Re: [tor-bugs] #19767 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19767: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump
+--
 Reporter:  RainerSchmidt   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Major   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Keywords:  Solaris, regression, crash  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  |  Actual Points:  .3
 Reviewer:  | Points:  0.2
|Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by RainerSchmidt):

 I'm not an expert, I tried the fix described above as follows, but it
 didn't work:
   git clone ​https://git.torproject.org/nickm/tor.git
 After downloading I checked the README and because there is no
 "./configure" I used:
   sh autogen.sh
 but this gave the warnings/errors in the attached log: tor_git.log.

 I'm not an expert in building/compiling SW with git (in the past I used
 download source and ./configure).
 So please help to get it working.
 Thanks.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19781 [- Select a component]: proxy settings and black bar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19781: proxy settings and black bar
--+--
 Reporter:  f451022   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  HTTPS-E 3.3
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.6.7
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by alexander):

 * version:   => Tor: 0.2.6.7
 * milestone:   => HTTPS-E 3.3


Comment:

 Replying to [ticket:19781 f451022]:
 > if you are on windows and change something in the proxy configuration,
 one black bar that usually forms is not more generated, I do not
 understand what the relationship of one thing with another else could be
 affected by other settings as well which could give more information on
 the user's screen.

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[tor-bugs] #19783 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Typo in build helpers: `MAXOSX_DEPLOYEMENT_TARGET`

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19783: Typo in build helpers: `MAXOSX_DEPLOYEMENT_TARGET`
--+--
 Reporter:  dcf   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 build-helpers/i686-apple-darwin11-g++ and build-helpers/i686-apple-
 darwin11-gcc have a typo:
 {{{
 -DMAXOSX_DEPLOYEMENT_TARGET=10.6
 }}}
 There are actually two bugs: `MAXOSX` not `MACOSX` and `DEPLOYEMENT` not
 `DEPLOYMENT`.

 Since this define has probably never had an effect, I suppose it can be
 removed.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8725 [Applications/Tor Browser]: resource:// URIs leak information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8725: resource:// URIs leak information
-+-
 Reporter:  holizz   |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  defect   |  team
 Priority:  Very High| Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_review
 Severity:  Major|  Milestone:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-rebase-  |Version:
  regression, tbb-testcase, tbb-firefox-patch,   | Resolution:
  TorBrowserTeam201607R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by yawning):

 Replying to [comment:40 mikeperry]:
 > 1. I think it *might* have been better to use http-on-modify-request
 here rather than both the content policy and the response listener, but
 you might also not have as much information there about the source content
 url. Maybe this doesn't matter so much, since what we really want is a
 direct Firefox patch. The extra observers will have a perf cost, though.

 The CSP is required because `http-on-modify-request` events dont' fire for
 `recourse://` urls, unfortunately.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove a fallback directory in 0.2.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19782: Remove a fallback directory in 0.2.8
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  fallbacks |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  0.1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by teor):

 * status:  new => needs_review


Comment:

 Please see my branch bug19782 on https://github.com/teor2345/tor.git

 It comments-out the fallback in the hardcoded list, and moves it from the
 whitelist to the blacklist so we don't include it in future releases.

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[tor-bugs] #19782 [Core Tor/Tor]: Remove a fallback directory in 0.2.8

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19782: Remove a fallback directory in 0.2.8
--+
 Reporter:  teor  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.8.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.2-alpha
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:  fallbacks
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  0.1   |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+
 An operator just told me they are taking down their fallback directory. So
 I need to comment it out in the 0.2.8 fallback_dirs.inc file, and move it
 from the whitelist to the blacklist.

 The fingerprint is 08DC0F3C6E3D9C527C1FC8745D35DD1B0DE1875D.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Round down DNS TTL to the nearest DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30 minutes)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19769: Round down DNS TTL to the nearest DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30 minutes)
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.???
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, dns,   | Resolution:
  TorCoreTeam201607  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by pulls):

 We have ongoing research on DNS-based traffic correlation attacks
 (https://nymity.ch/dns-traffic-correlation/) that relates to this. While
 fixing #19025 will help in mitigating attacks to an extent, the most
 important change to consider related to DNS is to also significantly
 increase MIN_DNS_TTL. This is because useful domains for our attacks today
 have low TTLs: about 50% of Alexa top 1M have a useful domain with TTL <=
 60 seconds, and 75% a TTL <= 30 min. Do you think it would be practical to
 have MIN_DNS_TTL set to, say, 30 min? Would too much break?

