Re: [tor-bugs] #19212 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SIGSEGV on particular website with developer tools open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19212: SIGSEGV on particular website with developer tools open
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 Two additional things:
 * For me (on Mac OS), the crash only occurs when the developer tools are
 open and the Network tab is active (although the game does not load in
 other cases; I always see a "Failed to download game data" message).
 * The crash still occurs when I set dom.indexedDB.enabled = true.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19212 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SIGSEGV on particular website with developer tools open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19212: SIGSEGV on particular website with developer tools open
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by mcs):

 I can also reproduce this on Mac OS. I am out of time for today, but I
 will attach a debugger session log for a debug build, where an assertion
 fails inside the JS interpreter.

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[tor-bugs] #19214 [Applications/Tor Browser]: After updating to TB 6.0.0, displayed search plugins reset

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19214: After updating to TB 6.0.0, displayed search plugins reset
-+-
 Reporter:  ironical |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tor browser search
 Severity:  Normal   |  plugin 6.0.0
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Tor Browser 6.0.0, Windows

 After opting for the update to 6.0.0 through the built-in update
 mechanism, my browser plugins were reset to the default set of plugins and
 my default search preference was also changed.

 The strange this is that my "old" search plugins are still there in the
 proper folder (\Browser\browser\searchplugins), and if I add a new search
 plugin from in-browser, it saves it to this same location, but the "old"
 ones are ignored.

 Any ideas? Thanks if you can help bringing them back!

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[tor-bugs] #19213 [Core Tor]: Build failure

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19213: Build failure
--+-
 Reporter:  bc348 |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 test.exe build error: undefined reference to sscanf
 (gcc 5.3.0 x86_64-w64-mingw32 with -flto enabled)

 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/tree/src/test/test_util.c#n4667]

 test/test_util.c line 4667:  int n = sscanf(contents, "%lu\n%c", ,
 );

 Need tor_sscanf

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18238 [Applications/Tor Browser]: remove unused code and strings from Torbutton

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18238: remove unused code and strings from Torbutton
-+-
 Reporter:  mcs  |  Owner:  brade
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  tbb-torbutton,   | Resolution:
  TorBrowserTeam201605R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mcs):

 * keywords:  tbb-torbutton, TorBrowserTeam201604 => tbb-torbutton,
 TorBrowserTeam201605R
 * status:  assigned => needs_review


Comment:

 Since some of this work is done, we should consider merging it for the
 upcoming alpha release. There are three commits on brade's bug18238-01
 branch that are ready for review, here:
 https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/brade/torbutton.git/log/?h=bug18238-01
 (please ignore the patches mentioned earlier in this ticket).

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18746 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: release descriptor 1.2.0

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18746: release descriptor 1.2.0
-+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  task | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 It's done, 1.2.0 is out.  Yay, thanks for all your help there!  Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16873 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add javadoc to metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16873: add javadoc to metrics-lib
-+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18746   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Great!  I just squashed commits and merged to master.  Thanks again!
 Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19051 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add benchmark code to metrics-lib test sources

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19051: add benchmark code to metrics-lib test sources
-+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18746   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * status:  merge_ready => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Thanks for looking!  Merged to master.  Closing.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19212 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SIGSEGV on particular website with developer tools open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19212: SIGSEGV on particular website with developer tools open
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: mcs (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19212 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SIGSEGV on particular website with developer tools open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19212: SIGSEGV on particular website with developer tools open
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-crash |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * priority:  Medium => Very High
 * cc: arthuredelstein, brade (added)
 * severity:  Normal => Critical
 * keywords:   => tbb-crash


Comment:

 A first look at it: this is due to one of our patches and it is already
 available on 6.0a5. Arthur/Mark/Kathy have any of you time to start
 working on this. I can continue tomorrow if you run out of time today.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19212 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SIGSEGV on particular website with developer tools open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19212: SIGSEGV on particular website with developer tools open
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Confirmed on Win 7:
 {{{
 Faulting application name: firefox.exe, version: 45.1.1.0, time stamp:
 0x
 Faulting module name: xul.dll, version: 45.1.1.0, time stamp: 0x
 Exception code: 0xc005
 Fault offset: 0x025f8a22
 }}}

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[tor-bugs] #19212 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SIGSEGV on particular website with developer tools open

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19212: SIGSEGV on particular website with developer tools open
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 System: linux 64bit (arch linux), gnome3, Tor browser 6.0

 Actions to reproduce:
 1) Open F12 tools (Network tab if it matters)
 2) Go to
 https://archive.org/details/a2_Zork_I_The_Great_Underground_Empire_1980_Infocom
 3) Click on the play button.
 4) After some downloads, the browser crashes.

