572, #17288, #17294, #6837, #15056, #18571, #6313, #17178, #8625, #16791, #16809, #17238, #17241, #17293, #18636, #8453, #9

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #14683, #17289, #17292, #18572, #17288, #17294, #6837, 
#15056, #18571, #6313, #17178, #8625, #16791, #16809, #17238, #17241, #17293, 
#18636, #8453, #9241, #16120, #16808, #17295, #17591, #18635 by isabela:
points to 6

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18967 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Add UUID to families in Onionoo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18967: Add UUID to families in Onionoo
-+-
 Reporter:  seansaito|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  persistence, |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by virgil):

 teor, this sounds like a good idea.  But I need a little handholding---can
 you be more specific?

 It sounds like you're saying this a single snap-shot (never looking
 backward).  And then, for each family, we sort all of the relays by
 claimed first-appearance, and then, the uuid of the family the fingerprint
 of the relay with the longest claimed-uptime?

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[tor-bugs] [Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki] Batch modify: #17740, #18642, #18515, #6418, #14164, #15087, #8001, #15618, #15621, #14013, #17435, #17684, #18280, #18620, #18402, #16824, #17639, #17688, #18319,

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

Batch modification to #17740, #18642, #18515, #6418, #14164, #15087, #8001, 
#15618, #15621, #14013, #17435, #17684, #18280, #18620, #18402, #16824, #17639, 
#17688, #18319, #12377, #13753, #15518, #16785, #16801, #16852, #17049, #17233, 
#17360, #17857, #18126, #18295, #18604, #18665, #18857, #18897, #18906, #18907, 
#18938, #17975, #18134, #16702 by isabela:
points to 1

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17799 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hash All PRNG output before use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17799: Hash All PRNG output before use
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605, TorCoreTeam-  |Version:  Tor:
  postponed-201604, review-group-1   |  unspecified
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  asn  |  Actual Points:  5
 | Points:  5
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


Comment:

 Added a comment about the fork/threads stuff too.  Short version: We're
 extra-afraid of forks, even though we never actually do any of the
 dangerous kind.

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[tor-bugs] #19140 [- Select a component]: @888-816-9657 mcafee antivirus technical support 888-816-9657 /m/c/a/f/e/e/ /a/n/t/i/v/i/r/u/s/ /t/e/c/h/n/i/c/a/l/ /s/u/p/p/o/r/t////

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19140: @888-816-9657 mcafee antivirus technical support 888-816-9657 
/m/c/a/f/e/e/
/a/n/t/i/v/i/r/u/s/ /t/e/c/h/n/i/c/a/l/ /s/u/p/p/o/r/t
--+-
 Reporter:  ramkakaaunty  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Deliverable-Sep2010
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.4.27
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  technical support
Actual Points:  technical support |  Parent ID:
   Points:  technical support |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 @888-816-9657 mcafee antivirus technical support 888-816-9657
 /m/c/a/f/e/e/ /a/n/t/i/v/i/r/u/s/ /t/e/c/h/n/i/c/a/l/ /s/u/p/p/o/r/t
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Re: [tor-bugs] #19121 [Applications/Tor Browser]: reinstate the update.xml hash check

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19121: reinstate the update.xml hash check
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  High |  needs_review
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Major|Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, | Resolution:
  tbb-6.0-must   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605, tbb-6.0-must => ff45-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201605R, tbb-6.0-must
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 A fix is available for review here:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/tor-
 browser.git/commit/?h=bug19121-01=c179270e049f085ec8ae1ad443dd1b1fe1084728

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19135 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19135: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable
--+--
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by akrey):

 The prompt looked like that, with the notable exception that I read
 'refresh tor browser', not ...'firefox'. That was what tricked me into not
 cancelling this.

 The browser.disable... is not in the saved prefs.js

 I don't remember seeing a notification banner, and I definitely did not
 click any. (Might a stray  land there?)

 TBB was probably installed as 5.0.3 and then upgraded regularly.

 It might be that this happened when a different monitor was connected to
 the laptop.