 If I understand the proposal here in #19769, rounding TTLs between
 [0s,30m) to MIN_DNS_TTL also for exits (?), then this will actually
 benefit an attacker who can observe both entry traffic and DNS requests
 for about 25% of Alexa top 1M (but for the remaining 25% it's an
 improvement together with #19025 over the status quo).

 Sorry if this is the wrong place for this, especially since we don't have
 a paper to share yet.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #8725 [Applications/Tor Browser]: resource:// URIs leak information

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#8725: resource:// URIs leak information
-+-
 Reporter:  holizz   |  Owner:  tbb-
 Type:  defect   |  team
 Priority:  Very High| Status:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser |  needs_review
 Severity:  Major|  Milestone:
 Keywords:  tbb-fingerprinting, tbb-rebase-  |Version:
  regression, tbb-testcase, tbb-firefox-patch,   | Resolution:
  TorBrowserTeam201607R  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * cc: boklm (added)


Comment:

 Couple points:

 1. I think it *might* have been better to use http-on-modify-request here
 rather than both the content policy and the response listener, but you
 might also not have as much information there about the source content
 url. Maybe this doesn't matter so much, since what we really want is a
 direct Firefox patch. The extra observers will have a perf cost, though.
 2. Given that we want to replace this by a direct patch, we should turn
 arthur's https://arthuredelstein.github.io/tordemos/resource-locale.html
 into a Tor Browser test of some kind to verify that future versions behave
 the same way. Boklm, can you handle that? Also, please add a test for
 https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/8725#comment:38 about the
 nested schemes. We should test that too.

 Otherwise, I think this is OK, and I agree it is an improvement. For now,
 I will merge this into the torbutton master branch for TBB 6.5-alpha,
 since it may shake a few more issues loose.

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[tor-bugs] #19781 [- Select a component]: proxy settings and black bar

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19781: proxy settings and black bar
--+-
 Reporter:  f451022   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 if you are on windows and change something in the proxy configuration, one
 black bar that usually forms is not more generated, I do not understand
 what the relationship of one thing with another else could be affected by
 other settings as well which could give more information on the user's
 screen.

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[tor-bugs] #19780 [- Select a component]: make about:tor more userful

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19780: make about:tor more userful
--+-
 Reporter:  f451022   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 If you have any probema with the configurations of proxy or something, the
 page about:tor could tell it instead to give a friendly message, which
 could confuse or mislead a layman or distracted User, I think just the
 Torbutton logo not enough.

 It's like a joke that "You are now free to browse the Internet
 anonymously.".

 In the logo should be changed.

 Of course sometimes it if possible, and only a suggestion, perhaps an
 alert can serve what can not and be as "friendly" as well.

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[tor-bugs] #19779 [- Select a component]: new identy shortcut don't work with toggle tools

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19779: new identy shortcut don't work with toggle tools
--+-
 Reporter:  f451022   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 new identy shortcut don't work with toggle tools.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19025 [Core Tor/Tor]: Exit relays always return DNS TTL 60 to tor clients

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19025: Exit relays always return DNS TTL 60 to tor clients
-+-
 Reporter:  phw  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:
 Priority:  Medium   |  needs_revision
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  Milestone:  Tor:
 Severity:  Normal   |  0.2.???
 Keywords:  dns, TorCoreTeam201607,  |Version:  Tor:
  029-proposed   |  0.2.8.2-alpha
Parent ID:   | Resolution:
 Reviewer:   |  Actual Points:
 | Points:  0.5
 |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by phw):

 Replying to [comment:2 teor]:
 > phw, do you want to do the changes file? Do you want to do #19769?
 > I'm happy to do either.