 I've tested this with both the security slider on low as on medium-high
 and that changes nothing.
 I went ahead and downloaded the debug systems and got a backtrace in gdb,
 which I'll include.

 If there is anything else that I can help with, do let me know!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19186 [Applications/Tor Browser]: KeyboardEvents are only rounding to 100ms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19186: KeyboardEvents are only rounding to 100ms
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_review
 Severity:  Normal   |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |Version:
  TorBrowserTeam201605R  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by arthuredelstein):

 Replying to [comment:5 gk]:
 > Looks good to me. And if that has always been as your patch proposes
 then we probably won't have a ton of users coming to us complaining about
 broken websites/games/whatever.
 >
 > However, it bothers me a bit that we did not catch that earlier. Could
 we maybe have a test for that (a new ticket for it is fine)?

 Agreed. I posted regression tests at ticket:19193#comment:1.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18525 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser no longer shows message when screen is maximized

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18525: Tor Browser no longer shows message when screen is maximized
--+---
 Reporter:  cypherpunks   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---

Comment (by bugzilla):

 Seems to be fixed in TBB 6.0. But what about full screen and F11?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15279 [Applications/Tor Browser]: uMatrix & uBlock to Replace NoScript (and they're awesome)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15279: uMatrix & uBlock to Replace NoScript (and they're awesome)
--+--
 Reporter:  johnakabean   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  project   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Related: [ticket:17569 Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #11966 [Core Tor/Tor]: "Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus consensus" is a lie for bridge users

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#11966: "Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus consensus" is a lie for 
bridge
users
-+-
 Reporter:  arma |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_review
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.9.x-final
 Keywords:  tor-bridge, TorCoreTeam201605,   |Version:
  review-group-2 | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:  arma | Points:  1
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  needs_information => needs_review


Comment:

 Replying to [comment:13 dgoulet]:
 > One question. When we trigger the
 `BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_BRIDGE_DESC` control event, we do it in the
 circuit building function instead of the "requesting bridge desc" function
 which I assume is `directory_get_from_dirserver`.
 >

 So... what happens is that we just build a circuit to our bridge, without
 knowing it's key, and then we ask the bridge for the consensus. The bridge
 responds with its descriptor. Then, usually, because the scheduled events
 run we call `fetch_bridge_descriptors()` and the bridge gives us the
 descriptor again. ''Then'' we decide "oh, I actually have the bridge
 descriptor, now I can ask for the consensus again." When we ask for the
 consensus again, at this point is the first time that any of the code in
 `directory.c` is called, but never before that (because of this fumbling
 around that happens with fetching the bridge descriptor).

 However, if we were to trigger `BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_BRIDGE_DESC`
 in `fetch_bridge_descriptors`,  then it seems like we would want to make
 this event be at like 3% bootstrapped, because "15%" is "establishing an
 encrypted directory connection" where the "directory" in question is
 actually the bridge (for which we already have it's descriptor at this
 point, because the stupid fumbling) and the point that we get the
 descriptor is before `BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_CONN_DIR=5` (5%).

 > For instance, `BOOTSTRAP_STATUS_REQUESTING_DESCRIPTORS` is used when we
 realize we need more descriptors rather than when the circuit is built for
 that request. What if that onehop circuit never gets build, we won't know
 that it was because we requested a bridge descriptor?

 Ah. That is true.

 --

 Okay, there's an alternate version of the patch in my `bug11966_v2`
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/isis/tor.git/log/?h=bug11966_v2
 branch] and it does like this:

 {{{
 May 31 15:11:45.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 0%: Starting
 May 31 15:11:45.000 [notice] Delaying directory fetches: No running
 bridges
 May 31 15:11:46.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 3%: Asking for bridge
 descriptors
 May 31 15:11:46.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 5%: Connecting to directory
 server
 May 31 15:11:46.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 10%: Finishing handshake with
 directory server
 May 31 15:11:46.000 [notice] Learned fingerprint
 8F347C5673390E46642B06A7B1F4088B59437AD0 for bridge 127.0.0.1:5009.
 May 31 15:11:46.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 15%: Establishing an encrypted
 directory connection
 May 31 15:11:46.000 [notice] new bridge descriptor 'test009br' (fresh):
 $8F347C5673390E46642B06A7B1F4088B59437AD0~test009br at 127.0.0.1
 May 31 15:11:46.000 [notice] I learned some more directory information,
 but not enough to build a circuit: We have no usable consensus.
 May 31 15:11:47.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 20%: Asking for networkstatus
 consensus
 May 31 15:11:47.000 [notice] Bootstrapped 25%: Loading networkstatus
 consensus
 }}}

 (FWIW, I still like the 18% method better but I don't really care either
 way.)