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[tor-bugs] #19139 [Core Tor/Tor]: Let Autoconf handle enabling C and POSIX extensions

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19139: Let Autoconf handle enabling C and POSIX extensions
--+-
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 The comment on
 
[https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/common/compat.c?id=9c7edb0f3edd2dec30f10e195f7bcc12a4005f30#n18
 src/common/compat.c:18] suggests using `AC_USE_SYSTEM_EXTENSIONS`. The
 attached patch does just that.

 Defining the preprocessor macros globally ensures the extensions are
 always turned on. Running GCC in pedantic mode tells me that there are
 instances where the code assumes the extensions are enabled while missing
 the proper preprocessor macros. FWICT it currently ''just works'' because
 GCC and its headers turn their own extensions on by default.

 The comment suggestion about maybe removing the `environ` configure check
 has not been researched.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19124 [Core Tor/Tor]: Shared Random and Half-Hour Consensuses

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19124: Shared Random and Half-Hour Consensuses
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #16943| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Comment (by teor):

 My test authority was asleep for a while, and has just logged:
 {{{
 May 20 11:00:01.000 [info] sr_state_update(): SR: State prepared for new
 voting period (2016-05-20 16:00:00). Current phase is reveal (13 commit &
 7 reveal rounds).
 }}}

 Something is really wrong here, unless the round numbers just keep
 counting up?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19126 [Core Tor/Tor]: Consistently use uint64_t for integers in shared random structs (was: Consistently use uint32_t for integers in shared random structs)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19126: Consistently use uint64_t for integers in shared random structs
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs|  Actual Points:  0.1
Parent ID:  #16943| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  invalid =>


Old description:

> Rather than using int sometimes and uint32_t other times, we could
> consistently use uint32_t in shared random structs.
>
> My branch sr-uint32 at https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git has a fix for
> this.

New description:

 Rather than using int sometimes and uint32_t other times, we could
 consistently use uint64_t in shared random structs.

 Note that reveal_num and version need to be 8 bytes for the SRV hash.

 ~~My branch sr-uint32 at https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git has a fix for
 this.~~

--

Comment:

 Re-opened, but recommend 64 bit now.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19127 [Core Tor/Tor]: Don't crash authorities with more than 254 shared random reveals

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19127: Don't crash authorities with more than 254 shared random reveals
+--
 Reporter:  teor|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|  0.2.9.x-final
 Severity:  Normal  |Version:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 029-proposed, assert-crash  | Resolution:  invalid
Parent ID:  #16943  |  Actual Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:  | Points:  0.5
|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 Obsoleted by #19134, because the spec says 8 bytes of reveal_num, not 8
 bits.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15713 [Core Tor/Tor]: toggling DisableNetwork during bootstrap causes delay

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15713: toggling DisableNetwork during bootstrap causes delay
--+---
 Reporter:  mcs   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-wants |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by mcs):

 I cannot reproduce it using Tor v0.2.8.2-alpha (included with Tor Browser
 6.0a5). So I think this ticket can be closed. Has work been done in tor to
 fix this ticket as well as #15713? Or is this a case of miscellaneous
 fixes and architectural changes leading to some problems disappearing?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19128 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19128: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING
failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  High |  needs_information
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Blocker  |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-alpha|Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201605  |  0.2.8.2-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  needs_review => needs_information


Comment:

 weasel liked it; merging it to maint/release-0.2.8 and to master.  Putting
 this in needs_information: did we fix the bug?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17799 [Core Tor/Tor]: Hash All PRNG output before use

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17799: Hash All PRNG output before use
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_revision
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605, TorCoreTeam-  |Version:  Tor:
  postponed-201604, review-group-1   |  unspecified
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  asn  |  Actual Points:  5
 | Points:  5
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * points:  2 => 5
 * actualpoints:   => 5


Comment:

 Merged cpunk's patch as 71e55898438bcef88060d0d32fc4c6b31f2cc4aa.

 Fixed double-init in b6ec4d3a8ace6b49fb433f0d8e596c683ef6abee.

 Lowered mutex management in 6f12d0c3177f8aea706a3581ebf97f979a334858

 Fixed a never-actually-free-it bug in
 ac1b0027cdd5f261c21ff90f2648a5d2df179010

 Added glass-box tests in ce71dbfbccbc8c42739f2738fa8e01e9aa294675 and
 67f2154bc26917d70d57e43b7b543570395b2987.