 Please go ahead.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: replace disconnect with duckduckgo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19735: replace disconnect with duckduckgo
--+--
 Reporter:  f451022   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by f451022):

 I think it would be a good alternative since two of the three options
 disconnect.me return to duckdcuckgo, and the one who does not return does
 not bring good results

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: replace disconnect with duckduckgo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19735: replace disconnect with duckduckgo
--+--
 Reporter:  f451022   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--

Comment (by f451022):

 an alternative to the case, with its requirements of deficiencies
 javscript would return to the startpage

 it had some changes since ceased to be standard, and also brings a good
 experience with javascript

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19753 [Applications/Tor Browser]: Tor browser does not respond when dragged

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19753: Tor browser does not respond when dragged
--+---
 Reporter:  Dbryrtfbcbhgf |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+---
Changes (by mcs):

 * cc: brade, mcs (added)
 * status:  new => needs_information


Comment:

 Thank you for filing this ticket. Unfortunately, I do not have a 10.12
 system. Can you provide some more information:
 * Does this problem occur on Mac OS 10.11?
 * Does it occur with Firefox 45 ESR on your 10.12 system?

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[tor-bugs] #19778 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Bridge descriptor sanitizer runs out of memory after 13.5 days

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19778: Bridge descriptor sanitizer runs out of memory after 13.5 days
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  High   |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 I'm currently reprocessing the bridge descriptor archive for #19317.  The
 process, started with `-Xmx6g` on a machine with 8G RAM, ran out of memory
 after 13.5 days.  I uploaded the custom log with additional debug lines
 for the currently processed tarball here:
 https://people.torproject.org/~karsten/volatile/collector-
 bridgedescs.log.xz (556K).

 While writing tests for #19755, I noticed a possible explanation, though I
 don't have facts to prove: `BridgeSnapshotReader` contains a `Set
 descriptorImportHistory` that stores SHA-1 digests of files and single
 descriptors to skip duplicates as early as possible.  Its effect can be
 seen in log lines like this, which comes from reprocessing 1 day of
 tarballs:

 {{{
 2016-07-28 11:54:31,206 DEBUG o.t.c.b.BridgeSnapshotReader:215 Finished
 importing files in directory in/bridge-descriptors/.  In total, we parsed
 87 files (skipped 9) containing 24 statuses, 33984 server descriptors
 (skipped 168368), and 29618 extra-info descriptors (skipped 50027).
 }}}

 I don't know a good way to confirm this theory other than running the
 process once again for a few days and logging the size of that set.  I
 also tried attaching `jvisualvm` last time, but for some reason that
 detached and froze after 90 hours.

 Possible fixes:
  - Use some kind of least-recently-used (or maybe least-recently-inserted
 if that's easier to implement) cache that allows us to skip duplicates in
 tarballs written on the same day or so.  There's no harm in reprocessing a
 duplicate, it just takes more time than skipping it.  Needs some testing
 to get the size right, though it seems from the log above that 100k
 entries might be enough.
  - Avoid keeping a set and instead start the sanitizing process until we
 know enough about a descriptor to check whether we wrote it before.  That
 would mean computing the SHA-1 digest and parsing until reaching the
 publication time.  In early tests this increased processing time by factor
 1.2 or 1.3, and even more processing time is not exactly what I'm looking
 for.
  - Are there other options, ideally ones that are easy to implement and
 maintain?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19735 [Applications/Tor Browser]: replace disconnect with duckduckgo

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19735: replace disconnect with duckduckgo
--+--
 Reporter:  f451022   |  Owner:  tbb-team
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Applications/Tor Browser  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  tbb-usability |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+--
Changes (by mikeperry):

 * keywords:   => tbb-usability
 * owner:   => tbb-team
 * component:  - Select a component => Applications/Tor Browser


Comment:

 I was going to switch this for the release next week, but I realized that
 DuckDuckGo does not automatically handle the Javascript-disabled case.

 In my ideal world, we would replace Disconnect with a search engine that
 provided a javascript experience for users with javascript enabled, but
 automatically fell back to the HTML version if javascript was disabled.

 As for the hidden service being the default or not, I am leaning towards
 not, for the following reasons:

 1. For medium-high security Tor Browser users, they will get the non-
 Javascript version of the hidden service, since it is not https. I think
 the right answer here is an EV cert for the HS (which will also help with
 user confusion).
 2. It's not clear that the duckduckgo .onion is using SingleOnionServices,
 OnionBalanace, and other optimizations that are likely needed to handle
 our full userbase.

 I may still switch the default search to the javascript HTTPS version of
 DuckDuckGo in the meantime for the 6.5 alpha, though.