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19043 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19043: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
-+-
 Reporter:  alec.heif|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_revision
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.???
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, |Version:
  0210-proposed  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  #17241   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet | Points:  3
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, sponsorr-0.2.10 => tor-hs, prop224,
 6.s194, 0210-proposed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17241 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement relay side support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17241: prop224: Implement relay side support
---+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 0210-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424 | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
---+---
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, sponsorr-0.2.10 => tor-hs, 0210-proposed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #17569 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser (was: Add UBlock Origin to the Tor Browser)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17569: Add uBlock Origin to the Tor Browser
--+--
 Reporter:  kernelcorn|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 +1 For bundling uBlock Origin with Tor Browser, great software (thanks
 gorhill).

 I'd suggest adding cached block lists to not have to download them on
 first run and to prevent users from having different block lists (to
 prevent fingerprinting).
 And disable the auto updating and only update when Tor Browser has a new
 uBlock Origin version or block lists.

 I already have uBlock Origin installed in my Tor Browser, because without
 it I think I'm less secure and potentially less anonymous with all those
 connections made to ad networks, big corporations. Since they have greater
 capability to correlate behavior etc.

 Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16702 [Core Tor/Tor]: Broken INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro circ bothers Tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16702: Broken INTRODUCE2 cell on an intro circ bothers Tor
--+
 Reporter:  s7r   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.7.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, 027-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  2
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
--+
Changes (by asn):

 * points:  1 => 2


Comment:

 Hard bug to catch!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17241 [Core Tor/Tor]: prop224: Implement relay side support

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17241: prop224: Implement relay side support
-+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  tor-hs, sponsorr-0.2.10  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #12424   | Points:
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+---
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  tor-hs => tor-hs, sponsorr-0.2.10
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final => Tor: 0.2.???


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19043 [Core Tor/Tor]: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19043: Implementation of prop224 ESTABLISH_INTRO cell
-+-
 Reporter:  alec.heif|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_revision
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.???
 Keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194, |Version:
  sponsorr-0.2.10| Resolution:
Parent ID:  #17241   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:  asn, dgoulet | Points:  3
 |Sponsor:
 |  SponsorR-must
-+-
Changes (by asn):

 * keywords:  tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194 => tor-hs, prop224, 6.s194,
 sponsorr-0.2.10
 * milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final => Tor: 0.2.???


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19051 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add benchmark code to metrics-lib test sources

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19051: add benchmark code to metrics-lib test sources
-+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18746   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 The benchmark should be added as is, b/c this was the way the initial
 comparison was made.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16873 [Metrics/metrics-lib]: add javadoc to metrics-lib

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16873: add javadoc to metrics-lib
-+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh   |  Owner:  karsten
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  merge_ready
 Priority:  Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/metrics-lib  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18746   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  needs_review => merge_ready


Comment:

 I think is is well done and should be released.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19206 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SOCKS isolation should include a process identifier.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19206: SOCKS isolation should include a process identifier.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:2 arthuredelstein]:
 > Another possible option would be to use a random string per first-party
 domain (such as a random UUID for the password). That would mean we don't
 have to obtain the PID.

 This would work as well, obtaining enough randomness to ensure collisions
 are unlikely is dirt cheap, and I assume changing the new circuit for site
 behavior to simply re-randomize is easy enough.

 Is there any advantage to this behavior being configurable (beyond
 https://xkcd.com/1172/)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript places WebM videos too late behind click-to-play in higher security levels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19210: NoScript places WebM videos too late behind click-to-play in higher
security levels
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  defect   |  team
 Priority:  High | Status:  new
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Major|Version:
 Keywords:  tbb-regression, tbb-security-slider  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 Upon further inspection I realized click-to-play is partially working;
 When requested directly, audio and video resources make a get request for
 every 5 seconds of media. The first segment loads fine, the second is then
 blocked by click-to-play.