 (The glass-box tests make sure all the deterministic parts work the way we
 would hope. They don't test that shake_prng_refill does exactly as it
 should, because that takes feedback from external RNGs.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19067 [Applications/Quality Assurance and Testing]: Create a testsuite bundle to provide an easy way for users to run the test suite

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19067: Create a testsuite bundle to provide an easy way for users to run the 
test
suite
-+-
 Reporter:  boklm|  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  task | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Quality Assurance and   |Version:
  Testing| Resolution:
 Severity:  Normal   |  Actual Points:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201605 | Points:
Parent ID:   |Sponsor:
 Reviewer:   |  SponsorU
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * sponsor:   => SponsorU


Comment:

 This is the ticket for the user-deployable automated Mac, Windows, and
 Linux testing SpnsorU item, right?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19135 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19135: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable
--+--
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Can you check prefs.js in the Old Firefox Data folder and see if it
 contains a setting for browser.disableResetPrompt? It should not contain
 that pref since the default value in Tor Browser 5.5.5 is
 browser.disableResetPrompt = true.

 I will attach a screenshot of the refresh prompt so you can consider
 whether it looks like what you saw. But as far as I can tell from looking
 at the code, the prompt should not appear unless (1) you click a button in
 a notification banner (which should not appear due to our pref settings)
 or (2) if it is invoked from a Mozilla page such as the following one:
  https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/refresh-firefox-reset-add-ons-and-
 settings
 (Tor Browser 6.0 will disable the capability to invoke functions like this
 from a web page).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19136 [Core Tor/Tor]: Crushed on Windows10 (Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha 9093e3769746742f)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19136: Crushed on Windows10 (Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha 9093e3769746742f)
--+
 Reporter:  user  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isis):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19137 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Prepare moving our MAR files to cdn.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19137: Prepare moving our MAR files to cdn.tpo
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)


Comment:

 Do we know what these tasks are? I guess it depends on how the CDN we are
 planning to use works, but as long as TLS key pinning is not broken the
 browser should not care where the update manifest and MAR files reside...
 I think.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19013 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities should log a more accurate message when reachability checks fail (was: Authorities shouldn't warn about reachability)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19013: Authorities should log a more accurate message when reachability checks
fail
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  logging easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+

Old description:

> Authorities log these messages even though they assume they are
> reachable:
> {{{
> May 10 01:31:46.000 [warn] Your server (52.27.2.173:8299) has not managed
> to confirm that its ORPort is reachable. Relays do not publish
> descriptors until their ORPort and DirPort are reachable. Please check
> your firewalls, ports, address, /etc/hosts file, etc.
> May 10 01:31:46.000 [warn] Your server (52.27.2.173:34237) has not
> managed to confirm that its DirPort is reachable. Relays do not publish
> descriptors until their ORPort and DirPort are reachable. Please check
> your firewalls, ports, address, /etc/hosts file, etc.
> }}}
>
> We should skip these messages for authorities, and any tors that are
> going to publish their descriptors anyway.

New description:

 Authorities check reachability even though they assume they are reachable:
 {{{
 May 10 01:31:46.000 [warn] Your server (52.27.2.173:8299) has not managed
 to confirm that its ORPort is reachable. Relays do not publish descriptors
 until their ORPort and DirPort are reachable. Please check your firewalls,
 ports, address, /etc/hosts file, etc.
 May 10 01:31:46.000 [warn] Your server (52.27.2.173:34237) has not managed
 to confirm that its DirPort is reachable. Relays do not publish
 descriptors until their ORPort and DirPort are reachable. Please check
 your firewalls, ports, address, /etc/hosts file, etc.
 }}}

 We should improve these messages for authorities.

--

Comment (by teor):

 Edited the summary and description to reflect the new purpose of the
 ticket.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19013 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities shouldn't warn about reachability

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19013: Authorities shouldn't warn about reachability
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Trivial   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  logging easy  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc, TorCoreTeam201605, logging => logging
 easy
 * priority:  Medium => Low
 * points:  1 => 0.2
 * severity:  Normal => Trivial
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final => Tor: 0.2.???


Comment:

 It's really not that severe, is it?