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[tor-bugs] #19777 [Core Tor/Tor]: tor-gencert should warn nicely when PEM passphrases are too short

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19777: tor-gencert should warn nicely when PEM passphrases are too short
--+-
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:  gencert
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 If you do `$ ./src/tools/tor-gencert --create-identity-key` and then give
 a horribly insecure passphrase like "tor" as the passphrase to the PEM
 certificate, tor-gencert will give this rather cryptic error message:

 {{{
 Jul 28 18:46:45.709 [err] Couldn't write identity key to
 ./authority_identity_key
 Jul 28 18:46:45.710 [err] crypto error while Writing identity key:
 problems getting password (in PEM routines:PEM_def_callback)
 Jul 28 18:46:45.710 [err] crypto error while Writing identity key: read
 key (in PEM routines:DO_PK8PKEY)
 }}}

 It would be nice if instead it just said "I require a passphrase with a
 minimum of 8 characters!" or something like that.

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[tor-bugs] #19776 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Make minor improvements to scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19776: Make minor improvements to scheduler
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 While running some local performance tests of the bridge descriptor
 sanitizer I noticed a few possible improvements:

  - I noticed that the default configuration changed some paths, like, move
 multiple directories under `out/`.  Can we undo that change, so that
 CollecTor uses the exact same paths in the new default configuration as
 previously?

  - The `recent/` directory is not truly configurable.  I can change that
 along with the other bugfixes to the bridge descriptor sanitizer, if you
 want.

  - It seems like the scheduler calculates how many minutes it needs to
 sleep from the current system time to start the next run with `x` minutes
 offset from the period of `y` minutes.  Example: system time is
 20:43:15.123, period is 60 minutes, offset is 44 minutes, the scheduler
 will start the next run at 20:44:15.123, but really it should start it at
 20:44:00.000.

  - Can we add a mode to run a given module immediately, skipping the
 scheduler entirely?  That would be quite useful for testing, batch-
 processing, and maybe other purposes.  Onionoo has such a mode with
 `--single-run` (or however it's called).  But please don't break the
 design too much to make this work, if it's too ugly, skip this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19437 [Metrics/Onionoo]: Find more reliable and universal way to get ASN and ASorg mappings

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19437: Find more reliable and universal way to get ASN and ASorg mappings
-+-
 Reporter:  twim |  Owner:
 Type:  project  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/Onionoo  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  asn, as, geoip, maxmind, bgp,|  Actual Points:
  organisations, diversity   | Points:
Parent ID:   |Sponsor:
 Reviewer:   |
-+-

Comment (by cypherpunks):

 pyasn's ASnumber->name mapping source (​http://www.cidr-
 report.org/as2.0/autnums.html) isn't as good as maxmind or
 http://thyme.apnic.net/current/data-used-autnums
 currently

 I filed a feature request to consider APNIC data as well:
 https://github.com/hadiasghari/pyasn/issues/30

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17434 [Core Tor/DocTor]: DocTor should understand the shared randomness protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17434: DocTor should understand the shared randomness protocol
-+--
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DocTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--

Comment (by dgoulet):

 Here is some information about what DocTor should look for:

 https://storm.torproject.org/shared/nFWmJv7iSzzek1goqARb7IySKvkdIvKFFBYOjunDTSa

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Re: [tor-bugs] #17434 [Core Tor/DocTor]: DocTor should understand the shared randomness protocol

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#17434: DocTor should understand the shared randomness protocol
-+--
 Reporter:  asn  |  Owner:  atagar
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  reopened
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  Core Tor/DocTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+--
Changes (by dgoulet):

 * status:  closed => reopened
 * type:  defect => enhancement
 * resolution:  user disappeared =>
 * parent:  #16943 =>


Comment:

 This has been merged to dir-spec.txt and moria1 has started to make commit
 so I'm reopening this so we can have it running _before_ dirauth start to
 upgrade to 029.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19775 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Upgrade polyanthum to Debian jessie

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19775: Upgrade polyanthum to Debian jessie
--+
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  task  | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:  1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by isis):

 * status:  new => closed
 * resolution:   => fixed


Comment:

 weasel and I did this this afternoon.

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[tor-bugs] #19775 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Upgrade polyanthum to Debian jessie

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19775: Upgrade polyanthum to Debian jessie
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  task  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 Related to #19235 and #18237.