 I'm not sure if splitting media into 5 second segments is new behavior,
 but that would explain the weirdness.

 The noscript changed that I referred to in the comment is this:
 
https://github.com/avian2/noscript/commit/2b7bd12752f4d2e4dd0e38290820e707585d6385.
 I would expect for resources requested directly to load without being
 blocked. My guess is that the second segment doesn't originate from
 chrome:.

 If I'm correct then the severity for this ticket should be lowered, and
 the summary rewritten.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #15254 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enable hidden-service statistics by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15254: Enable hidden-service statistics by default
-+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, stats, 027-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  6
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+---
Changes (by asn):

 * points:   => 6


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Re: [tor-bugs] #15254 [Core Tor/Tor]: Enable hidden-service statistics by default

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#15254: Enable hidden-service statistics by default
-+---
 Reporter:  dgoulet  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  tor-hs, stats, 027-backport  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:  SponsorR-must
-+---
Changes (by asn):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Hidden service statistics are a reality. No doubt about that:
 https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-frac-reporting.html
 https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-rend-relayed-cells.html
 https://metrics.torproject.org/hidserv-dir-onions-seen.html

 I'm going to close this ticket now.

 Please open a new ticket for any concerns or security issues with current
 statistics!

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[tor-bugs] #19211 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Ctrl+Shift+U shortcut on GTK systems does not work with focus on textboxes

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19211: Ctrl+Shift+U shortcut on GTK systems does not work with focus on 
textboxes
--+---
 Reporter:  gk|  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  tbb-usability
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+---
 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-60-released#comment-183119
 reports that our new circuit shortcut is not as universally usable as we
 thought. :(

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[tor-bugs] #19210 [Applications/Tor Browser]: NoScript places WebM videos too late behind click-to-play in higher security levels

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19210: NoScript places WebM videos too late behind click-to-play in higher
security levels
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor |Version:
  Browser|   Keywords:  tbb-regression, tbb-
 Severity:  Major|  security-slider
Actual Points:   |  Parent ID:
   Points:   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 If setting the security slider to medium-low or a higher level WebM videos
 start to play but are stopped shortly thereafter by NoScript's click-to-
 play feature. Expected is that they don't start playing at all until the
 user has confirmed that. Reported in our blog:
 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-60-released#comment-183099.

 As an example test with: http://ftp.acc.umu.se/pub/debian-meetings/2016
 /mini-debconf-vienna/webm/Debian_Installer_for_Novena.webm the video
 starts and a short time later NoScript kicks in.

 https://blog.torproject.org/blog/tor-browser-60-released#comment-183106
 suggests that this happened in earlier versions, too, although rarely.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18937 [Applications/Tor Browser]: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18937: What's new (bugs) in Tor Browser 6.0a5 -- April 28 2016
--+--
 Reporter:  bugzilla  |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by bugzilla):

 In TBB 6.0:
 {{{
 Failed to load module
 resource://gre/modules/devtools/WebConsoleUtils.jsm.1 XPCOMUtils.jsm:279:0
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18291 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Don't use libfaketime anymore for building the Firefox part of Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18291: Don't use libfaketime anymore for building the Firefox part of Tor 
Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  defect   |  team
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_revision
 Severity:  Normal   |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff45-esr,|Version:
  TorBrowserTeam201605, GeorgKoppen201605| Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-gitian, ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, GeorgKoppen201605
 => tbb-gitian, ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605, GeorgKoppen201605
 * status:  needs_review => needs_revision


Comment:

 Thanks. One thing I think we should keep are notes about which parts of
 our toolchains (and our other artifacts even if they are not exposed in
 the sha256sums.txt) are still not reproducible. This might make debugging
 issues in the future easier and leaves the ToDos obvious. Parts of the
 comment in the Windows gitian-utils descriptor could be resurrected for
 that. I know GCC is affected, too, and I bet clang as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18845 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Make zip and tar helpers generate reproducible archives without relying on libfaketime

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18845: Make zip and tar helpers generate reproducible archives without relying 
on
libfaketime
---+---
 Reporter:  boklm  |  Owner:  boklm
 Type:  enhancement| Status:
 Priority:  Medium |  needs_review
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser   |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal |Version:
 Keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201605R  | Resolution:
Parent ID: |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer: | Points:
   |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by gk):

 * keywords:  tbb-gitian, TorBrowserTeam201605 => tbb-gitian,
 TorBrowserTeam201605R
 * status:  needs_revision => needs_review


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18925 [User Experience/Website]: Add instructions for removing the code signing parts of OS X bundles

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18925: Add instructions for removing the code signing parts of OS X bundles
-+--
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  User Experience/Website  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  TorBrowserTeam201605 |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by gk):

 I've thought about this a bit and here are the requirements I came up
 with:

 1) We should build .dmg files as we are doing now for our QA. One idea was
 to create .dmg files only after signing the packages to make the whole
 process less burdensome. But that would leave us without testing the step
 where users get Tor Browser out of the .dmg container on their computer.