 All that happens is that authorities will test and report their own
 reachability:

 {{{
 [notice] Now checking whether ORPort (address redacted) and DirPort
 (address redacted) are reachable... (this may take up to 20 minutes --
 look for log messages indicating success)
 [info] consider_testing_reachability(): Testing reachability of my ORPort:
 (address redacted).
 }}}

 This might even be considered a feature - authorities on the public tor
 network should always have their reachability tests succeed, and chutney
 authorities set AssumeReachable, so they'll never see these messages.

 We should eventually fix up the log messages that are triggered when
 reachability testing fails:

 {{{
 [info] circuit_testing_failed(): Our testing circuit (to see if your
 ORPort is reachable) has failed. I'll try again later.
 [warn] Your server (address redacted) has not managed to confirm that its
 ORPort is reachable. Relays do not publish descriptors until their ORPort
 and DirPort are reachable. Please check your firewalls, ports, address,
 /etc/hosts file, etc.
 [warn] Your server (address redacted) has not managed to confirm that its
 DirPort is reachable. Relays do not publish descriptors until their ORPort
 and DirPort are reachable. Please check your firewalls, ports, address,
 /etc/hosts file, etc.
 }}}

 Really, all we need to do is choose between this message for relays:
 {{{
 Relays do not publish descriptors until their ORPort and DirPort are
 reachable. Please check your firewalls, ports, address, /etc/hosts file,
 etc.
 }}}
 and this message for authorities (auth_dir_any_non_hidserv()):
 {{{
 Authorities always publish directory documents, regardless of whether
 their ORPort and DirPort are reachable.
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12523 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Backport Firefox patch to mark JIT pages as non-writable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12523: Backport Firefox patch to mark JIT pages as non-writable
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  assigned
 Severity:  Normal   |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-firefox-patch, |Version:
  tbb-hardened, TorBrowserTeam201605 | Resolution:
Parent ID:  #12653   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-firefox-patch, tbb-hardened => tbb-security,
 tbb-firefox-patch, tbb-hardened, TorBrowserTeam201605
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Mozilla made progress on this and in order to enable that with `--non-
 writable-jitcode` we only need to backport https://hg.mozilla.org/mozilla-
 central/rev/a0dbf1fe665f. Seems to be worth for the next alphas at least.
 We might want to backport
 https://bugzilla.mozilla.org/show_bug.cgi?id=1234246 as well.

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[tor-bugs] #19138 [Core Tor/Tor]: Received extra server info (size 0)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19138: Received extra server info (size 0)
--+--
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 What is a size 0 server info?
 Should we mention it at all?
 {{{
 May 15 23:02:05.000 [info] connection_dir_client_reached_eof: Received
 extra server info (size 0) from server 'address redacted'
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16873 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add javadoc to metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16873: add javadoc to metrics-lib
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18746   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Replying to [comment:19 iwakeh]:
 > Currently, there are no links.
 this refers to package-info.java, the other pages are fine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16873 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add javadoc to metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16873: add javadoc to metrics-lib
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18746   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 I forgot:

 All links need a full package reference to work, e.g.
 `{@link org.torproject.descriptor.ServerDescriptor}`.
 Currently, there are no links.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18733 [Metrics/CollecTor]: contributor's guide incl. coding guidelines for java projects

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18733: contributor's guide incl. coding guidelines for java projects
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  task   | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18730 | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Maybe, after applying the patch. Could you already make the following
 changes to the javadoc task?

 It's along the lines of the metrics-lib javadoc:

 {{{
 
   
   
 
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16873 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add javadoc to metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16873: add javadoc to metrics-lib
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18746   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Wow! That was very fast!

 I still would like to read a little more of the javadoc.

 When looking (w/o reading much yet) at the resulting HTML:
 * we could add the copyright notice as footer
 * the usage pages are often helpful when getting acquainted with a new api
 * window title and
 * overview page title are missing.

 For these we need some more attributes in the javadoc task:
 {{{
   
 
 
   
 
   
 }}}

 It might be useful to introduce the `@since ` tags for all the
 documented methods?
 (as the java jdk does, there I really need it often when switching between
 java versions I only need to keep the latest doc around.)