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[tor-bugs] #19774 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: bridges.torproject.org could use a favicon

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19774: bridges.torproject.org could use a favicon
--+--
 Reporter:  isis  |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Very Low  |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB  |Version:
 Severity:  Minor |   Keywords:  ux, easy
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:  1 |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+--
 It doesn't have one. It could. I don't particular care what it is, but a
 little bridge or a little onion might be cute.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #12030 [Obfuscation/BridgeDB]: Create a DatabaseManager for interacting with BridgeDB's database backends

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#12030: Create a DatabaseManager for interacting with BridgeDB's database 
backends
-+-
 Reporter:  isis |  Owner:  isis
 Type:  enhancement  | Status:  new
 Priority:  High |  Milestone:
Component:  Obfuscation/BridgeDB |Version:
 Severity:  Normal   | Resolution:
 Keywords:  bridgedb-db, bridgedb-dist,  |  Actual Points:
  bridgedb-1.0.x, proposal-226, isis2015Q1Q2,| Points:
  isisExB, isisExC   |Sponsor:
Parent ID:   |
 Reviewer:   |
-+-
Changes (by isis):

 * severity:   => Normal


Comment:

 I've been working on this over the past few weeks. A prototype of this
 work is available in my `feature/12310-database-manager` branch, however
 it is not yet ready for merge.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19772 [HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere: Chrome]: CNET videos won't load w/ https and uBlock Origin & Chrome

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19772: CNET videos won't load w/ https and uBlock Origin & Chrome
-+-
 Reporter:  cwr64|  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere:   |Version:
  Chrome | Resolution:
 Severity:  Normal   |  Actual Points:
 Keywords:   | Points:
Parent ID:   |Sponsor:
 Reviewer:   |
-+-

Comment (by f451022):

 google chrome are not responsable of tor project, and also, tor and chrome
 are not a good combination, you are not anonimous and not private

 0. have an enormous fingerprint

 1. chrome have some tecnologies like a anti phishing what send all the
 links you visit to Google and etc..

 I recommendo switch to default a tor browser setup or use Chromium

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[tor-bugs] #19773 [- Select a component]: fwsbbbbbbbbbbbb

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19773: fws
--+-
 Reporter:  polo  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:
Component:  - Select a component  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal|   Keywords:
Actual Points:|  Parent ID:
   Points:|   Reviewer:
  Sponsor:|
--+-
 vvdbfrgrdsegfd

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19720 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19720: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  new => assigned


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Re: [tor-bugs] #18865 [Metrics/CollecTor]: actively monitor resources like available storage space

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#18865: actively monitor resources like available storage space
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


Comment:

 Please review
 [https://gitweb.torproject.org/user/iwakeh/collector.git/commit/?h=task-18865
 -monitor-available-space=0717e62542b4498b46c63f84890b8cc731faabbb this
 branch].

 Currently, the check is only added to ArchiveWriter. Where else should it
 go?

 I didn't make the limit configurable, as the properties file is really big
 already and the space needed depends on the download and will be the same
 for all instances. But, if there is a good reason for adding it to the
 configuration that's not a big deal.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19767 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19767: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump
+--
 Reporter:  RainerSchmidt   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Major   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Keywords:  Solaris, regression, crash  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  |  Actual Points:  .3
 Reviewer:  | Points:  0.2
|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => needs_review


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[tor-bugs] #19772 [HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS Everywhere: Chrome]: CNET videos won't load w/ https and uBlock Origin & Chrome

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19772: CNET videos won't load w/ https and uBlock Origin & Chrome
-+-
 Reporter:  cwr64|  Owner:  jsha
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:
Component:  HTTPS Everywhere/HTTPS   |Version:
  Everywhere: Chrome |   Keywords:
 Severity:  Normal   |  Parent ID:
Actual Points:   |   Reviewer:
   Points:   |
  Sponsor:   |
-+-
 Running current Chrome browser on current W10 desktop.  When BOTH HTTPS
 AND Ublock Origin are enabled, the CNET videos at
 http://www.cnet.com/videos/facebook-messenger-tips-
 tricks/?ftag=CAD-04-10aac3a will not load.  If I turn off BOTH HTTPS AND
 uBlock Origin, the videos load OK.  Turning off either HTTPS or uBlock
 Origin by themselves does not allow the videos to load.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19767 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19767: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump
+--
 Reporter:  RainerSchmidt   |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect  | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Major   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Keywords:  Solaris, regression, crash  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  |  Actual Points:  .3
 Reviewer:  | Points:  0.2
|Sponsor:
+--
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted
 * actualpoints:   => .3


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19767 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19767: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump
+--
 Reporter:  RainerSchmidt   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Major   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Keywords:  Solaris, regression, crash  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:  | Points:  0.2
|Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 > I don't think we can break a platform.