 2) We have scripts for checking the Authenticode signatures and the MAR
 files signatures to make sure we did not miss a file while signing and
 stripping the signatures is reproducible. We should have a script for
 checking signed .dmg files as well.

 3) We should provide instructions for removing code signing parts *on* OS
 X systems as well.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18884 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Rip Firefox Hello Beta / Loop extension in ESR45 based Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18884: Rip Firefox Hello Beta / Loop extension in ESR45 based Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  gk   |  Owner:
 Type:  task |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  High | Status:  closed
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Major|Version:
 Keywords:  ff45-esr, TorBrowserTeam201605R, | Resolution:  fixed
  tbb-6.0-must   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  needs_review => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Looks good to me. And given that this feature is not enabled in Tor
 Browser anyway we can put it into 6.0.1 too. Commit
 61a4d57b1cc573b85baef431b277149cbf740c74 and
 9a9765a3cb73e7341b7c2494c167725b4f688c07 on tor-browser-45.1.1esr-6.0-1
 have the fixes.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19186 [Applications/Tor Browser]: KeyboardEvents are only rounding to 100ms

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19186: KeyboardEvents are only rounding to 100ms
-+-
 Reporter:  arthuredelstein  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   |  arthuredelstein
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_review
 Severity:  Normal   |  Milestone:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting,  |Version:
  TorBrowserTeam201605R  | Resolution:
Parent ID:   |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:   | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by gk):

 Looks good to me. And if that has always been as your patch proposes then
 we probably won't have a ton of users coming to us complaining about
 broken websites/games/whatever.

 However, it bothers me a bit that we did not catch that earlier. Could we
 maybe have a test for that (a new ticket for it is fine)?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13313 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Enable bundled fonts in Tor Browser

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13313: Enable bundled fonts in Tor Browser
-+-
 Reporter:  dcf  |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  enhancement  |  team
 Priority:  Medium   | Status:  closed
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  Milestone:
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting-fonts,| Resolution:  fixed
  tbb-5.0a4, TorBrowserTeam201507R   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18097   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by lissacoffey):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 DirectWrite is one of two font rendering APIs used on Windows (the other
 is GDI). It doesn't quite work yet. The system fonts are not loaded, and
 bundled fonts are loaded. But all text is rendered as squares, even in
 browser chrome—except, curiously, Georgian text. [http://qwikfix.co.uk
 /sky-contact-number/ this] ticket attempts to solve an orthogonal problem,
 which is that it is possible to enumerate the system fonts installed on a
 user's machine.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18361 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18361: Issues with corporate censorship and mass surveillance
--+--
 Reporter:  ioerror   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Critical  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  security, privacy, anonymity  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:  None
--+--

Comment (by lissacoffey):

 When tied with [http://www.fixithere.net/sky-contact-number/ calling sky],
 it seems like a basic analytics problem to enumerate users and most sites
 visited in a given session.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12994 [Internal Services/Service - dist]: deb.torproject.org archive signing key expired

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12994: deb.torproject.org archive signing key expired
--+
 Reporter:  TorAmateurDev |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Internal Services/Service - dist  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by lissacoffey):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I have same problem :-( Subkey expired. It was fresh install.

 pi@raspberry ~/debian-packages $ gpg -v --list-keys
 gpg: using PGP trust model
 /home/pi/.gnupg/pubring.gpg

 
 gpg: NOTE: signature key 219EC810 expired Fri 29 Aug 2014 15:21:21 UTC
 pub   2048R/886DDD89 2009-09-04 [expires: 2016-08-28]
 uid  deb.torproject.org archive signing key
 sub   2048R/219EC810 2009-09-04 [expired: 2014-08-29]

 Thanks
 http://qwikfix.co.uk/sky-customer-services/

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Re: [tor-bugs] #21 [Mixminion-Client]: generate-surb closes stdout, breaks 'mixminion shell'