 As said above; I'll get back to the javadoc content in another comment
 soon.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19013 [Core Tor/Tor]: Authorities shouldn't warn about reachability

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19013: Authorities shouldn't warn about reachability
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:  teor
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-rc,  |  0.2.8.2-alpha
  TorCoreTeam201605, logging | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:  1
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Any objection to delaying this till 0.2.9?  It doesn't seem severe.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19128 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19128: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING
failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  High |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Blocker  |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-alpha|Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201605  |  0.2.8.2-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19128 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19128: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING
failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  High |  accepted
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Blocker  |  0.2.8.x-final
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-alpha|Version:  Tor:
  TorCoreTeam201605  |  0.2.8.2-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted


Comment:

 (setting myself as owner here, but I will need others to work on this too
 to figure it out)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18934 [Core Tor/Tor]: test suite failures with expensive hardening.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18934: test suite failures with expensive hardening.
+
 Reporter:  weasel  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:  Tor: unspecified
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  review-group-1  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:  very-small
 Reviewer:  nickm   |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Applied; thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19130 [Core Tor/Tor]: Seg fault in round_int64_to_next_multiple_of()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19130: Seg fault in round_int64_to_next_multiple_of()
---+
 Reporter:  arma   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Critical   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201605  |  Actual Points:  .3
Parent ID: | Points:  .3
 Reviewer:  teor   |Sponsor:  SponsorS-can
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * severity:  Normal => Critical
 * actualpoints:   => .3
 * points:   => .3
 * sponsor:   => SponsorS-can
 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
 * keywords:   => TorCoreTeam201605


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19130 [Core Tor/Tor]: Seg fault in round_int64_to_next_multiple_of()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19130: Seg fault in round_int64_to_next_multiple_of()
--+
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed and applying to master.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16534 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Failed to remove debugging options in Firefox

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16534: Failed to remove debugging options in Firefox
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-security  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed
 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 Fixed by #18885.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19128 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19128: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING
failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Blocker  |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-alpha|  0.2.8.2-alpha
  TorCoreTeam201605  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 So, my branch `bug19128_028` has a fix for a dangling pointer bug related
 to this stuff.  But my problem is, I can't see how the dangling pointer
 bug might actually cause this particular symptom.  I say we try it anyway
 and keep looking.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13367 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rate limit gyroscope sampling frequency on FF mobile

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13367: Rate limit gyroscope sampling frequency on FF mobile
--+--
 Reporter:  mikeperry |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-security, tbb-mobile  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-security => tbb-security, tbb-mobile
 * cc: amoghbl1 (added)
 * severity:   => Normal


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19128 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19128: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING
failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Blocker  |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-alpha|  0.2.8.2-alpha
  TorCoreTeam201605  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by toralf):

 Replying to [comment:5 nickm]:
 > Okay; what does the stack trace look like now?
 {{{

 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] tor_assertion_failed_(): Bug:
 src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING failed;
 aborting. (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING failed in
 memwipe at src/common/crypto.c:3039. Stack trace: (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-
 dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(log_backtrace+0x55)
 [0x124a47f6d5] (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(tor_assertion_failed_+0x9c) [0x124a48f41c] (on Tor 0.2.8.2
 -alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(memwipe+0xbf)
 [0x124a4a450f] (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_cert_free+0x43)
 [0x124a3dfc63] (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(routerinfo_free+0xf5)
 [0x124a3c7a65] (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x8bb9d) [0x124a3c7b9d]
 (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(router_add_to_routerlist+0x75d) [0x124a3c93ad] (on Tor
 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(router_load_routers_from_string+0x183) [0x124a3cce23] (on Tor
 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x113cd4) [0x124a44fcd4]
 (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug:
 /usr/bin/tor(connection_dir_reached_eof+0x3c) [0x124a45076c] (on Tor
 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0xf2739) [0x124a42e739]
 (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(+0x40024) [0x124a37c024]
 (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug:
 /usr/lib64/libevent-2.0.so.5(event_base_loop+0x6dd) [0x389f854171d] (on
 Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(do_main_loop+0x235)
 [0x124a37d0c5] (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(tor_main+0x1b35)
 [0x124a380745] (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(main+0x2b) [0x124a3786ab]
 (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug:
 /lib64/libc.so.6(__libc_start_main+0x114) [0x389f723b734] (on Tor 0.2.8.2
 -alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 May 20 01:03:10.000 [err] Bug: /usr/bin/tor(_start+0x29)
 [0x124a3786f9] (on Tor 0.2.8.2-alpha-dev 684babee8491c3e9)
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17508 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Using FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks inlining of memcpy when comiling Tor Browser with ASan