 Well, it apparently isn't a platform that anybody tested 0.2.8 on at any
 time in the last 5 months. So I'm not sure it's a good idea to apply any
 patch here without a lot of testing, or to hold up the 0.2.8.6 release for
 all the platforms whose users _did_ test one of the alphas.

 That said, I've tried to fix up the warnings in a branch called
 "solaris_warnings_028" in my public git repository at
 https://git.torproject.org/nickm/tor.git .  If the file_offset_bits issue
 is causing the crash, I hope this will fix that.  Please review and test?

 I worry that these changes might break compilation on other platforms.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19767 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19767: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump
+--
 Reporter:  RainerSchmidt   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Major   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Keywords:  Solaris, regression, crash  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:  | Points:  0.2
|Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 This warning appears 25 times.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19720 [Metrics/CollecTor]: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19720: CollecTor should be re-configurable without restart
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0 => CollecTor 1.0.0


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19767 [Core Tor/Tor]: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19767: Solaris, compile warning: "_FILE_OFFSET_BITS" redefined and core dump
+--
 Reporter:  RainerSchmidt   |  Owner:
 Type:  defect  | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium  |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor|  0.2.8.x-final
 Severity:  Major   |Version:  Tor: 0.2.8.5-rc
 Keywords:  Solaris, regression, crash  | Resolution:
Parent ID:  |  Actual Points:
 Reviewer:  | Points:  0.2
|Sponsor:
+--

Comment (by nickm):

 It looks like we need include orconfig.h before we include anything that
 includes feature_tests.h.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19169 [Metrics/CollecTor]: verify, correct and extend runtime statistics

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19169: verify, correct and extend runtime statistics
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0 => CollecTor 1.1.0


Comment:

 balancing milestones.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #2966 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Include bridge country codes in sanitized bridge descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#2966: Include bridge country codes in sanitized bridge descriptors
---+---
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_information
 Priority:  Low|  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+---
Changes (by karsten):

 * milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0 =>


Comment:

 Unassigned from milestone, because of all the uncertainty with getting a
 good design for this.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19317 [Metrics/CollecTor]: Sanitize TCP ports in bridge descriptors

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19317: Sanitize TCP ports in bridge descriptors
---+-
 Reporter:  karsten|  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by karsten):

 * milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0 => CollecTor 1.1.0


Comment:

 Moving to 1.1.0, because we'll want to add tests (#19755) before making
 this change.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19755 [Metrics/CollecTor]: improve code quality of bridgedescs module

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19755: improve code quality of bridgedescs module
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  enhancement| Status:  needs_review
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.1.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-

Comment (by karsten):

 Pushed more tests to the same branch to increase line coverage to 86%.  I
 think I can't go much above that, and I expect a few untested lines to go
 away in the refactoring process.  I'd say we're good to make changes now.
 And look at all the TODOs I added to the test file for bugs to be fixed...

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19578 [Core Tor/Tor]: Incorrect log message on mismatch ownership in check_private_dir

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19578: Incorrect log message on mismatch ownership in check_private_dir
--+
 Reporter:  nickm |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect| Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:|  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #18902| Points:  .1
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * owner:   => nickm
 * status:  new => accepted
 * points:   => .1
 * actualpoints:   => .1


Comment:

 I think I got it actually fixed in the branch as merged. Thanks!