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#21: generate-surb closes stdout, breaks 'mixminion shell'
--+
 Reporter:  weasel|  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Low   |  Milestone:
Component:  Mixminion-Client  |Version:  0.0.6
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  Fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by lissacoffey):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 [http://www.faqtory.co/sky/ http://www.faqtory.co/sky/]

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Re: [tor-bugs] #16423 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor relay dies with: Assertion pol->magic == EWMA_POL_DATA_MAGIC failed; aborting.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#16423: tor relay dies with: Assertion pol->magic == EWMA_POL_DATA_MAGIC failed;
aborting.
-+-
 Reporter:  ewma |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  High |  needs_information
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.???
 Keywords:   |Version:  Tor:
  relay,OpenBSD,026-backport,025-backport,027-backport|  0.2.5.12
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:
 |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by Luis.lr):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 027-backport añadido

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19206 [Applications/Tor Browser]: SOCKS isolation should include a process identifier.

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19206: SOCKS isolation should include a process identifier.
--+--
 Reporter:  yawning   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: gk (added)


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Re: [tor-bugs] #13786 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 4.5-alpha-1 and custom proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13786: Tor Browser 4.5-alpha-1 and custom proxy settings
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks-duplicate |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  closed
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 This should be fixed by #16917.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #13786 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor Browser 4.5-alpha-1 and custom proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#13786: Tor Browser 4.5-alpha-1 and custom proxy settings
--+--
 Reporter:  cypherpunks-duplicate |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  High  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by gk):

 * cc: ThomasMan (added)


Comment:

 Resolved #18981 and #19062 as duplicates.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #18981 [Applications/Torbutton]: Torbutton breaks http proxy settings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18981: Torbutton breaks http proxy settings
+---
 Reporter:  TomasMan|  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


Comment:

 Duplicate of #13786.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19062 [Applications/Torbutton]: To restore usabillty of http proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19062: To restore usabillty of http proxy
+
 Reporter:  TomasMan|  Owner:
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18981  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 Duplicate of #13786.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19062 [Applications/Torbutton]: To restore usabillty of http proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19062: To restore usabillty of http proxy
+--
 Reporter:  TomasMan|  Owner:
 Type:  task| Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18981  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * resolution:  fixed =>


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19062 [Applications/Torbutton]: To restore usabillty of http proxy

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19062: To restore usabillty of http proxy
+---
 Reporter:  TomasMan|  Owner:
 Type:  task| Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Torbutton  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:  duplicate
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  #18981  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+---
Changes (by gk):

 * status:  reopened => closed
 * resolution:   => duplicate


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19180 [Core Tor/Tor]: Add new compiler warnings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19180: Add new compiler warnings
--+--
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.???
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  029-proposed  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 The following change in 54610f721d66c41280e64674c27869eca381f059 got
 caught in the float suffix removal. The tests are not affected by it, but
 IMO it's still an erroneous change.

 {{{
 diff --git a/src/test/test_channeltls.c b/src/test/test_channeltls.c
 index f5fa50c..3a73c77 100644
 --- a/src/test/test_channeltls.c
 +++ b/src/test/test_channeltls.c
 @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ test_channeltls_create(void *arg)
channel_t *ch = NULL;
const char test_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {
  0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a,
 -0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14 };
 +0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14 };

(void)arg;

 @@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ test_channeltls_num_bytes_queued(void *arg)
channel_t *ch = NULL;
const char test_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {
  0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a,
 -0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14 };
 +0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14 };
channel_tls_t *tlschan = NULL;
size_t len;
int fake_outbuf = 0, n;
 @@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ test_channeltls_overhead_estimate(void *arg)
channel_t *ch = NULL;
const char test_digest[DIGEST_LEN] = {
  0x01, 0x02, 0x03, 0x04, 0x05, 0x06, 0x07, 0x08, 0x09, 0x0a,
 -0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0f, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14 };
 +0x0b, 0x0c, 0x0d, 0x0e, 0x0, 0x10, 0x11, 0x12, 0x13, 0x14 };
double r;
channel_tls_t *tlschan = NULL;
 }}}

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19207 [Core Tor/Tor]: Received http status code 504

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19207: Received http status code 504
+-
 Reporter:  chftthtorrelay  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|Version:
 Severity:  Normal  | Resolution:
 Keywords:  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:  | Points:
 Reviewer:  |Sponsor:
+-
Changes (by cypherpunks):

 * component:  - Select a component => Core Tor/Tor


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