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17508: Using FORTIFY_SOURCE breaks inlining of memcpy when comiling Tor Browser
with ASan
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tbb-hardened, ff45-esr-will-have  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * keywords:  tbb-hardened => tbb-hardened, ff45-esr-will-have
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Fixed in 6.0a5.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18904 [Obfuscation/meek]: Mac OS: meek-http-helper profile not updated

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18904: Mac OS: meek-http-helper profile not updated
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  mcs
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Obfuscation/meek |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605,  | Resolution:
  tbb-6.0-must   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Replying to [comment:10 dcf]:
 > Replying to [comment:9 gk]:
 > > The tor-browser-bundle one looks good to me and is applied to master
 (495885feb51d7f1faf6d4c0dc3dd8f47e9f1caa7). dcf could you review the meek
 part and create a new tag we can use?
 >
 > Yes but probably not until tomorrow.

 Ok. Just to give you some timeframe for planning: my current plan is to
 start the building for 6.0 next Tuesday, May 24, probably evening Europe
 time.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19128 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19128: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING
failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Blocker  |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-alpha|  0.2.8.2-alpha
  TorCoreTeam201605  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 I think I figured this one out.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16873 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add javadoc to metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16873: add javadoc to metrics-lib
-+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18746   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Good news: I'm even worse at estimating effort than I had thought.  Down
 to 0 points by now!

 Please review [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/karsten/metrics-
 lib.git/log/?h=task-16873 my branch task-16873] including the new code
 changes preceding the huge Javadoc commit.  That last commit is really
 big, so maybe it's sufficient to look at `package-info.java` (curious to
 hear what you think about the goals and non-goals stated there) and then a
 random subset of other interfaces/classes.

 Thanks in advance!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19128 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19128: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING
failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Blocker  |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-alpha|  0.2.8.2-alpha
  TorCoreTeam201605  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 Okay; what does the stack trace look like now?

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[tor-bugs] #19137 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Prepare moving our MAR files to cdn.tpo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19137: Prepare moving our MAR files to cdn.tpo
--+--
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 We want to have our MAR files on a CDN to reduce the load on our
 infrastructure. This ticket is for all the things the tbb-team needs to do
 to make that happen.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19135 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19135: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable
--+--
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by akrey):

 Basically yes, except that it was a popup, and not the bottom banner
 described there that I also know from plain firefox. Also, my browser was
 in use mostly every workday.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19131 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser Bundle Crash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19131: Tor Browser Bundle Crash
--+--
 Reporter:  eh|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  invalid
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => invalid


Comment:

 I am not sure what you are using but at least your tor (0.2.4.27) is way
 too old for a supported Tor Browser. Please download the latest version
 (on https://www.torproject.org/download/download-easy.html.en) and reopen
 the ticket with steps to reproduce your problem in case it persists.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19135 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19135: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable
--+--
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: mcs, brade (added)


Comment:

 So, you are basically seeing #16441 again, right?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19135 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19135: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable
--+--
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by akrey):

 See also: https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/refresh-firefox-reset-add-
 ons-and-settings

 I also have the 'Old Firefox Data' folder.

 The question is why firefox/tor browser would ''ask'' me to perform this.

 Also: https://support.mozilla.org/de/questions/1065438

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8185 [Core Tor/Tor]: circuit_package_relay_cell(): Bug: outgoing relay cell has n_chan==NULL. Dropping.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8185: circuit_package_relay_cell(): Bug: outgoing relay cell has n_chan==NULL.
Dropping.
-+-
 Reporter:  mr-4 |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_information
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  tor-relay, TorCoreTeam-  |Version:  Tor:
  postponed-201604   |  0.2.4.9-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:  isis |  Actual Points:
 | Points:  medium
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: user (added)


Comment:

 #19136 is a duplicate.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19136 [- Select a component]: Crushed on Windows10 (Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha 9093e3769746742f)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19136: Crushed on Windows10 (Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha 9093e3769746742f)
--+
 Reporter:  user  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #8185.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19135 [Applications/Tor Browser]: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19135: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable
--+--
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by akrey):

 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 Twitter pic is the same as the attachment.