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19578 [Core Tor/Tor]: Incorrect log message on mismatch ownership in check_private_dir

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19578: Incorrect log message on mismatch ownership in check_private_dir
---+
 Reporter:  nickm  |  Owner:  nickm
 Type:  defect | Status:  closed
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor   |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:  fixed
 Keywords:  TorCoreTeam201607  |  Actual Points:  .1
Parent ID:  #18902 | Points:  .1
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+
Changes (by nickm):

 * status:  accepted => closed
 * keywords:   => TorCoreTeam201607
 * resolution:   => fixed


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19762 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor systemd service should have ReadWriteDirectories=/var/run/tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19762: Tor systemd service should have ReadWriteDirectories=/var/run/tor
--+
 Reporter:  candrews  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  systemd   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19761 [Core Tor/Tor]: Tor systemd service should have RuntimeDirectory=tor

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19761: Tor systemd service should have RuntimeDirectory=tor
--+
 Reporter:  candrews  |  Owner:
 Type:  defect| Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  systemd   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19759 [Core Tor/Tor]: systemd tor.service hardening: add MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19759: systemd tor.service hardening: add MemoryDenyWriteExecute=true
--+
 Reporter:  candrews  |  Owner:
 Type:  enhancement   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium|  Milestone:  Tor: 0.2.9.x-final
Component:  Core Tor/Tor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal| Resolution:
 Keywords:  systemd   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:| Points:
 Reviewer:|Sponsor:
--+
Changes (by nickm):

 * milestone:   => Tor: 0.2.9.x-final


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Re: [tor-bugs] #19769 [Core Tor/Tor]: Round down DNS TTL to the nearest DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30 minutes)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19769: Round down DNS TTL to the nearest DEFAULT_DNS_TTL (30 minutes)
-+-
 Reporter:  teor |  Owner:
 Type:  defect   | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium   |  Milestone:  Tor:
Component:  Core Tor/Tor |  0.2.???
 Severity:  Normal   |Version:
 Keywords:  029-proposed, dns,   | Resolution:
  TorCoreTeam201607  |  Actual Points:
Parent ID:   | Points:  0.5
 Reviewer:   |Sponsor:
-+-

Comment (by nickm):

 So, clients don't do DNS cacheing by default any more, because of risks
 like this.  Do you think it might make more sense to simply remove client-
 side DNS cacheing entirely?

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19771 [Metrics/CollecTor]: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19771: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's
scheduler
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect | Status:  assigned
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords: |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+-
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * status:  new => assigned


Old description:

> Affected is the current HEAD of the master branch.
>
> The scheduling of the updateindex was stopped w/o any exception/warning
> whatsoever.
>
> Positive about this is that the other scheduled task were not affected.
>
> First steps:
>
> 1. add some logging to threads of the thread-pool
> 2. maybe, use other ways to study this behavior
> 3. implement a solution based on the facts found in the steps above.

New description:

 Affected is the current HEAD of the master branch.

 The scheduling of updateindex was stopped w/o any exception/warning
 whatsoever.

 Positive about this is that the other scheduled tasks were not affected.

 First steps:

 1. add some logging to threads of the thread-pool
 2. maybe, use other ways to study this behavior
 3. implement a solution based on the facts found in the steps above.

--

Comment:

 fixed typos, assigned.

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[tor-bugs] #19771 [Metrics/CollecTor]: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's scheduler

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19771: investigate halt of scheduling for one of many tasks in collector's
scheduler
---+-
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect | Status:  new
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal |   Keywords:
Actual Points: |  Parent ID:
   Points: |   Reviewer:
  Sponsor: |
---+-
 Affected is the current HEAD of the master branch.

 The scheduling of the updateindex was stopped w/o any exception/warning
 whatsoever.

 Positive about this is that the other scheduled task were not affected.

 First steps:

 1. add some logging to threads of the thread-pool
 2. maybe, use other ways to study this behavior
 3. implement a solution based on the facts found in the steps above.

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Re: [tor-bugs] #19170 [Metrics/CollecTor]: make parsing more robust (extra-info)

[Tor Bug Tracker & Wiki]

#19170: make parsing more robust (extra-info)
---+--
 Reporter:  iwakeh |  Owner:  iwakeh
 Type:  defect | Status:  accepted
 Priority:  Medium |  Milestone:
Component:  Metrics/CollecTor  |Version:
 Severity:  Normal | Resolution:
 Keywords:  ctip   |  Actual Points:
Parent ID: | Points:
 Reviewer: |Sponsor:
---+--
Changes (by iwakeh):

 * milestone:  CollecTor 1.0.0 =>


Comment:

 Removed milestone setting, b/c this topic might have to be addressed in
 metrics-lib first.
 Leave the component setting unchanged for now.

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