 This was on Win7, TBB 5.5.x, custom install dir (I still have it). I have
 two more win7, one win8, one linux with tor browser, this happened to none
 of them.

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[tor-bugs] #19136 [- Select a component]: Crushed on Windows10 (Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha 9093e3769746742f)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19136: Crushed on Windows10 (Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha 9093e3769746742f)
--+
 Reporter:  user  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.1-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 [周五 5月 20 14:08:28 2016] Tor软件错误 - Tor 软件遇到了一个内部错误。请将
 下列错误信息通过 bugs.torproject.org 发送给 Tor 的开发者：
 “circuit_package_relay_cell(): Bug: outgoing relay cell sent from
 ../src/or/relay.c:706 has n_chan==NULL. Dropping. (on Tor 0.2.8.1-alpha
 9093e3769746742f)
 ”

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[tor-bugs] #19135 [- Select a component]: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19135: 'refresh tor browser' makes it inoperable
--+-
 Reporter:  akrey |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 On starting tor browser I got a dialog box asking me if I wanted to
 'refresh tor browser', or something similar. Unfortunately, I quickly said
 yes without making a screenshot.

 It seems to have removed all the plugins, including the one that starts
 tor underneath the browser. So I ended up with a broswer window without
 the noscript or tor button, and when I try to open anything I get an error
 because the proxy isn't there. (If I start a newly installed tor browser
 in parallel the old one will also access that tor instance as its proxy.)

 Browser window looks like
 https://twitter.com/akrey/status/733563836691685376/photo/1

 There is a similar refresh thing in stock firefox; I have no idea when and
 why it decides to aks whether you want that.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19128 [Core Tor/Tor]: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19128: Bug: src/common/crypto.c:3039: memwipe: Assertion sz < SIZE_T_CEILING
failed; aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  toralf   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Blocker  |Version:  Tor:
 Keywords:  must-fix-before-028-alpha|  0.2.8.2-alpha
  TorCoreTeam201605  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by toralf):

 This bug is unfortunately still present in latest origin/release-0.2.8
 from yesterday, so #19073 is a different bug.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19021 [Metrics/CollecTor]: improve configuration process

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19021: improve configuration process
---+
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip operation |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+

Comment (by iwakeh):

 Does the following topic from the RoadMap mean that Torperf data fetching
 will be obsolete in CollecTor then?
 {{{Take Torperf offline; karsten; 2016-09-30 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19131 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser Bundle Crash

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19131: Tor Browser Bundle Crash
--+--
 Reporter:  eh|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19130 [Core Tor/Tor]: Seg fault in round_int64_to_next_multiple_of()

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19130: Seg fault in round_int64_to_next_multiple_of()
--+-
 Reporter:  arma  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:  teor  |Sponsor:
--+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 `rounded_cells_seen` is now uint64_t but `rounded_onions_seen` is still
 int64_t. Shouldn't the later also be uint64_t?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18811 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Our first-party isolation patch incorrectly rejects blobs retrieved in workers

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18811: Our first-party isolation patch incorrectly rejects blobs retrieved in
workers
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_review
 Severity:  Normal   |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, |Version:
  tbb-6.0-must   | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by arthuredelstein):

 * status:  assigned => needs_review
 * keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605, tbb-6.0-must => ff45-esr,
 TorBrowserTeam201605R, tbb-6.0-must


Comment:

 Here's a patch to fix the problem.

 https://github.com/arthuredelstein/tor-browser/commit/18811+3
 94fa4b050a1252914c57e59c747d4c9342cdf2cb

 Unfortunately I had to resort to making the blob URL a special case to
 undo the Tor Browser regression caused by the Mozilla patch mentioned in
 the description. I considered various alternatives but didn't find a
 better solution -- at least the change here is localized. Mozilla is
 working on blob isolation using origin attributes, so hopefully a cleaner
 solution will emerge from that approach.

 The problem reported in this ticket was originally revealed by two failing
 tests in
 `./mach mochitest dom/base/test/test_tor_bug15502.html`

 After this patch is applied, the tests all pass.

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